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ABSTRACT 
The concept of personal autonomy as an educational ideal is 
analysed from its etymological roots of autos and nomos. The autos 
is shown to be most closely associated with authenticity and this 
concept is explored from existentialist roots. Authenticity's 
points of contact with reason are examined and the authentic 
individual is shown to be a deep, reflective evaluatorof his own 
motives but existentialist radical choice of self is shown to be 
essentially incoherent. The nomos is linked to reason and the 
criteria it picks out. The limits upon reason are considered but 
its significance to personal autonomy is shown to be considerable; 
reason is argued to embrace feeling and a dimension of practical 
reason. The adjecti ve, pe rsona I, is not redundant wi th in pe rsona I 
autonomy as an educational ideal and is held to have significant 
moral implications for autonomy. A Millian analysis of the 
'endowment' of a person is considered and perspectives from both 
developmental psychology and an ancient tradition embracing persons 
and virtues are shown to relate to autonomy. 
The second part of the thesis considers the relationship of 
personal autonomy to three related concepts in education: authority, 
freedom and paternalism and pOints of contact are clarified. The 
final part examines a place for personal autonomy within educational 
activities in schools. It is argued that personal autonomy should be 
exercised in school-based education as its exercise is the only sure 
way to develop it. Therefore a perspective of education as a series 
of practices in which the learner should be enabled to engage 
exerCising a measure of personal autonomy is the theme of the final 
part. However, the purpose of the thesis is a clarification of 
fundamentals; it does not purport to present a curriculum for 
personal autonomy. 
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Introduction 
It seems generally agreed among those who have written about 
personal autonomy that authenticity is an integral part of that 
autonomy 1 and it is my central aim in this chapter to analyse and 
determine the place of authenticity within personal autonomy. The 
etymological roots of the term, authenticity, are in the Greek, 
authentes, and, therefore, direct attention to the nature and 
implications of the autos and the personhood within the individual's 
personal autonomy, rather than to the nature of the nomos which 
informs, in part, its autos. (Consideration is given to the autos 
and the concept of a person in Chapter 3.) An object thought to be 
authentic is regarded as fundamentally genuine and in no way 
conterfeit or spurious; it is the object in its original, first-
hand state - thus an authentic portrait by Leonardo is one painted 
by that artist from life and properly ascribed to him. The object 
is truly what it pertains to be, therefore, good faith, sincerity 
and truth are implicit attributes in authenticity. 
When used in connection with individual persons, authenticity 
applies to the autos or self and expresses itself in individual 
subjecti vi ty and awareness: II ••• we must regard a person as the 
unique ground of thought ..• in the sense that he has a 
circumspective understanding of his situation infused by his present 
concerns. 1I2 The individual is taken to be not only an institutional 
role-player but also a self-constituted in his own right and shaped 
in accordance with his own thought and action in practices in which 
he engages. His authenticity may be identified within the three 
cri teria of autonomy presented by Dearden: II (1) that he fonns his 
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own judgements on what to think or do; (2) that he is disposed 
critically to reflect on his own first-order judgements; and 
(3) that he is disposed to integrate his actual belief and conduct 
round these first-order and reflective judgements. 113 
Authenticity, then, should express what the individual really 
thinks, feels and is; it should express the nature of the IIreal ll 
self; the individual pursues authenticity by seeking to know himself 
in order to remove himself from inauthentic being. An individual 
may occupy many institutionally defined roles, but he remains only 
one true or real self which is wholly genuine and reliable as the 
expression of what he is; at root, he has, as Polonius advises his 
son, but one self to which he must be true. 
Nevertheless, all persons live, in some measure, within a 
social world and in defining their relationships with other 
individuals, groups or society at large, they may deceive themselves 
about the situations in which they operate. Sartre's description 
of bad faith illustrates self-deception: the woman who cannot admit 
to herself the implications of a man's advances and the waiter who 
loses himself in his role are two Sartrean examples. Even personal 
sincerity does not escape the threat of bad faith, in Sartre's view, 
because, II Tota I , constant sincerity as a constant effort to adhere 
to oneself, is by nature a constant effort to dissociate oneself 
from oneself. 114 Thus a teacher making an exposition to a class may 
convince himself that their qUiet, apparently attentive manner shows 
they are learning what he intends. Only time will tell whether his 
construction of the situation is only self-deception. 
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In Section 1 of this chapter, authenticity is first outlined 
within existentialism with particular reference to Heidegger and 
Sartre; existentialist thought has been a major influence upon 
psychiatric medicine and holds considerable implications for the 
individual. Some criticisms of existentialist authenticity are 
examined in Section 2, but authenticity has implications for 
education and social life in general, therefore its connection of 
the individual to the world of others is explored and maintained. 
Section 3 describes the relation of authenticity and reason and 
pOints to some limits of reason. Authentic choice is the subject 
of Section 4; the incoherence of existentialist radical choice is 
described and the concept of evaluation by the individual is held 
to be more meaningful in relation to choice. Section 5 draws some 
tentative implications for education from authenticity as a 
preliminary to Part 3 which argues for opportunity for individual 
authenticity within autonomy as part of educational practices. 
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(1) Existentialist authenticity 
Dearden accepts that the preoccupations of existentialists 
are important in clarifying the concept of personal autonomy: IISuch 
preoccupations include resistance to unthinking acceptance of 
social norms, the search for a kind of personal salvation from 
absorption in collectives, and the important role of choice and 
uecision, in defining one as an individual. .. 5 He considers that 
Heidegger's perspective of authenticity is that of personal 
autonomy but lacking a nomos such as reason in Dearden's own analysis. 
However, authenticity is linked with the autos and the etymological 
origins of the concept reveal connection with authentes and the self. 
The concept of authenticity is not,itself, expressive of a nomos. 
the absence of which from their concept of authentiCity Dearden 
arraigns Heidegger (and Sartre). Indeed, where these existentialists 
lay claim to a nomos subsumed within their description of authenticity, 
they must, because of the difference in meaning between the terms 
authentiCity and autonomy, be overstating the case. But Dearden, 
in turn, by equating personal autonomy and authenticity diminishes 
the significance of the latter because it lacks a nomos rooted in 
rational criteria. And although a nomos grounded in reason should 
not be undervalued, individual authentiCity may not only be a 
reflection of that rationality; an investigation of existentialist 
authenticity may give substance to this contention. 
Heidegger in his unfinished work, Being and Time, and Sartre 
in Being and Nothingness are presenting ontologies; they are concerned 
to elucidate the nature of Being. Heidegger, preceding Sartre, 
writes out of an ancient philosophic tradition from the Greeks and 
mediaeval philosophy and sees himself, perhaps, as a phenomenologist 
7 
in this old tradition of philosophic enquiry. There seems also 
to be Nietzschean influence in the emphasis upon authenticity in 
Being and Time. Heidegger writes to explore Being as the "most 
universal" concept which he describes as Oasein, Being - there or 
perhaps most simply translated as human being: 
"Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we 
must make an entity - the inquirer - transparent in his 
own Being. The very asking of the question is an 
entity's mode of Bting; and as such it gets its essential 
character from wha 1S inquired about - namely, Being. 
This entity which each of us is himself and which includes 
inquiry as one of the possibilities of its Being, we 
shall denote by the term 'Oasein'." 6 
Dasein is the whole of the person; it expresses the unity and 
centrality of man in connection to the nature of Being. Thus man 
is not to be analysed into separate elements - cognitive, affective, 
psycho-motor functions etc. - man or Dasein 'is' and is to be 
regarded as a whole. But there are many aspects of Being: history, 
nature, space, life, Oasein, language ••. are some examples - all 
are combined in Being. Therefore in whatever way Being operates, 
it remains wholly the Being itself. Studies based upon an analysis 
of human knowledge - history, mathematics etc. - are considered 
incoherent in themselves; only by a process of hermeneutic 
.. -._-----
phenomenological inquiry can Being be identified within such 
material. Thus Being, or Oasein, seeks understanding of itself and 
lives through itself in attempting an existential analysis of 
itself so that it may express an understanding of itself; the 
world, things about us, may only be understood through Dasein and 
the expression of things which Dasein makes in language. 
Man is, then, a Being in the world. When he meets things in 
that world there must be some difference and distance between them; 
8 
Dasein, as the expression of Being-there (in the world) only exists 
in the sense in which it reaches and is aware of those things. 
Heidegger's analogy of the tree contrasts the peasant whose care 
and association with the tree will, perhaps, centre on the harvest 
it may yield; the artist cares for the colour, tones and lines which 
the object presents to his perspective; the boy's care is for the 
tree as an adventure in climbing or as excitement at the prospect 
of surreptitious scrumping. The reality of what the tree is would 
be something apart from the subjective illumination which different 
perspectives provide; it would be akin, as a concept, to a Platonic 
Form. The tree as an object present-at-hand in the world is retained 
by Heidegger as significant because of the care and concern it 
generates for the individual and the same feeling may be attributed 
to living creatures and, indeed, to persons; for example, Billy's 
care for his hawk, Kes, irradiates his existence. 
Much of Dasein' s existence is "fallen". Being falls into the 
world of the everyday and this condition of lIeverydayness" Heidegger 
associates with inauthenticity akin to a state of heteronomy. It is 
a condition in which Casein can lose itself in apparent safety in 
the world of others and its individuality is immersed in that of 
mankind as a whole. In Sartre's Being and Nothingness, a person who 
escapes into bad faith wishes not to realise the freedom of Being-
for-itself, hence there follows the hiding of oneself in roles and 
the deceiving of oneself as to others' intentions. 7 Being-with-
others enhances the power of those others: 
"One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their 
power. 'The Others' whom one thus deSignates in order 
to cover up the fact of one's belonging to them essentially 
oneself, are those who proximally and for the most part 
'are there' in everyday Being-wi th-one-another. The "who" 
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is not this one, not that one, not onself, not some 
people and not the sum of them all. The "who" is the 
neuter, the "they "." 8 
Being-with-one-another dissolves the individual's Dasein into the 
Being which is that of IThe Others I. These disappear as meaningful, 
individual and distinct and become IItheyll; we, as individuals, are 
submerged in what "they" do, think, say .•• "We take pleasure and 
enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see and judge about 
literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back 
from the Igreat mass l as they shrink back; we find 'shocking
' 
what 
they find shOCking.,,9 IIThey" are the ones always responsible -
never me. And many, particularly school pupils, offer as an intended 
justification for thoughtless acts the statement that others did it 
too. Being is "levelled down" to the average - lIan existential 
characteristic of the 1 They"', so that; "Everyone is the other, and 
no one is himself. 1I1O And so II one's way of Being is that 
of inauthenticity and failure to stand by one's Self." 11 Everydayness 
makes inauthenticity the normal mode of existence. Words and 
language are just talk; truth and originality are submerged in 
inauthenticity. Activity, filling every minute of every day is 
just escape, or IIfalling" into an inauthentic mode of Being and is 
a result of what Being has allowed itself to do in choosing a mode 
of existence. 
The attainment of authenticity involves Dasein "brought before 
itselfll, escaping the reassuring inauthenticity of mindless 
conformi ty: 
"If Dasein discovers the world in its own way and 
brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own 
authentic Being, then this discovery of the 'world ' and 
this disclosure of Dasein are always accomplished as a 
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clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, as a 
breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars 
its own way. II 12 --
Dasein is brought before itself by a meod of 'angst', anxiety -
perhaps better translated as dread or uneasiness. It is to escape 
from this painful experience that Dasein retreats into inauthentic 
Being, but when able to face anxiety Dasein faces a lack of 
foundation to human existence. It is eventually conscience which 
recalls man from inauthenticity to authenticity. Flight into 
inauthenticity is to escape thoughts of the limited time left to his 
temporal existence; the growing imminence of his death which is the 
only time that man establishes completeness of his identity with 
himself stimulates conscience. To reach authenticity is not simply 
that the individual attains facility with rational criteria with 
which to judge his position in the world. To possess himself 
authentically is more an expression of mood, feeling and awareness 
which the individual applies and in attaining authenticity it is 
tacitly acknowledged that persons act and think on grounds which are 
largely not based on rational criteria - choosing friends, liking 
or disliking people etc. Dasein is IIthrownll into authenticity, in 
Heidegger's analysis, to attain a II moment of vision ll in the 
realisation of the nature of itself by leaving behind the usual, 
that which is taken for granted in the world. In reflection, the 
individual escapes the everydayness of the largely meaningless hustle 
and bustle of the day to day to attain that lucid vision of the 
authentic nature of his Being; at that point he is himself. IIAuthentic 
existence can begin only when we have realised and thoroughly 
understood what we are. lI13 Each person is fulfilled as himself and 
holds onto his own priorities and purposes and so, as his own 
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authentic self, can then realise his potential in the world. The 
authentic individual should never conform unthinkingly to the second 
hand. He gains a realisation of the passage of time in an historical 
perception of past, present, future. Time passes in instants and 
each instant could be the moment of authentic realisation which 
characterises Oasein. The individual realises himself by choice of 
the authentic in himself, in the sense of a radical choice of self 
to which Sartre refers and which is discussed in Section 4 below. 
Heidegger and Sartrels concept of the authentic individual is 
one which vests that individual with the power to change his life and 
the nature of his Being. The future is his to realise as he chooses 
within the limits of his "facticity", the factualcircumstances in 
which he is. If he is born a slave. for example, he has the 
authentic capability to change that aspect of his life by winning 
his freedom, by escaping, even by death - if escape is an imperative 
to his authentic realisation of himself. Both Heidegger and Sartre 
place great weight upon the responsibility of the individual in his 
relation to the world, which is a relationship in which, " ... it is 
no longer possible to draw a distinction between cognition, emotion 
and will. 1114 An affective core exists within the personality which 
influences the direction of an individual IS cognition, it seems. 
Sartre imposes a major responsibility upon the individual to 
control his own situation in the world and goes so far as to deny 
impl ications of the "gi venness II of the world: " ••• everyth i ng 
which happens to me is mine ••• the situation is mine because it is 
the image of my free choice of myself, and everything it presents 
to me is mine in that this represents me and symbolizes me. Is it 
not I who decide the coefficient of adversity in things and even 
their unpredictability by deciding myself,"15 Thus a war in which 
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I am mobilized is my war because I do not get out of it and for 
failing to do this, I am to be considered as having chosen it. 
Human reality has 110 excuses, in Sartre's view; it carries this 
most heavy burden of responsibility. 
(2) Authenticity and others 
If authenticity is to be a meaningful concept illuminating 
the autos of autonomy, it must hold meaning in terms of the 
individual's relationship to the world of others. Heidegger's 
reference to the realisation of authenticity in a "moment of vision" 
which does not necessarily last for more than a moment and Sartre's 
emphasis upon the individual's capacity to create the world as his 
own and reject the objective givenness of it seem to leave the 
person separated from the world of others. He seems to be placed 
in a situation of withdrawal from the world of others in order to 
experience that sense of his own being which Heidegger calls 
authenticity; the implication seems to be akin to that of a mystical-
religious experience in which there is no god. Indeed, if this 
were to be the nature of existential authenticity it would carry 
little weight with regard to implications for education, for example. 
InauthentiC existence is devaluing because the individual is 
just lost in the crowd; he loses himself in conformity and is 
unable to express himself authentically. But existentialism 
emphasises care and concern as the individual's link to the world. 
The example of the tree cited above and the reactions it might arouse 
link that object to persons. If nothing matters to the individual 
and his response is merely automatic and stereotyped, he will always 
sink into an unthinking conformity. He will 'go through the motions' 
but he will not see the point of things for himself. He will just 
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not care. No school pupil will work to the best (norm referenced) 
standard of which he is capable, in. for example, intellectual 
learning unless he cares enough about it and it matters to him; it 
may, however, be more appropriate for him to seek to express his 
authenticity in work related to a criterion referenced target. Such 
things matter to pupils who care for themselves for without self-
concern there may be little chance of concern for things, 
achievements, or. indeed, other persons. 
Authenticity involves the caring for things to which values 
are attributed from the individual's cognitive and affective self. 
Dearden describes two values, "implicit in Being and Time ll : 1I •.• the 
courage wh ich is needed to face the truth about our si tuation, and 
the freedom from illusion which the knowledge of that truth brings. 1I16 
Such values articulate both our care for the world and for ourselves 
and Heidegger sees them as expressions of whole persons - not only 
as rational expression but as mood produced from emotion as well as 
reason. The authenticity of a mode of existence in its relatedness 
to the world is described in literary examples by Trilling 17 using 
Wordsworth's poem: Resolution and Independence. For no reason the 
poet's joyful mood changes -
IIBut, as it sometimes chanceth, from the might 
Of joy in minds that can no further go, 
As high as we have mounted in delight 
In our dejection do we sink as 10w;1I 18 
and he encounters an aged leech-gatherer scraping a bare living in a 
rough. hazardous natural environment. In this loneliness, the 
stark authenticity of the old man's existence seizes the poet's mind 
and imagination. Similarly in Michael, the old shepherd losing 
his only, much beloved son, Luke, to the IIdissolute city", went 
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many a day to the sheepfold to which Luke had laid the corner-stone 
as a covenant between them, "And never lifted up a single stone.,,19 
Michael's grief is so intense that it is authentically part of his 
being in his relationship with his son through the symbolism of the 
unfinished sheepfold. 
Such care does not preclude reason and care is expressed in 
valuable human activities through the intrinsic value which such 
activities express; "Every valuable form of human activity depends 
on the exercise of a certain degree and kind of carefulness, 
whether it be courage as distinct from foolhardiness, love as 
distinct from casual sexuality, science, art, literature .•• 1120 
Such activities attach an lIintrinsic" carefulness to themselves and 
to gain rational understanding to care for them may well involve 
some conscious limits placed upon some more spontaneous reaction. 
But, eventually, a learner, having been careful of his reasoning in 
an intellectual activity, for example, should reach a point of 
authenticcally orienting himself to his subject. Dearden21 instances 
the student who learns what views have been expressed on a topic and 
who sets these out effectively and logically in an essay but the 
question still remains as to what he may think about the topic 
himself. That final crucial step towards an authentic understanding 
of rational knowledge should involve more than rationality in the 
individual in order for him to draw that authentiC conclusion. 
Existentialism has its critics concerning its implications 
for a world containing other persons, however; Dearden sees little 
purpose in attaining an lIauthentic condition ll partly because the 
. d· . d Iff . I I· f 1122 In IVI ua remains, IIdetached from any orm 0 SOCIa 1 e ... 
Suber writes, scornfully, of Heidegger as, II •.. the man who knows 
15 
real life only in communication with himself ... Heidegger isolates 
from the wholeness of life the realm in which man is related to 
himself, since he absolutizes the temporally conditioned situation 
of the radically solitary man, ... 1123 Waterhouse also offers strong 
criticism of Heidegger and Sartre's version of authenticity in its 
omiSSion of a social dimension: "My history is a history of action 
and interaction with others; I could not be as I am now without 
this formative interaction with other people.,,24 
This argument is persuasive; the language we use is socially 
derived; we are not just isolated self-concepts. We are social 
animals and acquire our culture and attitudes from others. The 
individual whose authenticity is submerged in 'bad faith' may only 
be judged to be in 'bad faith' in terms of the nature of relation-
ships with other persons. Hence a person authentic in himself, in 
Sartre's analysis, could only be so in terms of his social 
relationships. Inauthenticity is defined by the person losing 
himself in a socially defined role. Thus, Heidegger's IImoment of 
vision ll in which the individual realises his authentiCity is, in 
Waterhouse's view, some kind of withdrawn, self-indulgence because 
the social world is, " ••. the only possible forum for the realization 
of meaningful authenticity, that it is only in terms of our 
relationships with others that we can be either authentiC or 
inauthentic, and that the attempt to realize authenticity as purely 
a mode of self-relatedness is vacuous. 1I25 
However, we are not only that which others would have us be 
any more than we are only what we eat. And although Waterhouse 
makes the valid point that an individual's authenticity is to be 
defined within the lived world alongside others, this point does not 
appear to be disputed by Heidegger. The essential, basic structure 
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of existence he refers to as Being-in; the world surrounds this 
Being and it cannot exist except within a scale of life encompassing 
time and death which express a key sense of the world for Being. 
And a concern for other persons is acknowledged to be different from 
the world of things. Relationships, being-together. are significant 
in Heidegger: 
"Resoluteness. as authentic - Being one' s-sel f does 
not detach Dasein from its world. nor does it isolate 
it so that it becomes a free-floating 'I'. And how 
should it when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness. 
is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the World? 
Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current 
concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand. and 
pushes it into solicitious Being-with-Others." 26 
The self does not withdraw from the world of other persons but 
lives within it having thought. reflected. sought for an authentic 
identity in that world alongside others. Undoubtedly there is 
self-concern involved. but without it. there seems little likelihood 
of any other concern. The everyday world is not extinguished by 
authenticity. for: "In the moment of viSion. indeed. and often 
just Ifor that moment', existence can even gain the mastery over 
the "everyday"; but it can never extinguish it. 1I27 But as such 
instants of authenticity are not sustained. Waterhouse dismisses 
them as mystical and meaningless. It is certainly the case that 
Heidegger does not present a neat set of criteria by which to ensure 
that a person's authenticity may be judged. But Heidegger is not 
concerned to provide models of action; he is concerned with the 
exploration of ontology alone. And it would seem an aspect of a 
thoughtful, deep self-evaluator that he reflects to gain inSight 
into what he really feels or thinks. Buber also accepts that the 
IIstrong man" wi 11 reti re into soli tude to gather his forces for the 
17 
community existence which is to come. 28 The Bible is replete with 
such examples. But Heidegger does not concede that man can ever 
"extinguish ll the world. 
Waterhouse criticises Sartre as he does Heidegger on the 
grounds that authenticity is not a sustainable state and that it is 
isolating: "There is no way that Sartre can show that an authentic 
relationsh ip to myself produces authentic relations to others ... 29 
This may well be so, but we do construct the reference pOints of our 
world differently. Persons may well view the same set of 
circumstances in a different light. Kelly's theory of personal 
constructs seems to go some way to explain the differences which 
individuals develop and use to structure the nature of things. Now, 
without some basis of self identity there can be no reference points 
from which relationship to others may proceed and without authenticity 
in the individual, no other person can possibly reach that individual. 
And Sartrean authenticity does assert, as a necessity, the projection 
of the self into social concerns. 
A person unable to realise authenticity because he isolates 
himself from the world of others (as distinct from the world of 
everyday habitual conformity) is one needing help in re-establishing 
him and his place in the world and the skilled psychoanalyst should 
be the means of that individual's reorientation of himself to 
enable him to find himself, authentically. Laing's patient, Peter, 
describes the effect of isolation: 
"live been sort of dead in a way. I cut myself off 
from other people and became shut up in myself. And I 
can see that you become dead in a way when you do this. 
You have to live in the world with other people. If 
you don't something dies inside:::-" 30 
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The possibility of realising authenticity IIdies" in a person 
isolating himself from others. Indeed, some are so removed from 
their authentic selves that only confirmation and endorsement of 
their total presence gives them the strength to cope with the 
everyday, however, inauthentica lly: II In order to exist she needs 
someone else to believe in her existence. 1131 Thus writes 
R. D. Laing of a patient of psycho-analysis suffering from a IIlack 
of ontological autonomy"; she is reduced to panic if she IS not in 
the presence of someone who knows her or if she is unable to evoke 
the person's p r ~ s e n c e e in his absence. Indeed, all human interaction, 
II ... probably implies some measure of confirmation, at any rate of 
the physical beings, of the bodies of the participants. 1I32 
Confirmation may be just by a smile, eye contact, a handshake, gesture 
or verbal acknowledgement: "The crux seems to be that it is a 
response by the other that is relevant to the evocative action 
The existentialist search for authenticity seems to have 
influenced psychologists who may recognise the existence of an 
individual's "real" self when treatment of schizophrenia, autism 
or withdrawal is undertaken: 
liTo be 'authentic' is to be true .to onesel f, to be 
what one is, to be 'genuine'. To be 'inauthentic' 
is to not be oneself, to be false to oneself; to be 
not what one appears to be, to be counterfeit. We 
tend to link the categories of truth and reality by 
saying that a genuine act is real, but that a person 
who habitually uses action as a masquerade is not 
real any more." 34 
The psychologist who tries to perceive a person's authentiC self 
is beset with the virtually complete absence of reliable criteria 
,,33 
in trying to establish the extent to which a person's activities are 
truly authentic and his own. And, as Laing pOints out, a psychologist 
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may accept that schizophrenia exists in the individual, but the 
nature of schizophrenia denies him criteria upon which to judge it. 
Frenzied, hyper-activity in the individual may do no more than 
conceal from himself his own inauthenticity and authentic action 
may only be realised subjectively by the actual individual: 
liThe act that is genuine, revealing, and potentiating, 
is felt by me as fulfilling. This is the genuine 
fulfilment of which I can properly speak. It is an 
act that is me: in this action I am myself. I put myself 
linl it. In so far as I put myself lintol what I do, 
I become myse If th rough th i s do i ng • II 35 
However, for all of us, and certainly for the psychologist, it is 
vitally important that an authentic manifestation of a personls 
authentic self is recognised by other persons and, indeed, confirmed 
by them - or the individual may well lapse further into inauthenticity; 
such a state in its extreme form may leave the person quite 
disoriented having apparently lost his sense of a place in the 
world. His sense of his past may be lost in a dimming historical 
perspective which is so significant to Heidegger and those who share 
his view. 
The psychologist will employ professional skill and experience 
to judge the authentiCity of the individual, but lack of material 
criteria leave him to IIfeel ll (in Laingls word) that a person is not 
"putting on" inauthenticity. And where there must always be doubt 
of authenticity, the individual in question ought always to have the 
benefit of that doubt. T h e r ~ f o r e e an asthmatic fifteen year old 
who maintains that his choice of career is that of professional 
footballer may be strongly counselled by his headteacher to aim for 
something else (but the former pupil I have in mind did play 
profeSSional football for the national team). 
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However. confirmation of another person may be confirmation 
of a person's inauthentic self. Teachers and parents may confirm 
a child's inauthentic identity because they may believe some course 
of action is right for that child. In practice. this may well 
happen with young persons when they acquire those necessary 
dispositions to life and to others - considered specifically in 
Chapter 4. However. if a person's false. inauthentic self is 
confirmed when he reaches the age at which he can realise more 
intensely his own authenticity, he may either reject the relation-
ships confirming inauthenticity or he is likely indefinitely to remain 
inauthentic. Thus a pupil 'guided' into a career aim which is not 
authentic to his own self, may not succeed if the intrinsic 
motivation is lacking; it may be the case that parents and teachers 
seek out suitable niches in life for children and pupils and these 
recipients suffer the consequences in an inauthentic mode of being 
as a result. 
Neither Sartre nor Heidegger presents any idea of development 
of persons, but clearly children grow and do so in a social world, 
learning a social code in the language by which to express their 
thoughts and feelings. They should receive confirmation, acceptance 
and love as they develop into authentic individuals. The self of 
eaCh. as he moves towards adulthood. should express its own sense 
of being in evaluating the kind of decisions which it regards as 
significant in attaining authenticity. It is not the task of 
significant adults to disconfirm the groping towards authenticity 
because, ultimately ••• 
liThe capacity to experience oneself as autonomous means 
that one has really come to realise that one is a 
separate person from everyone else. No matter how deeply 
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I am conmitted in joy or suffering to someone else, he 
is not me, and I am not him ... The fact that the other 
person in his actuality is not me, is set against the 
equa lly rea I fact that my attachment to him is a part of 
me. If he dies or goes away, he has gone, but my 
attachment to him persists. But in the last resort I 
cannot die another person's death for him, nor can he 
die my death. For that matter, as Sartre comments 
on this thought of Heidegger's, he cannot love for me 
or make my decisions, and I likewise cannot do this for 
him. In short, he cannot be me, and I cannot be him." 36 
(3) Reason and authenticity 
Although the individual lives and interacts with others, his 
self concern contains an element of spontaneity which Peters 
acknowledges to be akin to Socrates's 'care of the soul': "This 
asserts positively that there must be some feature of a course of 
conduct, which the individual regards as important, which 
constitutes a non-artificial reason for pursuing it ... 1137 However, 
beyond this statement Peters seems reluctant to move because he 
makes reason and rational reflection the determinants of the actions 
of the autonomous person. The possibilities of spontaneity through 
authenticity he mentions only in passing, for example as Lawrence's 
"dark god withinll (sex) or whatever possibilities there are of 
existentialist, criterionless choice. 
It seems that authenticity is linked to motivation which fires 
the individual but a difficulty this presents is that a person may 
not know when his motives are his own or when they are gained 
second-hand. Feinberg contrasts the relative ease with which a 
person can know what his own intentions are with knowledge of his 
own motives. 38 It seems unlikely that a person can altogether 
transcend the culture and tradition about him in seeking authenticity; 
but dramatic changes of life-style or religion, for example, may 
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not necessarily express the authentic self and it is more likely, 
perhaps, that the individual will operate within cultural bounds 
that are largely given. Feinberg's American colleague chose 
Methodism as his faith when he experienced religious conviction 
rather than Buddhism or Roman Catholicism since that person's family 
and traditions were in Methodism; Feinberg (after reflection) grants 
that his friend's decision was probably authentic. Peters stresses 
the "givenness of social life"39 in the context of the two elements 
of: the givenness of the world with respect to human response and 
that of time. But perhaps the greatest significant 'given' in an 
individual's world is that other persons are also there and that 
they are not for manipulation into standardized packages and a 
reciprocity of respect for individual authenticity should be allowed 
to flow. 
However, the difficulty of knowing, even one's own motives quite 
aside from achieving understanding of others' motives may have led 
to undue emphasis upon the importance of rationality and rational 
reflection at the expense of other considerations; when spontaneity 
is held to be pre-eminently significant, criteria for judgement 
appear to be lost apart from spontaneity itself. The Dadaist 
movement in art rejected all previous standards and judgements; rules 
were rejected; spontaneity became all important. No artist's work 
was taken to be a model of a genre; each artist's work was taken to 
stand solely in its own right. But when a rationally argued model 
is established, the implication seems to be that it should be 
followed. For example, in the wake of the Secretary of State's 
document, 'The School Curriculum' and DES Circular 6/81, local 
education authorities, reminded of their statutory duties with 
regard to content and quality of education in their schools produced 
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written statements for their SChools. 40 Such statements are models 
and it may be that! rationally justified model may too easily 
become the model for all schools irrespective of the differences 
between them. Such a situation may lead to a loss of both 
rationality and spontaneity. 
Reason is undeniably a major informant of the nomos of the 
individual's autonomy. To the extent that knowledge is of a public 
nature, the expansion of an individual's knowledge will inform the 
nomos making the autos, the self, a more rational self. Arguments 
presented to restrict " •.• extreme forms of individualism"41 are, 
therefore, intended to establish rationality within individual 
thought and reflection as the determinants of a person's activities 
and choices. 
The autos, itself, is integral to reasoning; that self is not 
separate and distinct from the reasons of the nomos because the 
concept of autonomy involves an interlocking of both autos 9nd 
nomos applied to a person. And when a person thinks, reflects, 
evaluates rationally he does so as a self holding the conviction 
that this is the appropriate thing to do. Now such a conviction 
may have been arrived at rationally but the great diversity of 
the circumstances of the human condition imposes a bewildering 
variety of situations and circumstances upon the individual who may 
find rationality alone inadequate as a basis from which to act. 
Reasons will hold greater or lesser weight for different persons 
and although different sets of reasons may in the end be rationally 
defensible, different perspectives, choices and actions resulting 
from the same reasons indicate the presence and significance of the 
autos within autonomy. In psychological terms these differences 
between persons may be stated through the personal constructs which 
they hold. 42 
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However. reason ought not to be devalued in that it may be 
some defence against inauthenticity. Individuals may conform to the 
expectations others hold for them and lose themselves in 
inauthenticity. Reason is abused when a person allows himself to 
sink into a comfortable conformity, rationalizing away his 
authenticity. The ranks of both 'them' and 'us' express a measure 
of conformity even when 'we' are the non-conformists. It seems 
easy to conform by identification with our nation, our peer group, 
our social class etc.; we may lose our identity as persons to become 
consumers conforming to the manipulation of those who seek to 
ensure we learn the right responses to the economic, political or 
social stimuli thrust at us. 
Now reason may be some defence in enabling the individual to 
evaluate the signals intended to make him fall, inauthentically, into 
line. But a case for conformity may well be made out on a basis 
of reason and the person who tries to maintain his authenticity in 
his judgements by reason alone is likely to encounter severe limits 
on his time, intellect, energy and logic. The information or 
evidence he seeks may not be available and he will be obliged to 
take on trust what others tell him. And what may come to count as 
a good reason, II ••• seems so much a function of upbringing, fashion, 
social conditions and trends which can and do vary in other times 
and climes. 1143 
Rational knowledge obtained through a liberal or intellectual 
education may have limits to the ways in which it can inform the 
individual. But I do not want to devalue the significance of 
knowledge nor to maintain a relativist position on knowledge. 
Reason is a major consideration and not just the province of the 
academic or intellectual. There is difference between truth and 
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falsehood, but if the relativist is correct there is little point 
in teaching anyone anything since all versions express a version of 
the truth no better or worse than any other version. 
Nevertheless, authenticity engages more than cognitive 
rationality. Authenticity involves the autos, the whole self and 
not only the intellect; the affective dimension, for example, is 
also of significance. Peters44 argues that education of the 
emotions is a matter of cognition as emotions differ in cognitive 
content and belief; cognitive rationality informs the appraisals 
generating the emotions. (Discussion of this issue is presented in 
Chapter 2.) If Peters is correct in his case concerning education 
of the emotions, he may still not have the complete answer. 
Individuals are, throughout their lives, exposed to situations and 
lived experiences within the human condition and only when they are 
exposed to a range of experience at first hand may it be possible 
for them to invest something more than intellectual awareness in 
their developing understanding of the range of human circumstances. 
In education, it may only be when the learner personally 
engages the process of the educational practice in question that he 
gains authentically from the experience. The practices may be very 
different in some respects from a wholly rational, intellectual 
education. (Consideration of the nature of a practice in the sense 
intended here and the implications of a practical education are 
explored in Part 3.) But neither should practices of an intellectual 
education be excluded from a learner's experience. The imperative 
is that the learner experiences, authentically, the nature of the 
practice with which he engages. A learner cannot authentically 
experience the practice of history unless he practises as an 
historian; the experience of engaging in a physical game or sport 
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is authentically different from a solely intellectual acquisition 
of rules or tactics. The enthusiasm for team games such as rugger, 
soccer, hockey or netball has endured in some schools partly because 
such activities require more than intellect from players although 
some of the supposed benefits of such games may be apocryphal. 
Clearly many experiences are injurious to persons and education is 
not merely the release of the individual to any first-hand 
experience as long as it is authentic. The task of teachers and 
schools is partly to ensure that worthwhile practices neither 
physically nor mentally injurious to the learner are the educational 
provision available. Authenticity as part of autonomy should 
co-exist with paternalism as argued in .Chapte·r 6. 
The engagement of an individual in a practical education need 
not exclude a liberal education altogether and some aspects of such 
an education, for example the humanities, may have much to offer 
the individual enlarging his experience. Reason and emotion may 
together inform the person in living the practice with which he 
engages himself. But the accumulation of rational knowledge does 
not necessarily lead to authentic depth of understanding about a 
person's place in the world; expertise may have little connection 
with authenticity. 
Experts may not have proper understanding of issues affecting 
the human condition. Cooper45 pOints out the limitations upon 
Peters's view that understanding of death is acquired by the 
acquisition of rational knowledge, " ••• integration •.• in which 
different types of understanding interpenetrate in the spheres of 
knowledge which are relevant,,;46 Cooper makes the point that doctors 
are no better placed, despite their expertise, to judge whether 
their main task is to save lives than are other persons. The person 
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with the greatest initiation into relevant, rational knowledge does 
not, necessarily, then have the greatest understanding of death. 
Knowledge may provide insights and explanations of others, but the 
mere acquisition of such knowledge cannot tell the individual how 
to experience things. Persons adopt attitudes, form values and 
live out situations throughout their lives; these situations express 
the experience of our human condition rather than a world viewed 
from a perspectIve of balanced rational knowledge. The individual 
is left to orient himself to the circumstances and Situations in 
which he is. He must make his choices and deCisions; he must form 
attitudes and opinions. He will experience disappointment; he may 
fail to realise worthy ambitions; he will feel loyalties, sympathies, 
affections and hold to convictions. He will die. Life is 
experienced within that condition of humanity in which the authp.ntic 
self should orient itself to gain understanding of the motives, 
thoughts and actions of itself and of others. 
It is through such lived experience and. in education. through 
the actual experience of the practices within that education, that 
a person comes to a realisation of himself in forming his 
perspectives on life and his scale of values. He comes to 
discriminate between the primary and secondary considerations in 
his life. Cognitive rationality may well inform and, therefore. 
initiation into rational knowledge has some value for the 
individual. But in formal education, teaching and learning may 
become stylised in procedures which lack opportunity for direct. 
active, authentic experience of the educational practice which is 
ostenSibly the purpose in hand. Thus the scientific approach to the 
practice of history of Ranke becomes far removed from the Idealist. 
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hermeneutic tradition of Collingwood and this tradition again 
gives way ... School based learning may reflect accepted ways of 
thought buttressed by a public examination system and teachers may, 
in transmitting beliefs and values to their pupils, reflect only the 
stale and second-hand with closed minds themselves. 
(4) Authentic choice 
(a) Radical choice 
Choice is an issue of considerable importance in connection 
with authenticity, personal autonomy and existentialism and within 
the latter it is cons idered to be radica 1. or 'criterion less' choice 
of oneself, a choice without reasons. Dearden presents three 
conditions which are required for a chOice to exist for an 
individual at all: there should be alternative courses of action 
open to the indivi9ual; the acceptance of one alternative involves 
the rejection of the others; the decision must be voluntary in 
selection of the alternative adopted. 47 The actual choice is made 
on the basis of an individual being aware of the situation within 
which he must choose and having reasons for his ultimate decision: 
"Del iberate choice. then. involves a p,reference for one of the 
alternatives. This in turn implies the having of reasons. and good 
reasons imply criteria for chOice. The various 'ends' furnish such 
practical criteria.,,48 Dearden's account presents a neat and tidy 
arrangement for the making of choices. determined. it seems. on the 
basis of the application of reason to weighing ends evidently open 
to the chooser; a rational appraisal of ends establishes the criteria 
on which the choice rests. This description making reason central 
to the chOice may describe some choice situations and I certainly 
29 
acknowledge that reason has a place in choice. However, the 
description above may well not describe all situations involving 
choice. 
Bonnett49 gives the example of a soldier who is trapped behind 
enemy lines and considers that a course of action on his part may 
save an attack on hard-pressed comrades. This soldier has little 
information upon which to base his decision which is to attack the 
enemy as a result of which he is killed; however he actually loses 
his life unnecessarily since reinforcements are to hand and his 
comrades are saved. Dearden's conditions for choice given above 
are satisfied in this example with respect to: alternative courses 
are open; one is accepted,others rejected; the decision is voluntary. 
But the individual lacks sufficient information from which reasons 
may be established as the criteria for choice. Now it could well 
be argued that had that soldier set aside his sense of loyalty, his 
assessment of the tactical circumstances (on the limited information 
available to him) and all other motives which led to his decision 
to attack the enemy and had he waited for more information on which 
to make a more rational informed decision, his life would not have 
been lost. 
There is, however, marked authenticity in the soldier's choice 
of alternatives. Time is short; an instant decision seems necessary; 
death is a major consideration in his decision-making; he cares 
about his regiment; his conscience strengthens his choice to 
decide, authentically, what he must do. He does not neglect 
consideration of rational criteria, but these are just insufficient 
to describe the whole situation. His posthumous V.C. may be little 
consolation for the loss of his life; but he acts authentically, 
standing out from the crowd - showing initiative in a crisiS. Now, 
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fortunately. not all decisions are, in themselves. matters of life 
and death. but many are taken in situations in which force of 
circumstances deny access to Dearden's criteria of choice based on 
reason. The soldier's decision is based on rational criteria to 
the extent available; these are weighted according to the 
circumstances of that situation and an authentic decision reached. 
The man has settled dispositions and values including loyalty to 
his comrades and professionalism; his reasoning along with his 
'gut feeling' lead him to act as he does and take the consequences. 
Many choices, if not most. may well be taken in situations which 
do not meet Dearden's criteria of reason because time and 
circumstance require choice when rational criteria, even ~ f f they 
could be known, are simply not available. A person's motives, in 
so far as he may know them and the values implicit in his dispositions 
should not be ruled out in a choice Situation. 
Sartre's concept of choice is that of a radical. original and 
criterionless choice of self. But before putting Bonnett's soldier 
into Sartrean colours. some outline of radical choice is necessary. 
Sartre's account of radical choice given in Being and Nothingness 
is an ontological one, but ethical implications are inescapable. 
ChOice, in Sartre, is essentially a choice of the self as a whole: 
IIAnd as our being is precisely our original choice, 
the consciousness of the choice is identical with the 
self-consciousness which we have. One must be conscious 
in order to choose, and one must choose in order to be 
conscious. Choice and consciousness are one and the 
same thing.1I 50 
Thus choice is the choice of the being which I am; hence had Adam 
not taken the apple this would imply that another Adam was possible -
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II this real Adam is surrounded by an infinity of possible Adams. 1I51 
Self-consciousness of being the person I am is the choice which I 
make of myself; choice is in no way separate from myself. Empirical 
choices day by day are simply expressions of t h ~ ~ choice of self 
that I have made: II Indeed the distinguishing characteristic of the 
intelligible choice ... is that it can exist only as the transcendent 
meaning of each concrete, empirical choice."52 Hence, if I row a 
boat on a river, I am just that - myself engaged in the project of 
rowing and by means of engaging in such an activity •• !'We make it 
exist by means of our very engagement, and therefore we shall be 
able to apprehend it only by living it. 1I53 
However, Sartre is clear that in maintaining that a person's 
whole life is his choice rather than that an act of choosing is 
somehow objectively removed from the person, he is maintaining that 
a person holds full responsibility for his choice of the self he is. 
This original, radical choice of self has values intrinsically linked 
to it and these values are determined by the individual's choice of 
self: "Value derives its being from its exigency and not its 
exigency from its bei ng. 1154 Therefore, Sartre' s ala rum clock 
summons him because it is he who confers exigency on that object's 
significance. Artd if he is involved in a situation it is his 
responsibility; he is not an innocent victim of circumstances - he 
Aas chosen the world as his and the multitude of situations within 
it are also his: 
IIWe are taking the word 'responsibility' in its ordinary 
sense as 'consciousness (of) being the incontestable 
author of an event or of an object'. In this sense the 
responsibility of the for-itself is overwhelming since he 
is the one by whom it happens that there is a world; 
since he is also the one who makes hImself be, then 
whatever may be the situation in which he finds himself, 
the for-itself must wholly assume this situation ••. with 
the proud consciousness of bei ng the author of it .•. II 55 
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Therefore, if a person is mobilized in a war, it is his war since 
escape, if only by death or desertion, can still be effected. But 
if he does not get out of it, he chooses it until it is finished. 
Thus responsibility for the Nazi killing of Jews was a responsibility 
upon all who did not actively strive to prevent it. 
How then might Bonnett's soldier fare in a situation of radical 
choice? Let us assume that this man faces the choice of either 
acting at risk of his own life out of dispositions, duties, values 
etc. in order to gain a military objective, or of remaining hidden, 
preserving his life because to lose it will be a major loss to his 
family in which his wife is dying of cancer and soon only he may 
live to care for their children. The radical chooser must simply 
decide to follow one course because that course is an expression of 
what he is and of the moral vision that he has of others and the 
world. He just chooses one and in so doing creates the value implicit 
in that choice. His choice is one which still leaves him within 
Dearden's three conditions of choice: that there are alternatives; 
acceptance of one alternative involves a rejection of the other/s; 
the decision is, to some extent, voluntary. But the existentialist 
radical chooser cannot have reasons in his determination of what to 
choose because his original choice of self determines values by his 
choices. However, if the soldier already has commitments both to 
his family and to his comrades, he is drawn to both in the choice 
he must make. The outcome of his choice will express which 
commitment he holds to be the stronger, but as Sartre states that 
the individual will experience anguish in his dilemma. his 
commitments must exist prior to the occasion of the choice which he 
makes and these commitments cannot then be created by the choice 
its'elf. If the soldier is drawn in both directions, these 
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commitments and the values associated with them must be separate 
from the chooser. The values exist in the commitments rather than 
in the original, radical choice of self which the individual made: 
IIHow can I evaluate causes and motives on which I myself confer their 
value before all deliberation and by the very choice which I make 
of myself?"56 Sartre presents a similar dilemma in 
L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme of a young man faced with either 
staying to care for his ailing mother who otherwise will die alone 
and in sorrow or of leaving to fight for the Resistance against 
Nazi tyranny with all the implications the latter holds for France, 
for Europe and for the world. The fact that Sartre acknowledges 
this as a dilemma indicates that the moral claims involved are not 
created by a radical choice of self alone. 
If the soldier'S choice is not to act out of loyalty and 
military professionalism but to remain in hiding so as not to risk 
his life since he only joined the army because the pay is higher 
than social security benefit and the beer and cigarettes are cheaper, 
his choice to remain hidden, 'selfishly', will (if expressing 
radical choice) confer value on that option. The point is that 
radical choice lacks coherence because it does not acknowledge any 
point of reference external to the individual chooser and if no 
value exists for the radical chooser outside himself, alternatives 
which present him with dilemmas are impossible. In fact, the 
chooser cannot divorce himself from rational criteria altogether 
because to ignore such considerations makes choice incomprehensible. 
Choice entirely without reasons would be to engage in impulsive acts 
without regard to evaluation or preference; or perhaps, a person 
would simply choose the opposite of what it seemed sensible to 
choose. But a choice unrelated to what seems most advantageous or 
desirable is not intelligible. 
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Therefore a radical choice of self out of which value is 
created purely on the basis of that choice is to devalue rational 
criteria to the extent that radical choice is left claiming the 
right to determine values which already exist prior to the choice 
and so place the so-called radical chooser in a cruel dilemma. 
Reason ought not to be removed from choice any more than it should 
be taken to be the sole determiner of choice. Sartre's version of 
choice emphasises the variety of moral perspectives upon the world 
and the only way to decide which perspective to adopt may be to 
decide, radically, like the man who is faced with the dilemma of 
remaining with his ailing mother or joining the Resistance. He 
cannot make a radical choice of these considerations because they 
are already expressive of pre-determined values; however he can 
choose between them, but only by evaluation of his strength of 
commitment to the alternatives. 
(b) Evaluation of self 
A significant difficulty referred to earlier in this chapter 
is the extent to which a person can understand his own motivation. 
To reach such understanding ought not to involve neglect of rational 
considerations and criteria but it should require an individual to 
weigh these considerations in an attempt to evaluate his own motives. 
And it may be the depth of an evaluation of motives and the 
responsibility to act on these which may eventually make a person 
what he is. TaylorS7 draws a distinction between 'weak' and 'strong' 
evaluation; a 'weak' evaluation may be involved in a person choosing 
to have a lazy holiday on a sunny beach or a more energetic one. The 
choice between the two will require reasoning and a basis of rational 
criteria to inform the individual of what he really wants after a 
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period of reflection on the alternatives. But a 'strong' evaluation 
will be concerned more directly with quality of motivation and in 
appraising what is worthwhile in those motives. Therefore a 'strong' 
or 'deep' evaluation is one expressive of the kind of person an 
individual is because it describes the individual's adherence to 
certain values extracted from his deepest, almost inchoate, 
evaluations. If a person gives way to selfish and debasing activities 
and impulses, he influences and determines the sort of person he is, 
but a strong evaluation will be defined in a language of worth in 
which motivations or desires will be given values as higher or lower, 
worthy or debasing etc.: liTo characterize one desire or inclination 
as worthier, or nobler, or more integrated, etc. than others is to 
speak of it in terms of the kind of quality of life which it 
expresses and sustains."S8 
To reach such evaluation requires reflection on motives and 
evaluation of their quality. The individual must reflect on the 
situation, consider consequences and get the 'feel' of the 
alternatives. Eventually he may be able to articulate his appraisals 
in a language of contrasts; just as it is impossible to know what 
the concept red is unless other colours are contrasted with it, so 
values may be similarly contrasted. Reflection of this kind seems 
to have its origins in rhetoric and hermeneutics (deriving from the 
Greeks) and language seems to be the key medium in the expression 
of an evaluation of our motives in depth in its capacity to bring 
about a conscious awareness of ourselves: " .•. there is no societal 
reality, with all its concrete forces, that does not bring itself 
to representation in a consciousness that is linguistically 
articulated. Reality does not happen 'behind the back' of language; 
it happens rather behind the backs of those who live in the subjective 
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opinion that they have understood the world' (or can no longer 
understand it); that is, reality happens precisely within language. 1I59 
Reflection enables the individual to evaluate his motives in 
a language of worth and to re-evaluate, constantly, what he thinks. 
Such a process is radical in the sense that it is never-ending and, 
in the evaluations arri ved at, fundamentally defi nes and re-defi nes 
the kind of person involved. It is a process not lacking in criteria 
and one which will relate to reason but it will also be coupled with 
what the whole authentic self of the person is. In reflection, in 
addition to rational criteria and involving such criteria, II ••• is 
my deepest unstructured sense of what is important, wh,ich is as yet 
inchoate and which I am trying to bring to definition. I am trying 
to see reality afresh and form more adequate categories to describe 
it. To do this I am trying to open myself, use all my deepest 
unstructured sense of things in order to come to a new clarity.1I60 
Such thinking involves rational considerations, logic, standards 
of thinking and a resulting affective influence upon the person. 
A person capable of this deep re-evaluation and re-consideration 
of his motives defines his identity in an expression of authenticity 
which is his whole person in cognitive and affective dimensions. 
Thus when authenticity is achieved by reflection and re-evaluation 
of self and the self more nearly understands its own motivations 
and deep purposes, responsibility of the individual for his actions 
should follow. 
(c) Evaluation and obligation 
The authentiCity of the strong, reflective evaluator of his 
own motives holds implications not only for the individual, but in 
some situations, for others too. The Sartrean individual chooser is 
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claimed to generate his own values by his original, radical awareness 
or choice of his own self and were this situation feasible, the 
individual would generate his own moral values with regard to no 
criteria linking him to standards outside himself. However, this 
hypothesis has been shown above to be incoherent since the 
individual in a moral dilemma only feels the dilemma because he 
approaches the crisis with pre-existing values attaching to 
commitments outside himself. Nevertheless, the reflective, deep 
evaluator is also faced with the nature of that society in which 
he makes evaluations of his own motives and he owes obligations to 
others within that society. He is part of a reCiprocal relationship. 
The language in which he comes to an authentic articulation of 
his evaluations is a language of what is worthwhile and meaning is 
given to activities in the world by such a language. Thus if one 
individual is described as a 'great criminal', he is thus defined 
in the language of his society; hence a great criminal living under 
a Nazi government may be one seeking to help 'non-aryans' escape from 
brutality and inhumanity. Ronald Biggs may be cited as a great 
criminal in Britain in the 19605 but by the 19805, time and 
circumstance may even change that judgement. Existentialism may 
have been stimulated in societies where accepted moral rules were 
put in question unlike our society today in which such rules are 
generally accepted within what is a relatively stable. social 
environment. 
However. a society which values authenticity is unlikely to be 
a uniform one. Indeed, the reverse is likely to be the case. 
Inauthenticity involves being-with-others in a kind of uniform 
existence in which the individual's authentiCity is submerged in 
. the crowd and persons are lost in the language of uniform labels -
38 
the 'blacks', the 'coloureds', the 'gifted', the 'handicapped', 
'men', 'women' etc. Escape from the labels of the mass-media and 
from the submerging of the capacity for individual authenticity in 
an inauthentic mode of existence is to be encouraged. A realisation 
of authenticity should lead to a rejection of unthinking conformity, 
but not necessarily to the rejection of the standards expressed by 
the moral code in a particular society. Each individual being exists 
in the world of others and, as indicateo earlier, care relates being 
to the world of things and to other persons; deep, reflective 
evaluation of one's motives does not occur in a vacuum, but in 
that world of others and of oneself. Indeed, as Aristotle pOints 
out, the only fully, non-social be1ng is either a beast or a God! 
living in society and valuing authenticity implies acknowledgement 
of authenticity 1n others as well as in ourselves. We are all 
beings in the world and we can achieve little without others because 
those others are an integral part of our world and exist as ones 
evaluating themselves as 'ends' in their own right. 
Children may find difficulty in gaininga perspective of themselves 
in reciprocal relationships with others but in making choices and 
decisions on behalf of the young, we should be conscious of their 
potential for authenticity: "After all, all of us are children 
before we are adults and anyone of us may become mentally 
incapaCitated, so we do have a stake in seeing to it that such 
persons are treated as having, within the limits of possibility and 
prudence, the same rights and duties as they would have if they 
could speak for themselves, since in choosing for them we may well 
be choosing for ourselves. ,,61 Thus a teacher who chooses to inculcate 
a disposition in his pupils to mug old women has direct responsibility 
for such anti-social behaviour and anti-social attitudes; and, 
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reciprocally, as some teachers may be old women (especially the 
male ones) they may, themselves, be choosing to be mugged. 
The strong, reflective evaluator finds his authentic sense 
of being in knowing his own motives and is able to characterise 
these in a language of worth. He then holds the capacity to choose 
and he can exercise this both with regard to himself and also in a 
much wider context in his relationships with family and friends 
and, indeed, with a wider society - his nation, his world. Sartre, 
in his later writing, comes to accept the wider reciprocal 
implications of individual choice as is shown in acknowledgement of 
everyone's responsibility for the plight of the Jews in the 1940s. 
II ••• perhaps we shall begin to understand that we must fight for 
the Jew, no more and no less than for ourselves. 1162 And he makes 
clear the reciprocal obligation expected: IIWhat must be done is to 
point out to each one that the fate of the Jews is his fate. Not 
one Frenchman will be free so long as the Jews do not enjoy the 
fulness of their rights. Not one Frenchman will be secure as long 
as a single Jew - in France or in the world at large - can fear for 
his life. u63 An individual IS evaluation of his own motives in the 
choices he makes is linked to his obligations to others and in 
Chapter 3 an analysis of personhood should add weight to the 
implications of obligation to others implicit in authentic 
evaluation and choice. 
(5) Authenticity within education 
In this chapter I have argued that the concept of authenticity 
ought not to be subsumed within a conceptual framework marked out 
for personal autonomy in which authenticity simply accepts the 
dictates of a reason-informed nomos within that autonomy. I have 
" 
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laid claim to a place for authenticity (as part of autonomy) in its 
own right and, as such, it may be by individual evaluation of motives 
in apposition to the claims of cognitive rationality, particularly 
when reasons are insufficient, that authentic choice may operate. 
Authentic choice including self-evaluation of motives co-exists with 
the nomos of cognitive reason; each borrows from the other in 
situations of choice. 
In educational practice, the acquisition of rational knowledge, 
with its accompanying understanding and experience, is acknowledged 
to be significant. But if the learner is to get on the inside of 
such knowledge to make it his own, he must want to do so. And if 
he lacks in motivation, a required conformity aimed at making a 
person learn something may simply alienate the individual from such 
knowledge. Advancing age and maturity coupled with a growing 
capacity for self-evaluation of one's own authentic motives should 
be recognised and the individual allowed, for example, curricular 
choice as far as is justifiable within the confines of a curriculum. 
(i) Guidance 
The young person should be encouraged to evaluate his purposes 
and reflect upon them to clarify their worth to him in connection 
with his life as a whole to the extent that he can imaginatively 
project. He may digest parental advice; he may be influenced by 
sibling precedent etc. But his teachers should guide him not by 
direction but by helping him with the evaluation of what he wants 
by considering alternatives and by encouraging his reflection and 
deep evaluation of himself. The authentic person should have concern 
for himself and he should act out of this concern. This is not to 
assert selfish individualism or a subjective bloody-mindedness which 
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asserts the right to do it his way - come what may. It is more the 
concern to appraise oneself in the context of situations in which 
one will be found in life, in society, in institutional roles. It 
requires the individual to. " ... reflect upon one's personality, to 
assess the situations in which one is placed. to examine the language 
one speaks, to reflect on the goals to pursue in one's life, to 
consider the value to be put on one's activities, to examine how 
one came to one's beliefs, to assess one's emotional responses, to 
think how to widen the projects and possibilities open to one."64 
Essentially the individual should realise his motives, get on the 
inside of his learning and live life to the full richness which 
personal authenticity should afford. 
(ii) Educational practices 
In learning, a student may be most likely to be authentic in 
that learning when he is directly engaged in the nature of the 
educational practice in question. Involvement with process and the 
procedural aspects of, for example, an intellectual subject by pursuit 
of a problem-solving activity and utilising skills in that pursuit 
may enable the individual most directly to realise the experience. 
He may then be able to appraise the experience of learning in 
determining his authentic reaction to that experience. Clearly not 
all learning in school can be voluntarily undertaken, at least not 
in its initial stages, but authenticity seems at odds with the case 
for a largely compulsory curriculum envisaged by White. 65 A case for 
authenticity in the curriculum is put by Bonnett. 66 It is not my 
aim in this thesis to debate the issue of a compulsory curriculum, 
but what seems in practical terms unclear about the case for compulsion 
is the extent to which it shou.ld go for persons with very different 
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aptitudes and abilities. Should every 'normal' person be able and 
expected to perform quadratic equations for example, and if so, why? 
The onus is upon those who argue for compulsion to provide justifiable 
benchmarKS in the areas which they claim should be compulsory so 
that consideration of the case for compulsion can be grounded upon 
specifics. 
Practices involving the humanities within an intellectual 
education may particularly provide opportunity for the development 
of authenticity in pupils because the humanities are concerned with 
'whole persons' in their subject matter, in situations reflecting the 
human condition. The Schools Council Humanities Curriculum project67 
laid great importance upon discussion enabling young adults to orient 
themselves towards matters of controversy in modern society so that 
growth in self-knowledge could occur. Young persons could reflect 
on issues of direct significance to their lives, evaluate their own 
motives and orient themselves to an authentic awareness of their lives 
in relation to the controversial issues considered. Nevertheless, 
if a person's evaluation of his own motives leads him to realise his 
authentic self as a scientist, there may be a dilemma to be resolved 
involving considerations of balance in a curriculum if the role of 
a scientist is defined too narrowly. 
(iii) Relationships and obligations 
The school social environment gives scope for that reciprocity 
in relationships referred to above. Teachers should care for their 
students' development towards authenticity and, in particular, provide 
confirmation to the individual who needs adult attention and recognition. 
However, further discussion of this issue is reserved for Chapter 3 
which explores the relationships of persons more d i r ~ c t l y . .
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Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the nature of reason which 
is held to be a central component of personal autonomy. An 
autonomous person may be thought to be ruled by a nomos informed 
by criteria picked out by reason. Authenticity and the autos may 
be considered to come to terms with the nomos informed by rational 
criteria so that autos and nomos attain a modus vivendi together. 
The chapter is presented in two parts, A and B. The two sections 
of Part A consider the objective nature of reason as a function of 
intelligence and objective standards attaching to reason. Peters, 
Dearden and others have placed great emphasis upon the objective 
nature of reason in that: "The child who learns to think independently 
in mathematics, science or history does not just make up or invent 
good reasons of the right sort: the criteria implicit here are valid 
independently of his wishes and have to be learned, as does how to 
apply them."1 However, the "independently valid" rational criteria 
are, in Dearden's view, betrayed by human lapses into irrationality, 
" our many inconsistencies, muddles and mistakes, for these are 
explained precisely by our trying to determine our minds by reference 
to appropriate criteria but with very varying degrees of success.,,2 
Part B of this chapter departs somewhat from the Peters - Dearden 
perspective on reason in order to show reason's relation to feeling 
which is argued to be a part of reason. The second section of 
Part B considers the implications of a practical dimension within 
reason and emphasises its significance in choices and deCisions in 
the practical life of the autonomous person. 
The chapter concludes with considerations of some educational 
implications of reason, practical reason and autonomy in connection 
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with Dearden's view concerning the merits of an intellectual 
education as a means to develop autonomy. 
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PART A 
(1) The nature of reason: a Peters perspective 
Reason is a function of intelligence and as such may be regarded 
as on a continuum from the highly rational to the non-rational. 3 
As a function of intelligence, reason enables a person when 
presented with a situation unlike any previously encountered to 
interpret that situation by transferring relevant knowledge and 
experience to it. Some animals may be considered intelligent in 
that they reveal a capacity to adapt previous learning to new purposes; 
Jane Goodall's research into chimpanzees' behaviour makes claims for 
these animals to be regarded as intelligent and able to reason. 
Piaget's concepts of assimilation and accommodation apply to reason 
in that an individual is considered to assimilate new concepts by 
integrating them into his existing organisation of concepts. But if 
the difference between his existing patterns of thought and new 
concepts is too great for assimilation, the individual accommodates 
by adjusting his own thought structure and anticipations. 
Intelligent behaviour involves rules which mark out criteria 
distinct from simply regular behaviour. This distinction between 
regular and rule-guided behaviour is explored by Bennett4 in his 
analysis of rationality in connection with apian activity. The 
capacity to generalize and make rules in forming beliefs and in 
determining actions so that a person's b e ~ a v i o u r r reflects and adheres 
to the planning and rule-making with which he involves himself is a 
feature of reason and intell igence: "Rational behaviour and bel ief 
spring from the recognition implicit or explicit, that certain 
general considerations are grounds for action or belief .,,5 Reason, 
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on this account, is not then tied to the particular; it relates to 
circumstances and conditions which reflect the variations in human 
experience over the passage of time. Indeed, Peters argues that reason 
relates to truth, thus the pursuit and maintenance of truth through 
reason is crucial to education and to life in general. (The public 
nature of reason and the objective standards associated with it 
will be explored in Section 2 below.) 
Intelligent rule-guided behaviour is part of reason and its 
associated rational criteria, therefore, and its presence in varying 
degrees determines the nature of the following continuum of rational 
to non-rational. Non-rational is the greatest contrast with rational 
and expresses the absence of the capacity to reason to even a 
minimum standard. Animals, lacking intelligence in general, and 
unable to apply intelligence to different situations as humans 
normally can, are, therefore, non-rational. Bennett's honey-bees 
may reveal co-ordinated behaviour but lack the capacity of human 
language which is usually mankind's method of communicating rational 
thought. 
Irrationality is to move away from non-rationality on reason's 
continuum. It implies some awareness of rational thinking and 
associated action in a sense in which non-rational cannot do. But 
the individual whose thoughts and actions are irrational is still 
considered unable to attain a higher mark of rationality than this, 
II ••• low grade type of experience. 1I6 Peters sees irrationality 
infused by an affective dimension expressing a state dominated by 
feel ings rather than intellect so that the ind i vidual's capaci ty to 
reason is seriously impaired. Irrationality is lacking in consistency 
of thought and logiC so that thought and action are disrupted and 
out of step with the stimuli which generates them; an extreme 
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example would be that of a person suffering from paranoia. Very 
young children's thinking may also reveal irrationality in their 
inability to perceive reality in different situations. 
A higher level of reasoning than that of the irrational may be 
termed unreasonable. The implication of this then is that an 
unreasonable person has understanding of the importance attaching to 
particular reasons but is unwilling to accept the implications which 
should be drawn from those reasons. Whereas the irrational individual 
is in a state of mental disorder which he can do little to change 
for himself, the unreasonable individual is just unwilling to be more 
reasonable. He could be more reasonable were he differently disposed 
so to be. Therefore the irrational individual cannot be described 
as unreasonable; the unreasonable individual is one who fails to be 
as reasonable as he could be. The unreasonable individual's thought 
and action must then be under his own control to be judged unreasonable 
and he then has responsibility for his choices and decisions. 7 An 
unreasonable choice may arise from lack of reasoning skill with a 
resulting failure to appreciate the connections in reasoning or from 
affliction of akrasia, lack of capacity to exercise the will to act 
upon reasoning. However, such circumstances may be overcome to some 
extent. 
The unreasonable individual, then, is deliberately biased, 
bigoted, obtuse in the partiality of his beliefs. Peters regards him 
as strongly influenced by his feel ings: "Emotions, usually of a 
gutsy sort, are aroused by particular people and situations. liB Feelings, 
on this account, get in the way of reason which has the added task 
of surmounting emotion to enable the individual to be reasonable in 
contrast to unreasonable. Credit arises from being reasonable: 
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"In order for an action to be reasonable it must be 
well-cons idered, intell igent, sens ible, far-s ighted, etc". 
and may be presumed to be prudent, wise, etc.; while its 
being rash, foolish, futile, stupid or inconsiderate 
will nonnally disqualify it for praise as 'reasonable'." 9 
Credit attaches to reasonable acts because reason is the basis of 
the judgements of those to whom reasonableness is attributed. The 
reasonable person judges a situation on the balance of reasons so 
that if faced with uncertainty as to which alternatives to choose, 
the decision is established on the sufficiency of reason. No 
preferable reasons exist for selection when the person appraises 
these and, essentially, he chooses the best reason or set of reasons 
over less convincing ones. Reasoning is of a means - end kind 
because it cannot be adjudged independent of its appropriateness 
to some purpose or end. Thus, as Black pOints out, it is reasonable 
to run for the sake of one's health or to catch a 'bus or for 
pleasure, but not simply to run quite aimlessly. 
The means to the desired end must be appropriate to be 
reasonable. Therefore, although some sanctions and punishments may 
be regarded as reasonable in order for school rules to be upheld, 
the infliction of physical pain may· not be reasonable as a means to 
uphold school rules. Judgement of the reasonableness of the means 
to the desired end should satisfy an impartial observer that the 
reasons adopted are better than their alternatives. Nevertheless, 
actions judged to be reasonable may subsequently still prove wrong or 
unjustified; outcomes may be sought which are not attained and 
reasoning may not prove to be correct. 
Associated with reasonableness at reason's end of this continuum 
is the concept of rationality expressing the objective standards 
attaching to reason and to be considered in Section 2, below. 
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Rationality is often associated with a high level of reasoning. Thus, 
if I reasonable I is associated with what is worthy and creditable, 
rationality is the ultimate excellence in reasoning. Rationality is 
associated with a solely human capacity to ratiocinate and handle 
propositions and proofs with intellectual rigour; reason may be 
considered to attain its highest expression when regarded as a 
function of the human intellect engaged in ratiocination. The 
rigorous intellectual discipline of reflective rational thought is 
thought to impose its own discipline and standards upon the reasoner 
who is drawn by the power to reason to conclusions avoiding the 
pitfalls of illogicality. 
Finally, rationalization is not a part of reason's continuum 
as it is an aberrant form of rationality. It involves an attempt 
to base a case apparently on reason but to claim it as more rational 
than is justifiable. An absence of good, appropriate reasons is 
disguised by what is apparently reasonable. (A Weberan perspective 
on rationality and rationalization is considered in Chapter 6.) 
The nature of reason, then, may be considered along the continuum 
outlined above from non-rational through unreasonable to its opposite, 
reasonable and ultimately, rational supported by genuine concern for 
rational standards. Feelings, on this account, are generally 
considered as obstacles for reason to surmount. Reason's end of 
this continuum is thought to encompass standards of an objective, 
publiC kind, expressing truth irrespective of the particulars of 
time and place. Feelings are conSidered, on this account, as 
subjective and likely to weaken reasoning. The issue of the objective 
aspect of reason and its standards is the subject of the next section. 
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(2) Reason and standards 
Reason, as a function of intelligence, is held by Peters to 
express a public character and an objectivity in standards based 
upon criteria independently valid of the wishes of any individual. 
This notion of public standards attributed to reason will be explored 
below, first by discussion of what rational knowledge is held to be 
and, second by analysis of what the standards held to be criteria of 
good reasoning are. 
Peters emphasises the significance of language as a means of 
expressing the public nature of reason.'O Language, although private 
to the individual user, is held to be an expression of public 
knowledge which is universalizable. Concepts are shared within the 
process of language within a structure by which rational thinking 
may be conveyed; syntax and linguistic rules ensure that reason is 
expressed in a public tradition according to procedures independent 
of the wishes of any single person. Those language codes described 
by Bernstein'1 emphasise the public nature of knowledge so that those 
who are the most capable performers within the public tradition of 
language usage also prove the most able learners in the sphere of 
public forms of knowledge. Initiation into defined bodies of public 
knowledge, such as science or history etc. is what is held to develop 
rational thought. The individual brings his mind to bear upon 
established propositions within accepted forms or fields of 
knowledge and shares in the enlightenment such initiation brings. 
His consciousness is joined to the public tradition so as to share 
in that objectivity and universal standard of rationality. Tests 
for truth specific to particular forms of knowledge give support 
and credibility to the public nature of knowledge transcending the 
immediate present and linking with a vast cultural context based upon 
reason. 
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This perspective on reason and rational belief is particularly 
linked to the nature of propositional knowledge outlined in his 
description of liberal education and forms of knowledge by Hirst 
who argues that any individual who seeks justification for the 
pursuit of rational knowledge is already committed to it: 
liTo ask for the justification of any fonn of activity 
is significant only if one is in fact committed 
already to seeking rational knowledge. To ask for a justification of the pursuit of rational knowledge 
itself therefore presupposes some commitment to what 
one is seeking to justify." 12 
To determine why rational knowledge in science, history, mathematics 
etc. should be pursued is, then, to be a reasoner, to seek for good, 
particular reasons and so to be committed to reason and to rational 
knowledge. This transcendental justification may hold for an 
individual asking why he is directly engaged in pursuit of one 
particular sphere of rational knowledge, but, as White pOints out, 
it cannot justify why knowledge should be held as rational truth and 
pursued in all the different forms of Hirst's analysis. 13 Peters, 
in a similar way to that of Hirst, also argues that a person who 
asks what there are reasons for doing is already committed by an 
antecedent attitude implicit in that question to the pursuit of 
reason. But a questioner may simply want to know what reason or 
reasons there may be in a particular case; he may have no greater 
commitment to reason than this. Indeed to enquire into what one is 
already strongly committed to would be anathema to autonomy and to 
reason itself since such enquiry may be undertaken out of habit or 
upon direction from another person without rational, personal 
commitment from the individual himself. Furthermore, to be committed 
to reason by a prior conception or antecedent attitude must require 
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the individual's willingness to reason because if he is not already 
rational or reasonable he will be unable to understand the argument 
based upon reason which is presented to him. 
The individual who claims commitment to reason as an expression 
of objective truth should be in a position to satisfy himself that 
particular reasons are good ones because they can be tested by 
standards and criteria which can uphold the validity of those claims. 
Bailey, following Peters in the intellectual tradition supporting 
the objectivity of reason, offers four standards as criteria 
descriptive of a good reason: relevance. appropriateness. logicality, 
sufficiency.14 Relevance should relate a justifying proposition 
to the belief or action which it sets out to justify. The justifying 
proposition must also be appropriate to the belief for if a belief 
is prejudiced it may have to rely upon a claim to justification which 
cannot reach a standard of truth, for example, " ••. iron expands 
when heated because rubber stretches when pulled. II15 Two propositions 
must, further. be logically connected, as a theoretical syllogism 
could demonstrate. Bailey'S fourth criterion of a good reason is 
sufficiency: the claim that in order to be fit I must undertake 
gardening is insufficient justification for the gardening. There 
are clearly other and, perhaps, more effective ways of keeping fit. 
A case made out on the basis of reason should reach the 
categories of reasonable or rational described in the previous 
section. Objective standards reflecting the criteria Bailey 
describes as relevance, appropriateness, logicality and sufficiency 
should ensure that reason holds the key to knowledge, understanding 
and successful processes of thought. Only when our reasoning does 
not meet the criteria described will we be subject to, " ..• many 
inconsistencies. muddles and mistakes, for these are explained 
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precisely by our trying to determine our minds by reference to 
appropriate criteria but with very varying degrees of success. 1I16 
When reasoning is confined to an intellectual education based 
upon a school curriculum vested in fonns of knowledge and 
the learner is initiated into disciplines by ratioCination among 
propositions, perhaps the criteria of good reasons described above 
may hold. But education also involves preparation for life in all 
spheres and not solely the intellectual. Practical life requires 
a capacity to reason in situations where solutions are not known in 
advance because practical life, in and outside schools, contains 
situations as part of the human condition which require reasoning 
and standards which are not immutable in the sense that standards 
of tbeoretical reason in an intellectual education may appear to be. 
The following example may clarify the position. 
A syllogism, for example, may read: 
'All wars can be shortened by the use of nuclear weapons; 
The American conflict with Japan in 1945 was a war; 
It was appropriate to shorten it by use of nuclear weapons.' 
Two scientists, Robert Oppenheimer and Edward Teller, who had much 
to do with developing an atomic bomb agreed that the above syllogism 
was rationally acceptable. After the Second World War, Teller 
proceeded with successful research to produce a hydrogen-bomb; 
Oppenheimer would not continue with this work and was arraigned for 
disloyalty to the U.S.A. for his action. Their actions express 
different beliefs. But why should the valid reasons supporting the 
above syllogism in relevance, appropriateness. logic and sufficiency 
of standard be regarded so differently by Oppenheimer concerning the 
development of the hydrogen-bomb? What made some reasons so 
compelling for him and others so compelling for Teller? 
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Undoubtedly both men cared greatly for reason and, in fact, 
for their own particular reasons concerning the practical dilemma 
confronting them. And although the reasons they considered may have 
met the criteria of relevance, appropriateness and logic, sufficiency 
of reason may have had a variable effect upon these individuals. The 
sufficiency of reasons was felt differently by these persons. Their 
strength of feeling contributed to the power a reason had for them 
because faced with the same infonmation and evidence, only the 
individual's feelings were left to make him adopt the perspective 
he did on this issue. Each person evaluated the reasons in the 
situation and, presumably from a depth of personal, authentic 
appraisal, came to a state of personal awareness of the sufficiency 
of reasons to him as a separate, distinct, authentic person. His 
feelings merged with his view of the sufficiency of particular reasons 
and led him to know what he wanted to do and what for him he had to 
do. Thus a view of mind is offered in which there is, II ••• internal 
conflict among rational alternatives, rather than one in which 
there is simple unity or in which there are feelings being controlled 
with difficulty by stern reason." 17 (The issue of the place of 
emotion and motive will be considered in Section 3 below.) 
Persons do have different purposes and their perceptions of 
the same situation may well vary even when reason'S standards are 
maintained. In both theoretical reason when ratiOCination in 
intellectual matters is pre-eminent or in practical life situations 
where a more practical reasoning may operate, differences and 
divergence between reasoning individuals are apparent. Equally valid 
cases may be made out on a basis of reason because individuals with 
different dispositions and convictions feel that the strength of 
some reasons is greater than that of others. All good reasons may 
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be appropriate, relevant and logical, therefore, but not necessarily 
universally sufficient. 
In practical situations of day to day living, most (if not all) 
individuals suffer restrictions on their time, energy and, sometimes, 
capacity to follow the steps of reasoning pursued when a case is 
made out and it becomes a matter of personal judgement at which 
point that case is likely to be acceptable on rational grounds. The 
public nature of reason1s standards enables the individual to 
understand a case made out on reason but, whether those reasons are 
good and sufficient enough to convince him that they should be his 
reasons to care about, depends upon his authentic self's existing 
dispositions, attitudes, convictions and judgement of his own motives 
and ends towards those reasons. A person may maintain the importance 
of reason in his life and thought as a function of his intelligence 
but when viewing a case made out on reason, he must bring to bear 
his feelings and dispositions towards the reasons or a reason in any 
particular case. One should be consistent in one's rationality whilst 
recognising that a particular reason is not an absolute and that, 
essentially, one's feelings and reasonings dispose one to particular 
perspectives and persuasions. 
The individual whose day to day perspectives are, in practice, 
informed by rational criteria infused and influenced by his feelings 
may well change his mind about the sufficiency of reasons applying to 
particular circumstances. The Kantian concept of Practical Reason 
as a supreme, objective dictator is remote from the realities of 
practical life in which the autonomous person's "own activity of mind" 
explains, " .•. his own choices, deliberations, decisions, reflections, 
judgements, plannings or reasonings. II18 After all, how could it be 
otherwise? A good reason today, which passes the criterion of 
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sufficiency, may fail the test tomorrow because a person may change 
his views about a reasonls sufficiency; he may reflect authentically 
and come to feel differently about a reason. Reason may enable an 
individual to change but it is still he who does the changing. 
Dearden, for example, has come to change his view on the issue of 
whether the outline of a curriculum may be derived from autonomy.19 
He has come to feel differently about his reasons. A reason or a 
set of reasons is sufficient or insufficient f ~ m m the individual IS 
own perspective. 
The following two sections aim to show why particular reasons 
are always open to question about what they should compel because 
feeling is not separate from reason as a function of intelligence 
within the circumstances of education and practical life. 
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PART B 
(3) Reason and feeling 
Bailey argues that: liTo do 'what I feel like doing' can never 
be the basis of autonomy because what I feel like doing can always 
be what someone else has made me feel 1 ike dOing. 1I20 But if I am 
not to trust my feelings on the grounds that someone has induced 
these feelings in me, there seems equally little cause why I should 
trust reasons suggested by others and which are not, necessarily, 
my own. In this section the implication of feeling for the objective 
standards presumed to be part of reason will be explored and I shall 
argue that both my reasons and my feelings should be authentic to 
me. Both reason and feeling, informing each other, blend in authentic 
relationship within the thoughts, feelings and acts of the individual. 
The relationship between reason and the passions·(feelings) has 
long exercised philosophers. Plato21 divides the soul into three 
elements comparing it to 'a charioteer and his two horses. The 
horses are taken to represent the spiritual and worldly aspects of 
the soul (feelings) and the charioteer is representative of reason. 
Reason helps with the control of the passions in this analogy. But 
Plato's example does not altogether separate reason and passion 
because w e r ~ ~ this to occur, the chariot would have no motive power 
whatever the skills of the charioteer. Successful action requires 
a balanced relationship between reason and passion in Plato's view, 
therefore. 
Hume rejects the Greek idea of a balance between reason and 
passion; reason, for Hume, is cast in the role of paSSion's Islave".22 
Reason concerns only connections between propositions involving 
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evidence and argument, therefore, in Hume's view. reason is 
theoretical and, so. passive in nature. It lacks the motive force 
to inspire action since only the passions have this capacity; thus 
an understanding of x cannot compel me to do y. Only when the 
individual is inclined by his desires or dislikes will he be in a 
position to act because passion will then dictate it; reason is left 
quite separate from such determination: 
"An active principle can never be founded on an inactive; 
and if reason be inactive in itself. it must remain so 
in all its shapes and appearances, whether it exerts 
itself in natural or moral subjects, whether it 
considers the powers of external bodies, or the actions 
of rational beings." 23 
In A Treatise of Human Nature. Book II, Part III, Section III 
and in Book III. Part I, Hume argues the case that reason is 
"inactive lJ and "can never be a motive" nor can it "oppose passion 
in the direction of the will"; it is held to be "perfectly inert" 
and "wholly inactive". However. reason is not discounted altogether 
in the Humean account as it is considered able to help in clarifying 
situations which the individual encounters but, even so. he is always 
initially directed by his feelings which determine his view of a 
situation. Reason may also help the passions realise those ends 
which they prescribe for the individual; reason can light his way 
but it cannot change his route. This contention will be questioned 
below, but Hume may be right on the point that, " •.. it is through 
their connection with a person's likes and dislikes, desires and 
aversions, concerns, interests and fears, that reasons ..• get a grip 
on his will, enable him to make up his mind, give him a motive for 
action. "24 
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However, Hume's account of the place of reason as inferior to 
passion is not acceptable as it stands. Our emotions may well alter 
given circumstances and considerations of a rational kind. Education 
itself has much to do with reason; Dearden makes the point that 
reason has a significant place within an intellectual educaton as 
an informer of emotion, so that: "An intellectual appreciation of 
long-term objectives, a firm grasp of general principles, or a 
loyalty to the requirements of truth may each conflict with particular 
emotions ... "25 The issues we regard as worthwhile may only come to 
appear so to us by the medium of reasoning when our perspectives are 
extended by education and reason. Our appetites for food or sex etc. 
are controlled, in some measure, by reason. Hume underrates the 
influence of reason upon feeling, an error which Plato avoids as 
shown by his analogy of the charioteer and the two horses by which 
he demonstrates the interaction of reason and feeling. Passion may 
not be reason's slave, but a person who claims to be autonomous will 
have achieved some balance and interaction between his reason and 
his passions; he is certainly not one in whom passion always rules. 
The Humean error of viewing reason as only passion's "slave" is 
virtually reversed by Kant. When writing of the individual's will 
Kant argues that reason should subdue "incl ination" (desire or 
feeling). In this he differs from his near contemporary, Herbart, 
who describes a balance of factors in his analysis of the will into 
both objective and subjective aspects which should be in harmony 
with each other. (Description and discussion of Herbart's analysis 
of the will follows in Chapter 3.) Kant unequivocally subjects 
feeling to reason's law: 
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II for reason, which recognizes as its highest practical 
function the establishment of a good will, in attaining 
this end is capable only of its own peculiar kind of 
contentment - contentment in fulfilling a purpose which 
in turn is determined by reason alone, even if this 
fulfilment should often involve interference with the 
purposes of inclination." 26 
"Inclination ll (feeling, paSSion, desire) is to be controlled by 
reason. Thus, in Kant's view, Hume's conception of the relationship 
between reason and passion left the individual merely heteronomous 
since passion controls and reason remains "inert" in directing the 
will of the individual to action. For Kant, the will is autonomous 
when ruled by reason which overrules "inclination ll • Passion 1s 
apparently distilled out of the rational will of the individual who 
acts in accord with his duty to the moral law. 
However, if a person acts according to his duty as revealed to 
him by Kantian practical reason, he cannot altogether act from 
prudential reasons; genuine respect for other persons as ends is part 
of one's duty and it cannot be to gain credit or approval for a 
virtuous act that an individual acting according to the dictates of 
Kantian practical reason seeks. The individual responding to duty 
by dictate of reason must, therefore, act from the right motives. And 
if this is so, a person's will to act for a good, moral purpose is 
influenced by "inclination ll to do the good; he must want the good 
and he must want to do his duty in accordance with reason. Therefore, 
reason and "inclination" operate together in directing the will to 
the good. 
Nevertheless, Kant's view, described above, distinguishes reason 
. from "inclination" and considers reason as a dictator over and 
above the "purposes of inc 1 ination". But if a person recognises 
that his reason directs him to his duty and he responds to his reason 
66 
(as Kant expects) and does his duty, he must in doing it want to do 
it; his ilinclination" is turned in the direction of his duty and action 
follows in which the duty is fulfilled. The individual may continue 
to want other things not construed by reason as his duty, but if he 
follows his reason along the path of duty, he must actually want to 
do this more than anything else at that time, in that situation. 
Therefore, the individual has a commitment towards the good and his 
duty generated by a combination of reason and "inclination", but 
"inclination" alone, separate and distinct from reason. should be 
rejected. 
Kant's argument that the power of reason directs the individual 
into a dispassionate respect for moral principles appears to remove 
even the prospect of passion for reason itself (an issue to be 
considered below). Reason may be distinguished from passion; it may 
be disinterested but without some passion or "inclination" it cannot 
be held to engage the will and, therefore, Kant's term, respect for 
others is, in practice, expressive of that "inclination" for the 
good to which reason and paSSion jointly direct the individual's will. 
A modern, influential view on the relationship of reason and 
feeling is that of Peters who acknowledges a place for passion in 
re I ati on to reason, but one fa r more c i rcumscri bed than that of Hume. 
Peters refers to rational passions for truth and other standards 
associated with reason. The individual who reasons out of a genuine 
concern for reason is paSSionate about it; he," •.• is one who has taken 
a critic into his own consciousness, whose mind is structured by 
the procedu res of a pub li c t rad i ti on" • 27 I n Peters's view, to be 
skilled at reasoning is inadequate because one must also care about 
reason. The Sophists who were good at reasoning did not, however, 
care enough about reason to escape Plato's critiCisms of their claims 
67 
to teach virtue, arete, in The Meno. 28 Mere virtuOSity in argument 
is insufficient criterion for caring, passionately, about reason. 
Peters stresses that there is an affective aspect to the exercise of 
reasons; " ... there is more to caring about reasons than an infinite 
regress of reasons for reasoning. At some point we have to have 
caught the concern ..• 11 This passion for reason, then,excludes the 
feelings, as such, and emphasises the importance of a concern for 
truth and criticism requiring depth and thoroughness in levels of 
reasoning. Such thoroughness and commitment to reason is what it means 
to Peters to attain rationality upon reason's continuum d e ~ c r i b e d d
earlier. Plato gives proper weight to reason, in Peters's view, but 
Aristotle who does not divorce reason from affective considerations 
in general, is regarded as one, " ... not sufficiently aware that 
the use of reason is a passionate business. 1I29 
However, apart from the passion for reason and reason's objective 
standards, Peters regards the passions as subsumed within a class of 
cognitions which he describes as appraisals. Peters has support in 
psychology for this perspective. For example, Lazarus 30 outlines an 
individual's response to threat as: first, cognition about the extent 
of the danger; second, a primary appraisal follows about the extent 
to which the individual regards himself as threatened; third, a 
secondary appraisal follows by which he determines causes of action 
appropriate to the danger he has appraised. The two appraisals may 
be virtually instantaneous but both are cognitive. However, the 
appraisal may not, necessarily, be rational; a person may perceive 
inaccurately and his beliefs may prove false, but the appraisal is 
cognitive. Feelings follow the cognitive appraisals but as they are 
often the most conspicuous feature, they may be wrongly taken to be 
the cause, "But the fundamental thing that generates an emotion is 
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the cognitive activity of appraisal and the impulses it 
generates. 1131 
Peters concurs with this psychological perspective and holds 
that if emotion is produced only by cognitive appraisals, emotion. 
itself, is passive and in order to manage such passivity, it is 
necessary to control and canalize it. Feelings are rather alien to 
IIwishful thinking", according to this view; feelings cannot, themselves, 
bring about action. But cognitive appraisals identifying what it is 
a person wants may then become a motive for subsequent action. 
Essentially Peters has it that reason is cognitive and appraisals 
of a cognitive kind lead to the control and utilization of emotion 
in pursuit of an individual's rational purposes. The subjection 
of emotion to reason has some similarity to Kant's account. 
The only passions which are attributed major significance akin 
to reason itself within the priorities of the individual are the 
rational passions. These passions do involve a type of affective 
support for standards of reason, as described above. And the rational 
passions are not only confined to theory, in Peters's acocunt, for 
in interpersonal relationships, care and consistency (as standards) 
should replace, " .•. slapdash, sporadic and subjective types of 
reaction. 1132 
However, this account of the emotions is open to question 
particularly (for my purpose here) concerning the passivity of emotions. 
White33 pOints out that emotions may also be motives and, therefore, 
relate to subsequent action; thus, fear, for example, can be both a 
feeling and a motive in that one may be frozen to the spot out of fear 
or one may run rapidly away from the savage dog (given cognition that ~ ~
a dog is a threat irrespective of whether that cognition is rational). 
White considers that the strength of feeling may be what distinguishes 
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emotion from motive. LYOns 34 agrees with this perspective on the 
issue of passivity. It seems possible to have a motive to murder. 
for example. but not eventually to dare to commit that murder because 
other factors overcome the strength of the motive although the motive 
still exists. Conversely. emotions may prove highly motivating: 
rage, hate, revenge, shame. remorse, etc .• etc. Emotions are passive, 
" .•. in the sense that the appraisals central to emotions affect 
the subject of the appraisals. But then m o t i v ~ s s can as well. and 
in so far as they do they become emotions. Emotions and motives 
overlap. ,,35 
It may be, therefore, that reason is not only the factor of 
cognitive appraisal and that emotion is not only the passive 
recipient of the verdict of an individual's appraisals. Such 
appraisals may well have a dimension of feeling associated with them 
and reason may be an association of both cognition and feeling. 
Reason and emotion may be a part of each other. 
The interrelation of reason and feeling is evident in Freud's 
analysis of ego and id. 36 The ego, representative of reason and 
rational reflection, is distinguished from the id which contains the 
passions .. (Freud also refers to the super-ego which contains restriction, 
prescriptions. compensations as, for example. are severe rules and 
restrictions which a father may impose on his children.) Freud 
cons iders that, liThe ego is not sharply separated from the id; its 
" "t "t ,,37 A d h b "f PI lower portlon merges In 0 1 • n per aps orrowlng rom ato's 
analogy of the charioteer, Freud indicates that the ego's link to the 
id is, 
II like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check 
the superior strength of the horse; with this difference. 
that the rider tries to do this with his own strength 
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while the ego uses borrowed forces ... Often a rider, if 
he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to 
guide it where it wants to go; so in the same way the 
ego is in the habit of transforming the id's will into 
action as if it were its own. "38 
Therefore, when the ego resists the appetites of the id, it does so 
by holding, tenaciously, to other feelings, emotions and attachments. 
So if a parent forgoes something he wants on behalf of a child, it 
is because he wants to do so, not because he is compelled to act in 
th i sway. I n Freud's wo rds, "... one must not take the difference 
between ego and id too hard and fast, nor forget that the ego is 
a specially differentiated part of the id."39 
This perspective of the ego is, then, removed from an 
identification of it as a controller of feelings as in Kant's or 
Peters's analyses, since the ego is simply " .•. midway between id 
and reality, it only too often yields to the temptation of becoming 
sycophantic, opportunist and lying, like a politician who sees the 
truth but wants to keep his place in popular favour. ,AO Reason 
and feeling are part of each other just as ego and id interact with 
each other in the Freudian analysis. It is a fusion or a blending 
of the two which enables an individual to care about persons, principles, 
things in general. Feeling may be, in some situations, highly 
motivating and, thereby, provide criteria wholly sufficient for a 
particular decision and course of action. Feelings may be rationally 
or irrationally motivating but without feeling as part of reason and 
an influence upon reasoning, it seems unlikely that anyone would 
want (i.e. have reason) to act at all. 
The aim of the following section is to describe reason linked 
to feeling and forming part of the practical capacity of an autonomous 
person either in education or in practical life in general. A version 
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of reason follows which considers both theoretical and practical 
aspects in connection with personal autonomy. 
(4) Practical reason 
Reason may be distinguished as theoretical or practical. The 
former has to do only with ratiocination in operating with propositions 
and testing for the truth of these; the process is largely 
intellectual. Practical reason also involves ratiocination but 
engages directly the wants and, therefore, the feelings and desires 
of the individual as the practical syllogism analysed below reveals. 
Practical reason includes the strength of an individual's motives 
and recognises within its operation individual authentic cho,ice and 
evaluation; it also has some relevance to moral reasoning. Practical 
reasoning is relevant to practical life and perspectives drawn from 
practical reason enable a person to use his reason in all situations 
of practical living and not only within the parameters of an 
intellectual education; he can act upon reason once convinced of 
its sufficiency in any particular case. 
Feeling is a part of practical reason,as the practical syllogism 
demonstrates, in which an effect is revealed against the pull of 
feeling and helps the individual concerned draw a practical judgement 
out of emotion and reason combined. It would be misleading to ignore 
the effect of feeling within the rational functioning of the 
individual. And Peters makes the point that, lilt is pOintless to 
tell people that they ought not to feel in a certain way if, in 
general, human beings cannot avoid being subject to such feelings."41 
The Aristotelian practical syllogism analyses the operation of 
practical reason thus: 
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I want x, 
Unless I do y I will not get x, 
Therefore, I must do y. 
The first premiss encompasses feelings, wants and desires; the second 
states a necessity without reference directly to wants; the conclusion 
entails particular action. Thus practical reason is a wants-
statement linked to natural necessity requiring a practical necessity 
analogous to a command. Within the practical syllogism, therefore, 
the individual's wants, feelings, motives, desires are determiners 
of whether or not action follows; if the motive is strong enough, 
action is entailed: "Thus to speak ofa practical syllogism is not 
just to speak of an argument or inference; it is to speak of a 
situation in which action necessarily occurs."42 Within the syllogism, 
" ••. the two premises result in a conclusion which is an action -
for example one thinks that every man ought to walk and that one is 
a man oneself: straightway one walks .•• What need I ought to make, 
I need a coat: I ought to make a coat. And the conclusion - 'I 
ought to make a coat' is an action. 1143 
The individual acts, therefore, because his wanted end (the 
deontic statement) combined with the realisation that unless he does 
something (anankastic statement) he will fail to achieve his end. 
This situation does not altogether remove all deliberation about ends 
nor deliberation about the effects of proposed actions upon several 
ends at the same time. Deliberation ceases only when something 
relatively specific can be decided upon and, in effect, be known by 
perception and direct experience. (And not all practical reasoning 
need be in the form of the practical syllogism.) However, the 
practical syllogism reveals how reason and paSSion may interact in 
practical reasoning, not in Hume's sense with passion determining 
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that our deep-down wants are just what we corre to do. but. liTo show 
why sorrething is an obligation founded upon interest. is not to 
show that it is something we ('really', 'innermost') want to do. but 
that it is something we have to do for the sake of that which we 
want .•. 44 Therefore. wants (feelings. emotions. desires. motives 
etc.) are linked with the necessities of a situation facing the 
individual and together they result in action. 
Moral reasoning and moral action are taken by Aristotle to be a 
part of practical reason. Theoretical reason (for example. in science) 
leads to explanations which require demonstration to be acceptable. 
but first principles may not always be capable of demonstration. 
According to Aristotle, sorre fundamental principles in theoretical 
or scientific reasoning must be accepted not by demonstration but 
by ~ ~ or intuition and the acceptance of fundamental prinCiples 
. which cannot ultimately be demonstrated avoids an infinite regress 
in seeking for a scientific explanation. In practical reason, 
adequate explanations require demonstration based upon fundamental 
principles which are a basis of justification; these principles are 
the ultimate end or ends of the inquiry. However, Aristotle seems 
to consider practical reason is also, ultimately, unjustifiable by 
scientific, rational demonstration; the ends, the fundamental 
principles, may only be known by intuition. Both practical and 
scientific or theoretical reasoning are viewed in a similar way by 
, 
Aristotle: n ••• ultimate ends are known by some kind of intellectual 
intuition. n45 Aristotle attaches having the right ends (underlying 
principles) as a condition of the excellence of practical reason 
and in matters of conduct the individual is compelled by practical 
reason to act in an appropriate interpersonal way, therefore: "If reason 
is practical it is so in this way ..• that the premises of the, argument. 
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in being reasons for believing the practical judgement, e.g. for 
believing that one ought to do a certain thing, are necessarily also 
reasons for acting in conformity with the judgement, i.e. for doing 
that thing. 1146 
The end (envisaged by Aristotle) is, itself, ultimately 
undemonstrable, known only by intuition and, presumably such an end 
is basically the good life, itself. Nevertheless individuals are 
likely to hold a wide variety of ends to which they apply practical 
reason; a life which is rationally ordered will not have only one 
end in view. Reason will explore an order of priorities among the 
ends of any individual; ends may clash and give way to each other. 
However, in Aristotle's view, rational organisation of one's p r a c t i c ~ l l
life and decisions seems impossible without some ultimate end, known 
by intuition rather than by scientific demonstration. It is the end 
which gives coherence and a sense of priority to all other ends. 
The individual is thereby enabled to order his priorities according 
to this means - end rational structuring. This intuitive recognition 
of a fundamental, underlying end, Aristotle perhaps sees as 
eudaimonia (happiness or human flourishing). The individual has 
within himself, authentically and rationally determined, a concept 
expressing what is, for him, the good life. A flourishing life 
becomes a second-order end giving coherence to the many other ends 
an individual may have. Practical reason helps the individual to an 
overall life plan; single ends may be wealth, reputation, altruism, 
etc. but, for Aristotle, happiness or human flourishing seems, 
intuitively, inclusive: 
II ••• further we think it (happiness) most deSirable of all 
things, without being counted as one good thing among others -
if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable 
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by the addition of even the least of goods; for 
that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and 
of goods the greater is always more desirable. 
Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, 
and is the end of action. II 47 
But Aristotle also attaches moral virtue to this end of happiness 
or human flourishing and the activity of practical reason expressed 
in the thought and acts of the phronimos (the practically intelligent 
person). Intellectual and moral virtues meet in this person and 
Aristotle,somewhat arbitrarily, attaches practical wisdom (with moral 
virtue) as an end of practical reason. The choice of ends of the 
phronimos must include practical wisdom and moral standards: 
" ••• the choice will not be right without practical wisdom any more 
than without virtue; for the one determines the end and the other 
makes us do the th i ngs that I ead to the end •• .48 
However, Aristotle seems open to criticism in attaching 
practical wisdom with right motives and choice of ends to the person 
with practical reason. The person of practical wisdom may have 
practical reason and adhere to moral standards, but so may also the 
rational egoist (for example, Alcibiades, the man who is clever but 
bad). Aristotle does not allow for the person of practical reason 
to be bad; he must have practical wisdom and act morally; he must 
act in the interest of the community. 
II(Men} should p r ~ y y that the things that are good 
absolutely may a so be good for them, but should choose 
the th ings that are good for them. II 49 
But however praiseworthy the aim, the argument seems insufficient. 
A man ought, in Aristotle's view, to come to hold the ends, motives 
and desires of the morally virtuous individual so that out of the 
right dispositions for moral actions he aims for the long-term good 
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described as eudaimonia: "The conception of the ultimate end as 
partly consisting in a life or morally virtuous action. therefore, 
is in effect a conception of eudaimonia as a comprehensively 
inclusive second-order end. u50 Moral virtue and a high level of 
practical reasoning appear to meet in eudaimonia. But there seems 
no good reason to require the man of practical reason to be morally 
virtuous. 
The limit of Aristotle's argument attaching moral virtue to 
practical reasoning (and autonomy) remains unresolved and the issue 
of moral virtue and autonomy will be considered further 1n Chapter 3 
but on a different basis, an analysis of personhood. 
A somewhat di fferent perspecti.ve upon practica I reason 
demonstrates the uneasy separation of reason into theoretical and 
practical aspects which Ryle has agreed is mistaken. 51 Reason as 
theory may be taken to involve the manipulation of propositions 
whereas reason as practice may be considered in connection with 
action, morals, practical life, "our capacity •.• to feel the proper 
feelings towards the inhabitants and the furniture of this world."52 
But Ryle shows that such capacities are not somehow internally 
separated from thought; therefore, II ••• in telling you what I was 
amused at •.• I am already telling you the thought without which I 
should not have been amused. 1I53 The thought was not the cause of 
the amusement in discrete, separated form from the amusement itself, 
it was part of the amusement - just as (says Ryle) the heads side of 
a coin is still a part of the coin. Therefore, it is not the case 
that, " .•• to do what one is doing or saying, one must perform, like 
lightning, a bit of thinking and then pass on to a bit of doing or 
saying. 1154 
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Theory and practice as thought and action are parts of the same 
and practical reason interlocks thought and action. It also has 
relevance to practical living and everyday human interactions, choices 
and decisions. In schools. for example, practical reason applies to 
situations within classrooms but also to those on school corridors. 
in school yards and playgrounds. the comings and goings. the smoking, 
the drinking. the glue sniffing. Practical reason also applies to 
the interpretation of situations by the individual's evaluation of 
the educational gains of work experience or community service. It 
has to do with a cognitive and affective active involvement in lived 
experience at first hand as well as in intellectual practices confined, 
largely. to classrooms. 
Situations of practical life involve personal autonomy because 
they involve all aspects of our nature as persons. Individuals do 
not function as in Kant's rational model. (as argued in Section 3) 
nor does practical reason operate. to useWiggins's example, like 
a snooker player who has to choose from the many shots possible the 
one which rates highest as a combination of, (a) the value of the 
shot (the colour of the ball) and. (b) the opportunity left available 
for the next shot. 55 Human life situations are rarely like this: 
" ... the relevant features of the situation may not all jump to the eye. To see what they are. to prompt the 
imagination to play upon the question and let it activate 
in reflection and thought-experiment whatever concerns 
and passions it should activate. may require a high 
order of situation appreciation oras Aristotle would say 
perception (aisthesis)."56 
Human concerns may be priorities for some yet not for others and 
will compete for a place on a hierarchy of priority. The sufficiency 
of any reason is unlikely to be a foregone certainty. A person 
faced with a particular situation may. on reflection. change his mind 
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when he grasps the costs or implications of proceeding as he may 
have intended. The individual has to find a way through the many 
possibilities confronting him and use his practical reason as part 
of his autonomous judgement of situations. Practical reason enables 
the individual to judge those key concerns and conSiderations within 
situations so that out of those cognitive and affective appraisals 
he comes to know how, when and why to act. 
It is misleading to regard reason as only properly evident 
in education when linked to the pursuit of truth as part of some 
intrinsic value within forms of knowledge. Human life situations do 
not neatly fit any particular set of laws or rules. The individual 
may only have practical reason upon which to rely and although some 
implications attaching to Aristotle's view of practical r e ~ s o n n may 
be unjustified, as considered above, he may well be correct to 
consider that, 
II ••• all law is universal but about some things it is not 
possible to make a universal statement which shall be 
correct ••. In fact this is the reason why all things 
are not determined by law, viz. that about some things 
it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is 
needed. For when the thing fs indefinite the rule also 
is indefinite •.. " 57 
As in the practical syllogism, practical reason comprises 
reason and feeling, for a starting point in reasoning is the deSire 
or want felt by the individual and its involvement, subsequently, in 
the judgement and action which follow. Wants and reasons are closely 
related: II ••• 'wants' emerge from 'wishes' when chi Idren begin to 
grasp that means can be taken to bring about or avoid ..• 
pleasurable or painful conditions. And with the emergence of 'wants' 
the notion of 'reason' emerges as well. For a 'reason for action' 
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is that end, for the sake of attaining or avoiding which, means can 
be devised. llsa Wants may express emotional turmoil within the 
individual and when an individual does not do what he apparently 
wants to do, in the sense that duty or obligation seem to override 
the want, that want seems to be lost. However, if a person acts 
because of what he feels he ought to do rather than do what he 
originally wanted, he must want to do what he ought to do more than 
wanting to realise his original preference. Therefore, the reason 
that a person eventually acts upon comprises the want which carries 
the requirement of action with it. Thus, lithe final explanation of 
what one does in terms of one's beliefs, which supplies an assessable 
reason not backed by any further reason, must correspond to a want. 1159 
The reason which the individual finally holds to comprises his 
ultimate want. To want to do something is, then, to have some 
reason for doing it and that reason results in the action which 
comprises the end of that reason; without the want, the reason lacks 
force to generate action and so the want becomes the reason. The 
original want may not be the final want because reason informs it 
but the final want is the reason for the choice and the action. If 
reason is somehow divorced from wants, as Kant's Practical Reason 
entails, reason is unlikely to influence action but, II ••• a want, 
to be a want at all, must influence action, whereas reason need not."60 
Kant presumably immerses wants within his concept of Practical Reason 
but does not indicate this in his description. But, as demonstrated 
by the practical syllogism, the want coupled with practical necessity 
produces the reason for the action. 
Wants and reasons combine in the individual's judgement of 
situations therefore. And the sufficiency of reasons is determined 
by an appreciation of the nature of the situation in Question. 
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The practical necessity which informs the person's wants enables 
him to exercise a judgement and act upon practical reason. 
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Some educational implications of reason, practical reason and 
autonomy 
Professor R. F. Dearden considers that an intellectual education 
is one particularly well suited to the development of personal 
autonomy. Reason governs such an education which need not be 
narrowly conceived as Dearden shows by including not only cognitive 
elements within it but emotion and moral judgement also. 61 
Elsewhere62 he stresses the importance of objective standards 
linked to truth (discussed in Section 2 above) which an intellectual 
education should yield when expressing rational thinking; he refers 
to the learner working towards the solution of a "geometrical 
problem ll or thinking II independently " in mathematics, science or 
history. A failure to achieve understanding of knowledge based upon 
objective, rational standards explains the lIinconsistencies, muddles 
and mistakes" which characterise the learner who has not mastered 
the appropriate rational standards. In Dearden's view, the heights 
of an intellectual education are to be found in the range of s t u d i e ~ ~
encountered within a university where knowledge, argued to be 
intrinsically valuable and based upon objective, public standards 
of reason, is held to be true beyond, " .•• particularities of time, 
place and identity ••. "63 This pursuit of truth in rational knowledge 
is what Peters argues should be supported by a calm, disinterested 
passion for reason. 
Although accepting the intrinsic value of rational knowledge 
and its public standards, Dearden's main j u s t i f i c a ~ i o n n for 
initiating a person into knowledge is in order to develop that 
individual's autonomy; an intellectual education is, therefore, to 
be considered instrumentally and practically valuable as a means to 
that end. Dearden wants to maintain personal autonomy as an aim of 
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education but the capacity of the individual to make judgements out 
of his personal autonomy is also what he seems to anticipate since 
autonomy, " .•• involves at least some degree of reflexive 
consciousness of oneself as having a distinct mind of one's own 
to make up and one's own life to lead, and it will eventually lead 
to claiming the right against others so to make up one's own mind 
and act. 1I63 The expectation that a person of sufficient autonomy 
will exercise autonomous judgements and ~ ~ in respect of these goes 
beyond the confines of an intellectual education. Dearden refers 
to action and may be assuming more from an intellectual education 1n 
developing autonomy than such an education can deliver because it 
is not clear why personal autonomy developed within the confines 
of an intellectual education should be equally applicable to actions 
and situations within practical life outside that intellectual education. 
Dearden considers that an individual in a professional career 
is likely to be more autonomous thana wage-slave. The implication 
seems to be that the one who progresses furthest in an intellectual 
education is likely to have achieved more personal autonomy than one 
who abandoned an intellectual education much earlier. A wage-
slave can exercise some measure of autonomy personal to himself and 
his family life. perhaps. but he lacks the capacity to exercise 
a wider autonomy. The doctor, the lawyer, the teacher who proceed 
further than many with intellectual education are, on this account, 
more likely to be able to exercise personal autonomy than, say, the 
successful entrepreneur who gave up on a formal intellectual education 
years before the others. However. the education and professional 
training of doctors. lawyers and teachers requires their engagement 
in practical activities having instrumental purposes which must be 
motivating to those learners since their wants (to acquire the 
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practical abilities and skills to practise in their chosen 
professions) sustain them through the rigours of learning and 
training. Their later education is practical rather than 
intellectual. Indeed, the wage-slave, whom Dearden puts in contrast 
to the professional, may be an aspect of all persons and the decline 
in the need for the unskilled in our modern society requires, 
increasingly. individuals to be more skilled, more competent. more 
able to act in situations of increasing complexity than ever before -
whatever their occupation. 
Reason in education has a practical dimension which requires 
direct individual engagement in actions and Situations involving 
educational practices. The association of wants with reasons within 
practical reason emphasises the need to use reason appropriate to the 
level of individual development (as Piaget describes). Reasoning 
with a child must be done in relation to his stage of development 
if the practical necessities of a Situation are to merge with his 
wants, yielding practical reason meaningful to him and resulting in 
action. The reasoning wh ich teachers and parents undertake w,tth the 
young should aim to inform the child's wants in order to assist the 
resolution of conflicts between wants so that situations can be 
appreciated from different situational perspectives. But without 
wants. reasons are unlikely to bite. In situations involving 
guidance to the young, attachments and caring relationships between 
children and young persons and their parents and teachers are of 
major significance because if such relationships are, " .•. affective 
and affectionate ••. ,,64 there may be more likel ihood that wants 
informed by reason ensure an appropriate appreciation of situations 
both within educational contexts and in all dimensions of practical 
life. 
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If an individual learner is to exercise reason and develop 
autonomy in education, he must directly engage in a practice. His 
thoughts and feelings must engage the nature of the practice directly 
whatever the nature of that practice - intellectual or otherwise. 
And if reason is to be realised in education and in practical life 
later on, all educational activity must be in some way, practical. 
In an intellectual education, intellectual practices, such as 
Dearden IS examples of mathematics and history, should be experienced 
at first hand; the teacher IS task is, then, to ensure the student 
encounters the actuality of the practice - but at a level 
appropriate to the learner's reason. The endeavours and dilemmas 
of learning should be felt by the learner. And it may be that it 
is chiefly through procedural aspects of knowledge, in learning how 
to learn and in the acquisition of skills that reason in all its 
dimensions can facilitate the development of personal autonomy within 
education. (This issue is further explored in Part 3.) 
Should a student not engage his wants coupled with the sufficiency 
of his reasons in learning within those practices which comprise 
his education at first hand, he will not have.opportunity to develop 
his own powers of reason nor is it likely that his autonomy will 
develop. There certainly seems little justification to claim that 
personal autonomy will develop outside the strict confines of the 
intellectual education which Dearden describes unless the individual 
is required to engage his reason directly to the practices of his 
education. 
What should be a more likely means to ensure the development of 
personal autonomy within education and outside it in practical life 
is for the learner to grapple directly with the thoughts, feelings 
and actions entailed by reason when it is applied within an educational 
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practice. Thus, in an intellectual education the student should 
think and feel as a mathematician and the history student should 
handle the implications of particular primary and secondary evidence 
directly; only by seeking solutions himself to the problems of 
learning within the practices of intellectual disciplines may the 
individual's reason be exercised in learning situations and so perhaps 
also carry into other situations in practical life in general. 
The implications of reason in formal education are explored in 
Part 3. There I shall endeavour to show how the learner's reason 
may have most scope when educational activity is a series of 
practices directly engaging the individual himself for only then may 
that person's reason be effectively utilized. 
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Introduction 
The preceding two chapters analyse the components of autos and 
nomos which together comprise autonomy. Reason and the criteria it 
picks out inform the nomos of the concept and authenticity more 
particularly illuminates the autos (self). However, the autonomy 
under consideration is personal autonomy and the adjective holds 
major significance as Dearden indicates: "There is no redundancy 
in insisting on the adjective in this phrase. Autonomy can 
intelligibly be attributed to many other sorts of things besides 
persons. ,,1 
The first use of autonomy may have been in connection with the 
Athenian polis, a City-state maintaining an individual identity under 
its own laws, traditions and customs. And the City-state was 
regarded by Aristotle as the only political form in which the 
individual person could pursue his life's purpose or telos which 
Aristotle associated with eudaimonia (referred to in the previous 
chapter as human flourishing or happiness) or, as MacIntyre expresses 
it, " •.• the state of being well and doing well in being well, of 
a man's being well-favoured himself and in relation to the divine."2 
It is the good for the individual and for the polis for in Aristotle's 
experience eudaimonia and autonomy were goods both for the individual 
person and for the state. The private good of the individual was 
inextricably linked with the public good so that each member of the 
community acknowledged responsibilities towards other members. 
However. in modern society when an individual has the power of autonomy 
but lacks a sense of the public good, his autonomy may be used to 
exploit others. Dearden instances the 'rational egoist' as such an 
indi v idua 1. 
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This chapter aims to show how the implication of person. in. 
for and through education has considerable significance for the 
concept of personal autonomy as an educational ideal. Persons have 
both rights and responsibilities attaching to them. An individual 
has rights respecting his status as a person; those individuals who 
commit murder are not put to death in this society; paternalist 
interventions are circumscribed. (Paternal ism is the subject of 
Chapter 6.) However, responsibilities also attach to persons 
although in everyday life there may be no certain way by which to 
ensure an individual exercises the responsibilities ofa person with 
acts with due regard to appropriate standards of inter-personal life. 
Nevertheless personhood as an ideal does hold implications for 
responsibilities of a social and moral kind for among the 'endowment' 
of a person explored in Section (1) below is the concept of 
universality and reciprocal awareness and relationship to other 
persons. Section (3) further examines the social context in which 
the individual person develops in personal autonomy; Section (4) 
outlines the value of a sense of community within which the personally 
autonomous individual functions. 
It is my contention throughout this chapter and the theSis 
as a whole that an ideal of personhood does attach social and moral 
responsibility to the individual. This is not to claim that all 
'persons' are necessarily moral. But to hold personal autonomy to 
be an educational ideal and properly to explicate the relevance of 
personal autonomy (as distinct from any other autonomy) both attach 
moral and social responsibility to the concept of a personally 
autonomous individual. However. I should emphasise at this point 
that my brief is very different from that of John White's and others 
who have explored means of reconciling pupil-centred educational aims 
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with moral aims. 3 White explores the area of educational aims as 
a whole; my concern is solely an analysis of the concept of a person 
in connection with personal autonomy. 
The format of this chapter is first to define in Section (1) 
what the concept of a 'person' may be held to be in comparison and 
contrast with the 'self' and the reciprocal nature of the social 
identity and responsibilities of persons is explored. The Kantian 
concept of a person as an 'end' is analysed and that 'distinctive 
endowment' of a person referred to by Mill is described in its 
components of reason, the will and the universality of reCiprocal 
responsibilities. 
Section (2) demonstrates rational autonomy as the end of 
psychological theories of the development of persons and shows 
the related concepts of 'person' and 'rational autonomy' to be 
closely associated. An alternative perspective of individual 
development in the virtues (from the Greek tradition) is also 
considered as part of the theme of the development of persons. 
Sections (3) and (4) consider the individual of personal 
autonomy in a social context and explore the sense of community which 
attaches essential social and moral responsibilities of personhood 
to the educational ideal of personal autonomy. 
The chapter concludes, in Section 5, with a brief discussion 
of Dearden's view of personal autonomy which the implications of 
personhood analysed in this chapter put in question. 
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(1) The concept of a person 
In order to attain personal autonomy, one must first be a person 
and in clarifying what is meant by a person. it is easy to adopt a 
stipulative definition which may colour consideration of autonomy 
applied to persons. However, use of a stipulative definition here 
will be resisted because, " ••• stipulative definit10ns of person can 
have a dramatic effect on the outcomes of metaphysical, moral and 
poli tica I reason:ings. 114 But as the Oxford Eng Ii sh Dictionary offers 
seven separate meanings with several meanings sub-divided, the 
temptation to stipulate is strong and, perhaps, may not be altogether 
avoided. 
Bailey stipulates: "By 'person' I mean a rational living bOdy.IIS 
He seems to combine two sub-divisions of the O.E.D. for his 
definition: 'a self-conscious or rational being' and 'living body 
of a human being'. And he produces a hierarchy from this: 
"a) non-living bodies ..• things 
b) non-sentient living bodies ••• plants 
c) non-rational sentient living bodies ••• animals 
d) rational living bodies ••• persons." 6 
Just why persons lack sentience in item (d) is never fully clarified 
because Bailey indicates that; "Recognition of something as a person 
involves the attribution to the other of feelings, capacities for 
pleasure and pain ... " etc.? Sentience is Simply 1rrelevant or 
inconvenient to Bailey's a r g u ~ n t t which follows his definition. 
Further, the style of Voltaire's reported comment on the Holy Roman 
Empire as neither holy, nor Roman, nor an emp1re may be extended to 
Bailey's definition of person as 'rational living body' as it is 
arguable that a person must be either, rational, or living or a body. 
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The insane or infants may well Qualify as persons although they 
are unlikely to display rationality; however, they are both members 
of a rational species and. thus, rationality may, perhaps. be assumed, 
whereas displays of intelligence by higher primates do not Qualify 
them as rational. But not all persons are living in a physical or 
human sense as grammatical use of first. second, third persons,or 
theological use of the three persons of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
or institutions described as bodies such as universities or colleges 
illustrate. Descartes is even prepared to dIspense with BaIley's 
body by identifying a person with a mind only: "I was a substance 
whose whole essence and nature consists only 1n thinking" for. 
" .•• the mind by which I am is wholly distinct from the bOdy.IIB 
Presumably then, on Descartes's view, a person who stopped thinking 
for ever, ceased to be a person and it might be in order to switch 
off the life support machine for the one whose brain was dead and 
who would, never again, be able to think. Descartes's view 1s 
constricting in that a person need never have contact with others 
throughout his life, but he would be a person because he was a 
centre of consciousness. However, most persons may well regard 
their bodies as of crucial significance to them and the loss of a 
limb may be of immeasurable significance to a person; physical pains 
and pleasures and bodily actions are matters of immediate note to 
the individual. 
Bailey'S innocuous definition of 'rational living body' 
attributed to a person is. then, stipulattve, but virtually any 
definition of person is likely to be so because of the wide-ranging 
implications of the concept of a person. Perhaps to accept that 
rationality should be, in a normative sense, a major characteristic 
of a person and that he or she is a human being is suffIciently 
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broad and in keeping with common usage to explore in conr.ection with 
the concept of personal autonomy. 
Practical reason, as the nomos of autonomy may then be held as 
a normative component of a person. But the autos or self of 
autonomy, described as authentic in Chapter 1. has yet to be explored 
in connection with a person. One perspective upon the relationship 
of autos and person would be simply to equate the two. But Dearden 
pOints out, as indicated above. that the adjective, personal, as 
part of personal autonomy. is not redundant because autonomy may 
be applied to many things other than to persons. Therefore, when 
autonomy is applied to persons rather than to city-states etc., the 
nature of the autos is presumably influenced by the implication of 
the meaning of person. 
The D.E.D •• in a philosophical sense, describes a person as 
a 'self-conscious or rational being' or as the 'actual self of a 
human being'. thereby inferring that self or autos and person are 
the same thing. Nevertheless. usage does indicate some difference. 
Self is used reflexively, for example. as in myself or yourself. 
and person can be used to identify others grammatically or literally. 
Persons may be counted rather than selves. My person. and its 
evidential associations, may be identified in a way that my self 
cannot because while others may identify my person. only I can 
know myself. If I leave my jacket with wallet (containing not 
unduly incriminating evidence about me) on the classroom desk and 
invite my pupils to explore this evidence. they find out about my 
person by using the evidence rather than about my self. An individual 
knows his own body and mind in the most intimate way; they are not 
separable from himself and loss of a limb may well be of drastic 
importance to the individual's self. Although such a loss would 
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also be of importance to a person, an individual would still be 
recognised as the same person by those who formally knew him in 
spite of his physical loss. One who becomes mentally deranged may 
still be recognised as the same person by others when he may fail 
to recognise his original self. Therefore (as described in 
Chapter 1) treatment of a person who cannot recognise himself may 
require confirmation of his person (as his public self) by his 
psychoanalyst and by other persons. 
However, in real life (rather than in conceptual analysis) 
person and self are the same. Sartre's concept of self and 
criterion less choice of self were shown to be incoherent in 
Chapter 1 because although the authentic individual is a deep, 
reflective evaluator of his own motives and purposes, he is a person 
in the world of others and in relationship with individuals, groups, 
communities and the social world. Personhood should not be 
conceived of as a role in which the self may hide in Sartrian 
mauvaise foi. One1s self should be present in the person of that 
'social self' recognised by others as father, son, husband, 
teacher, community m e m b ~ r r etc. 
"These are not characteristics that belong to human 
beings aCCidentally, to be stripped away 1n order to 
discover 'the real me'. They are part of my substance, 
defining partly at least and sometimes wholly my 
obligations and my duties. Individuals inherit a 
particular space within an interlocking set of social 
relationships; lacking that space they are nobody, or 
at least a stranger or an outcast. 1I 9 
Nevertheless, one's person is how one's self is identified in 
relationships in social life in general: 
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II the concept of a person is the concept of one who 
has the concept of a person. This draws attention to 
the reflexive nature of the concept of a person and 
that in turn leads to a view of persons as necessarily 
social, since persons not only see themselves as persons 
but al so others as persons like themsel ves. II 10 
Thus, I am recognised as a person by others and recognise others 
as persons in turn and this generates the idea of a social group 
of persons. A person is a social being, therefore; he does not 
live a separate, totally isolated existence; he lives in a world 
of others and shares this world with others. He has, II ••• a shared 
conception of the world - for example, a shared concept of a 
person - or shared purposes as when persons co-operate to bring 
about common ends, as in formal education.,,11 Sharing a common 
conception of the world, persons can consciously bring about change 
and, therefore, may be held responsible for what it is they bring 
about; things, plants and animals, from Bailey'S hierarchy referred 
to above, are not attributed responsibility because, unlike persons, 
they cannot conSistently bring about change. 
One's claims to be any particular person or kind of person 
must be recognised and upheld by other persons. If I cl a 1m to be 
any particular person, my person requires recognition by others as 
such for I cannot be a leader or member of any group unless that 
group recognises me as leader or member. Reciprocity is imperative; 
language only has meaning between persons in groups. communities 
and societies; money is a commodity of value only to exchange 
between persons; a teacher must, II ••• be seen by others as in 
authority, the others concerned including some at least of those 
over whom authority is exercised. 1I12 
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The reciprocal nature of the social identity and responsibilities 
of persons holds implications for the nature of the relationships 
which develop between them. A person can consider himself within 
his group or community as, II ••• socially responsible or accountable 
for his actions. 1I13 Therefore, impersonal, moral standards should 
follow in the social rules and interaction between persons in 
society as from childhood they increasingly come to recognise 
themsel ves as persons as seen by, II ••• others who are al so seen as 
seeing themselves in the same way.1I14 
In what follows in this chapter, then, a person is taken to 
be the concept of a rational human being existing in societies or 
communities and as such a concept attaching to it moral significance, 
II ••• For morality, if it exists for anything, exists for the sake 
of human beings, not for the sake of a philosophically defined set 
of rational substances." 15 The association of person with reason, 
community and morals and to personal autonomy are themes explored 
below. 
(a) Persons as ends 
Immanuel Kant lived in the wake of a scientific revolution 
which stimulated the ideas of eighteenth century enlightenment. To 
the SCientists of the seventeenth century, nature seemed a vast 
mechanism over which man could exercise control. Man could use 
his scientific discoveries to his own ends and although his new 
knowledge made him an agent of change, he was also part of nature 
and the natural world. The enlightenment held human reason to be 
centrally important, not only in SCience, but also in the ethiCS 
which had to take account of scientific advances. Kant, however, 
in attempting to e ~ p l i c a t e e the centrality of Practical Reason in 
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governing man, seems to employ reason in man as the essence of his 
ethics. But, "Reason can supply ... !!£. genuine comprehension of 
man's true end; ••. 1116 because whereas in the ancient world, 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics describes a teleological scheme 
showing a " ••• fundamental contrast between man - as - he - happens -
to - be and man - as - he - could - be - if - he - realised - his -
essenti al - nature ••• ,,17, Kantlan reason had no such telos. For 
Aristotle and his mediaeval commentator, Thomas Aquinas, exercise 
of the virtues ensured the transition of man towards his "true end" 
or telos. But this tradition in ethics may have been lost in the 
eighteenth century enlightenment when the human self was first 
thought to have achieved recognition of its own autonomy. Thus 
Kant's ethical theory may, in some respects, be seen as an attempt 
to find a telos for man in reason and autonomy to replace the loss of 
the traditional, ancient concept of the public identity of a person 
exercising the virtues and thus realising his true end as a 
rational human being whose activities were circumscribed by a social 
and moral context. 
In Kant's theory, man is identified as an end and a moral 
being; II ••• morality is the condition under which alone a rational 
being can be an end in itself, because only through it is it 
possible to be a legislative member in the realm of ends ••. For, 
as an end in himself, he is destined to be legislative in the realm 
of ends, free from all laws of nature and obedient only to those 
which he himself gives. ,,18 Things are accorded relative value and 
of use only for the satisfaction or happiness they may provide for 
the individual. In Kant's view, an autonomous individual 
or person holds absolute value and every rational person is the 
concern of every other rational person. And it is wrong to use 
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persons as "means only"; persons must not lose their dignity as 
persons to be made, for example, slaves or tools of others because 
this would be to treat them only as a means to some other end. 
Persons are used as means in normal, everyday social 
transactions. If I buy or sell anything to another person, both he 
and I use each other as a means to achieve the sale or purchase; 
however, neither of us should use each other as a means ~ . .
There is a strict limit to which we use each other only as a means. 
During the transaction between us, I should still regard the other 
person as a person in his own right, a sharer in our common social 
identity, embracing and going beyond his role as salesman and in this 
sense I regard him as an end in himself. For Kant, reason led him 
to a perspective that persons are " ••• objective ends - that is, 
things whose evidence is in itself an end ••• " Therefore, his 
practical imperative is: "Act in such a way that you always treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, 
never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end." 19 
To describe someone as an end seems odd. An end is the desired 
product of a course of action distinguished from means or methods; 
in the era of payment by results 1n schools, children's 
demonstration of knowledge to inspectors was a means by which the 
school gained the end of financial security. Schools currently 
affected by falling pupil rolls may see the attracting of new pupils 
as a means of keeping teachers' jobs. However, if an end is, in 
itself, valuable so that for example, a pupil is not only regarded 
as a means of absorbing knowledge, but is seen as a person in his 
own right who is better for the knowledge that he gains, then he 
is, in a sense, the end of the process of learning. So, " .•• to 
respect a person as an end is to respect him for those features 
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which make him what he is as a person and which, when developed, 
consti tute his flourish ing. 1120 Those features are what Mill describes 
as, II ••. the distincti ve endowment of a human being. 1121 They are 
the merits of a person; they are what is intrinsically valuable about 
him or her. 
(b) The I endowment I of a person 
(i) Reason, in Kant's view,is the power which, through its processes 
of legislation, will make a person moral and, therefore, the primary 
element of his endowment is his power to reason. Each person is 
Ii nked to every other person by reason: liThe practi ca I necess i ty of 
acting according to •.• duty, does not rest at all on feelings, 
impulses and inclinations; it rests merely on the relation of rational 
beings to one another, in which the will of the rattonal being must 
always be regarded as legislative, for otherwise it could not be 
thought of as an end in itself. Reason, therefore, relates every 
maxim of the will as giving universal laws to every other wiI1. .• 1122 
Reason, then, guides the will of the person in making maxims to be 
applied as universals. Kant's view of the relations between persons, 
the morality of social life, has a strong legalistic aspect in that 
it is always the maxim of a person IS will which expresses a principle 
of universal legislation. In describing the principle that one 
should, IIAct according to the maxim wh ich can at the same time make 
itself a universal law 1123, Kant requires that the actions of the 
individual should be those which every person should do or will, 
themselves. Reason is accorded the status of a power over the Moral 
Law which should be obeyed in a world community of persons who are 
free yet whose wills are controlled by their duty to obey the will of 
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other rational persons. In summary, then, rationality led to maxims 
of the will which became universalised moral laws which had to be 
obeyed and which Kant expressed as the Categorical Imperative. 
However, there are difficulties with a Kantian perspective of 
the process leading to the Categorical Imperative as the 'endowment' 
of the person. The Renaissance may first have articulated an 
individualism which scientific ideas and the Enlightenment of the 
eighteenth century took further. Traditional social authority of 
priest or guardian and the individual's social and community identity -
akin to the virtue which Aristotle terms friendliness, a public 
friendship between persons - diminished. 24 The motive force of the 
acts of the individual and that to which he had to account, in 
Kant's view, was conscience. a kind of inner self. It was those 
inner thoughts. the .promptings. the oyercoming of reluctance. the 
delays which made the individual his own man. He might decide that 
it was wrong to kill, to steal etc. but another might consider it 
right to perform an abortion or to steal a drug vital to a friend's 
life which he could not otherwise obtain. An individual acting 
according to his private conscIence was performing a private act and 
his view of himself determined the nature of his moral actions. 
However. as this process was individualised. Kant sought a way to 
universalise moral issues so that each individual was bound by them. 
Each individual could make moral law and contribute to the binding 
power of universal moral law; each moral legislator acted according 
to the will of his conscience, his highest rational personality, 
which bound the individual to the universals which he, himself, 
willed. Should a man will that every member of a society could lie 
because he did so himself. chaos would result if nobody told the 
truth. Reason was the key endowment of the individual enabling him 
104 
to contribute to the making of this somewhat mechanical, legalistic 
concept of universal imperatives. 
Kant's thesis is, however, open to question in that. liMy 
judgement that certain general rules or principles pass the 
universalization test, does not suffice to show that I am morally 
bound to obey them."2S And, if laws exist which do not pass the 
same test, this also does not decide that I should not obey them. 
"He (Kant) seems to have jumped from the fact that a society which 
grants its members democratic rights of participation in the making 
of laws, is autonomous, to the conclusion that the individual 
members of such a society are also literally autonomous."26 After 
all, if a society is democratiC in giving each person a share in the 
law-making of that society his share must be very small in any large 
modern society given that his share is equal to that of others. 
(Smaller communities may yield other perspectives.) Only if each 
person's self-legislating will co-incides with all others' wills can 
the law be universalised and even if all wills do coincide, any 
one member of that society can still question whether he should obey. 
Kant's moral system based on rationality does not determine that 
'endowment' of the individual referred to above. Reason, alone, 
cannot prescribe a content to morality as Kant's scheme assumes. 
Although Kant's thesis of morals is questionable, reason is of 
major significance to the nature of the 'endowment' of a person. 
Practical reason, discussed in Chapter 2, in both its rational and 
affective dimenSions, is concerned with actions of the individual 
and although reason may not, alone, produce moral precepts. it can 
significantly influence the form by which a set of moral beliefs 
may be arrived at; thus, " ••• although a consideration of rationality 
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cannot provide us with any help on the issue of what moral principles 
we should adopt and act upon, it can tell us a good deal about the 
form, the manner, the language of our moral code, displaying the 
need for this to be coherent, consistent and subject to evidence 
and reasons of a publ ic kind. 1127 Indeed, Downey and Kelly argue that 
to seek for a set content of moral principles is to " .•. surrender 
one1s autonomy and all claims to indlviduality."28 If one doesn't 
have a set content of morals one retains autonomy and individuality, 
in their view, and this, in itself, is a moral gain. However, 
discussion of respect for persons and first and second order moral 
principles are reserved for Section b(iii) below. 
Dearden also finds that reason cannot prescribe moral principles: 
"Moral concern for others is moral concern for others, and not for 
the protection of our own a u t o ~ o m y . . 1129 And he regards mora Ii ty as 
a limit upon the freedom of the individual and,hence,a threat to 
autonomy. But he contrasts such a s1tuation with one by which, 
"If we start from a moral point of view then a different sort ot' 
autonomy becomes possible. We can now make independent moral 
judgements, and we can reflect (morally) on the criteria of judgement 
which we employ, holding to what we really think with what will now 
become moral integrity."30 However, it is not "we", alone, who must 
start from the moral point of view. It is the person within personal 
autonomy who is prescriptive of a moral pOint of view within the 
nature of the concept. Persons logically precede their attainment 
of any measure of autonomy and if morals exist for anything they 
exist for human beings as persons 1n that public or social sense 
referred to above: " .•. it is the ability to think for oneself, to 
make choices and to act morally •.• that constitutes what it means 
to be human."31 
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Children must be brought up from infancy in some context of 
values; by engaging in educational practices, opportunity for 
a cultivation of virtues within developing dispositions should be 
afforded the learner but only if he has scope for some measure of the 
exercise of autonomy in his learning. Personal autonomy should then 
be a means for developing dispositions of a moral as well as an 
intellectual nature. (The exercise of personal autonomy in educational 
practices is considered in Part 3.) Rational autonomy and developing 
moral dispositions become complementary, 1n an educational context. 
The person comes to show, perhaps, those characteristics of personhood 
described by Wilson: 
PHIL (HC), " ..• having the concept of a 'person'." 
PHIL (CCl, " ••• Claiming to use this concept in an overriding, 
prescriptive and universalized (O,P and U) principle. 1I 
PHIL (RSF) (DO and PO), " ••• having feelings which support 
this principle. either of a 'duty-oriented' (DO) or a 
'person-ori ented t (PO) kind. II 32 
Baier33 presents an analysis of how a person exercises his 
reason in making moral judgements. He offers four types of 
proposition in a hierarchy of rational judgements. The first type 
yields answers to questions about whether it is right or wrong for 
someone to do something at one particular pOint 1n time; the 
second type considers whether acts such as killing are wrong for 
everyone in all circumstances or only for certain categories of 
persons in particular circumstances; the third type of proposition 
tests the second type and comprises general principles such as 
justice or benevolence. The fourth, final, level of propositions 
concerns statements about the rationale for and function of the 
institution of morality and this level of proposition justifies. 
questions or explains a person's adherence to the general principles 
the individual comes to hold from level three upwards. 
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However, Baier is unable to show why persons should reason in 
this way. If an individual lives in a moral community, Baier's 
hierarchy of moral reasoning carries weight; it becomes valuable 
and desirable to all to live in a moral community. However, an 
ind-ividual may prefer to live in a moral community and not follow 
the rules; he may reason very differently from the hierarchy Baier 
describes, or he may only reason according to it for solely 
prudential motives or for even more selfish purposes to exploit 
opportunities for selfish gains from a conununity very largely given 
over to Baier's analysis. 
The educational task has to do with the development of a sense 
of moral community, in schools and in wider communities later on, 
in which the dispositions of rational persons in exercising moral 
and intellectual virtues are formed; therefore, " ••• the fact that 
the concept of a person entails a community of persons who acknowledge 
each other's interests as reasons for actions explains why self-
interest must be defined as consistent with the interests of others 
and thus with mora Ii ty. 1134 
(ii) A further component of the 'endowment' of a person is his will 
which Peters rightly points out is only contingently aSSOCiated with 
autonomy. It is, however, central to the nature of personhood. A 
person exercises his will and it is regarded as a quality of that 
individual rather than some component of the nomos of his autonomy 
because, like reason, it may be thought of as a process enabling the 
individual to fulfil his purposes. Straughan describes two traditional 
perspectives on the will as competitive and conformist. 35 The former 
is considered to be essentially Kantian in the struggle it entails 
between inclination and obligation; the latter tradition is, 1n 
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origin, Aristotelian and the account which follows holds, largely, 
but not exclusively to the latter. 
Kant views the will as 'autonomous' in that only action 
compatible with the autonomy of the will is permitted. The will is 
based upon reason which is distinguished from desires, wants and 
the emotions. The collective will of all rational persons produces 
the Categorical Imperatives which all persons must obey. The 
rational will is thought to be controlled by allowing the interests 
of all rational persons to influence the individual's choices and 
he becomes both maker and subject of the moral law. Thus the 
maxims of the will become the basis of universal law, binding upon 
all; everyone is enjoined to acton the principle that: " •. his will 
is therefore never to perform an action except on a maxim such as 
can also be regarded as universal law, and consequently such that 
the will can regard itself as at the same time making universal law 
by means of its maxim."36 However, the Kantian concept of reason is 
considered in Chapter 2, Section 3, and there it is argued that reason 
and inclination or desire must together influence the will. If 
emotion is removed from reason there seems little prospect for 
reason to engage the will of the individual, therefore, practical 
reason encompasses reason and emotion and a person's inclinations 
should be acknowledged as part of the will. 
The somewhat oddly named conformist tradition of the will is, 
perhaps, more apparent in Herbart's analysis of the will because 
although considerably influenced by the Enlightenment and Kant, 
Herbart's analysis shows associations with a more ancient tradition. 
He shares Kant's conviction that the essence of morality lay in a 
'good' will, therefore it is the teacher's task to make the child's 
will 'good'. Education, for Herbart, is concerned with morality 
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first and foremost, but morality is also made a part of a highly 
structured pedagogy sub-divided into government, discipline and 
instruction forming a kind of grid, or synthesis, of teaching and 
learning. Underlying the whole educational scheme is ethics and 
linked to it is the will. 37 
Herbart analysed five elements of the will with each element 
sub-divided. The first element is inner freedom which is possible 
only when the two parts of the will are in harmony; one part, the 
'objective' or 'obeying' will is based in wants, desires. appetites 
and the 'subjective' or 'commanding' part of the will is that 
responsive to moral considerations. The 'obeying' part 1s commanded 
by its counterpart creating inner freedom for the individual. This 
has similarity to Kantian reason subjecting emotion to the maxims 
of the will, but Herbart considers there could be an intuitive 
recognition of the good - like the ear recognising a combination of 
musical sounds as pleasing. The idea of balance or harmony is 
evident. However. there are evident difficulties aSSOCiated with 
intuition and an intuitive sense of the good because clearly unless 
the dispositions of the person are moral. intuition may well mislead. 
The second element of the will, in Herbart·s analysis. is 
'perfection'; this expresses the force of the will, a kind of ego-
strength. and Herbart can admire Napoleon Bonaparte's will although 
disapproving of the directions it took. The third element of the 
will is 'benevolence' shown when the will of one person complements 
that of another and mutual striving develops. The fourth and fifth 
elements chiefly concern the relations between wills; 'rights' or 
'law' is a fourth element and ensures that competition between wills 
is resolved by 'law' in the attainment of the object. 'Law' should 
operate in maintaining a conflict-free harmony between wills, not 
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displeasing to an aesthetic sense. The final element is 'recompense' 
or 'requittal' to ensure that if 'law' is infringed - recompense 
is approved; Herbart seems to have an analogy with punishment arising 
from the criminal law in mind. 
All elements of the will should harmonize, in Herbart's 
analysis - both the 'objective' and 'subjective' parts and all five 
elements: .. only all of them combined can give direction to 
Ii fe ... 38 Irrational actions might result from a loss of anyone 
component because man is considered likely to be morally one-sided. 
Although all elements of the will should harmonize in the adult, 
Herbart considers that young children will most benefit from emphasis 
in teaching an extension of the inner will at first and education 
should stimulate wide-ranging interests to give scope for this 
development. 
Herbart's analysis of the will is the essence of his theory of 
ethics and is Kantian in making the will of major importance and in 
associating this with reason for the determinations of the will are 
to be essentially rational in kind. However, Herbart's emphasis 
upon harmony and balance between the elements of the will in order 
to achieve an appropriate means seems reflective of an Aristotelian 
perspective upon the virtues. Sophrosyne, a balance Or harmony and 
a uniting of the virtues may express a synthesis of moral virtues 
in Aristotle's view. Such a virtue seems to represent the idea of 
self-control or self-rule as in a balance of reason and feeling achieved 
in practical reason. 
Also partly in the sphere of a Kantian, competitive perspective 
on the will is Peters 39 who views it as concerned with action having 
strong connections with moral considerations. Consistency in holding 
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to moral principles, in his view, is only possible if persons, 
II ..• genuinely care about the considerations which are incorporated 
in fundamental principles." Standing firm against desires and wants 
or to IIsocial pressure" is only likely if rational persons are, 
II •.• passionately devoted to fairness, freedom and the pursuit of 
truth and if they have a genuine respect for others and are intensely 
concerned if they suffer. 1140 It is shown in Chapter 2 Section 3 that 
emotions may be motives and it seems unlikely that a rational 
person will come to exercise his will unless he wants to do so. 
Peters refers above to a passionate devotion to fairness, freedom 
and truth, to a genuine respect for others and intense concern for 
others I sufferings. And it may well be unlikely that children come 
to care, rationally, for others unless they want to do so and are 
committed in the emotional terms used by Peters to show that care 
and concern in moral action. A person may come to have such cares 
only if his dispositions incline him to that perspective; if the 
virtues are actually exercised in an educational situation, moral 
dispositions are more likely to be enhanced. This issue will be 
explored in Section 2 below. 
An inter-relationship between reason, emotion, care, concern 
and strength of purpose from both the competitive and conformist 
perspectives of the will are evident in Wilson1s analysis of KRAT 
in which he distinguishes four components: 
IIKRAT (1) (RA) Being in practice Irelevantly alert l to 
(noticing) moral situations, and seeing them as such (descr.ibing them in terms PHIL etc.). 
KRAT (1) (TT) Thinking thoroughly about such situations, 
and bringing to bear whatever PHIL, EMP. and GIG one has. 
KRAT (1) (OPU) As a result of the foregoing making an 
overriding,prescriptive, and universalised decision to act 
in people1s interests. 
KRAT (2) Being sufficiently wholehearted, free from unconscious 
c o u ~ t ~ r m o ~ i v a t i o n , , etc.} to carry out (when able) the above deCISion In practlce." 41 
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The outline of personal development presented in Section (2) 
below demonstrates how an individual may come to have a will akin 
to Wilson's analysis. 
(iii)The final component of the 'endowment' of a person to be 
considered here is the relation of a person to a concept of 
universality in the responsibilities of personhood. A person has a 
social identity; he lives in relationship to other persons. He is 
aware of others and they reciprocate this awareness. Group activities 
involve behaviour and habits which are shared by members of the group: 
liThe possession of the concept of a person makes it 
possible for an individual to be seen and to see himself 
as socially responsible or accountable for his actions; 
it also makes it possible for a group of such persons 
to acquire impersonal standards by reference to which 
such actions can be judged. Standards which apply to 
all members of a community, thus giving it its basic 
identity, and which are thought of as having overriding 
importance, are usually called moral standards." 42 
Should a person not be held responsible for what he does, he is, then, 
to be denied the status of a person in the sense given above. 
Kant draws out this concept of the relation of person to 
person in his description of persons as ends who all, equally, by 
the combined force of collective reason, through the maxims of the 
will, make universal law and thus impose the moral standards referred 
to by Langford, above. That every person has to obey rules of conduct 
governing the behaviour of all rational persons is a view which Kant 
may have acquired from Rousseau. Kant refers, for example, to the, 
" ••. felt dependence of the private will upon the general will,"43 
and the concept of the general will he, presumably, derives from 
Rousseau's The Social Contract in which the nature of the contract 
between persons is described: " .•• whoso gives himself to all g i ~ e s s
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himself to none. 1I44 Each member of the social group is to acquire 
the same rights as those which each other member surrenders, thus 
each person has precisely the same rights and, as parties to the 
"social pact", II ••• each of us contributes to the group his person 
and the powers which he wields as a person under the supreme direction 
of the general wi 11 .•• 1/45 The genera I wi 11 is the strength of the 
community and aims at the good and even though only a minority of 
the community know the good, eventually their expression in the 
general will should lead the whole community to the right ends. 
However, how this theory might work in practice is never demonstrated 
by Rousseau who does produce federal constitution models In some 
attempt to engage persons as directly as possible in their 
communities. However, the problem of consensus is never resolved. 
The basis of a public relationship between persons is often 
described as one of respect for persons: liTo feel respect for 
persons .•• is to be moved by the thought that another is, after all, 
a person like oneself (i.e. a centre of consciousness) and that as 
such he is to be accorded certain rights and to be treated with 
consideration.,,46 To respect a person is, then, to acknowledge 
that another, like one's own person, is an expression in his own 
being of those attributes which are what a person is. Therefore if 
x is to be conceived of as a person it 1s inconsistent not to treat 
x as a person to whom respect is due on the basis of the nature of 
XiS person status. To treat a person as such is then to respect 
that person as he is (according to the concept described in this 
chapter) - a rational and social being with moral potentiality in 
his I endowment I of personhood. Respect for persons is an imperative 
of social life because it is the acknowledgement not only of others 
as persons but also that others contribute to our self-identity. 
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It is in our reciprocal relationships that obligations arise and 
a person's authenticity is an enhancer of an awareness of care and 
concern for others. Therefore. the authentic person's evaluation 
of his own motives is not separable from his relationships to other 
persons. (Chapter 1. Section 4 explores self-evaluation of motives.) 
There are. however those who appear not to respect persons -
apparently failing to recognise the attributes which comprise what 
a person is; Dearden considers that the rational egoist may well be 
autonomous. for example. However. the individual who does not 
recognise the nature of another's personhood and. therefore. 
withholds respect so as to use ~ n o t h e r r only as a means. is not fully 
rational quite aside from any other obligation. A rational egoist 
presumably bases his egoism upon his reason and argues that use of 
others as means only is in his interest and, as such. rational. But 
this argument is based upon reason and yet persons are reasoners, 
indeed, persons are the only source of reasoning, thus the rational 
egoist is inconsistent in his reasoning and is not rational because 
of his inconsistency. So-called rational egOists. therefore, claim 
to. " ..• value reasons, but do not take reason as far as it could be 
taken; they value reason, but not reasoners or persons. who are the 
on ly sou rces of reason. 1147 
Bailey's point is a good one and endorses the idea of persons 
as the sources of reason and, thereby. requires that those who . 
respect reason, respect persons. But Bailey further argues that 
there is a fundamental difference between rational ca'l"e and affecti ve 
care. He constrasts caring for a bone china cup with caring for a 
person: "In both cases •.. caring involves treating the object in 
such a manner as to at least maintain the characteristics of its 
conceptual isation. 1148 He then indicates that care about bone china 
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is dependent upon affective regard, but care for persons is based 
upon care for reason which is integral to what a person is. He must 
have a minimal concern for persons, therefore, irrespective of what 
he feels about them. However, it is the individual person who 
determines the nature of his regard for objects. A person may value 
a piece of china not for its aesthetic features but solely for its 
monetary value and he may secrete the object in a bank vault as an 
asset at a time of rapid monetary inflation; it will be, to him, a 
means only of preserving his wealth and although he may attach 
affective regard to his wealth, the piece of china, in its own right, 
holds no affective claim upon the owner. Another person may have 
affective regard for the china cup because he is a tea fiend and the 
object is a means of satisfying that desire. He may prefer a large 
mug, but for want of anything bigger, the china cup has to suffice -
again, there is a lack of regard for the intrinsic nature of the 
object. But if the designer and maker of the object considers it 
he may well feel an affective regard for it because he has engaged 
in the practice of making the object which may, in its intrinsic 
being, express its creator's joys. satisfactions, frustrations and 
disappointments. The collector of bone china may also, in perhaps, 
a less direct way than the maker, but with aesthetic sensitivity, 
hold a strong affective regard for the object in its own right. The 
maker, above all, is the person whose dispositions have been influenced 
by his investment of himself in the practice of ceramics. 
However, in caring for a person, Bailey's argument that if one 
cares for reason one must care for reasoners who are persons may be 
acceptable. but reason has an affective dimension, as described in 
Chapter 2, Sections 3 and 4. Reason cannot be isolated from emotion 
in Kant's sense as it has been shown that both work together 
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to determine action. However, it may be the case that to feel 
concern for reason is also to have respect for reasoners, but if a 
person is not rational, as is an insane person, for example,one can 
only respect rational kind. Nevertheless a minimal respect for a 
rational species of persons may be acceptable for a basic relationship 
to others. But human relationships exist in lived situations in 
which practical reason functions by enjoining emotions and wants 
to reasons and a person's sympathies must then also be part of his 
reason. 
Bailey views the Christian injunctions concernIng relationships 
with enemies and those who hate others as sensible only when 
considered as injunctions to act in the minimally rational sense of 
respecting others: "It does not make sense to urge me to have 
certain feelings towards my neighbours, enemies or denigrators, but 
it does make sense to remind me that even those who hate me are 
persons to whom I have a duty of minimal respect and concern.,,49 
But how the force of reason is to be so strong when divorced from 
all feeling as a motivating factor is unclear. The Christian is 
further enjoined to do good to enemies and denigrators and to show 
love, charity or caritas towards them. These injunctions are much 
stronger than a minimal respect. The Christian, hated by another 
person, does not simply stifle his reciprocal animosity by minimal 
respect, but shows an "active sympathy" or an "attitude of agape"SO 
to that person because he is, presumably, wrong to hate the Christian 
and needs help to enable him to attain a true perspective on the 
relationship. 
Persons are able to reason, thus respect for persons is entailed 
in the nature of what a person is as a reasoning being. However. the 
integration of emotion and reason in the nature of practical reason 
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(as shown in Chapter 1) involves an affective dimension in reasoning 
about persons, and, dependent upon a person's authentic awareness of 
things, an affective dimension in reasoning about inanimate objects 
also. (See note in references to this Chapter.) 
Thus far, therefore, it is maintained that a person is a social 
and moral being with attaching responsibilities. A person may be 
thought of as an end in him or herself and is endowed with reason, 
a will and is due respect from other persons. 
(2) Development of a person 
Introduction 
Developmental psychology sets out to describe the development 
of a person as a social and moral being. And this section will 
consider, under (a), some popular psychological accounts of personal 
development. The theories of Freud, Piaget, Kohlberg and others 
present models of development out of different and often restricted 
experience and research. Piaget's work with his own children is very 
particular in emphasis; Kohlberg's concluSions that moral development 
is invariant irrespective of culture are also based upon limited 
data. These psychologists present accounts of development of a 
sweeping kind which are, then, models - because a development must 
proceed in some direction and psychological accounts of personal moral 
development lead to a model of the person as a social and moral 
being. The individual emerges, within these models, in a manner 
akin to Froebel's analogy of the maturation of a human being and 
that of a tree - from seed, through stages of growth into a tree. 
An acorn cannot develop into anything other than an oak tree; a 
human new-born baby cannot develop into anything but a person. 
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Developmental psychologists pre-select the concept of what 
a person is, as a fully social and moral being and then demonstrate 
how development occurs to that pOint. The model of the end of the 
process of development is the same for all psychological theorists -
that of rational autonomy exercised by the developed person. A 
social and moral being is then held to be rational and autonomous. 
However, without a prior conception of what it is to be a moral person, 
development theories would be meaningless; " .•. we persist in thinking 
that a morality of self-accepted principles is a higher human 
achievement than conformity, when the small numbers achieving this 
might lead to the conclusion that it is some kind of abnormal (and 
therefore undesirable) aberration from the statistical norm of 
conformity. 1151 A person is held not to have reached the end of his 
development as a person until he is both rational and autonomous 
because he cannot be moral unless he is able to exercise rational 
choice - and chooses the good. Further consideration of 
psychological development is reserved for (a) below. 
A second [and somewhat opposing] perspective, (b), upon the 
development of a person has its roots in Aristotle's thought and the 
. 
concept of eudaimonia which complemented autonomy when applied to the 
polis. Eudaimonia was held to be the end (telos) for a person and 
pursuit of this end was a kind of individual development. Such 
pursui t was to travel through life with a purpose - "It is to fi nd 
oneself placed at a certain point on a journey with set goals; to 
move through life is to make progress - or to fail to make progress -
toward a given end. Thus a completed and fulfilled life is an 
achievement and death is the point at which someone can be judged 
happy or unhappy. Hence the ancient Greek proverb: 'Call no man 
happy unti I he is dead.' 1152 Mac Intyre's modern perspecti ve drawn 
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from the Greeks is in a tradition maintained in the middle ages as 
a quest: liThe unity of an individual life is the unity of a narrative 
quest. 1I53 The narrative quest is in pursuit of the good for man, 
but this good is no end to be attained by the individual's passage 
through invariant stages, as in some psychological accounts. The 
good for the individual is a life spent in seeking that good life; 
by engaging in activities and practices of what is for his good as 
a person, the individual exercises the virtues and thus attains 
the end of the quest in the progressive unfolding of his life. 
Therefore, this concept of development as a quest embracing intrinsic 
exercise of the virtues is, in itself, an instantiation of an 
individual person's nature as a social and moral being. The additional 
issue of a relationship between personal development (as a quest), 
the virtues and rational autonomy is considered in (b) below. 
(a) A person in developmental psychology 
Freud's psychoanalytic perspective of personality is referred 
to in Chapter 1 in the connection of an integration of reason and 
emotion in Ego and Id. 54 His clinical observations led him to make 
rationality a key theme in individual development although not all 
persons reached the point of autonomous reasoning and acceptep social 
conventions by assiduous rule-following. He did emphasise the early 
years of a person's life as a most significant time in development. 
Freud seems to have influenced the investigations of Hartshorne 
and May.55 Their enquiry into honesty in the conduct of 10,000 
children of secondary school age found that it was practised only 
in certain situational contexts and a child who acted honestly in 
one situation might not necessarily do so in another. Group norms 
and group approval were identified as significant factors In honest 
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behaviour rather than the internalisation of moral principles; 
direct teaching of moral guidance had little effect. Hartshorne 
and May concluded that moral conduct was shaped according to Freud's 
perspective - when the self struggles through emotions towards a 
Superego ideal. However, a different perspective on this research 
might view the individual developing in cognitive rationality and 
identify the honesty characteristic as an example of ego-strength, 
holding meaning only in relation to rationality's development in 
a person. Virtues or character traits would be held meaningless 
outside a perspective of individual reasoning. 
Peck and Havighurst's research revealed more affinity to 
development towards a perspective from rational autonomy and also 
from a Freudian perspective, particularly in the importance 
attributed to a child's early years. 56 They arrived at a character 
analysis of development of five types: 
- amoral: ego-centriC, giving little thought to others I feelings; 
- expedient; ego-centric but ostensibly moral; 
- conformist; lacking internalised moral principles, but fear of 
disapproval leads to actions apparently moral; 
- irrational - conscientious: holding a moral code but rigid in its 
application; disregards others I sensibilities; 
- rational - altruistic; having consideration for others. 
This final character type is presented as the height of moral 
maturity in the development of a person. Such an individual would 
have care and thought for others and would be alert to the consequences 
of his actions; differing circumstances would' influence his actions. 
Piaget's analysis of personal development more clearly presents 
a developmental model through the medium of rationality towards 
individual autonomy.57 Three stages are. identified by Piaget: 
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egocentric, transcendental, autonomous. Each stage is held to be 
invariant. At the first, egocentric, stage the child shows no 
understanding of what a rule is; from about six years of age, a child 
is in a heteronomous state in which he grasps a rule's r e ~ u i r e m e n t s s
and regards these as immutable. From about twelve or later. a child 
comes to view rules as not immutable and, in co-operation with others. 
open to change. This final stage is autonomy. Piaget holds that 
autonomy can only be arrived at when a child has understood what 
rules are, therefore an invariant sequence must mark moral development. 
A Piagetian analysis of development is formal. Plaget does not 
present a view of virtue, although he holds to a distinct model of 
moral action and judgement. For example, he contrasts a child's 
reaction to breaking many cups by accident and one cup deliberately 
showing that, at first, a child considers the quantity of breakages 
to mark the deviance, rather than the intention of the cup-breaker. 
But the accidental breaking of cups is hardly a moral issue and only 
a person's intentions and actions make acts moral or otherwise. A 
moral perspective can only be maintained when there is understanding 
of what it is to be a moral person. However, Plaget presents his 
perspective as process of development, rather than as the product 
of what a moral perspective generates. 
This analysis of development owes much to Kant in its connections 
with autonomy, heteronomy and the will and it also has associations 
with Durkheim's sociological perspectives. 58 Bul1 59 and Kay60 have 
evolved similar developmental analyses. Bull presents a four stage 
development model; beginning in anomy, the person moves through 
heteronomy and socionomy to autonomy. Kay's three stage model begins 
with the amoral proceeding through the premoral to the moral stage 
at which autonomous, rational judgement occurs. 
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However, perhaps the most influential thesis developed out of 
a Piagetian analysis is that of KOhlberg. 61 Kohlberg's six stage 
analysis seems to be a more detailed account of Piaget's three s t a g e ~ ~
having two stages to each of Piaget's one. The stages are regarded 
as invariant with respect to the development of the individual 
although not all persons may reach the final two autonomy stages. 
Essentially the stages represent steps in the development of an 
individual's rational reflection. Kohlberg's research, with limited 
samples, has extended to America, Turkey, Malaysia, Mexico and Taiwan 
and he considers the stages of development invariant - irrespective 
of culture or geography. 
Kohlberg accepts the existence of moral principles which may 
guide a person's moral choices, but a principle 1s not seen as a 
Categorical Imperative but as an aid to the autonomous person in 
resolving conflicts. Justice is the major principle in resolving 
moral questions, in the view of Koh I berg , following P1aget: " ••• the 
role of justice is a sort of immanent condition of social 
relationships or a law governing their equi librium. 1/62 Justice 
is considered to stand above all principles at the autonomous stage. 
Concern for others and empathy with others are only, 1/ .•. the 
precondition for experiencing a moral conflict rather than a mechanism 
for its resolution.1/63 The principle of justice may resolve claims 
between persons holding each individual to be of equal value as a 
person and, therefore, Kohlberg regards it as, 1/ ••• the ultimate 
bas is of mora Ii ty ,1/ and, 1/... the most autonomous ly mora I form of 
roora 1 judgement. 1/64 
Justice is, then, a key principle and contrasted with all other 
virtues by Kohlberg. Character traits such as honesty hold little 
meaning as development depends upon cognitive rationality, in 
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Kohlberg IS view; "In cheating, the critical issue is the recognitIon 
of the element of contract and agreement implicit in the situation 
and the recognition that although it does not seem so bad if one 
person cheats, what holds for all must hold for one. 1165 In Hartshorne 
and May's research into honesty, children not attaining autonomy in 
reasoning are to be seen as unable to apply reciprocal thinking 
and ob ligation. Cogni ti ve ratlona Ii ty is the process of mora I 
development and although Kohlberg acknowledges an affective 
component to be part of reasoning at the autonomous stage in that, 
" •.• all mental events have both cognitive and affective aspects 1166 , 
he does regard the affective as subsumed within the cognitive. Thus 
when two adolescents plan to steal and the anxiety one feels is put 
down to 'being chicken' yet the other regards that anxiety as a 
'warning of conscience I , the difference is the ability to reason so 
as to make sense of feelings. The affective dimension is controlled 
by the cognitive in Kohlberg's view; an interaction occurs but the 
cognitive is always superior at the autonomous stage. 
There is, then, emphaSis upon rational autonomy as the end of 
the psychological models of moral development of persons described 
above. These models largely agree that individuals are amoral before 
becoming moral persons and individuals must learn a self-interested 
prudence before assuming morality. It seems most likely that 
adherence to the rules and principles of others. such as parents or 
teachers, is probably essential prior to the attainment of the end 
of the model, namely that of personal, rational autonomy. If the 
Piagetian - Kohlberg model is taken to be essentially correct, little 
guidance is afforded educators from its insights concerning 
educational practice in achieving rational autonomy as a final stage. 
Kohlberg is no more than tentative in a view that cognitive 
124 
stimulation may hasten development towards autonomy. Valuable though 
psychological perspectives may be, however, the educator must bring 
up children in some way which will enable them to realise their 
'endowment' as autonomous persons. Therefore the educator must hold 
to some model of his own expressing a measure of social consensus 
of what it is to be a person in the full sense of a rational, moral, 
social human being. A person achieves autonomy, but only after 
an education in which the autonomous person becomes accepted as a 
social being within a social framework in which there is acceptance 
of what it is to be moral: 
"If we talk about moral development at all it has to be 
done in terms of some conception of what it is to be 
moral. If this conception implies self-acceptance of 
rules and principles, then one must have gone through a 
phase of acting on other people's rules and principles, 
and through a phase of Internallzing in some sense those 
rules and principles, for how else does one have hold 
of any rules and principles to exercise choices or 
rejection over?" 67 
(b) Personal development in autonomy and the virtues 
The development of a person as a social and moral being in the 
psychological models may provide a true description but the major 
issue remains as to which features of social and moral activity 
educators should inculcate in the young as they progress towards 
some exercise of rational autonomy so that their autonomy becomes 
part of the social and moral competence which is fundamental to the 
nature of a person. Development of the individual to a realisation 
of himself as a person (in its full social and moral sense) is referred 
to above, in MacIntyre's term, as a quest in pursuit of the good. 
The individual develops - "Man is in via,,68 - in, and towards, the 
good. Parents and teachers as the educators of children and young 
125 
people should enable them to realise themselves as persons with 
social and moral natures moving towards autonomy. And to move 
towards autonomy and the good requires practice and the exercise 
of autonomy and the good to an extent appropriate to the individual's 
development. 
In education in schools the good for one individual is in some 
measure the good for others and it may well be in the exercise of 
the virtues and the exercise of autonomy in educational practices, 
to the extent made possible by his stage of psychological development, 
that a person realises his nature as a social and moral being and 
his power to exercise autonomy. From the exercise of the virtues, 
dispos itions shou ld be developed in a person because, "Vi rtues are 
dispositions not only to act in particular ways, but also to feel in 
particular ways. To act virtuously is not, as Kant was later to 
think, to act aginst inclination; it is to act from inclination 
formed by the cultivation of the virtues. u69 Both affective and 
cognitive dimensions fuse in the virtues and in the dispositions 
arising; Piaget, in spite of his emphasis upon the child's cognitive 
reasoning, agrees that feelings and sympathies are also significant 
to development: " ••• the child's behaviour towards persons shows 
signs from the first of those sympathetiC tendenCies and affective 
reactions in which one can easily see the raw material of all 
subsequent moral behaviour. lIlO The exercise of autonomy and practice 
of the virtues should shape the dispositions of the developing child 
through the medium of his educational activities. (Discussion of 
the nature of educational practices to enable the development of 
autonomy and the virtues is presented in Part 3.) 
Practical reasoning, demonstrated best, perhaps, in the practical 
syllogism described in Chapter 2, informs the actions of the 
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individual in situations at particular times and in particular places. 
Practical reason should integrate emotion and reason in human acts 
by which the virtues may be exercised. Aristotle emphdsises a 
distinction between the intellectual virtues which require teaching 
and moral virtue which results from habit: "For the things we 
have to learn before we can do them. we learn by doing them. e.g. 
men become builders by building and lyre-playing by playing the lyre; 
so too we become just by doing just acts. temperate by doing temperate 
acts. brave by doing brave acts ••• It makes no small difference. 
then. whether we form habits of one kind or another from our very 
youth; it makes a very great difference. or rather all the difference.,,71 
However. if a person exercises moral virtue by doing acts which are 
just. temperate or brave. the nature of what comprises a just. 
temperate or brave act must be known in order to know whether a 
virtuous act has been accomplished. A standard or model seems 
necessary before it is possible to determine the just or temperate 
action of the individual. therefore. 
The significance of habit in development of the virtues is 
explored by Peters72 and is discussed more fully in Chapter 4. 
Peters presents three uses of habit: habitual action as a descriptive 
term; explanatory phrases embracing habit. 'out of habit'. 'from 
force of habit' etc.; learning by habituation. Activities which are 
descriptive of habit or explanatory phrases may be adhered to, adapted 
or cancelled as a person chooses, as is the case with respect to 
punctuality. But other examples may require much more reasoning. as 
is the case with honesty. However. habit remains of some significance 
here. because if each time a person faced with a moral dilemma needs 
to think through all reasons and reflect fully on the situation in 
hand. he may have little time for the unusual situation or. indeed, 
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for other things. Habits may even, " •.• serve a useful anti-weakness 
purpose in cutting short deliberation and initiating action before 
the allure of counter-incl inations becomes too great,,,73 where 
children are concerned. Character traits, such as honesty, may be 
habitually applied, hence they may become established character 
features. The acquisition of standards of habit may simply be the 
expression of consensus through one's rationally acquired rules of 
behaviour. 
Peters's third category of habit, learning by habituation, 
applies markedly to the first two stages of moral development 
decribed as egocentric and transcendental by Piaget who refers to the 
need of the individual at these stages, that " ... adult pressure 
imposes on his mind a system of realities which at first remains 
opaque and external. ,,74 However, the limits on the efficacy of 
habit are evident as the person reaches autonomy. At this stage 
he must use his practical reason when action is required calling 
upon virtues of a high order such as justice, integrity, tolerance 
etc. Stable, systematiC behaviour is unlikely to result until a 
person I s practical reasoning detennines his actions: "The genuinely 
virtuous agent ••• acts on the basis of a true and rational 
judgement. ,,75 Nevertheless, unti I practical reason and autonomy 
have sufficiently developed in the person, habituation in the exercise 
of the virtues has a part to play. (The val idi ty of Peters I s view 
of habituation is more fully explored in the following chapter.) 
The virtues describe a relationship between rational autonomy 
and moral principles of action: "Virtues are valuable not because 
they promote the agent's self-interest, but because they involve the 
desires and capacities to regulate one's life by the ultimate 
standards of morality and rationality."76 Exercise of the virtues, 
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the Aristotelian origins of which are considered by note in 
reference 77, requires rational choices to be made by autonomous 
persons in that the courageous person overcomes his fear by the 
exercise of practical reason in order to pursue his objective. Justice 
calls for a systematic, rational regulation of conduct and not only 
when self-interest matches justice. And in spite of Kohlberg's 
scepticism about the 'bag of virtues', justice is held to be a key 
principle enabling the individual to make rational and moral choices 
at Stage 6, autonomy, in Kohlberg's developmental model; justice 
is held to be, " ••. the most autonomously moral form of moral 
judgement ... 78 
If a person achieves his potential as a person and enjoys the 
'endowment' of his personhood described earlier, he will be moral, 
because the more he realises his 'endowment' as a person, the more 
evident will be his moral sense. To be virtuous a person must be 
rational and autonomous because he must be in a position to choose 
virtue rather than non-virtue. The acquisition of the 'endowment' 
of personhood through habituation and the acquisition of the right 
dispositions is not a check or denial of individual autonomY,but 
a means of informing that autonomy of the implications of the nature 
of what a person is. Therefore personal autonomy is autonomy expressed 
in conjunction with the ideal of personhood. 
The two strands illustrating the development of a person, the 
psychologtcal model of development considered above in (a), and the 
integration of the virtues with rational autonomy, (b), describe 
personal autonomy. The end of the psychological accounts is autonomy 
based on reason. The virtues are exercised (in Aristotelian 
terminology) by a person whose practical reason leads to practical 
129 
wisdom. And although habituation has an early, significant part to 
play in development of the virtues, eventually the increasing 
exercise of the virtues and the exercise of autonomy by the individual 
person require the use of his own independent practical reason as he 
develops in virtue and in autonomy. The ideal of personal autonomy 
brings together, then, the nature of a person as essentially social 
and moral, and autonomy. 
(3) Context for the development of a person towards autonomy 
Universality (in social and moral responsibilities) distinguished 
in Section (1) (b) (iii) as part of the 'endowment' of a person has 
particular significance in relation to the social context in which 
personal autonomy develops. A person, as a social being, has 
relationships with others and the nature of those relationships, the 
social roles which are occupied and the ethos of a community of 
persons have all some bearing upon autonomy. 
Mi 11 comments on personal development thus: "Human nature is 
not a machine to be built after a model. and set to do exactly the 
work prescribed for it. but a tree, which requires to grow and 
develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inner 
forces which make it a living thing.,,79 Mill's analogy of person and 
tree seems to locate the autonomy of the individual as an inner 
endowment. However, although there may in some Situations be meaning 
in such analogies, a tree and a person are significantly different. 
A tree requires a suitable physical environment if it is to develop 
appropriate to its "inner forces" which determine the kind of tree 
it is. But human beings may develop in ways which mayor may not 
enhance the possibilities for autonomy and they require social 
contexts for their development: "Autonomy has 'outer' and 'inner' 
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dimensions, for people are persisting beings, and there is something 
odd about a characterisation of personal autonomy which leaves this 
out of account."BO The individual person as a social being should 
show, " ... a willingness to take the initiative in interpersonal 
transactions and an ability to enter into constructive relations 
with others."B1 
Personal autonomy is a social product and has meaning in 
a social context. Indeed, without care. love and the fonmation of 
good habits a child may fail to develop his capabilities for the 
exercise of personal autonomy. Parents are recognised as crucially 
important to a child's development not only in respect of inborn 
characteristics which may predispose a person to interpret events 
in his world in a particular way, but also in their child-rearing 
practices. Authoritarian or 'liberal' parents are likely to influence 
children in some direction. Social class, is also likely to be 
influential; middle class parents who may encourage their children's 
participation in family decision-making and who answer their children's 
Questions freely and openly are thought likely to speed their 
development. Language codes of elaborated or restricted kinds are 
also influential in development. Peer group influence may be 
significant and co-operation with others 1s stressed 1n P1aget's 
account of development.B2 A jumble of media influences surround the 
individual with T.V. Quiz programmes and 'star' prizes of goods of 
material value interspersed with advertisements to stimulate 
acquisitiveness and envy for others' material goods. Violence, 
salacious titillation. sex stereotypes and. in general, a material 
version of the good life scream out for individual indulgence in 
fanciful unreality. 
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However, by the very social nature of persons, autonomy when 
attributed to persons can only occur in a social context. Peters 
writes warmly of the English public school system of character 
training in that the individual is helped to, " ••• stick up for 
principles connected with 'fair play' in the face of group pressure,,83 
and he is sceptical that Kohlberg's single virtue, justice. will 
be able to ensure the individual resists pressures with moral 
courage gained from his social upbringing. But Kohlberg is not 
dismissive of environmental, social factors and the speed at which 
an individual passes through the stages of development which Kohlberg 
identifies as invariant may be stimulated by the social context, 
for, " ••. social-envi ronmental determinants of development are its 
opportuni ty for role-taking. 1/84 
The development and exercise of personal autonomy is not 
accomplished remote from social roles. A person is someone's son 
or daughter or father. He is a citizen; he 1s a member of a 
profession and his personhood is realised, to a considerable extent, 
in roles. One individual plays various parts in the lives and 
development of many others. Indeed to divorce an individual from his 
roles is to weaken the social relationships which provide, " •.. that 
arena ••• in which the Aristotelian virtues function if they function 
at all.1/85 Each person's history is intertwined wi th that of others 
like the interrelationships of Becket and Henry II or Mary Stuart 
and Elizabeth I, in MacIntyre's examples.86 
A danger, in Kohlberg's view, is a dissolving social 
. . cd Arne' . t 87 H perspectIve In m ern rlcan SOCle y. e expresses concern that 
trends are influencing persons to look after 'number one'; the 'me' 
generation, at a Stage 2 level of development. has little participation 
in school, work or government. Hence Kohlberg wants a greater 
132 
participation in school democracy and in community activity. But 
lacking environmental stimulation. he considers few will progress to 
the higher stages of development; the school may well have a 
significant part to play in such stimulation. perhaps. 
School practices involve relationships which entail exercise 
of the virtues since these define the nature of the relationships 
of those engaged in educational practices. (The nature and 
implications of education practice are explored in Part 3.) It has 
been argued that, "Moral attitudes are caught from every interaction 
of teacher and pupi I since these again, like all human interactions r 
are moral interactions. 1188 The relationships between pup i Is and 
teachers operate in learning situations of all kinds. in the use 
of rewards and punishments and in the kind of respect between them. 
And should the relationships within educational practices fail to 
recognise the full social and moral nature of persons by, perhaps. 
centering too much upon the development only of the intellect, those 
relationships miss the opportunity for a wider exercise of the 
virtues; indeed, "discovering" Mozart or learning to care for the 
elderly may be greater strides into personhood than, "examinable 
'knowingS-that'.1I89 
The organisation of the school and a "hidden curriculum" of 
unstated values may significantly influence personal development 
towards autonomy. Ability groupings and a ruthless examination 
sieve may engender feelings of failure and rejection of the school's 
offerings.90 The school's control system alongside other day to day 
realities may well make for an authoritarian system in which, 
" ••. anything of importance is decided by the fiat of the headmaster 
and in which the prevailing assumption is that the appeal to a man 
is the only method of determining what is correct."91 The result, 
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according to Peters, is unlikely to encourage autonomy because such 
attitudes are most appropriate to, II ••• Piaget's first stage of 
development. These institutional realities are bound to structure 
the perceptions of the students. u92 
The importance of the school as an environmental context for 
the development and exercise of personal autonomy and as a major 
opportunity for the encouragement of a sense of community Is stated 
by Durkheim93 whose influence on Piaget's developmental model may 
be considerable. The group and small community enable group norms, 
tI ••• everything constituting the intellectual and moral patrimony 
of the group"94 to be absorbed. School community activities are 
seen as transitional stages between family life and adult society. 
The opportunity to influence a child's development towards the good 
is cons iderable: tiThe habit of common Ii fe in the class and 
attachment to the class and even to the school constitute an 
altogether natural preparation for the more elevated sentiments 
that we wish to develop in the Child. We have here a precious 
instrument, which is used all too little and which can be of the 
greatest service. tl95 The crowds, praise and power of school life 
create a climate, in Durkheim's analysiS, of a group and community 
ethos and experience holding great potential for personal development. 
(4) Conclusion for persons and personal autonomy - a sense of 
community 
Authenticity and practical reason, the subjects of the previous 
two chapters require the addition of the social and moral dimensions 
of personhood in order to complete the account of personal autonomy 
developed in this thesis. The social and moral dimensions of persons 
shown in the 'endowment' of a person as an end have been explored 
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above as practical reason, the will and universality; the concept 
of personal development has been considered both from a psychological 
perspective and that of habit, practical reason and the virtues. 
These themes involving persons and autonomy meet in an educational 
environment in which social, moral and intellectual activities 
operate. And it may be that for educational practices to contr1bute 
to the development and exercise of personal autonomy a sense of 
community is essential. Indeed, the school (i.e. the groups of which 
it is comprised) should be an expression of a community covenant 
between pupils, parents, teachers, employers etc., both as an 
instantiation of what the school (as a community) is and, also, 
as a centre for educational practices of social, moral and intellectual 
kinds, linking individual persons to wider community implicat10ns 
and associations. 
The ancient sense of community, referred to in the introduction 
to this chapter, involved both autonomy for the polis and eudaimonia 
for the individual within the moral and social community sense 
specifically evident in the exercise of the virtues. However, the 
present day has lost much of this sense of a shared good for a 
communi ty: "When Aristotle sought to clarify what he meant by 
phronesis and the phronimos, he could still call upon the vivid 
memory of Pericles as the concrete exemplar of the individual who 
possessed the faculty of discriminating what was good for himself 
and for the polis. But today, when we seek for concrete exemplars 
of the types of dialogical communities in which practical rationality 
flourishes, we are at a much greater loss."96 The polis expressed 
a sense of commun,ity among the ci tizens of Athens but modern societies 
seem to lack the same sense of personal identity. Autonomy for the 
individual has become partly divorced from the fundamental implications 
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of persons but some sense of community expressing, II ••• an ethos 
and the shared acceptance of nomoi ..• "97 is an imperative for 
personal autonomy so that no escape into egoism is possible for those 
who, in spite of all, pursue such an imperfectly rational perspective. 
A sense of community is r e ~ u i r e d d in order to, " ••• attempt to 
recover and reclaim the autonomy of practical rationality and show 
its relevance to all domains of culture."g8 In such a community, the 
individual must exercise authenticity by reflection and awareness 
of his own motives but his self-awareness is also his awareness of 
himself as a person in all -its social and moral implications; in 
other words, the autos of autonomy instantiates the moral and social 
dimensions of a person. 
In Section (1) (b) above. Dearden's distinction between moral 
concern for others and autonomy was noted. His use of the word 
'we' to stress the moral perspective is significant and akin to 
Aristotle's (similar) style in the Nicomachean Ethics for although 
Aristotle's Ethics may be a set of lecture notes using the first 
person plural for effect during delivery to a live audience, 'we' -
as persons - collectively share a common social and moral heritage 
only to be realised in a community context. A person cannot escape 
moral implications within a sense of community where shared goods 
and individual claims can be weighed. Rawls argues that: 
"We have the guiding principle that a rational indi vidual 
is always to act so that he need never blame himself 
no matter how his plans finally work out. Viewing himself 
as one continuing being over time, he can say that at 
each moment of his life he has done what the balance of 
reasons required. or at least permitted •••• Now looked 
at in this way, the principle of responsibility to self 
resembles a principle of right; the claims of the self 
at different times are to be so adjusted that the self 
at each time can affirm the plan that has been and is 
being followed. The person at one time, so to speak. 
must not be ~ b l e e to complain about actions of the person 
at another tIme." 99 
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Rawls identifies 'self' and 'person' in this extract and argues that 
a person has a moral duty to himself as a person at different pOints 
in time because he is the same person irrespective of any time 
lapse. (An alternative view to this is considered in Chapter 6.) 
The individual has an obligation to himself to act on the best 
reasons because he has this same obligation with regard to all 
persons. However, this obligation and identification of the rights 
and interests of the self with others seems to reQuire an ideal 
self to which duties are owed. The interests of the individual, 
however, must be weighed not only by his person over time, but 
also in competition with other persons' interests; this situation 
reQuires the existence of a community because only by living 
together and weighing conflicting claims by reason can the 
interest of the individual become consistent with that of others. 
White expresses reservations about small communities because 
of the, " .•• obvious danger of communal egoism - of living only for 
itself and ignoring the needs of those outside it _,,100 And he 
argues that in order to preserve his psychical unity, the individual 
must enlarge his life-plan to integrate moral conflicts in, " ••• 
an enlarged conception of his own well-being.,,101 However, this use 
of "well_beingll is akin to the implications of personhood explored 
in this chapter and it may only be when a person has exercised the 
virtues and developed the right dispositions that he will even seek 
to resolve the dilemmas and moral conflicts challenging to his 
life-plan. An individual could still, presumably, rest in heteronomy 
or anomy whatever the cost to his psychic unity as a person. In 
practice, a recognition of his personal identity over time and the 
fact that his history is interlocked with that of others in a 
collection of communities of smaller and larger kinds, political, 
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spiritual and intellectual, in which he h.as practical engagement 
may, most effectively, ensure that the autos of his autonomy carries 
the full impl icatio ns of a person: 
"Autonomy •.. has to be understood not against but in 
terms of social existence. The core of personal autonomy 
is developed in a social setting, and its content is also 
socially conditioned." 102 
(5) A note on persons, autonomy and Dearden's view 
In this chapter, I have tried to show that, ideally, the term 
person, carries implications of a social and moral nature when 
denoting the characteristics of a human being, man or woman. To 
live up to these characteristics and attributes determines, in some 
measure, the relative standing in personal autonomy attained by an 
individual. The greater claim an individual has to be a person, the 
greater his potential for personal autonomy, for the concept of a 
person can be nothing but the autos of personal autonomy; the 
adjective, personal, colours the nomos of practical reason engaging 
it in consideration of respect or sympathy for other persons. 
The concept of personal autonomy which Professor R. F. Dearden 
has analysed is distinguished by him from morality which he considers 
"requires a separate root". 103 He does hold that morality is a 
major educational consideration, but its place in relation to the 
aim of autonomy remains uncertain: " ••• he sti 11 faces the problem 
of relating his main pupil-centred aim, personal autonomy, to this 
moral aim.,,104 In what follows, then, I shall endeavour to show how 
uneasily a divorce between autonomy and morality sits in Dearden's 
account and that these concepts complement each other. 
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"There is no separate task of acquiring the concept of a 
person, as a piece of learning quite distinct from 
formIng practical and role concepts, or such rules as 
those of not hurting, telling the truth and keeping 
promises. To grasp such concepts and rules is also 
necessarily to understand their anchorage in cares, 
concerns, interests and desires, and hence their 
complementarity to the existence of persons. To observe 
such rules is to have respect for persons. Moral life 
and respect for persons are, as Peters has pOinted out, 
two sides of the same coin.1I 105 
Dearden emphasises here the llrules" anchored in the "existence of 
persons" with one result expressed in the maxim of "respect for 
persons". He echoes this idea in a reference to habit which he 
considers unsuitable for the, " •.• more obviously moral sort of 
action, such as truth-telling, keeping promises, responding to 
others' needs and avoiding hurting others. For there we are 
dealing directly with persons and ought to be mindful of what we 
are doing. 11106 Dearden must be us ing "person II in an evaluati ve 
sense in the above quotation otherwise he would be expressing a 
naturalistic fallacy in the last sentence because certain aspects 
of IIpersons II carry a high value, hence his conclusion from this that 
we lIought to be mindful II of our actions. 
Peters also describes a relationship of person to high 
qualities of personhood in personal autonomy: 
II' Being a person' is connected conceptually wi th ••• being, 
to a certain extent, an individual who determines his 
own destiny by his choices .••. We are all persons in that 
normally we have a potentiality for developing these 
capacities, but human excellences seem to consist in 
developing such capacities to a considerable degree. 
Critical thought .•. autonomy of choice, creativity of 
the attempt to launch out on one's own and to impose 
one's stamp on a product; integrity is shown in sticking 
to one's principles ••• and strength of will ••• We often 
say of someone, 'He is a real person'. We are not using 
the phrase to stress the fact that he is a person in the 
sense in which any normal human be1ng is. Rather we are 
drawing attention to the impact he makes on us 1n respect 
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of some quality of mind which is intimately connected 
with being a person - for instance his independence 
of mind and his strength of character." 107 
The "human excellences" described by Peters as relevant to a person 
are qualities illustrative of personal autonomy. One who attains 
a high level of personal autonomy will on Peters's account be, "a 
real person". Social and moral aspects of a person show through 
in this description in terms such as "integrity" and "strength of 
character" and Peters goes onto state of integrity that, " ••• we do 
not seem to use the word of a man who sticks to principles which 
we regard as irmnoral." 108 Dearden outlining why personal autonomy 
should be valued presents as the first of his grounds: "that 
through it we can achieve integrity and thus not be involved 1n 
self-deception, or the deception of others.,,109 Personal autonomy 
by its association with persons of integrity seems clearly to be 
reflective of the social and moral implications of a person; 
Dearden's fourth ground for valuing personal autonomy, "that 
consistency with its principles already requires that we be fair 
in our dealings with others,,110 is descriptive of the virtue of 
justice or fairness in relations with others. The moral implications 
of personhood seem evident in this account. 
However, in subsequent accounts of personal autonomy, Dearden 
shows what distortion can occur if the social and moral implications 
of a person are divorced from that of autonomy. He emphasises, as 
stated above, that the adjective in the phrase personal autonomy .is 
not redundant and separation of it from its noun leads to a most 
uneasy situation: 
"Suppose that a person chose, decided, deliberated, planned 
and so on, but the considerations he bore in mind were false, 
or the criteria which made them considerations for him were 
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inappropriate, what then? For instance, a man might 
determine for himself the early history of true world by 
consulting Genesis, or a man might plan some crime 
without reference to, or even in deliberate disregard of, 
any moral scruples, Would that still be autonomy? On 
the account given here, it would, or at least could. 
still be autonomy. If so that shows truth and morality 
not to be among the conditions which must be present for 
there to be autonomy." 111 (My emphases) 
The clarity and simplicity of Professor Dearden's literary style 
may well mask much reflection upon his choice of words. He refers 
at the beginning of the passage above to "a person" who is in error; 
evidently the person's reasoning has gone wrong because many persons 
who seek for the truth may end in error. However, when the example 
moves further into the realms of gross irrationality and moral 
turpitude. Dearden abandons "person" and adopts the alternative 
term, "man", and, liThe point is that the concept of a man (or a 
human being) is a biological concept, whereas that of a person 1s 
not." 112 Furthermore, when Dearden presents a rhetorical question 
about whether a collection of gross failures to reason to an 
adequate standard and evil disregard for "any moral scruples" may 
"still be autonomy?", he decides it can still quality as "autonomy". 
This conclusion may be acceptable because Dearden omits the crucial 
adjective, personal, to govern autonomy, with similar implication 
to his change of "person" into "man" earlier in the extract. The 
implication of "person" remains a guide and influence upon the nomos 
and although "autonomy" as a term in its own right may be explicated 
in ways which remove it from the moral government of persons, it must, 
as an educational concept and as an educational ideal be harnessed 
to its adjective, personal. 
The person exercising personal autonomy determines the criteria 
which will determine choice and those criteria will become the nomos. 
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Dearden describes how features of a situation are picked out as 
reasons l13 and these features will be selected by criteria which 
then enable the individual to select relevant reasons. Dearden, 
as argued in Chapter 1, is rightly sceptical of criterionless choice 
made by the existentialist whose criteria do not extend 'beyond 
himself. The only chOice for the existentialist is choice of 
himself. Dearden's argument is that, " .•• the existentialist 
position is not in itself free of all criterial presuppositions 
in its supposedly fundamental choosings. For even such supposed 
choosings as this has reference to what is required if one 1s to 
be a good existentialist: sincerity, respect for truth and the 
courage to face it, and self-knowledge. 'Bad faith ' can be bad only 
if certain value-criteria are taken for granted, or pre-supposed.,,114 
Dearden's contention here is a good one. The existentialist's 
choice of self is incoherent as argued in Chapter 1; some value-
criteria must be pre-supposed. However, when Dearden divorces 
autonomy and persons he is. himself, weakening the criterial 
considerations of the implications of a person in relation to 
autonomy. Personhood removed from its social and moral aSSOCiations 
would leave autonomy Similarly crippled. But. "Autonomy neither 
does nor could require the stepping outSide of all criteria to 
engage in some supposedly criterionless choosing,,115; autonomy's 
nomoi are shared by rational criteria and the moral and SOCial 
criteria of the implications of personhood. When Dearden states 
that, "Great criminals are markedly autonomous men, II he precedes 
this sentence with the Qualification that. "Without morality ..• the 
more autonomous an agent is. the worse he is likely to be. 11 116 "Men" 
and "agent" figure in these statements because the values implicit 
in the words, person and personal. are. in this context, divorced 
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from autonomy. A person, developing In the full moral and social 
implications of that term, must exist prior to achievement of 
personal autonomy. 
The values which Dearden attributes to the autonomous person 
are very positive ones: itA person could not be to any mark.ed degree 
autonomous without this being an important part of his self-concept. 
As such it will be an important part of his dignity, or sense of 
personal worth, and its exercise will be claimed as a right to be 
respected by others.,,117 Dearden's references to dignity and the 
individual 's right to respect from others infer the "central values ll 
or virtues of the endowment of a person to which he refers in 
The Philosophy of Primary Education, including: reason. integrity, 
truth, freedom of choice, judgement of what Is worthwhile, 
responsibility and fairness. 118 Telfer refers to similar virtues 
in the autonomous person: "Honesty with oneself is the most obvious 
of these •.• courage to face unpleasant truths, patience and 
thoroughness are others.,,119 She further adds: perseverence, 
patience and courage to the list and although such virtues as 
character tra its may be relati ve, "There would be no pOint in mark.ing 
. 
them out ••. if there did not exist, in general, inclinations which 
they regulate or canalise.,,120 Such "incl inations" are presented 
as descriptive of the autonomous person. 
Therefore, although Dearden may be precise to the letter when 
he states: "Ultimately, however, it must be admitted that an autonomous 
agent could refuse all moral concern for others, quite compatibly 
h· 121 h' '. with retaining IS autonomt' ; e 1S preclse In that agencies of 
an impersonal nature - institutions, economic investments etc. - may 
act autonomously; a 'man' may also refuse moral concern for others. 
But only persons can exercise personal autonomy and they act in the 
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light of very definite implications relating to the concept and 
nature of a person. The implications of the responsibilities of 
personhood should contribute substantially to an analysis of what 
personal autonomy, as an educational ideal, expresses. 
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Introduction 
Dearden refers to the connection of personal autonomy and 
authority as a "paradox": 
"This paradox was classically expressed by Aristotle, 
who observed that 'the things we have to learn before 
we can do them, we learn by doing them.' Thus we 
become just by performing just acts, brave by performing 
brave acts and so on. But does not performing a just 
act presuppose that we already are just? To be done as 
a just act, an act must be done not simply with outward 
conformity, but with knowledge of what it is to act justly, doing this for its own sake, and d01ng it from 
a settled disposition so to act. But in that case we 
must a 1 ready ~ ~ just." 1 
Aristotle's view on the development of moral virtue is that the 
forming of good habits will lead to an exercise of virtue which 
will, eventually,be understood in full rationality by the 
individual. However, Dearden points out that, logically, a person 
cannot be said to have performed a just act until he knows what 
justice is; his reason must be developed to the point at which 
he has attained understanding of what a just act is. Therefore, 
a paradox seems to exist between autonomy and authority, 1n Dearden's 
view. The young are taken to lack the rationality to be able to 
exercise autonomy as a person may only be able to exercise autonomy 
when he knows what autonomy is. A school pupil needs to have 
gained knowledge, for example, and to have become rational before 
he can understand what it is to exercise autonomous judgement. Thus 
authority must be maintained over the young, developing person, 
deferring the exercise of autonomy until, at least. formal education 
in school is completed. Authority is justified by enabling the 
development of autonomy in the young. 
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However, Dearden is not altogether satisfied with his own 
explanation of mitigating the effects of the paradox of autonomy 
and authority: "Something of a paradox nevertheless does remain. 
It seems unavoidable when we are dealing with a being which develops 
across time and in ways which may set the particular interests of 
different times in conflict with each other. 1I2 Certainly the age 
range of school pupils in Britain is considerable.3 And physical, 
moral and intellectual development of persons across this age divide 
may well be immense. Thus the relationship of autonomy and authority 
is likely to change as students aspire to and eventually attain 
adult status for if an individual does x only because another in 
authority so directs, that individual's rational autonomy is 
negated within a framework of education law up to the age of 
eighteen by present legislation. 
The aim of this chapter is to suggest a resolut10n of the 
paradox Dearden states between personal autonomy and authority 
largely within the context of schools, teacher authority and 
student autonomy. Section (1) defines authority and clarifies the 
. 
distinction presented by Peters of the teacher as ~ ~ authority and, 
also, in authority. Section (2) distinguishes in part (a) the 
- . 
implications of 'person' in the relationship between personal 
autonomy and authority and takes further the description of 
development in moral virtues presented in Section (2) of the previous 
chapter. The Aristotelian emphasis upon the importance of developing 
good habits is argued to be relevant to the development of 
appropriate dispositions and Gardner's case criticising Peters's 
argument for a particular kind of habituation is countered. Part (b) 
of Section (2) explores the relationship of rational autonomy and 
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authority outside considerations of moral virtue and clarifies the 
authority of the teacher as ~ ~ authority upholding appropriate 
standards in learning. But it is argued that teaching methods should 
give scope for the exercise of some student autonomy 1n learning 
even though the content of a curriculum may be established by 
authority. 
Section (3) presents a resolution of the paradox of personal 
autonomy and authority through the medium of developing dispositions 
and it is held that there is much in common between dispositions of 
both moral and intellectual kinds. A conclusion is drawn that by 
enabling students to exercise some measure of personal autonomy in 
learning, there is more likelihood that dispositions attaching to 
personal autonomy will be developed in the student. If knowledge 
of justice is presupposed in one who carries out a just act and yet 
the exercise of autonomy is altogether denied the individual student 
learner. it will never be known (within the educational process) whether 
that person has developed in the educational ideal of personal autonomy. 
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(1) Definition of authority 
Hobbes contrasts human society with a natural one governed by 
the law of nature. In the natural world, animals or insects 
invariably behave according to their own social code which is acquired 
by instinct. Human society, however, requires the authority of 
rules or laws which are stated in language so that appointed 
individuals in any society have the right to make judgements on these 
rules or laws which apply to particular cases. 
Peters4 develops a perspective on authority in education from 
the analysis of Max Weber who distinguishes three kinds of authority 
in human society: (i) traditional authority. by which laws rest upon 
long established social conventions. the authority which, for example, 
a local Justice of the Peace in Tudor England would have exercised; 
(ii) legal-rational authority by which the person having authority 
has it on grounds of the normal rules of legality established in that 
society, the authority by which judges of the American Supreme Court 
may, for instance. declare unconstitutional measures passed by 
Congress; (iii) charismatic authority, Weber's third category. is 
vested in the characteristics of the person who has the charisma 
to influence others by virtue of his own personality - such as Jesus. 
Hitler or Napoleon. 
Using Weber's analysis, Peters draws a distinction between a 
person being ~ ~ authority, as distinct from being ~ ~ authority. The 
traditional and legal-rational categories of authority place a person 
in authority in such authority within the structure of a particular 
SOCiety's rules or within a legal structure of an institutional 
framework. A headteacher is. therefore, in authority in his own 
school. but not in any other school; a teacher is in authority with 
respect to his class in a way appropriate to that of a good parent 
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and the power of the individual in authority will be contingent 
upon the rules which are established for the profession or 
institution in Question. 
The concept of ~ ~ authority is applied to an individual who has 
special skills or knowledge to impart in a particular situation and 
such authority is accepted when recognised by a sufficiently informed 
and rational community of learners. An authority is one who claims 
recognition as an expert; his claim to authority is based upon 
knowledge, skill or training, whereas charismatic authority is derived 
chiefly from personality. 
In the school, authority may well require power to provide the 
teacher in authority with status or respect in order for him to exercise 
his authority. The person who holds charismatic authority may well 
be able to exercise authority with little questioning of that authority 
by the young but where there is little charisma, authoritarianism 
may prevail. 
Authority need not be authoritarian. This is to be distinguished 
from authority when one who is in authority by virtue of his position. 
exercises and upholds that authority for no reason other than the 
fact of that authority. Rules of reason are discounted and the only 
concern of authoritarianism is obedience. Such a situation is far 
removed from rational autonomy. 
The teacher as an authority may also be considered a provisional 
authority with respect to his pupils. If the teacher (as ~ ~ authority) 
exercises his authority with regard to knowledge and skills effectively, 
his pupils should learn to operate the processes involved in 
educational practices for themselves in order to extend understanding 
and enhance skills and, indeed, put the teacher's own expertise to 
the test. Eventually pupils should reach a paint at which they can 
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determine the strength of a teacher's authoritative statements 
concerning some area of knowledge; his case must rest upon good 
reasons and be held to be true under scrutiny of maturing minds. 
Thus a teacher's authority is more justifiable if it is used in order 
to develop autonomy in pupils by encouraging their exercise of 
autonomy within a learning framework provided by that teacher's 
authority. The more removed authority may be from pupil autonomy 
the more authoritarian it becomes. If a teacher's job is merely to 
tell pupils what to think his authority will be authoritarian in 
that his being in authority will be the sole justification for his 
instruction. But the exercise of a provisional authority encouraging 
to autonomy may be one condition to enable pupils to think for 
themselves and, therefore, a teacher's function is not, " ••• just to 
stuff the minds of the ignorant with bodies of knowledge which they 
themselves have managed to memorise. For they are concerned with 
teaching others how to think not just with telling them what to 
think."S A teacher's role as !!!.authority may be used to attain very 
different ends therefore; unless the teacher as ~ ~ authority in 
learning allows for both the development and the exercise of autonomy 
in learning. educational practices may never reflect a realisation 
of the aim of personal autonomy. Nevertheless, the teacher in 
authority still holds a custodial responsibility 1n ensuring the 
safety and well-being of pupils; this authority is not negotiable. 
(2) The paradox of personal autonomy and authority 
Ca) Persons 
Dearden's reference to a paradox in the deferring of personal 
autonomy to authority in education has implications both for the 
social and moral implications of a person, and also for rational 
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autonomy. Discussion of the moral issue and authority will be 
considered in this section, (a), and the extension of the paradox 
to rational autonomy and authority under (b). 
The paradox of moral education is stated by Peters6 explicating 
Aristotle who distinguishes two kinds of virtue, moral and intellectual, 
and the circumstances required for the cult1vation of each. 
Intellectual virtues are developed by teaching but moral virtue, 
" ••• comes about as a result of habit.,,7 Habit seems the antithesis 
of rational moral action, hence an apparent paradox is created which 
Dearden transposes into a relationship between authority and rational 
autonomy in which he points out that understanding must logically 
precede an action denoted just or brave etc., (as described in the 
introduction to this chapter). However, in Aristotle's view, states 
of character emerge from the acquisition of good habits, II ••• for by 
being habituated to despise things that are fearful and to stand our 
ground against them we become brave, and it is when we have become so 
that we shall be most able to stand our ground against them. ,,8 
Aristotle does, then, emphasise the importance of habit in the 
acquisition of moral virtues for, in his view, only habitual practice 
of moral virtues will enable the individual to reach an appreciation 
of what these are, because, "Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to 
nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature 
to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.,,9 The forming of 
good habits makes " ••• all the difference", in Aristotle's opinion, 
in developing moral virtues. But Aristotle does not leave moral 
virtue only in the sphere of habitual action. He infers that although 
habituation may well lead an individual to moral virtue. moral action 
is the antithesis of habit in the sense that habit involves doing 
things only from force of habit rather than as action involvlng 
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essential reflection and judgement of a rational nature. Aristotle's 
analysis of a virtuous act requires a person to understand what he is 
doing, to choose so to act " •.• for its own sake" and, furthermore, 
to show a II ••• fixed and permanent disposition" so to act. 10 If an 
action does not meet these criteria, Aristotle does not regard an 
action as morally virtuous. Therefore, Aristotle, himself, presents 
a paradox because he considers habituation imperative to the forming 
of moral virtues, but that moral action cannot proceed only on the 
basis of habitual action because habit alone will not require 
individual, rational, autonomous thought prior to the performance of 
an action. 
Peters agrees with Aristotle that habit is a means to the end of 
producing a morally virtuous person. The "brute facts" of child 
development, as revealed by psyChological research and intelligent 
observation, delay and defer the acquisition of fundamental moral 
principles by the child. Habits must first mould him to act in a 
virtuous manner even though he has not attained the standard of 
Aristotle for judging an act to be virtuous. Parents and teachers 
should, then, use their authority over the young to habituate them 
to moral habits of thought and action. Their authority is justifiable 
on the grounds that it is essential in ensuring the child's develop-
ment as a person who can choose the path of virtue for its own 
sake. Chi ldren must, therefore, 1/ ••• enter the Palace of Reason 
through the courtyard of Habit and Tradition. This is the paradox 
of moral education ••• "11 
The difficulty attaching to the acquisition of necessary habits 
is how to ensu re that they do not, "... stu I ti fy the deve I opment of 
a rational code ..• "12 in the individual who moves towards virtue and 
personal autonomy. Peters endeavours to reconcile the reason and 
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habit paradox by arguing that habit should not be interpreted too 
narrowly as an automatic, mindless response, conditioned by 
repetition and drill under authority's directives. If a young person 
learns, by habit, to act upon a rule, this is, of necessity: 
" ... an open-ended business reQui ring intelligence and 
a high degree of social sophistication. For the child 
has to learn to see that a vast range of very different 
actions and performances can fall under a highly abstract 
rule which makes them all examples of a type of action. 
If the child has really learnt to act on a rule it is 
difficult to see how he could have accomplished this 
without insight and intelligence. He might be drilled 
or forced to act in accordance with a rule; but that is 
quite different from learnlng to act ~ ~ a rule. 
So it seems as if the paradox of moral education is 
resolved. For there is no necessary contradiction 
between the use of intelligence and the formation of 
habits." 13 
Young initiates into moral virtue need not be creatures of habit and 
act out of force of habit; Peters indicates that there must be an 
intelligent adoption of habits in a growing awareness of the reasons 
for the rules of moral conduct which these habits reinforce. He 
seems to suggest that the young can be habituated into a rational 
acceptance of rules of conduct. Habit must remain the starting pOint 
because the "brute facts" of the development of children do not admit 
acting ~ ~ rules at first in that a child just cannot appreciate and 
be moved by the practical necessity of reasons for the rule. 
Peters adopts Oakeshott's analogy of a subject's "language" and 
"literature" in order to illustrate the paradox of habit and reason. 14 
This analogy describes a subject's "language" as the level of think1ng 
and reasoning possible within that process of learning which can take 
the learner to the highest levels of thought of which he is capable • 
. In Oakeshott's view, the level to which subjects are taken 1n 
universities enables the individual to reach the highest pOint 1n the 
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learning process. (Dearden has more recently expressed a similar 
view.)15 The IIliterature ll of a subject is, in the analogy, taken to 
be the body of knowledge supported by approved and reliable authorities. 
Peter-s transfers Oakeshottls IIlanguage" and llliterature ll analogy to 
the paradox of reason and habit showing that it is necessary to 
induct the young into the llli terature ll of mora 1 knowledge and vi rtuous 
conduct so that, eventually, they will acquire understanding of the 
1I1anguageil of virtuous action. The llliterature ll (gained by habit) is 
the means to the end of learning the II language II (of moral actions). 
Having acquired the "literature ll or moral virtue, the learner comes 
to an understanding, by practical reasoning, of how to use the 1I1 anguage ll 
to think for himself in the realm of morals. 
The resolution of the paradox of habit's contribution to a person's 
capacity to exercise moral virtues offered by Peters is critiCised by 
Gardner16 whose argument centres on two interconnected issues: the 
nature of the language, or IIsphere or discourse ll , used by Peters and 
its place in a IIprogression ll or developmental perspective of moral 
education. A IIprogression ll or development of chi Id to adult Is, 1n 
Gardner's argument, within the sphere of a psychological or psycho-
analytic perspective on child growth (as described In Chapter 3. 
Section 2, above). According to Gardner, Peters describes a psycho-
logical development process of moral education employing habit training 
and, at the end of this process, puts a concept drawn from a completely 
di fferent area of thought or IIsphere of discourse"; Peters is said to 
have engaged in drawing a conclUSion, i.e. the autonomous person with 
practical reason, from an argument in a different language from this 
concluding concept. The conclusion is, II ••• the type of moral agent 
described by moral PhilosoPhers. 1I17 aut the language of psychoanalytic 
argument cannot result in such a conclUSion, therefore, Gardner 
164 
considers that Peters's argument contains an antinomy. Gardner 
pOints out that: "I regard psycho-analysis as a sphere of discourse 
or mode of explanation and I treat the language of the moral 
philosopher, that 1s, of those who share Peters's Aristotelian view 
of the moral agent, as another sphere of discourse or mode of 
explanation. 1118 
Gardner's case is that the psycho-analytic perspective on 
children's development is logically removed from the concept of moral 
agent which moral philosophers hold. On the one hand. character. 
p e r s o n a l 1 t ~ ~ and behaviour are explained, for example. by genetic 
features and early life experiences (as in Freud) so that. II ••• in 
this sphere of discourse notions like 'autonomy'. 'responsibility'. 
'choice' and 'spontaneity' would seem to have no home ••• 1119 In 
contrast to this there is a moral philosopher's perspective; "It is 
the realm where notions such as 'autonomy'. 'responsibility' and 
'choice' are at home, where explanations terminate with the conscious 
operations of the agent's mind ... 1120 Thus Dearden's view that a 
person is autonomous to the extent that what he thinks or does 
cannot be explained without particular reference to his own 
independent thinking is, in Gardner's argument. a concept quite 
removed from any account of psycho-analytic development. Habits are 
crucial in Peters's account but as these are the antithesis of 
genuine moral action and Peters concludes his argument at the pOint 
of the rational, moral person in a different language from habits 
and development, the paradox of moral education is unresolved. Peters 
is considered to draw an antinomy, II ••• in which the domain where 
agents are the initiators of their actions is contrasted with the 
domain where all events are treated as the products of antecedent 
causes. 1121 As a result, Peters's case that, " ••• there is no 
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contradiction involved in talking of individuals acquiring habits ~ ~
being rational, intell igent and fai rly spontaneous ,,22 is insupportable. 
Gardner finds three possible resolutions to this paradox which 
he considers unresolved by Peters; the first two are: that the young 
are more rational than the psycho-analytic model allows and that 
autonomous adults will emerge whatever their childhoods - both 
resolutions are dismissed. The third possible resolution is to 
abandon the, " ••• moral philosopher's view of the adult moral agent"23 
but Peters's conclusion is to avoid this and Gardner evidently will 
not grasp this nettle and. instead. hopes-for a new way of 
conceptual ising children which will not end in the contradiction he 
claims to identify in Peters's argument. 
If Gardner's criticism of Peters is tenable, considerable. 
implications stem from it. Any philosopher or any psychologist who 
utilises the perspectives of the other's area of investigation and 
who presents the rational. autonomous person as the ideal of any 
outline of development of a person is. from Gardner's argument, 
presumably in error. Piaget and Kohlberg. for example. use both 
philosophic and psychological perspectives presenting a developmental 
view of morality in the individual whose acquisition of reason may 
eventually enable him to reach a stage of adult autonomy. Peters's 
argument has considerable affinity to both these writers' views. 
However, there are difficulties attaching to Gardner's Position 
particularly in connection with his account of "progression" or 
development and to his case concerning a "sphere of discourse"; he 
gives examples as follows: 
"For instance, if the problem is getting to a certain town. 
we may plot a course, and if the p r ~ b l e m m concerns going 
from a profit to a loss, we may deVIse a strategy. But 
these problems' are not analogous to the type of issue 
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we f ~ n d d in Peters's main presentation of his paradox. 
for In our examples both the start and the goal or 
objective can be contained within the same realm or 
sphere of discourse." 24 
Gardner's argument hinges, to a considerable extent. upon what he 
stipulates as a "sphere of discourse" because cOllmon use would 
presumably regard this as rational thought and argument which would 
apply to many areas of thought and associated practices. But if 
Gardner's stipulation is supportable. he should extend the implications 
of it to his choice of examples cited above. The first of these. the 
distance between two pOints, has little claim for comparability with 
a "sphere of discourse" embracing the moral development of persons. 
Rational thought in any particular sphere is determined by the key 
concepts with which it is concerned and in moral education, the 
subject determining the nature of the discourse is that of a person, 
and such a subject, because of the breadth of implications implic1t 
In an analysis of the concept of a person, requires discourse 
appropriate to such breadth. The concept of a person, as the autos 
of personal autonomy, carries SOCial and moral implications (as 
described in Chapter 3) but it also has implications for many other 
aspects of understanding. And it may only be when the perspectives 
generated by science, philosophy, morals, religion et alia are· 
combined, that the concept of a person is fully identifiable by 
rational thought and argument across many "spheres of discourse ll • 
Indeed, if all "discourse" is compartmental1sed In segregated IIspheres". 
knowledge, understanding and human perspectives will be blinkered; 
different "spheres" should try to borrow from each other because 
wi thout the "cogn t t i ve perspecti ve II of Peters, there can be 11 ttl e 
thought which blends, enlightens and integrates varied perspectives 
for the individual. Peters is true to his calling in using different 
areas of knowledge to derive the most revealing analys1s. 
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Gardner's second example above is of the economic prescription 
for progressing from loss to profit to illustrate development in a 
particular "sphere of discourse". It may be possible to adhere 
strictly to economics in evolving a strategy in order to move from 
loss to profit but economics concerns persons as do all other SOCial 
SCiences and any strategy which omits conSideration of the human 
condition may have little chance of success. The economist's 
investigation into the nature of the interaction of persons helps 
him reach perspectives which involve values to shape key deCiSions in 
economic strategy. Although strains of intellectual activity may be 
sometimes stated under titles such as economic history or economic 
geography in the humanities and human sciences, the nature of a 
person calls for a combination of expert authority in ensuring as 
wide a perspective as possible is achieved. Therefore. at school level, 
a broad curriculum is essentially a gaining of understanding across 
a wide spectrum of knowledge synthesised in the learner's perspectives. 
Moral virtue in the individual transcends all discrete areas 
of "discourse" since it relates to the concept of the whole person. 
Thus, Peters I s phrase. " ••. the brute facts of ch ild development ", is 
not specific to any discrete intellectual perspective; its rawness 
may make a psychologist squirm even given the reference to development 
wh ich, in Gardner I s view, is here the "sphere of discourse" of 
psycho-analysis. The phrase has meaning in philosophic discourse 
and opens a wide perspective upon moral education involving a concern 
for the whole person. 
A further feature of Gardner's argument is that the development 
of children by habit is formative; the child becomes father of the 
man. Therefore, given the significance attached to habit by Aristotle 
and Peters, Gardner Questions whether a rational, autonomous person 
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could ever, possibly, emerge from such inauspicious beginnings. 
Peters is convinced of the fonmative nature of habits when he po1nts 
out, IIAnd so we stand at the door of the nursery which is the gateway 
to moral education. For it is here, in all probability. that the 
pattern of character-traits and the manner of exercising them is 
laid down. 1I25 Such habits may lead to persons becoming, "compuls1ves, 
obsessives, Puritans and impractical idealogues." But Gardner 
considers that if individual children can be shaped, moulded and 
indoctrinated by habits imposed by authoritarian adults, a child's 
future may never result in rational autonomy. However, Peters 
stresses that it is how habitaution occurs that is of major 
significance; "Habits need not be exercised out of force of habit."26 
The acquisition of good habits should allow the mind greater freedom 
to exercise itself in other ways which require greater thought. 
Habits can be used constructively, if used carefully: 
"For it is only if habits are developed in a certain kind 
of way that the paradox of moral education can be avoided 
in practice. This is a matter about which psychologists 
and practical teachers will have much more to say than 
philosophers. For I have only tried to resolve the 
theoretical paradox of moral education in a theoretical 
manner." 27 . 
Thus, it's not (only) what you do, it's the way that you do it 
which is Peters's message regarding habituation. And Gardner agrees 
that habits should be acquired by particular means although 
maintaining the paradox is unresolved. Brute drill in habits of 
moral virtue is not a feasible method to develop rational autonomy 
because autonomy is remote from such drill with its impl1cations of 
mindless, conditioned response. The methods of habituation are 
of central importance in enabling the individual some measure of 
flexibility to exercise judgement as he develops. Dearden pOints out 
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that without some flexibility, moral development might be stunted. 
" ••• if the second stage really were as authoritarian as P1aget 1s 
sometimes made to say that it must be, then it is hard to see how 
autonomy could ever emerge from it ... 28 
The educator in authority over children and young persons must 
exercise his authority by applying the appropriate means and style 
of habituating the young into moral virtue. The teacher is no moral 
expert but a shared perspective of moral virtues should be extended 
to encompass the young so that a school, for example, becomes a 
community with expectations of adherence to rules reflecting moral 
virtues. The educator in authority must have great care for the means 
of habituation and, when feasible, encourage reasoned discussion of 
rules and standards by inviting active involvement of those of 
suitable age in the maintenance of standards. The paradox of moral 
education, as Peters argues. enables personal autonomy to gain 
expression as adulthood approaches. 
(b) Rational autonomy and authority 
Peters resolves the paradox of moral education by judicious use 
of appropriate methods in forming habits express1ve of moral virtue 
in the young and a person, as a social and moral being, comes to 
rational autonomy by adults ~ ~ authority habituating him or her 
initially into the path of moral virtue. Autonomy and authority 
reach a modus vivendi in the way habits are inculcated. However. 
Dearden's description of personal autonomy distingu1shes this concept 
from moral action and in this section, therefore. other facets of 
rational autonomy will be considered in order to clarify the nature 
of the relationship between autonomy and authority apart from in the 
sphere of moral virtue. 
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The attempts made to clarify the relationship between authority 
and autonomy in society in general do show that both apparentiy 
intractable concepts have a relationship in some respects. The 
following schema from R. P. Wolff·s, In Defense of Anarchism, is used 
to describe an autonomy - authority relationship as a paradox of 
democracy: 
II( 1) Authority is the right to be obeyed. 
(2) Obedience is doing something because someone tells 
you to do it. 
(3) Autonomy is self-legislation - never doing something 
because someone else tells you to do it. (4) therefore, for authority to exist autonomy must 
be forfeited. 1I 29 
In order to retain some power for autonomy, Bates argues that the 
prima facie moral principle to obey the law may be overridden by some, 
other moral principle on a particular occasion and the individual 
person should reserve the right to make that final deCision. The 
individual is not alone in claiming his autonomy as no philosopher _ 
even Hobbes - considers the state's authority and power over the 
individual to be unlimited. The task of philosophers has been to 
clarify the limits of obligation binding upon the individual who 
claims autonomy over the state's authority. It seems likely that a 
person in a modern democratic society will, in general, obey the 
authority of the state but reserves to himself the ultimate deciSion 
whether to do so or not were the laws of the state to conflict with 
other prima facie moral principles. Were Bates's analysts to be 
amended to read: 
(1) Authority is to claim the right to be obeyed, 
and, (3) Autonomy is self-legislation - never dOing something only 
because someone else tells you to do it (an emphaSis Bates, presumably, 
intends from his emphasis of the word because), 
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it would, perhaps, more precisely convey his qualification upon 
authority in the form of autonomy. The paradox of autonomy and 
authority is not only confined to education and the young, therefore, 
since it remains unresolved in adult society which has grown. to 
some extent, out of the institutional framework of mass education. 
Gibbs30 examining The Republic finds a paradox of autonomy and 
authority. He pOints to Plato's strong support for authority even 
to the point of authoritarianism when defining the society of The 
-
Republic. but, at the same time. Plato Is also in favour of rational 
autonomy and is critical of societies which omit features of autonomy. 
such as Timocratic, Oligarchic and Democratic SOCieties. But, In 
The Republic. the highly autonomous Guardians rule a society of 
different classes who are responsible for defence or material 
production for all; these specialists are recognised as expert in 
their particular fields and in consequence. the rulers recognise 
the autonomy of each of these groups within its own sphere of 
responsibility. Therefore, the authority of the rulers is tempered 
by autonomy within particular groups in The Republic, because: "It 
would be unrealistic to demand that a person's judgement shall always 
be determined by his reflections. without recourse at all to the 
judgements. testimony and advice of other peoPle.,,31 However. the 
Guardians in authority would only attain rational autonomy and 
authority after the long educational process described by Plato during 
which autonomy for the Guardian submits to appropriate discipline and 
authori ty. 
In a political context of a whole SOCiety. therefore. Bates and 
Gibbs find some scope for autonomy when government is ~ ~ authority. 
just as Peters too finds it possible to draw autonomy out of careful 
and judicious practice of authoritative habituation into moral virtue. 
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It may be unlikely that schools could function as organisations 
upholding educational and moral standards in the virtues without 
their teachers ~ ~ authority over pupils. However, a teacher is also 
an authority with expertise in what he teaches, but it does not 
necessarily follow because a process of authoritative habituation into 
moral virtue is required prior to the exercise of personal autonomy 
by the individual as the end of that process, that teacher expert 
authority involving other learning should delimit the exercise of 
autonomy unti 1 formal education is completed. Nevertheless, methods 
of forming good habits in the moral virtues are emphasised by Peters 
as a means of resolving the paradox of moral education; teacher 
methods of using expert authority may be equally significant in the 
intellectual sphere. 
Dearden describes the relationship of autonomy and an intellectual 
education, thus: 
"Perhaps autonomy is like happiness 1n this respect: that 
you do not achieve it by making it your primary objective. 
A decentred concern for appropriate standards would be the 
primary pOint. But the collateral effect on the person 
himself would be no less important for being indirect." 32 
What are these standards within an intellectual education? They are 
presumably the levels of practice that ~ ~ authority would accept as 
appropriate to the educational practice in Question; they, therefore, 
should be acknowledged and adhered to by the learner. They are, also 
endorsed by the expert who is most aware of what the standard should 
be and adheres to it himself. However, standards are not immutable; 
review and improvements, appropriate to some standards, are likely 
to be essential to their maintenance. 
But, unless a learner comes to grips, in the learn1ng process, 
with meeting standards for himself, Questioning accepted standards 
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as good ones and, at some stage, rationally questioning the authority 
of the teacher's view on an issue confronting them, there 1s little 
reason to assume that autonomy will develop at all. Autonomy within 
an intellectual education should be exercised by the learner day by 
day, albeit, in the early stages, with due respect to expert authority 
of teachers. As with moral virtue, the method of develop1ng 
intellectual autonomy is crUCial, but without scope for its expression 
in the learning process, there seems little reason why it should come 
into existence at some later stage. An intellectual education should 
be a stimulating experience in which learners, conscious of standards, 
tackle problems, question accepted statements and explore the 
territory with intellectual rigour. Without, in some measure, an 
exercise of autonomy, this Situation is not possible because if the 
teacher, as an authority, does no more than convey his conclusions 
to his pupils on all significant issues within an intellectual 
education and gives them little scope for autonomous thinking in the 
learning process, authority rather than autonomy will become the aim. 
Learning will be circumscribed by the teacher's perspectives when 
the teacher's task ought to be the use of his expert authority to 
enable the learners to reach the point of questioning accepted 
conclusions. 
Dearden presents the concept of learning how to learn in 
connection with the teacher as an authority, illustrating particular 
methods of using that authority: 
liThe teacher properly has authorit.y, ~ u t t he i a ~ ~ choose to 
exercise it by teaching general prlnclples, n ormat1on-
getting skills, modes of inquiry, self-management skills 
and the habits which are necessary to back up all of these 
and to make them operative. Instead of just telling, as 
an authority, the teacher may rather elicit autonomous 
activity by posing questions, raising p r o ~ l e m s , , suggesting 
new directions for an interest, or Socratlc probing." 33 (my emphases) 
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But a teacher may not choose these methods; he may choose alternatives 
which place repeated, heavy emphasis on rote learning with the result 
that opportunity for the exercise of pupil autonomy in the learning 
process may well be lost. How the teacher chooses to use his 
authority is crucially important as is the manner in which habits are 
inculcated in the young towards moral virtue. But pupil learners 
must get to grips with the constraints of learning within any 
particular discipline of an i n t e l l e c t u ~ l l education; they must encounter 
those constraints at first hand as autonomous learners. (External 
constraints in learning situations are described in the following 
chapter.) 
In schools, the learning situation is one in which careful 
balances should be struck. The teacher as an authority has a 
significant place in determining the content of a curriculum in terms 
of knowledge and examination of different ways of life (as White 
pOints out in Towards a Compulsory Curriculum) which the inexperienced 
would otherwise know nothing about. But within a context of 
guidance, the learner must be enabled to exercise a measure of 
autonomy within the learning process itself. If autonomy is not 
exercised in educational practices there is little reason to suppose 
that it will develop at all and deferring to authority, even without 
justification, may become a habit formed from an absence of pupil 
autonomy in learning. To exercise autonomy is to be autonomous 
within the area of learning circumscribed; without the exercise of 
autonomy there seems little likelihood that a disposition encompassing 
autonomy will develop and personal autonomy, as an educational aim, 
will not be directly realised. 
Dearden's borrowing of Peters's paradox of moral education 1n 
order to apply it to a relationship between autonomy and authority 
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within the context of a liberal or intellectual education, therefore, 
has meaning if the methods employed by an authority are appropr1ate 
to autonomy. Even habits are relevant to reinforce learning as 
Dearden indicates above, but these habits are an habituat10n into 
suitable learning practices rather than brute drill. One major habit 
of mind is to think for oneself and to seek informat10n to conf1rm 
or deny one1s view, rather than to depend absolutely upon the spoken 
word of the nearest claimant to be an authority. However. 1t 1s also 
necessary to recognise and, when appropriate. defer to an authority 
in order to exercise an intellectual autonomy revealing independent 
judgement, initiative and originality in thought and practice. Perhaps 
the Aristotelian concept of the mean is a useful gu1de to practice 
in this respect. Methods of learning may be considered on a continuum 
from drill to the exercise of autonomous thought and although some 
kinds of drill may suit some kinds of learning, opportunity at the 
OPPOSite end of the continuum must allow for the exercise of 
autonomous thought and practice in learning. The teacher as an 
authority who holds to autonomy as an aim of education should use 
that authority to promote the exercise of autonomy by the methods 
of teaching and learning he adopts. (Educational practices towards 
the exercise of autonomy are explored in more detail in Part 3.) 
(3) Towards a resolution of the paradox 
It has been argued that those ~ ~ authority in schooling should 
ensure that the route to personal autonomy followed by the young 
should be guided by habituation of a particular kind so that the 
social and moral implications of the nature of persons are realised. 
Children must be brought up somehow and establishing the r1ght 
dispositions to engage the virtues is a central element in the 
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development of personal autonomy in its moral dimensions. It is 
maintained. above. that Aristotle. as Peters explicates him, is 
essentially correct to emphasise the importance of habit, given the 
appropriateness of the habituation involved. Settled dispositions 
should lead to virtuous actions, therefore. However, reason and 
understanding are also part of autonomy and cannot be excluded from 
the acquisition of the right dispositions for if the stage of develop-
ment of rational autonomy is reached the indiv1dual achieves the 
ultimate dispOSition of autonomy; moral virtues meet with 
authenticity and reason to dispose the individual to be personally 
autonomous. But until a young person has sufficiently matured, his 
dispositions will be held on grounds which are not arrived at by 
his own process of reason. Habituation into particular d1spositions 
is necessary and. later. practical reason should illum1nate the 
value of the disposition for the individual. 
A disposition has Similar characteristiCs to an attitude. Both 
are directed at a referent which may be a category, a set of 
phenomena. objects. events. persons. behaviours etc. The direction 
is always external. away from the person thereby relating him through 
his dispositions to other persons and things. Attitudes and 
dispositions are. therefore. unlike traits of character which have 
only subjective reference to a person with such traits and describe 
an external. outward-oriented perspective. Both attitudes and 
dispositions seem to have three main features; firstly there must be 
knowledge by the referent of the attitude or disposition. This 
cognition will vary with age and developing rationality. achieved, 
partly by expanding knowledge and understanding. Second. there will 
be an affective element in that the individual will have positive 
feelings towards the referent if early habituation succeeds; negative 
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or neutral feelings may also character.ise attitudes or dispositions. 
The third element is conative to ensure behaviour is generated 
towards the referent and an element of will is involved in ensuring 
that action occurs in accordance with the attitude or disposItIon. 
Attitudes differ from dispositions in that an attitude is less 
fixed in its response and, therefore, the conative element so 
essential in a disposition will be less regulated. Attitudes are 
predispositions in that they may influence and precede adoption of 
settled dispositions. But only when the three elements, cognitive, 
affective and conative. combine is a disposition likely to become 
settled. Even then. the level of cognition and the power to reason, 
may well influence the nature of the disposition. The acquisition of 
knowledge is not an end in itself but it may well influence the 
fonnatton of particular dispositions. A settled disposition, in 
the sense intended here, may be what teachers look for 1n pupils 
and describe as 'the right attitude'. And although a teacher may 
mean no more by that phrase than his judgement of a pupil's view of 
teacher authority, on reflection. a teacher should mean something 
more akin to 'the right. settled dispositions'. 
In the social and moral development of a person, inculcation of 
the right dispositions engaging the virtues seems a generally 
uncontentious issue. White emphasises the need for the individual 
to acquire these dispositions or self-regarding virtues: 
" ••• He needs courage to prevent his being dominated 
by fearful desires when his long-term good opposes this, 
temperance to keep his bodily desires within bounds; 
patience, strength of will; a good temper ••• the 
reflective disposition to integrate the whole gamut of his 
desires ••• the disposition to act on these desires ••• 
not to leave himself, Hamlet-like, eternally reflecting 
but never cOfTlTlitted to anything." 34 
178 
Parents and teachers in authority should use that authority in order 
to develop these dispositions constituting the SOCial and moral 
aspects of persons in the young. Authority should ensure the exercise 
of these dispositions and virtues within the home and the school 
because they cannot be developed other than by practice and 
habituation. 
However, dispositions also influence the individual in spheres 
of activity which do not obviously involve moral issues. Habits of 
mind and standards of thought in intellectual practices also involve 
the development of particular dispositions. Dearden identifies 
similarities and differences between moral and intellectual 
di spos i tions : 
"Thus an analysis of the learning task of moral education 
closely parallels what was said, in effect, concerning the 
other forms of understanding. For there, too, in 
mathematics or art for example one can distinguish the same 
three elements of knowledge, caring (intrinsic interest 
appreciation) and a c t i o n ~ ~ the acting again ranging from ' 
good work habits, such as neatness and legibility, to the 
more mindful and considered activities of problem-solving 
and constructive thinking. There are also differences, 
of course, since morality concerns our relations to others 
whereas these other pursuits may not." 35 • 
Dearden expresses a parallel between moral virtue and other kinds 
of learning in his three criteria of knowledge, caring and action, 
but he also distinguishes some aspects of learning from morality 
because the latter concerns the person's relations to others. However, 
much learning in mathematics and art. for example, within a school 
context will involve relations to other persons as SOCial and moral 
beings. Neatness and legibility, which Dearden rightly emphasises 
as good work habits are, essentially, aids to communication with 
other persons. Such habits are presumably of less significance 1f 
communication with others is not intended and the individual's pride 
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or self-respect in the appearance of his work is solely at issue. 
School based learning does involve much learning together In small 
and larger groups of persons so that the moral dimension involving 
persons with persons becomes inextricably linked to the learning of, 
for example, specific mathematical principles or drawing techniques. 
The relationship between teacher and student in a school context 
involves the teacher both in authority and as an authority 
simultaneously. He is in authority in that he must maintain the rules 
determining relationships between persons in the institut1on; he 1s 
also an authority in mathematics or art etc. as an expert assisting 
his students to gain insights into these educat10nal practices for 
themselves. The disposit10ns related to the virtues developed by 
habituation under guidance of those in authority grow by aSSOCiation 
with the intellectual dispositions aided by those who are authorities 
in these intellectual disciplines. Personal autonomy 1s revealed by 
the range of dispositions which the individual exercises both in 
respect of the moral and the intellectual virtues. 
Many activities have implications for both moral and 1ntellectual 
virtues. Dearden describes the need for authority to requ1re certa1n 
behaviour in chi ldren; "Learning that pinching hurts, how gardens 
are to be treated, what a library-user does, what truth-telling and 
promise keeping are, involves discovering expectations and finding 
out that their fulfilment is if necessary insisted upon·.,,36 He 1s 
writing here of those in authority requiring the maintenance of 
certain rules shaping moral dispositions. But the examples given can 
carry both a moral and another dimension. Learning that punching 
hurts by receiving or delivering a punch may, given a set of rules. 
a referee and a boxing ring, not be considered a moral issue by the 
protagonists, at least; learning that punching hurts by a child who 
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is bullied so that another releases his prejudice about class. colour. 
race etc. is a moral issue. That a library user does not deface 
books so that neither he nor others can enjoy them is a moral issuei 
learning how to use a catalogue or how to survey a book are not. as 
such. moral issues. Personal autonomy expresses the relationship 
of the person to autonomy and. therefore. both the moral and 
intellectual dispositions are called for in a child's development 
towards autonomy. Some issues are. inescapably. moral - such as 
Dearden's examples of truth-telling and promise-keeping. but issues 
which may seem neutral may well have moral implications because 
education is concerned with the development and learning of persons 
in a full social and moral sense and. in schools. relationships 
with others are not confined only to particular lessons on a weekly 
timetable. Therefore, the authority of the teacher who Is both 1n 
authority and has expert authority in some area of intellectual 
activity should be used jointly to ensure the exercise of the virtues 
and the development of dispositions in the student in order that he 
may exercise personal autonomy within the limits set by the school. 
The teacher or the parent's authority should aim to inculcate 
the dispositions which enable children and young persons to exercise 
a personal autonomy in moral and intellectual areas. They should be 
guided to get on the inside of the activities to which they are 
disposed through the processes of education. They should acquire 
the "language" of learning from the authori tati ve "11 terature" (to 
borrow from Oakeshott's analogy) and gain experience of educational 
practices for themselves: 
liThe problem is to introduce them to a c1 vi lised outlook 
and activities in such a way that they can get on the inside 
of those for which they have aptitude. 
The same sort of problem can be posed in the case of their 
attitude to rules of conduct." 37 
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Peters seems to be suggesting that the developing of the dispositions 
which a learner requires for intellectual matters is a process not 
dissimilar to the need to habituate a person into the moral virtues. 
The "literature" may be required prior to the acquisition of the 
"language" of the acti vity, the latter expressing the right 
dispositions to the learning in question. The individual should 
apply both his knowledge from the intellectual sphere and the moral 
dispositions he has developed so that, " ••• as a scientist he will 
not be oblivious of the moral presuppositions of sCientific inquiry 
nor of the aesthetic features of theories; neither will he be 
insensitive to the relevance of his findings to wider issues of 
belief and action • .,38 The learning situation inVOlves the individual's 
dispositions in general: "Some of the values of scientific thinking _ 
for instance being clear and precise, looking for evidence, checking 
results and not cooking them - are instantiated in the learning 
si tuation ... 39 There is no separation between the di spos i tions 
shaped by those in authority or the disposItIons developed by those 
who are authorities in areas of intellectual learning, therefore; 
the person involved expresses a range of disposItIons in his own 
person. 
However, it is unlikely that any disposition will flower unless 
cultivated. Authority should not, then, be considered as a means of 
keeping shut the flood-gates against the tide of personal autonomy 
until formal education is completed. Authority should be used to 
organise, guide and instantiate autonomy in the processes of learnIng. 
The paradox of authority and autonomy is resolved not by one 
cancelling out the other but by those who are in authority and 
those who are authorities using that authority to provide parameters 
to the exercise of personal autonomy by students within schools. 
182 
This may best be accomplished by engaging pupils in educational 
practices directly to ensure the development. shaping and exercise 
of the right dispositions in both moral and intellectual spheres. 
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Introduction 
In this chapter I intend to clarify the relationship of personal 
autonomy and freedom. The latter concept has aroused much interest 
in philosophy for centuries and is avidly claimed as an attribute 
in the workings of modern states by governments of any political 
persuasion. When applied to the individual, freedom is also used 
as a commendatory term as Cranston pOints out: liThe word, 'freedom' -
like its synonym 'liberty' - has a strong laudatory emotive meaning 
for English-speaking peoples ••• ,,1 And. echoing this tradit1on, 
Whi te emphas ises that. "Any infringement of liberty is prima facie 
morally unfusti fiable. 112 Rousseau complains that, "Man is born 
free. and everywhere he is in chains. u3 But The Social Contract is 
given over largely to persuading the reader to experience and 
appreciate those "chains" which are necessary for a real sense of 
freedom. Indeed, the constraints, Rousseau's "chains", are necessary 
for an understanding of what freedom is because in the application 
of the word, freedom is always freedom ~ ~ x or freedom for y or 
freedom from x so as to do y etc. (Negative and positive concepts of 
. 
freedom will be explored in Section 2.) It would seem that, "Our 
favourite use of freedom ..• is to get rid of it • .,4 Marriages, jobs, 
contracts and formal arrangements impose constraints invited by 
individuals and constraints, therefore, will receive cons1derat10n 
in Section (1), below. 
Perhaps because freedom tends to be regarded as a good thing, 
it has come to be, mistakenly, taken to be a power. Locke associates 
freedom wi th power: ., .•• the idea of liberty is the idea of a power 
in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the 
determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is 
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preferred to the other .•• " And he argues that d man standing on a 
cliff can leap twenty yards down but not up, " •.• but he is there-
fore free because he has a power to leap or not to leap. But if a 
greater force than his either holds him fast, or tumbles him down, 
he is no longer free in that case because the d01ng or forbearance 
of that particular action is no longer in h1s power."S However, if 
a person is able to do something and thus has the power to do it, 
he is not necessarily free to do it. Hence, in Locke's example, a 
man may be free to try to leap twenty yards upwards, but without 
assistance, he will, given the limits imposed by gravity, lack the 
power to do so. 
The words 'may' and 'can' have been taken by Cranston to 
emphasise the difference between freedom and power; I may set out on a 
journey, but whether I ~ , , or not, depends on whether my car will 
start or whether the bus arrives etc. "Truly there is little point 
in 'being free to' unless we 'have the power to', but it certaInly 
does not follow from this that the one is identical with the other. ,,6 
However, Cranston's illustration of the use of 'may' does not 
distinguish between 'may' expressing freedom and 'may' expressing 
possibility but with some measure of doubt entailed. Thus, for 
example, 'may' may not always express freedom, as in this sentence. 
However, when contrasted with 'can', 'may', generally, seems to infer 
that the individual faced with a chOice Is free to elect for one 
option or others. 
Perhaps one reason why freedom Is regarded as such a commendatory 
term is that it can be confused with power (as the example above from 
Locke shows) and thus appears to enhance the potential of the individual 
to whom it is applied. An individual who is free is in a state or 
condition in which constraints upon his thoughts and actions are 
1 ~ ~
either withheld or are absent. The person has opportunity to act 
as he claims. But, in practice, it is possible that he lacks the 
capacities or powers enabling him to act even though the opportunity 
exists for him to do so. He enjoys freedom and opportunity but he 
lacks personal power and capability. Thus freedom may be seen as a 
kind of state or condition. 
However, it may also be argued that the power and capability of 
an individual also constitute a state or condition. A ruler may be 
in a state of power over his subjects, but he may decide not to 
exercise his power in some particular, thereby allowing his subjects 
the freedom to act in ways he has not specifically prescribed. And 
a teacher in authority over a class, having institutional authority 
vested in him, will soon find when he wishes to exert that authority, 
whether he has the power to do so or not. (Authority in this context 
is considered in Section (1) of the previous chapter.) 
Although, therefore, it may be an over-simplificatIon to contrast 
freedom as a state or condition without which power cannot be 
exercised with power as a capability, ability or active faculty 
applied to an individual, it is nevertheless apparent that power 
only clearly exists when it is exercised; the significance of the 
light switch is not proven until the light comes on. Personal 
autonomy is in a close relationship with freedom, because without 
a condition of freedom the individual cannot exercise autonomy. 
Autonomy is a kind of power, therefore, which remains emasculated 
without freedom in which to operate. And although it is presumably 
possible for a person to be autonomous but not in a condition of 
freedom - a frustrating situation for such a person - that condition 
of freedom is no guarantee that a person will be or will act 
autonomously; he may Simply make heteronomous or conformist choices 
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in his life and squander the opportunity which freedom provides 
for the exercise of his autonomous powers. However, the knowledge 
that an action or a choice is autonomous may well require rational 
explanation on the part of the individual in order to demonstrate this. 
In Part I of this thesis, autonomy is held to give the 
individual a personal power and capacity to be self-determining from 
a perspective which is both authentic and rational and the implicit 
nature of the ideal of personal autonomy will further require the 
autonomous individual to recognise inter-personal standards within 
a community life requiring moral perspectives as a part of the very 
nature of personhood. Therefore freedom from constraint cannot be 
freedom to pursue egotistical ends if personal autonomy is the power 
determining action. 
In the sections of this chapter I shall explore in turn: 
(1), constraints upon freedom; (2), the nature of negative and 
positive freedom as conditions or states involving the individual 
and these concepts of freedom will be compared with that of personal 
autonomy; and, (3), a perspective on freedom and autonomy within 
education will conclude the chapter. 
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(1) Constraints upon freedom 
It seems appropriate to begin with constraints when trying to 
clarify the relationship of freedom and personal autonomy because, 
"The fundamental sense of freedom is freedom from chains, from 
imprisonment. from enslavement by others ... ", and " ••. to know 
one's chains for what they are is better than to deck them with 
flowers ... otherwise there will be danger of confusion in theory 
and justification of oppression in practice. in the name of liberty 
itself."l Bantock8 has argued that 'real' freedom must involve a 
measure of constraint because children having uninformed minds will 
only attain freedom by education and the acquisition of suitable 
knowledge. As they mature in character, abilities and all their 
faculties, constraints are reduced. But the range of constraints 
is considerable. Harris9 refers to: logical, physical. psychological, 
moral. legal constraints and. indeed, there seems to be as many 
constraints as there are freedoms. A person's life style engages 
constraints in its day to day operations and a style of sleep. food 
and T.V. may imprison an individual by constraints of habit and 
ignorance for only by experiencing and rejecting alternatives may he 
be considered free or autonomous. 
Two categories of constraints may be identified: those which 
are (a) external to the individual and those which are (b) internal 
or psychological. The individual who attains personal autonomy 
still lives in a world of external constraints; he must come to 
accept the restrictions upon his activities imposed by the physical 
world - he cannot jump twenty yards in the air etc. - and there are 
also those external constraints which society creates towards which 
the individual must orient himself. 
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(a) External constraints 
Entwistle 10 , although making little reference to internal 
constraints, provides a good analysis of external constraints: 
regulatory, disciplinary, custodial. Regulatory constraints are 
those concerned with law and order in human society. Each and every 
person encounters constraints imposed by law; Locke, concerned with 
the constitutional implications of the Stuart prerogative, 
articulates the need for regulation between persons: IIFor in all 
the states of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law 
there is no freedom. For liberty is to be free from restraint and 
violence from others; which cannot be where there is no law; but 
freedom is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to do what 
he lists (for who could be free when every man's humour might 
domineer over him?) but a liberty to dispose, and order as he lists, 
his person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within the 
allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be 
subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his 
own. 1I11 Hobbes has a similar conviction in the necessity for the 
constraint of law regulating individual wants: "For the use of laws, 
which are but rules authorised, is not to bind the people from all 
voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as 
not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, weakness or 
indiscretion; as hedges are set, not to stop travellers, but to 
help them in their way.1I12 He emphasises that liberty is the silence 
of the law. 
Schools and the individuals within them function within the 
framework of legal constraints. The rules of any particular school 
will express the requirements of the law as well as require certain 
behavioural standards for the protection of persons and property and 
it is part of the education the school provides that institutional 
192 
power should be seen to be used properly. In a democratic society, 
citizens accept the restrictions of the law in approving its 
imposition on all, equally, in that it, in Hobbes's phrase, "hedges 
in" the citizen. School pupils who participate in the framing of 
rules may come to understand those rules more clearly and be more 
likely to respect them. Given that the individual pupil may develop 
in personal autonomy, he will live in a situation hedged in by 
regulatory constraints, not least of which is that which requires 
his attendance at school until a certain, stipulated age is attained. 
If. personal autonomy develops in school pupils then, it develops in 
a situation of constraints. 
The disciplinary constraints of education also bear on the 
individual from outside. Much learning imposes the constraints of 
its own disciplines of thought. Subject disciplines apply their own 
rules of logic and limit, thereby, the freedom of the learner. 
Subject disciplines have their own internal principles, concepts and 
rules of thought. In some respects it is the constraint of the 
subject rule which makes for the highest expression of the subject -
as in the rigidity imposed on the poet by the form of the sonnet. 
Such rules allow the outstanding performer to show his ability in 
his discipline. Spontaneous free expression in art is regarded as of 
little value by Bantock. He considers that those children who are 
encouraged by a tradition (which he considers derives from Rousseau 
and Froebel) within which they may express some sense of self rather 
than respond to the practice of techniques acquired from o u ~ s i d e , ,
achieve little: "For an essential part of any mental therapy lies 
surely in the re-ordering of experience in relationship to something 
other than itself, a coming to terms with that which lies outside 
the self, and the consequent emergence of the self on a new level of 
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experience; this involves a submission at some stage to a discipline 
of a sort ... 1113 If personal autonomy is to be accepted as an 
educational ideal, disciplinary constraints of the kind referred to 
above should not fundamentally prevent the growth of the pupil 
learner in autonomy; indeed, Bantock regards such constraints as 
essential to free the individual from the constraint of ignorance. 
Entwistie 's third category of external constraint upon children 
is custodial. Denial of freedom to children is usually justified on 
grounds that it is in the child's interest not to be free. Locke 
indicates that equality is an essential measure in the relationships 
of persons, " .•• that equal right that everyman hath to his natural 
freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any 
other man ... " But "Children, I confess, are not born in the full 
state of equality, though they are born to it. .. II And liTo turn him 
loose to an unrestrained liberty before he has reason to guide him 
is not the allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free, but 
to thrust him out among brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, 
or as much beneath that of a man, as theirs is." 14 Bantock considers 
that custOdial constraints are imperative and he views the authority 
which children should come to accept as an imperative: lilt seems to 
me that the most preSSing problem of the moment in education - as in 
the whole of our SOCial life - is the search for an 'authority' that 
will give strength and meaning to man's free development of himself 
that will allow man to come to his true 'self', in Lawrence's 
significance of the term - which, in the last resort, is what 
education implies. illS Although Bantock touches here on a view of this 
constraint which has implications for the psychological aspects to 
be considered below, he clearly considers it imperative that parental 
and teacher authority over children should be competently and confidently 
applied. 
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In schools, teacher authority, as a constraint upon children, 
is partly formal in that it is derived from legal obligations of 
both common and statute law embodied in the institution of the school 
itself. However, a teacher's authority is also his or her own, in 
the sense of that which an individual earns by performance in the 
job undertaken; personal competence, knowledge, training, common 
sense and a concern for children's intellectual, physical and emotional 
development are a part of this actual authority which, in our schools, 
is far more significant than the formal authority of the institution -
in so far as effective teaching is concerned. (Authority is addressed 
more directly in the preceding chapter.) 
A school student lives, then, in a world of external constraints -
more so than does the adult citizen. And the extent to which a 
student's freedom should be subject to external constraint will be 
considered in the final section of this chapter because no easy way 
exists, it seems, by which external constraint can be judged 
appropriate or inappropriate. It would be of little practical use 
to adopt the maxim that a person should be free from constraint as 
long as his freedom does not interfere with another's freedom 
because every social situation would involve balancing one type of 
constraint against another with no sure way of determining particular 
claims. It does. in practice, seem nonsense to claim that children 
should be free from all constraints because the consequences of 
constraint clashing with claims to freedom might result in the most 
evident kinds of anti-social behaviour. The picture of the choir's 
activities in Lord of the Flies may be more likely than those 
children pictured in Coral Island! Constraints, of particular kinds, 
upon children may enlarge their freedom and their autonomy (later on 
as adults) by their acquisition of knowledge and experience. 
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(b) I n t ~ r n a l l constraints 
More significant as a bar to the development of personal 
autonomy may be internal constraints which have particular 
significance in positive freedom (to be considered in Section 2). 
Benn 16 describes three conditions in which autonomy can be restricted 
by constraint: compulsive acts or inner drives; "defects of epistemic 
rationality" such as paranoia; lacking consciousness of the sense 
of ability to change the world - as in dissociation of personality 
or schizophrenia. Obsessions, compulsions, drives may divert the 
individual from attaining a state of freedom, since these may 
become so powerful an. influence upon the individual that he may lose 
sight of his rational purposes and the capacity for autonomous 
thought and action: IIA man's freedom can therefore be hemmed in .by 
internal, motivational obstacles, as well as external ones." 17 If an 
individual has internal, psychological fetters or constraints which 
figure largely in his judgements, his freedom will be, to that 
extent. limited. 
Reference has been made earlier to the importance of overcoming 
internal constraints by the individual person. In Chapter 1, 
Section (4) (b) and (c), authenticity was argued to be evident in the 
person who was able to evaluate. deeply and reflectively. his own 
motives. Recognition of the strength and importance of one's motives. 
expressed in a language of worth, is central to authenticity as a key 
component of the autos. The deep or strong authentic evaluator 
encounters and overcomes internal constraints in making evaluation 
of his motives; unless inner constraints are set aside no authentic 
evaluation is possible. Further. in Chapter 2. Section (4), analysis 
of practical reason revealed the significance of wants in connection 
with reasons and such motives have relevance to the strength of will 
required to overcome at least some inner constraints. The will was 
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recognised as only contingently connected with autonomy, in Chapter 
3, Section (1) (b) (ii), but as part of a person's capacities it 
does have direct relevance to personal autonomy in enabling the 
individual person to set aside inner constraints and pursue those 
motivations which he evaluates as of the greatest significance to his 
life and learning. 
It may be that inner constraints are much more significant a 
restriction upon the individual than external ones partly because 
society makes for a level of external constraint upon all individuals 
because of the nature of society itself as a community 
constraining all by rules and laws. (Skinner argues for the benefits 
to society of wholesale constraints upon the individual in Beyond 
Freedom and Dignity.) External constraints can, usually, be 
recognised; internal constraints may not be as easily recognised for 
what they are. Therefore it would be nonsense to claim that a 
compulsive murderer was psychologically freer because of the acts he 
committed when he was, in fact, driven to act as he did. Fromm 
draws attention to two kinds of constraint: 
" ... we are fascinated by the growth of freedom from 
powers outside ourselves and are blinded to the fact of 
inner restraints, compulSions and fears, which tend to 
undermine the meaning of the victories freedom has won 
against its traditional enemies •.• the problem of 
freedom is not only a quantitative one. but a qualitative 
one; that we not only have to preserve and increase the 
traditional freedom, but that we have to gain a new 
kind of freedom, one which enables us to realise our own 
individual self, to have faith in this self and in life. "18 
Fromm is describing the individual overcoming irrational fears to 
achieve a true state of self-awareness in which internal constraint 
is kept in check. 
The individual's authenticity and autonomy give him the power 
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to accept some internal constraints as part of himself (of his 
personality and way of thinking) and to reject others which may 
stand opposed to his major motives and purposes. Berlin describes 
an educational process by which external disciplinary constraints 
may be taken on board by the individual's rational autonomous 
judgement and made part of his way of thinking so that although 
they are, in a sense, still constraints, they become part of him 
and enlarge his state of freedom: 
IIIf I am a schoolboy, all but the simplest truths of 
mathematics obtrude themselves as obstacles to the free 
functioning of my mind, as theorems whose necessity I 
do not understand; they are pronounced to be true by 
some external authority, and present themselves to me 
as foreign bodies which I am expected mechanistically 
to absorb into my system. But when I understand the 
functions of the symbols ••• because they appear to 
follow from the laws that govern the processes of my 
own reason, then mathematical truths no longer obtrude 
themselves as external entities forced upon me which I 
must receive whether I want it or not, but as something 
which I now freely will in the course of the natural 
functioning of my own rational activity." 19 
Berlin describes an individual who takes the external constraint, 
makes it his own and thus makes himself internally, psychologically, 
freer. The activity of his reason has shown him the way to the 
intellectual enlightenment of number systems. Bantock would be well 
pleased! However, not all persons require the freedom from inner 
constraints to reason at higher mathematical levels. Perhaps the 
vast majority do not require such a state of liberation and the 
acquisition of a complementary personal autonomy may well vary from 
person to person. 
Both internal and external constraints set parameters for the 
state of freedom within which the individual functions. When 
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personal autonomy is pursued as a major aim in education it may be 
that internal constraints limiting freedom also restrict the 
development of that autonomy. However, the relationship of freedom 
and personal autonomy will be reserved to Section (2) (c) and 
Section (3), following the analysis of freedom in Section ~ ) ( a ) , ,
into negative freedom and (2) (b), into positive freedom. 
(2) The nature of freedom 
I have argued above that two kinds of constraints influence and 
circumscribe the actions of the individual - those constraints which 
are external to him and those which are internal, a part of his 
psychological make-up, making him, partly, the kind of person he is. 
If constraints are minimised, the more freedom the individual has so 
that he may develop in his own way. Freedom is regarded as a good 
thing and communities with pretenSions to be democratic tend to 
regard it as a necessity; hence the imposition of constraints upon 
an individual by such a society must be made justifiable because 
a Western democratic society, at any rate, will tend to regard 
infringements of liberty as prima facie morally unjustifiable. 
Although constraints will be applied, it seems desirable to extend 
the area of freedom as much as possible so that the individual may 
obtain the greatest scope by which to attain his own purposes. It 
is the constraints which must yield justification and withstand 
scrutiny; all departures from that state or context of living which 
freedom expresses must be for compelling reasons. 
External constraints upon the individual bear upon negative 
freedom and internal constraints bear more upon positive freedom; 
the analysis of freedom into negative and positive aspects will be 
explored below: 
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(a) Negative freedom 
Isaiah Berlin's essay, Two Concepts of Liberty, has been 
described as seminal because of the influence it has exerted over 
discussions of freedom. Negative freedom, in Berlin's analysiS. is 
to do with that area of his life within which a person ought to be 
left to do or be what he wants without interference from other 
persons. The wider the area of non-interference by others. the 
wider scope for freedom. This view of freedom as the area within 
which the individual can pursue his own purposes is that of Mill who 
wants the area of freedom of action to be as wide as possible and 
because human activities do not always run harmoniously together, 
external constraints upon negative fteedom require justification 
based upon high values such as justice, happiness, equality, 
security, etc. The Millian tradition places great emphasis upon 
individualism. Each person, according to this view (deriving from 
Aristotle and, latterly, the Renaissance) should have the 
inalienable right to pursue his own good in his own way. Mill 
thought that if the area of freedom was unduly circumscribed, 
individualism would lack all s ~ o p e e for self-expression and, therefore, 
the individual would not attain the opportunities which his 
individualism should afford. Negative freedom is then an 
"opportunity concept .. 20 in that each individual is afforded the 
opportunity to act in his own way, but he may choose not to exercise 
his individualism or he may be unable to exercise it. However, no 
external obstacle obstructs him and he has a measure of freedom 
within which interference with his purposes does not run. Hence, in 
Hobbes's example, the individual traveller was free to proceed in 
his own way on the road which was bounded by hedges; the individual 
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was free in the area set out for transit and within those bounds, 
he was free from other constraints. 
Negative freedom is threatened by the assumption that it will 
be bounded by constraints from outside because once that assumption 
is accepted. consideration of what constraints are proper and to what 
extent negative freedom should be restricted become the starting 
paint. But a more appropriate starting point in deciding the area 
of freedom may well be a situation of complete negative freedom -
as Mill suggests. However, decisions based upon assessments of the 
appropriate extent of negative freedom present difficulties because 
these will be contingent upon the range of possibilities open to a 
particular individual, how significant these are, how far an increase 
in the negative freedom of one individual may restrict that of other 
individuals etc. The maxim that an individual person should be free 
in so far as his actions do not interfere with the freedom of others 
is not adequate as a basis for adjudicating claims (to be free from 
interference) because each claim will require separate judgement. 
The strength of the claims of freedom over other considerations 
will have no obvious criteria from which to derive judgement in all 
cases. It seems unrealistic to make all children free from 
constraints when attendance at school can claim the justification to 
ensure they learn and gain knowledge to make them more informed 
choosers in their adult lives, for example, even though de-schoolers 
counter-claim tbut lack evidence) that school breaches a child1s 
autonomy. Nor are children free from regulatory constraints when 
at school - few will regard it justifiable to allow children 
to act in anti-social ways such as bullying or vandalism. But the 
area of allowable freedom and the extent of constraint are rarely 
clear-cut and argument over whether children should be free from 
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corporal punishment for example is, as yet, an issue not fully 
resolved in Britain and certainly not resolved world-wide. 
External constraints and the area of individual freedom giving 
an individual the opportunity for action is often described as 
freedom from interference. However, freedom expressed in a more 
positive sense may be described as freedom to do or act in certain 
ways. If a person is free from certain constraints the area of his 
freedom is not limited by the extent of those constraints, but some 
constraints may be said to make individuals free to do things - as 
in the above example of children constrained to attend school to gain 
knowledge so they, as adults, are free to choose and act in informed 
ways. Indeed, it has been suggested that negative freedom, expressed 
in freedom from constraint, is also the same freedom expressed in 
more positive terms - as freedom to act. think. do. etc. Most expressions 
of freedom can be used to emphasise different aspects of each case: 
if I am free from my striking union's recommendation. I may go to 
work; however. I could be just as easily free to go to work because 
of the absence of my union's recommendation to the contrary. Negative 
freedom implies that the presence of some constraining factor makes 
a person unfree, whereas expressed in positive form, freedom implies 
the absence of something making for unfreedom so, therefore, it may 
be argued that. "In recognising that freedom is always both freedom 
from something and freedom to do something, one is provided with 
a means of making sense out of interminable and poorly defined 
controversies. concerning, for example, when a person really is free, 
why freedom is important and on what its importance depends. 1I21 
The understanding of statements about freedom may hinge more 
upon the nature of the constraints operating upon each individual 
in each situation rather than upon juggling with words involving 
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freedom from, freedom to, freedom for - in order to, etc. Therefore, 
as well as a consideration of the area of freedom left clear from 
interference by external constraints, it is necessary to consider 
those internal constraints which affect the freedom of the individual 
and to examine, then, the positive nature of freedom. 
(b) Positive freedom 
Both negative and positive freedom may well be aspects of the 
same thing. However, the absence of external constraints enables 
a person to realise the opportunity presented by freedom in the 
negative sense but it does not enable the person to do things which 
other kinds of constraints may prevent. Some constraints are inner 
constraints - within the psychological make-up of the individual 
and freedom in a Dositive sense may require the removal of certain 
kinds of inner constraints if such freedom is to be achieved. Some 
writers have pursued the links between inner constraints and positive 
freedom in some depth; Kant, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, T. H. Green 
follow this theme, whereas Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, Mill direct 
their attention to external constraints and freedom in the negative 
sense. 
E. G. West describes the positive sense of freedom thus: 
" ••. the 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' consists 
in the attainment of self-mastery, or, in other words, 
the release from the domination of 'adverse' influences. 
This 'slavery' from which men 'liberate' themselves is 
variously described to include slavery to 'nature', to 
'unbridled passions', to 'irrational impulses', or simply 
slavery to one's 'lower nature'. 'Positive' liberty is 
then identified with 'self-realisation' or awakening into 
a conscious state of rationality. The fact that it is 
contended that such a state can often be attained only by 
the interference of other 'rational' persons who 
'liberate' their fellow beings from their ' i r r a t i o n a l i t ~ ' ' ~ ~
brings this interpretation of liberty into open and strlklng 
conflict with liberty in the 'negative' sense." 22 
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T. H. Green distinguishes a lower and a higher self associating 
the rational, idea I self as the one wh ich shou ld master the lower, 
baser self concerned for immediate gratification and governed by no 
more than irrational impulses. Positive freedom involves release 
from inner constraints such as these so that a condition is reached 
in which the individual attains the self-realisation to which West 
refers above. Fromm, writing in the light of the effects of National 
Socialism upon Germans in the 1930's and '40's comes to a similar 
conclusion about the 'self' as that of T. H. Green. The 'higher' 
self which lives in positive freedom has strength and dignity, in 
Fromm's Freudian-inspired analysis, but Fromm fears that man, 
unable to reach a condition of positive freedom, will find the means 
of escape from freedom altogether. In a similar view, West, in 
the extract above, ironically refers to 'rational' persons 'liberating' 
fellow beings from 'irrationality'; in reality he infers the 
subjection of the individual by some outside power which subsumes 
the individual's purposes within itself, fusing the self with some 
idea or ideal; this outside power can be a person, an institution, 
a god, a nation, hence, for the person: liThe meaning of his life and 
the identity of his self are determined by the greater whole into 
which the self has submerged. 1I23 Authoritarianism, destructiveness. 
automaton conformity are stated as mechanisms of escape from 
freedom for the individual in Fromm's analysts. 
Persons can, in the ~ ~ of positive freedom, be subjected to 
oppression and torture by political power on the grounds that it 
expresses the higher self. Totalitarianism or democracy may impose 
sovereignty upon the individual, subsuming his freedom in the political 
concept which does away with the individual's 'irrationality'. A 
democratic state is one through which the individual rules and is 
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ruled; therefore, in a democratic state, it may be argued that 
the individual is free and, indeed, if the power of that democratic 
state increases, the individual's freedom also increases. This, 
however. could be a distortion of positive freedom. Only individual 
persons exist and no one is able to legislate for himself even in the 
most democratic society; he is ruled by a majority of his fellows. 
perhaps. 
Fear of the subversion of positive freedom leads some 
individuals to a Stoic position of retreat into an inner self, or 
"inner citadel". which no outsider can penetrate. The Stoic retreats 
by eliminating the importance of things about him and. therefore. 
he preserves, in his view, his inner freedom. If prison or ill-
I 
treatment are not held to be a menace by the Stoic, they will not 
influence him. When the slave,Epictetus, was badly treated by his 
master to the extent that his master broke his slave's leg in spite 
of Epictetus's advice that this was likely to happen, Epictetus 
stoically pOinted out to his master that he had warned that this 
would occur. The slave withdrew from the worldly condi tion into 
his inner self, hence preserving his freedom. Although the Stoic 
acts according to his reason, his withdrawal from the world and 
from, if need be, compassion and concern for others, provide a 
strong limitation on this position. 
The distortion of positive freedom into its very oppOSite is 
a danger. Winston Smith eventually has to accept that, "Freedom 
is Slavery"24 and Aldous Huxley's perceptive passage below 
illustrates the same contradiction: 
"But if you want to be free, you've got to be a prisoner. 
It's the condi tion of freedom - true freedom. 
7rue freedom!' Anthony repeated in the parody of a 
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clerical voice. 'I always love that kind of argument. 
The contrary of a thing isn't the contrary; oh, dear 
me, no! It's the thing itself, but as it truly is. 
Ask any die-hard what conservatism is; he'll tell you 
it's true socialism. And the brewer's trade papers; 
they're-full of articles about the beauty of true 
temperance. Ordinary temperance is just gross 
refusal to drink; but true temperance, true temperance 
is something much more refined. True temperance is 
a bottle of claret with each meal and three double 
whiskies after dinner ... 
'What's in a name?' Anthony went on. 'The answer is, 
practically everything, if the name's a good one. 
Freedom's a marvellous name. That's why you're so 
anxious to make use of it. You think that, if you call 
imprisonment true freedom, people will be attracted to 
the prison. And the worst of it is you're quite right. ,II 25 
The presentation of something as its antithesis is not, of 
course, confined to freedom buthas become a feature of modern 
advertiSing for example - as in the representation and identification 
of the smoking of Cigarettes with healthy sports. But however 
skilled the presentation it cannot make opposites the same thing. 
And positive freedom ought not to be shunned because freedom is 
sometimes distorted into what it is not. 
In reality, " .•• Positive freedom is identical with the full 
realisation of the individual's potentialities, together with his 
ability to live actively and spontaneously ... "26 FrolTlJl's view is 
that, avoiding the distortion and subversion of mechanisms of escape 
from freedom, real freedom is expressed in the individual's self as, 
" .•• the spontaneous acti vi ty of the total integrated personality. 1127 
The condition he describes is an attitude of mind of an individual 
free from inner constraints inhibiting attainment of positive 
freedom. 
(c) Positive freedom and personal autonomy distinguished 
R. F. Dearden Quotes Berlin's description, below, as an account 
of personal autonomy. He indicates that Berlin, "equates autonomy 
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with what has traditionally been called 'positive freedom'.1128 
liThe positive sense of the word I I iberty I deri ves from 
the wish on the part of the individual to be his own 
master:- I wish my life and decisions to depend on 
myself, not-an-external force of whatever kind. I wish 
to be the instrument of my own not of other men's acts 
of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be 
moved by reasons, by conscious purposes which are my own, 
not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside 
I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer-deciding, not 
beIng decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by 
external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or 
an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, 
that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own 
and realising them. This is at least part of what I mean 
when I say that I am rational, and that it is my reason 
that distinguishes me as a human being from the rest of 
the world. I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself 
as a thinking:-;illing, active being, bearing 
responsibility for his choices and able to explain them 
by reference to his own ideas and purposes. I feel free 
to the degree that I believe this to be true, ana--
enslaved to the degree that I am made to realise that 
it is not. 1I 
Dearden considers that the essentials of personal autonomy 
are included in this description. It is certainly apparent that 
the individual here acts rationally; he is authentic in his wishes; 
he is an lIindividual ll , a IIhuman being ll - a person, therefore, with 
a moral sense; he has a will of his own. Nevertheless, there is a 
strong emphasis upon the word, IIwishll, in the passage above (see 
my emphases) and if a person wishes for something, he presumably 
has not actually achieved or attained the object of his wish. The 
person in Berlin's description wishes to attain a condition of 
positive freedom. It is, however, an ideal condition removed from 
the real, practical world; he indicates that: III wish my life and 
decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever 
kind. 1I But even the StOic in his inner citadel will require food and 
drink - unless he withdraws from life itself, the ultimate negative 
act. It is also a condition which seems to give little direction to 
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the individual who is said to be able to explain his choices. 
" •.• by reference to his own ideas and purposes". This latter 
phrase is reminiscent of Dearden's description of that individual 
who makes choices in relation to, "his own activity of mind", but it 
is hard to imagine anyone who does not (if rational) make choices. 
and yet is totally unable s u b s e q u e n ~ l y y to explain his choices. 
Although the essentials of personal autonomy are included in Berlin's 
passage, they are wished for, or sought for, by an individual who 
may well be mistaken about his attainment of a condition of pOSitive 
freedom; Berlin states that, "I feel free to the degree that I 
believe" the attainment of the condition described has been atta ined -
however, I am also, "enslaved to the degree that I am made to realise 
that it is not". If I do not realise that I have not reached my 
desired condition of positive freedom and if only believing that 
I have reached it, when I may well be mistaken, is enough for me 
to "feel free", then positive freedom, itself, exposes me to control 
from outside which I may fail to realise has occurred. 
Personal autonomy, although sharing most of its key concepts 
with positive freedom, may be especially considered as a power in 
the individual by which to judge his own relative condition of 
positive freedom. The individual who attains a high degree of 
personal autonomy is ruled by autonomy's nomoi, those constraints 
or rules, internalised by the individual, which enable him to think 
and act according to the standards set by the nomoi. The individual 
who attains a high degree of personal autonomy does not only "wish" 
to attain positive freedom, he does attain this condition of self 
and the inner constraints imposed by his own internalised rules 
enable him to act in accord with these same rules or nomoi. The 
individual who is personally autonomous does not "feel free" in a 
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state of euphoria like those who bind themselves mistakenly to some 
external force or ideal; he may often have difficult and painful 
choices to make - hedged in by those constraints or rules which he 
has internalised. Personal autonomy is a power setting standards 
of authentic and rational thought and action but positive freedom 
remains a necessary condition for the full exercise of personal 
autonomy because the individual must master some kinds of internal 
constraints or inhibitions before he attains positive freedom sometimes 
represented as his 'higher' self. However, without personal autonomy 
,the individual may lack the power to prevent the subversion of his 
positive freedom into a condition of unfreedom. This condition 
masquerades as positive freedom, directs the individual's purposes, 
subsumes his very self and eliminates both individual positive 
freedom and personal autonomy. 
Dearden, in clarifying the relationship of freedom and autonomy 
makes this point: "Attempts to identify the two more closely lead 
to a version of 'positive' freedom which may make a kind of sense 
but which is ill-advised. For when autonomy has as yet no psycho-
logical reality in a person, coerCion may then be passed off as 
liberation, as being what he 'really' wants or wills, and thus as 
needing no further jusiification. 1I29 Such a situation will 
expose the person to exploitation and he will lack the means to 
r e c o g ~ i s e e the condition of unfreedom into which he may be drawn and, 
as Dearden indicates, external authority, subverting freedom for 
the individual, will escape the necessity of justifying itself. 
Cranston pursues a distinction in the nature of positive 
freedom by stating that: "Rational freedom finds freedom in self-
discipline. Compulsory rational freedom finds freedom in discipline. 
Rational freedom is thus, individualistic, linked to a private ethic. 
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compulsory rational freedom is political - linked to a social ethic ... 30 
According to the interpretation presented above, "rational freedom" 
is positive freedom; it must be attained before the power of 
personal autonomy can function in and for the individual. Personal 
autonomy is that "private ethic" linked to positive, rational 
freedom. The danger to the individual's positive freedom and 
personal autonomy comes by the wholesale adoption of the "social 
ethic" which subsumes the person as a part of a greater whole, but 
which, as Dearden warns, may claim to be rational and, therefore, 
to be for the good of the individual, even though denying him his 
personal positive freedom and his personal autonomy. 
My argument so far in showing the relationship- between 
positive freedom and personal autonomy has, therefore, presented 
the following pOints of contact. First, I argued the necessity for 
the individual to be released from inner constraints - fetters on 
his significant motives - which inhibit his actions and thoughts 
(although it is essential to recognise that the implications of 
personhood claim the primacy of ethics - as argued in Chapter 3). 
Thus, free, he can attain a condition of personal, rational, positive 
freedom. This freedom has similar characteristics to those of 
personal autonomy, but as argued in the introduction to this chapter, 
freedom is not a power; it is a state, condition or situation in 
which the individual places himself, or is placed. Positive freedom 
is an ideal condition in that the individual can then, from such a 
state, exercise the power of his personal autonomy. I now wish to 
consider how the individual's gain in personal autonomy enables him 
to attain a condition of positive freedom and, also, how the 
individual who attains a condition of positive freedom can then 
exercise personal autonomy to a high degree. 
210 
Although an individual enjoying negative freedom may be free and 
independent from the interference of others, such a condition of 
freedom only places the individual in a situation in which he may 
choose to act. Freedom in the negative sense in which Isaiah Berlin 
uses it, is an opportunity concept. External constraints are 
removed from the individual's situation so that he has the opportunity 
to act; the individual may choose not to exercise this freedom, 
but he has the choice and obstacles from outside do not prevent him. 
Freedom in the positive sense of Berlin's usage is a concept 
involving doing or exercising abilities: 
"Doctrines of positive freedom are concerned with a view 
of freedom which involves essentially the exercising of 
control over one's life. On this view, one is free only 
to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself 
and the shape of one's life. The concept of freedom here 
is an exercise concept." 31 
Only when the individual has reached a condition of positive freedom 
is he in a position to act and think in the light of that condition. 
He must have released himself from those inner constraints which may 
prevent his activities, even though he is in a condition of negative 
freedom giving opportunities for those activities; positive freedom 
is the state or condition giving potential for self-realisation by 
the individual. 
If a person is to attain a condition of self-realisation (a 
condition of positive freedom) he must be able to discriminate between 
his wants, wishes, desires. Many such wishes, impulses and needs 
will motivate an individual; some of these may act as constraints 
upon his achievement of self-realisation - or, if it exists, the 
attainment of a 'higher' self. Some internal constraints will block 
the individual's route to positive freedom and individuals may be 
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unable to discriminate, adequately, between different sorts of 
motivation and, as a result, lead themselves to a false awareness 
or false consciousness of themselves. Such a situation may result 
in that collective control of the individual referred to above. 
Each person is an individual in his or her own right; he or 
she has a potential for authenticity and perhaps each person may 
have to seek a different route towards personal self-realisat,ion; 
no specific guidelines or prescription of steps to be followed 
exist to lead an individual to self-realisation. The power to help 
bring an individual to a state of self-realisation must be particular 
to each individual autos and express those rules, nomoi, or rational 
constraints characteristic of a condition of positive freedom. This 
power, therefore, must be that of personal autonomy. Positive 
freedom (self-awareness, self-realisation) is the condition to be 
achieved, hence it is not the power for the achievement of itself. 
Personal autonomy has been shown above to be Similar in its 
characteristics to those of positive freedom; thus as a person gains 
the power of autonomy, so he gets nearer to a condition of positive 
freedom. 
The powers which personal autonomy can provide for the 
individual are: the power to reason; the capacity to develop as a 
person with an appropriate view of inter-personal relationships; 
the power of will; the capacity to think and act authentically. 
(These concepts are considered in Part 1.) Each of these powers 
contributes to an individual's capacity to select between courses of 
action, enabling him to find his deeper or real purposes which should 
weigh more in his scheme of things than transient wishes for comforts 
easily acquired. The individual achieving his 'real', authentic 
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purposes will have attained something of the condition of positive 
freedom. Exercise of the power of personal autonomy should enable 
the individual to avoid. as far as possible. mistaking his 'real
' 
purposes and should. therefore. act as a constraint or group of 
constraints upon the person's judgement in any course of action. 
Autonomy will force out of the reckoning what is not complementary 
to the achievement of self-realisation so that the person who gains 
direction by an exercise of autonomy should move nearer to his ideal 
condition of positive freedom. 
When a person attains a condition of self-realisation and he 
can truly be said to 'know himself' so that he is free in the 
positive sense. paradoxically. personal autonomy remains a self-
constraint in enabling him to act on his more important purposes. 
Motivations of a less significant kind in his overall scheme of 
things should be set aside and autonomy's powers should help prevent 
the individual from error by his capacity to make authentic choices 
between the motivations he has. His reason imposes standards of 
thinking upon him; his autonomous personhood involves him in 
sympathetic consideration of other persons; his will ensures that 
actions are carried through with a force commensurate with the other 
powers of autonomy; his authentic self ensures that there is a 
feature of his choices among motivations which is not extrinsically 
detennined. 
Garforth contrasts freedom with. "fulfilment". The latter. in 
his view, is a major extension of freedom in the negative sense and 
Ule acquisition of the capacity to do and to have the potential to 
be fulfilled: "But liberation is only part of fulfilment, namely, 
freedom from restraint. self-conflict etc., it is not the whole 
meaning of fulfilment, which includes also the fruition or 
213 
actualisation of potentiality. Therefore. to identify fulfilment 
with freedom is to impoverish the former by equating it with the 
conditions which make it possible.1t32 For an indi vidual to be 
fulfilled. in this sense, therefore. he must experience the state 
or condition of freedom. But true fulfilment is more than this and 
without personal autonomy. no real fulfilment of individual potential 
is possible. 
(3) Freedom, personal autonomy and education 
In the previous section I argued that d e v e l o p m e ~ t t and exercise 
of the power of personal autonomy in the individual should lead to 
the attainment of an ideal state of positive freedom. This state is 
one of self-realisation in which the individual frees himself from 
inner constraints and is then more able to exercise the power of 
personal autonomy. The analysis of personal autonomy in Part 
comprised authenticity, reason and the criteria picked out by reason 
and the implications for interpersonal life of the adjective, personal, 
associated with autonomy. In the following sections, I aim to show, 
(a) where these characteristics of autonomy and the aspects of 
positive freedom meet, and, (b) where personal autonomy and negative 
freedom may meet in an educational context. In particular, I aim 
to suggest an approach to the issue of whether a loss of negative 
freedom can be justified by gains in personal autonomy. 
(a) Shared characteristics of positive freedom and personal autonomy 
Personal autonomy and positive freedom meet in rational 
reflection by the individual. A major characteristic of positive 
freedom distinguished by Berlin in Two Concepts of Liberty is that 
of reason: liThe notion of liberty contained in it is not the 'negative' 
214 
conception of a field (ideally) without obstacle, a vacuum in which 
nothing obstructs me, but the notion of self-direction or self-
control."33 Berlin goes on, in a kind of Kantian argument, to 
express the resu I ti ng syrrvnetry of a "rational society" in wh ich 
rational goals are shared by "rational minds", hence there results, 
" .•• the positive doctrine of liberation by reason". Equally, the 
individual, using his autonomy, is aware of these rational ends 
and regards rules as "al terable conventions 1134 which he can subject 
to rational reflection and adapt in the light of reason if he regards 
this as appropriate from his vantage point of autonomous judgement. 
The condition of rational, positive freedom in the individual enables 
him to use the power of autonomy by thinking and choosing according 
to the standards implicit in rational reflection. 
Positive freedom and personal autonomy also meet in that they 
apply only to persons. Only a person may enjoy the condition of 
positive freedom, and as I have argued in Chapter 3, the 
characteristics of a person are implicit in the ideal of personal 
autonomy. Not only is the human characteristic of rational reflection 
shared by positive freedom and personal autonomy, then, but a moral 
sensibility is equally evident. There are clear dangers to both 
ideals when distorted from rationality and an acknowledgement of the 
personhood of others. Berlin pOints out of positive freedom that; 
"Socialised fonns of it, widely disparate and opposed to each other 
as they are, are at the heart of many of the nationalist, communist, 
authoritarian, and totalitarian creeds of our day. It may, in the 
course of its evolution, have wandered far from its rationalist 
moorings ."35 However, Berlin does not explicitly indicate that the 
condition of the ideal of positive freedom is necessarily lost if 
"rational moorings II are slipped. The opportunity for the indi vidual 
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to realise a higher self in self-realisation associated with 
nationalism, communism etc. seems, in Berlin's terms, to leave the 
individual still in a state of positive freedom. 
Dearden pOints out the danger of a higher or 'real' self having 
no psychological reality, " .•• in which case the coercion of an 
actually existing self will be passed off as the freeing of an as 
yet non-existent self."36 It seems necessary to justify coercion 
of any individual, but in this instance,the justification is subsumed 
in the name of positive freedom, thus allowing the excesses of any 
movement or creed to oppress the individual. However, it is hardly 
appropriate,given the danger of a distortion of individual positive 
freedom, for Dearden to brush it aside altogether and consider that, 
" .•. it would be altogether simpler to confine freedom to external 
circumstances, as before, and to speak of the conflicting desires 
which are not yet properly c o n t r o l l e ~ ~ Simply in terms of inability.1I37 
But as the condition from which personal autonomy can spring, 
positive freedom ought to be acknowledged as such and regarded as 
an ideal in its own right having characteristics akin to those of 
autonomy. 
The personhood which both positive freedom and personal a'utonomy 
share is enhanced by a further common characteristic - authenticity. 
This characteristic expresses the importance which an individual 
attaches to his thought or action contingent upon reasons relevant 
to that individual's personal values. ExtrinsiC reasons should not 
weigh in an individual's actions when those reasons are intended (or 
by accident) deflect him from his own inner purposes when these 
have been tempered by rational reflection and a proper view of 
persons. Authenticity attaches to the individual's self and expresses 
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personal, genuine, first-hand decisions of that individual; it embraces, 
then, a wide range of issues with which the individual is involved -
in values, ideals, preferences, opinions, attitude to rules, etc. 
One difficulty in trying to ascertain whether a person's choices 
are, authentically, his own and, therefore, express his positive 
freedom and autonomy, is deciding to what extent a person acts in 
accordance with his ~ ~ preferences. The influences upon the 
individual to act in accord with his culture, his family, or the 
influences described so forcefully by Fromm in Fear of Freedom are 
strong. Essentially, any judgement upon authenticity of action 
seems to rest upon awareness by the individual of what his motives 
are. (See Chapter 1, Section 4 (b) for consideration of authentic 
self-evaluation.) 
Riesman38 offers an analysis of character types motivated by 
a variety of circumstances which give rise to a negation of 
authenticity. In Riesman'sanalysis, the earliest type he describes 
is the "tradition-directed" conformist whose confonnity is directed 
by, II ••• power relations among the various sex and age groups, the 
clans, castes, professions .•. - relations which have endured for 
centuries and are modified only slightly, if at all, by successive 
generations. ,,39 This character-type Riesman distinguishes from the 
"inner-directed" person whose direction in life and whose aims are 
implanted in him when he is a child by his parents and his elders 
in general; they override all authenticity and he proceeds towards 
in-bred, inescapable goals. The present-day, in Riesman's analysis, 
has generated the lIother-directed" character-type, one influenced by 
friends and peer group, by the mass media and the signals of society 
at large. This type lacks the inner stability of the "tradition-
directed" or "inner directed" person and may well suffer considerable 
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anxiety if he believes he is acting other than in accordance with the 
norms internalised by him from the training or signals received from 
outside. Only when the individual devises his own norms - his own 
nomoi - can he ~ t t a i n n authenticity of thought and action. This does 
not, necessarily, require the person to be totally different in 
thought and action from society or family norms, but the individual 
person must see for himself the force and reason behind those norms 
that he does embrace; his decisions must be authentically his own -
if he is to be autonomous in action from his condition of positive 
freedom. 
The autonomous person will conform when there are good reasons 
for so doing and, IIHe cannot be indifferent to the reactions of 
others, but he can be moved by other considerations too. ,AO He 
will not suffer the pangs of anxiety if he chooses a path different 
from those which the lIinner ll or lIother directed ll person feels 
compelled to follow. He will evaluate his motives in a condition 
of positive freedom so that his courses of action are authentic -
reflecting his personal autonomy. He must, then, be in a condition 
of positive freedom, in order to be sufficiently free from inner 
. 
constraints and able to know himself by evaluation of his motives. 
His immediate intentions or the causes of his immediate activities 
are relatively easy to observe, but the underlying motives may well 
be obscure. However, the difficulty of ascertaining the authenticity 
of a person's motives for action does not deter society from holding 
a person respons ible for those actions: IIThere is a presumption in 
favour of men being usually responsible for their actions, and the 
fact that we single out such odd cases for special consideration 
suggests that we believe that in general men can help doing what they 
do. 1141 
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Authenticity - in which positive freedom and personal autonomy 
meet - implies that a person holds major responsibility for his 
choices and actions and knows his own motives well enough to feel 
that responsibil i ty: "We can help doing things provided that, at 
least, we think we can."42 If, then, a person is to be held 
responsible by society for his actions, he will presumably, wish 
to ensure that these are, authentically, his own. Indeed, self-
realisation of his motives is essential in ensuring a person feels 
responsibility for what he does, "For if people believe they are 
not responsible for their actions, they tend in fact to become less 
responsible for them."43 
The individual who is in a condition of positive freedom and 
able to utilise the power of personal autonomy revealing this in 
authentic choices and actions still functions within bounds 
circumscribed by his own society and culture. Nevertheless these 
do not prevent the individual's authenticity of motive from governing 
his activities within that cultural framework; there is, " .•. no 
reason why the self that is such a product cannot be free to govern 
the self it is."44 
The educational implications for the meeting of positive freedom 
and personal autonomy in authenticity are those described, very 
briefly, in Chapter 1, Section (5) and to be enlarged in Part 3. 
It is essential that the learner should be able to get to grips, 
directly, with the practices in those disciplines and range of 
experiences provided within a formal education. Further, the 
necessity for the learner to gain inSight into his own purposes and 
motives and the implications attaching to these should be supported 
by the provision of guidance concerning choices within formal 
education and choice of career alternatives. Such guidance must not 
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be directive but should encourage the self-appraisal necessary to 
bring the learner face to face with examination of his own motives. 
If his choices are authentic. his power as an autonomous person 
should enable him to attain a condition of self-realisation and 
fulfilment which only the individual who is personally autonomous 
may attain. 
(b) Negative freedom and personal autonomy within education 
The affinity between positive freedom and personal autonomy 
is strong. However. the relationship between personal autonomy and 
negative freedom may be a more contingent matter as I aim to show 
below. And although the educational considerations in what follows 
do have some curricular implications, it is not my remit to examine 
the case for any particular curriculum by which to develop autonomy; 
the educational implications discussed in Part 3 centre on practices, 
procedures. skills and dispositions rather than on defining any 
specific content of knowledge for a curriculum - the intention of 
J. P. White. for example, some of whose views are referred to below. 
Dearden holds the view that negative freedom and personal 
autonomy complement each other; 
II ••• a person could have an autonomous character but not 
be free to exercise any autonomy, though this would be 
a highly frustratIng condition to be in ••• For a man 
might have highly developed capacities for autonomy, 
but yet be imprisoned, or be conscripted as a private 
into a Guards regiment, or be subjected to the dictate 
of an enemy occupation." Dearden emphasises that. 
II ••• freedom is normally a necessary condition of the 
exercise of autonomy ... but not a sufficient condition 
for the exercise of autonomy. Opportunity there must be, 
but whether a given individual is able to rise to it is 
another matter." 45 
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The exercise of autonomy is, in Dearden's view above, only possible 
in a condition of negative freedom; the individual may not be able 
to rise to the opportunity afforded by negative freedom because of 
inner constraints, perhaps, but freedom is required for the exercise 
of autonomy on the assumption that the person in a condition of 
negative freedom is autonomous. It seems, then. that a person in 
the compulsory years of schooling and receiving an education intended 
to develop personal autonomy, should not be permitted to exercise 
that autonomy. The individual in compulsory school is denied 
negative freedom; he must receive an education and he cannot legally 
elect not to be educated. Therefore, Dearden envisages a situation 
in which anyone below the present school leaving age of some sixteen 
years should receive an education to develop autonomy which cannot 
be exercised until later; autonomy's exercise can only be switched 
on when autonomy has been. adequately, developed: 
"What is more interesting from the point of view of 
autonomy as an educational ideal is the Question of 
whether freedom is a necessary condition for the 
development. as opposed to the exercise, of autonomy. 
Being a necessary condition for the latter by no 
means logically implies being a necessary condition 
for the former." 46 
Dearden further argues that a very strict upbringing with little 
scope for the exercise of autonomy may effectively develop autonomy -
perhaps by an "inward rebellionll against the disCipline imposed from 
outside. And he is sceptical that de-schoolers like Illich47 , who 
wish all persons to be put into a state of negative freedom on the 
assumption that their autonomy will flower, are mistaken in their 
assumptions: "The de-schoolers assume autonomy to be a natural 
development. whereas what seems altogether more natural is to act 
on impulse and to yield to group pressure."48 Dearden is surely 
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right in this case. The exposure of the young to the pressures of 
commercialism with an accompanying termination of compulsory schooling 
seems to present highly unpredictable outcomes which could be 
harmful to the young. 
However, Dearden does not show that the denial of negative 
freedom expressed in compulsory schooling will lead to autonomy; he 
claims that, "logically", there is no reason to suppose that a strict 
schooling will prevent the development of autonomy, but that is hardly 
a positive argument for compulsory schooling. Such schooling may be 
justifiable on grounds of prevention of harm to the young etc.; 
worse things could befall a child than compulsory school experience 
were this to be eliminated and negative freedom made the norm for 
children. But if autonomy as an educational ideal is to justify 
compulsory schooling, it 1s necessary to show how the education 
involved is a means to develop autonomy. Dearden has outlined various 
solutions to this problem and he has attempted to distinguish a 
particular curriculum from his analysis of autonomy. In his thesis49 , 
he presents a general education which is akin to a liberal education 
outlined by Hirst50 coupled with the process of learning how to 
learn as an educational means to develop autonomy. Latterly51 
Dearden has changed his views and he has decided that it may not be 
possible to distinguish the development of autonomy within and out 
of a general education, but he has argued that an "intellectual 
education" is able to assist the development of autonomy. Dearden 
makes little reference to content in his case for an intellectual 
education's contribution to the development of autonomy, but he, 
presumably, still intends the learner to pursue some components of 
a liberal education. 
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However, it is not clear from Deardenls account of an 
intellectual education's association with autonomy how such an 
education can have a practical value for the individual in his life 
as a whole. And if autonomy is held to be an educational ideal, it 
is still necessary to show some instrumental value for autonomy when 
an education is intended to uphold autonomy as one, if not, the key 
principle upon which that education is based. The exercise of 
autonomy in practical life outside schooling and in the longer term 
of an individual IS life is crucial to any instrumental justification 
of education for autonomy. And without some exercise of autonomy 
within the practice of education and within those constraints 
described in Section 1 above, it may be that an autonomous disposition 
will not develop in the individual. An education for autonomy may 
be more likely to move the individual towards realising the power 
which autonomy is when scope exists within that education for the 
exercise of autonomy. Such an education should, then, instantiate 
personal autonomy and recognise that a development of autonomy in 
the individual requires the practising and exercise of an autonomy 
which may carryover into practical life outSide education. 
(Consideration is given to Deardenls views concerning an intellectual 
education and autonomy in Chapter 2, Section 4. The argument in 
Part 3 aims to show how autonomy can be exercised in education by 
the learner's engagement directly in practices and his development 
of the skills and dispositions of learning how to learn.) If an 
education can be shown both to develop autonomy, and allow for its 
exercise within the operation of an educational practice, the case 
for the individual's loss of negative freedom - by compulsory 
attendance at school, for example - is more justifiable. 
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J. P. White argues his case for a compulsory curriculum arising 
from a withholding of liberty from children on grounds that the 
development of autonomy in the individual justifies this. He starts 
from a libertarian argument that any restriction upon negative, 
indi vidua I freedom is, II ••• prima facie mora lly unjusti flab Ie. 1152 
However, restricting a child's freedom to ensure that he receives 
the kind of compulsory education White believes appropriate. claims 
as its justification bringing a child to an lIideal ll situation from 
which he can make autonomous choices: 
II ••• we must ensure (a) that he knows about as many 
activities or ways of life as possible which he may 
want to choose for their own sake. and (b) that he is 
able to reflect upon priorities among them from the 
point of view not only of the present moment but as 
far as possible of his life as a whole. We are justified, therefore, in restricting his liberty as 
far as is necessary to ensure (a) and (b): we are-right 
to make hIm unfree now so as to give him as much 
autonomy as possible later on.1I 53 (My emphases.) 
White seems to give virtually unlimited scope to restricting freedom 
and with it. autonomy's exercise. in the above statement because 
he is prepared to restrict freedom, lias far as is necessary" to 
ensure the given objectives. The libertarian starting point for 
this argument for a compulsory curriculum White has latterly 
reconsidered and now holds that paternalism may have been a preferable 
starting pOint.54 And there seems little justification for a denial 
of negative freedom for those who may not be compensated by a gain 
of autonomy but a recognition of the extent to which autonomy figures 
is acknowledged. by Dearden, to be sometimes difficult to identify in 
individual decisions and choices. Any calculus by which loss of 
negative freedom Is balanced by gain of autonomy appears an unlikely 
measure to adopt and White's purpose above, II ••• to give him as much 
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autonomy as possible later on, II may be Ii ttle consolation for that 
person whose education does not develop his autonomy and whose 
negative freedom is lost in a vain search for autonomy. 
To defer exercise of autonomy until after compulsory education 
ends seems to infer that adults, having left compulsory education, 
should be by then more autonomous than children who are still of an 
age requiring compulsory education. But this presumption may be 
false; it could be that some children or young adults required to 
receive elements of a compulsory education are more autonomous than 
some adults. However, considerable difficulties may be antiCipated 
were some individuals to be accorded legal rights at an earlier age 
than their peers were it possible to assess autonomy in the 
individual and were this to be accepted as a determinant of adult 
status. If some persons were regarded as legally liable at age 
fourteen years, for example, in a society using capital punishment 
for murder and yet others were not regarded as legally liable until 
age sixteen, two fifteen-year-olds (one legally liable for a crime 
and the other not so regarded) would be treated in a very different 
way in that one might die for his crime and the other live. To 
infringe a principle of equality between persons of the same age would 
require very strong grounds for discrimination. Society does 
discriminate between its members and treats them differently if it 
thinks it has good reasons for so doing - thus the insane and children 
are discriminated against by loss of negative freedom. However, 
further consideration of this issue will be reserved to Chapter 6. 
The denial of negative freedom to the young does seem justifiable 
if the result is to safeguard them from harm. Mill is reluctant to 
interfere with an individual IS freedom in the case of an adult on 
the grounds that: 
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" the sole end for which mankind are warranted, 
individually or collectively, in interfering with the 
liberty of action of any of their number. is self-
protection. That the only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilised community. against his will. is to prevent 
harm to others. His own good. either physical or 
moral, is not a sufficient warrant .•• The only part 
of the conduct of anyone. for which he is amenable to 
society,is that which concerns others. In the part 
which merely concerns himself. his independence is. 
of right, absolute." 55 
Although Mill emphasises that the prevention of harm to others is the 
only adequate criterion for restricting an individual IS negative 
freedom, he does exempt children and certain other categories from 
this statement, II ••• This doctrine is meant to apply to human beings 
in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, 
or of young persons below the age the law may fix as that of manhood 
or womanhood. ,,56 Chi ldren or young persons are exceptions from the 
right to an equal measure of negative freedom with adults in Mill's 
view which represents present practice with regard to the young. 
White (considering a compulsory curriculum) has argued for a 
stronger claim to interference than that of Mill by claiming that: 
"Considerations of a person's own good as well as that of others may 
justify interference. 1I57 But his argument commences with a Millian 
position of prevention of harm and then switches this to considerations 
of a person's good: " •.. it would be right to constrain a child to 
learn such and such only if (a) he is likely to be harmed if he does 
not do so, or (b) other people are likely to be harmed ... To put the 
same point positively: a curriculum course is justified under (a) if 
it is good for the pupil. It is justified under (b) if it is good 
for others as well. ,,58 Gardner59 has pointed out the illegitimate 
move from harm to good in White's argument which is actually a move 
from "likelyll harm to actual good and White60 has conceded this objection. 
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Two questions may be addressed: 
1. If unequal treatment of adults and children and young persons 
is justifiable on the grounds that children may be harmed if exposed 
to the full consequences of competition with adults, is it possible 
to determine an age or stage at which the young person should be 
permitted a more equal measure of negative freedom and given scope 
to exercise the developing personal autonomy which White considers 
grounds for compulsory education and even for a compulsory curriculum? 
2. Why should White or any other curriculum prescriber be confident 
that his curriculum will develop autonomy and enable the adult to 
exercise this when the exercise of autonomy is not explicitly stipulated 
within tne curriculum? 
1. In answer to the first question of establishing an age at which 
negative freedom should give scope to the individual's exercise of 
autonomy, Mi 11 has no doubt that, " •.. young persons be I ow the age 
the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood" should not acquire 
an equal measure with adults of negative freedom. The criterion 
used is that of age. Age imposes a fixed standard and only, "human 
beings in the maturity of their faculties", in Mill's words, may have 
the opportunity of freedom in order to exercise autonomy. However, 
a person whose faculties are mature at an age below that imposed by 
the machinery of the law and who is barred from the exercise of 
autonomy by absence of a state of negative freedom could claim 
injustice on Millis description. Mill wrote before the advent of 
compulsory schooling or of any particular curriculum and a "discovery" 
of adolescence, subsequently, making a nice divide of child, 
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adolescent. adult is a more recent state of affairs. The Crowther 
Report asserts that: 
"A boy or girl of 15 is not sufficiently mature to be 
exposed to the pressures of the world of industry or 
convnerce." But, " ... by 15. and still more by 16. they 
have already acquired a good deal of independence. II 61 
And in the light of the perspective the makers of the Report had 
upon young persons. they tried to find in a transitional phase 
between 15 and 18. more freedom for 'young adults'. Hours of part-
time employment, school conditions brought nearer to work conditions, 
leisure activities, money in the pocket were all considerations of 
the framers of the Report. But even with more negative freedom 
provided for the young, the authors had little doubt that fifteen 
year olds were not in the "maturity" of their "faculties". 
However, to attribute maturity of faculties to an individual is 
not necessarily an easy matter. Physical, intellectual, emotional 
development would be involved and development of some or all faculties 
could be at differing rates in different persons of similar age. 
If change is gradual and does not necessarily embrace all facets of 
maturity at the same time within the individual,response to 
recognition of adulthood should, perhaps, also be gradual, as the 
Crowther Report suggests. A claim to recognise the negative freedom 
of a young adult in some spheres and allow potential exercise of 
autonomy by an individual need not, necessarily, entail a completion 
of formal education. However, more option w i t ~ ~ regard to content of 
learning seems appropriate. White's approach to a compulsory curriculum 
seems to have no clear concluding point and whether a learner not 
achieving some benchmarks in, for example, White's Category 1 
activities would be expected to continue his education until he 
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achieved the designated standard, is not clear from Towards a 
Compulsory Curriculum. 
Adulthood is certainly not a simple empirical concept which can 
reveal when a "young person ll becomes lIadultll. It is a concept not 
altogether compatible with physical or intellectual development and 
both criteria may be complete in a young pre-adult whereas some adults 
may be physically stunted, intellectually limited or mentally 
defective. Neither the possession of a breadth of knowledge nor the 
capacity to make a valuable contribution to the community are 
distinguishing criteria; some children may outdo some adults in these 
respects. Lacking certain criteria to distinguish adults from non-
adults leads to an assumption that adulthood may be only a status 
attributed to an individual and that status is picked out, simply, 
by age. Physical maturity comes with age and it seems only across 
passage of time that we find meaning in human endeavours and come 
to recognise that our being is inescapably rooted in time. Time 
allows the conscious awareness of the individual to mature into a 
condition of positive freedom and a release from inner constraints. 
Given the absence of certain criteria to distinguish the adult 
and age alone recognised when adult status is attributed to a young 
person, it seems doubtful to presume that everyone achieving adult 
status and more negative freedom should have become autonomous to a 
significant degree. But there seems no workable alternative to the 
presumption that young individuals will have gained in autonomy and 
will be able to exercise autonomy as adults. And it may even be 
that without expectation on the part of the educator that autonomy 
will develop in the individual, autonomy may be less likely to develop. 
A presumption seems inescapable that autonomy exists in the individual 
who approaches adult status and scope for exercise of autonomy at 
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this stage seems appropriate to enable the "young adult" the 
opportunity increasingly to practise his autonomy in a widening 
context of negative freedom but still within an educational framework. 
As adult status approaches, Mill's perspective (for the individual) 
carries more weight in that: " ••. the only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, 
against his wi 11, is to prevent harm to others ••• " And the opportunity 
to exercise autonomy within learning may be a way to ensure that the 
necessary presumption for autonomy in the person who gains adult 
status is a reasonable presumption. This issue is considered further 
below. 
2. White has, himself, an answer to the second question concerning 
his curricular prescription for autonomy in Towards a Compulsory 
Curriculum. More recently, in The Aims of Education Restated, he 
argues, more directly than in his former work, that education should 
be a means of developing appropriate dispositions in the young. He 
maintains that the charge by Gardner that his interest 1n autonomy 
is merely to view this as "equipment II to choose a plan for one's 11 fe 
is mistaken. And White claims that if the curriculum he presents 
is able to develop the individual learner as an autonomous chooser, 
" ••• how can one fail to be developing a disposition towards 
autonomy ... 62 
The importance of dispositions is recognised in Section (3) of 
the previous chapter and I agree with the emphasiS White puts upon 
dispositions. He refers to developing a disposition towards autonomy 
in those who follow his curricular principles and acquire the 
knowledge and understanding he outlines. However, it remains uncertain 
in White's account just how the learning will occur; methods of 
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teaching and learning are not explored and are. therefore, left 
in a secondary role to that of the specific compulsory knowledge 
content. But if the person who is to be developed as an autonomous 
chooser is not permitted to exercise autonomous choice within (or 
because of) the confines of a compulsory curriculum, this may 
influence whatever disposition towards autonomy is being developed. 
If there is little allowance made for the exercise of a developing 
or well developed autonomy (particularly in the young adult) there 
may be less likelihood of an exercise of autonomy by that individual 
as an adult in situations in practical life not directly related to 
education; there seems no surety that the exercise of autonomy will 
follow from its development when ~ u r i n g g development, autonomy remains 
untried in practice by lack of the exercise of that autonomy. 
It is my contention that within compulsory education, the 
successful development of autonomy can only be tested by some 
exercise of that autonomy. Even if White is correct about the 
priorities of knowledge and understanding required for autonomy's 
development (and it is not within my remit to explore this issue) 
how learning occurs will be of crucial significance also for teaching 
- . 
and learning because this lived experience will have influence upon 
the individual learner's dispositions. Unless the curriculum is 
considered a practical experience for the learner engaging him in 
direct and active practice of those educational practices to be 
addressed so that he must exercise a measure of personal autonomy 
within the process of learning, personal autonomy may not develop at 
all. The presumption that autonomy has developed when compulsory 
years of education come to an end may prove false. 
In Part 3, further consideration is given to how autonomy should 
be exercised within education. The constraints operative within the 
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learning process must be recognised and experienced personally by 
the individual who is to develop in autonomy and only engagement in 
the practices of education, with some scope for the exercise of 
autonomy (albeit within the parameters of a compulsory education), 
is likely to ensure its certain development. The parameters of age 
in relation to compulsory education and other aspects of life is 
considered further in the following chapter. 
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Introduction 
In this chapter clarification of a relationship between 
paternalism and personal autonomy is undertaken. Paternalist 
interventions are likely to restrict autonomy but may also be 
regarded as safeguards to autonomy. Section (1) considers the nature 
of paternalism as strong or weak in type and contrasts occurrent 
with global autonomy in relation to justification for paternalist 
intervention. Paternalism and the status of children is explored 
in Section (2). Rationality as justification for paternalism is the 
subject of Section (3) and although limits upon cognitive rationality 
are acknowledged and any distinction between children and adults 
seems an uncertain stipulation on this criterion, rationality is 
accepted as significant in assessing justification for paternalist 
intervention. Consent theory is the subject of Section (4) because 
consent is significant to autonomy in that a person1s consent to 
paternalism in education and schooling may be argued to give 
subsequent consent and justification to interventions made on his 
behalf at an earlier point in time; the value of subsequent consent 
is Questioned. Prior consent to paternalist intervention with regard 
to adolescents and young persons is argued to have significance for 
education. Hypothetical-rational consent is also considered as a 
less contentiOUS area of consent theory concerning the young. 
Section (5) aims to clarify a stage or age in the development of the 
individual when autarchy (a preliminary status to autonomy) might be 
recognised and extended to the individual. 
237 
( 1 ) Paterna Ii sm 
Paternalism seems to sit uneasily with autonomy. Kleinig 
describes paternalism thus: 
II what I understand by 'paternalism' is conduct and 
policies required of or imposed on others, where this 
is motivated by a concern for their good." 1 
His definition is, perhaps, more than simply stipulative. A measure 
of coercion or, at least, compulsion is involved in paternalist acts, 
therefore personal autonomy lacks a condition of negative freedom 
and liberals may then find the term, paternalism, offensive and 
undermining of individuality. There seems little pOint in using 
an alternative term to that of paternalism in the following discussion 
in spite of its sexist overtones; maternalism must be considered as 
part of its implications. Kleinig considers 'parentalism' may be 
a more meaningful term2 and teachers, in English Common Law, are 
considered to be in loco parentiS to their pupils within the context 
of compulsory schooling. 'Patriarchal ism' may convey a further 
meaning within paternalism also. However, to employ an alternative 
term to that of paternalism is likely only to confuse and the 
derogatory overtones of the term will add to the demand for 
justification on behalf of liberty and autonomy. 
Paternalism may be classified as strong or weak. Strong 
paternalism involves: 
" ... interventions to protect or benefit a person 
despite the person's informed voluntary consent to 
the contrary ..• II 3 
Weak paternalism: 
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II ••• involves interference where there is (or believed 
to be) a defect in the decision-making capacities of 
the person interfered with (or to ascertain whether the 
person's behaviour is fully reflective). It is claimed 
to be justifiable insofar as consent to the interference 
wouid be forthcoming were these capacities restored. II 4 
It is weak paternalism which probably mainly concerns compulsory 
education and schools although young persons of age 14 or 15 who 
resent compulsory attendance at school may well consider themselves 
constrained by strong paternalism. 
Liberals, along with Mill, have claimed a presumption in favour 
of the right of the individual to be free from both strong and weak 
paternalism. Paternalism should be severely constrained. in Mill's 
view: 
" ... the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilised community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His 
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant." 5 
However, in his often cited example of the unsafe bridge, Mill 
considers it right for a person who unknowingly puts himself at 
risk, to be restrained against his will if necessary. This would 
be a case of weak paternalism according to the definition given above 
on the assumption that the person restrained would have consented to 
being so treated had he been aware of the peril. The restraint is 
to avoid possible harm to the individual, however, not to anyone-
else, therefore, Mill seems to see this as an exception to his 
IIpreventing harmll principle stated above, since no other person's 
harm is in question. Indeed, the one who does the restraining of the 
other in danger, may be putting himself at risk not only in the 
physical sense of perhaps forcibly restraining another on the perilous 
edge of an unsafe route at some dizzy height, but he may also be 
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danger of not receiving the later consent of the one who is 'saved'. 
If a shouted warning is heard and ignored by one about to put himself 
at risk. it is unlikely that he will thank another person for 
coercing him not to take the risk. Lively makes the point that: 
"Broadly ... an individual is more likely to know what is in 
his interests. than others. not because he will necessarily 
be better informed about the consequences of his actions. 
but because he will better know what his wants and 
preference orderings are." 6 
Mill would agree that a person. himself. is best placed to 
decide what is the good for him and if he chooses to put himself at 
risk by refusing a blood transfusion on religious grounds. or he 
undertakes to row across the Atlantic or he chooses to spend a month 
on Rockall. he should be allowed to get on with it. The sense in 
which any action of a person may be said to affect others. short of 
actual harm. ought not to prevent the action. in Mill's view: 
"I fully admit that the mischief which a person does to 
himself may seriously affect. both through their 
sympathies and their interests. those nearly connected 
with him and. in a minor degree. society at large. II 7 
However this circumstance is not adequate to justify intereference 
in Mill's opinion. 
If the action is self-regarding. the individual should not be 
restrained. However. in the unsafe bridge example. restraint is 
allowed by Mill. presumably on the grounds of ignorance on the part 
of the person planning to cross that he is in danger. Therefore. if 
a Sikh chooses not to wear a crash-helmet when riding a motor-cycle. 
and puts himself thus at risk, he ought to be permitted to do so. As 
long as a person knows that what he intends to do is likely to have 
grave consequences for him. and yet he still chooses to do it. he 
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should be allowed to get on with it because his reasons are so valued 
by him as to outweigh the risks. Jesus, criticising influential 
members of the Jewish community of Roman Palestine, took a risk, 
galned their hatred and was crucified as a result; neither God the 
Father nor Jesus's disciplines acted as a paternalist in advising prudence 
in this instance. Mill considers paternalist intervention should be 
withheld in the interest of the individual's negative freedom to 
make an autonomous choice of what he thinks is in his interest; in 
the situation he describes,Mill seems more for liberty than 
utilitarianism. The individual is deemed best placed to know in 
what his good consists. Persons differ from each other; their 
projects vary in accordance with their attitudes, dispositions, 
abilities, values etc. Therefore, a prospective paternalist may 
conceive of the good in his ~ ~ terms which may not necessarily be 
in the terms of those persons affected by paternalist interventions. 
After all. the anti-paternalist may argue, persons should never 
be treated as the means to others' ends and only recognition of a 
person's autonomy in a situation of negative freedom gives him the 
scope for self-determination. And it may only be by making mistakes 
that we learn anything and even children learn to look after themselves 
by actually doing so. Parents may be over-protective of their 
children perhaps making them unnecessarily dependent because of the 
exercise of paternalism. 
However. although the liberal will adhere to the right of an 
individual to exercise autonomy and make his own chOices, it is not 
always the case that a person's choice is the best or even his best: 
" ... although some particular decision may be genuinely 
ours it may not be our best. II In fact. " ••• where 
lntervention is not llkely to interfere with a person's 
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important and settled concerns, but only with the 
consequences of indiscipline, laziness, carelessness ••• 
then personal integrity is not likely to be at stake. 
The interferer will not subvert the person's major goals 
and Ii fe-plans, but rather help to secure them." 8 
Such a view justifies seat-belt legislation in motor cars, crash-
helmets for motor-cyclists and presumably supports the withdrawal 
of all cigarettes on sale to the public with tobacco provided only 
on a doctor's prescription. 
Some have tried to justify such examples of paternalism on 
grounds that the intervention to prevent harm to the individual is 
not restrictive of that individual's freedom and autonomy because 
the individual is considered to be a different self after lapse of 
time. Parfit9 considers that individual persons are not necessarily 
psychologically continuous in all respects; in one sense a person 
is continuous in that his life continues; in another sense a person's 
self is "connected" only to some degree with his self at an earlier 
point in time. A latter self exists after a lapse of time, hence 
the reluctance to mete out punishments to the person who has 
committed an offence much earlier but whose person has evidently 
changed in nature and character; to punish the individual for 
committing a crime long ago at a much later point in time would be 
to punish a person who had not committed the original offence. 
Regan accepts, simply, the existence of a future self in respect 
of particular characteristics; someone who commits an "unrelated 
aggravated assault" at the same time as embezzlement may reform as 
a new self in honesty, but not restrain his temper, hence: 
"In such a case, I think we might hold it inappropriate 
to punish the embezzler now for his embezzlement, but 
still appropriate to punish him for the assault .•• " 10 
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A motor-cyclist involved in an accident who survives even 
without wearing a crash-helmet, may develop a more prudent attitude 
to safety and have a different disposition in the future - a future 
self will have been realised. If the motor-cyclist does not change 
after his experience, he may, by his reckless behaviour, continue to 
threaten his future selves and justification may be offered to coerce 
him into protection of these selves. The issue is essentially that 
of preventing harm to a future person. 
However, if this IIfuture self" argument is accepted, it involves 
a considerable undermining of a person's autonomy because if he were 
to make an autonomous, rational choice at one point in time, it 
could well be annulled at a later point in time. Regan is reluctant 
to consider persons as different selves at successive instants in 
time so that each person is a successive present with a future self 
expressed in future instants because if a rational chOice is made 
which requires reflection across time, it will never be concluded 
unless individual rationality is redefined to apply to a series of 
persons corresponding to what is considered now to be a person. But 
such difficulties are further compounded by the fact that the whole 
apparatus of contract and promise-keeping would be cancelled out by 
the adoption of a "future self" argument. 11 Furthermore, paternalist 
intervention to prevent harm to possible future selves as distinct 
from actual persons also puts the argument into difficulties because 
to justify the obligatory crash-helmet by this argument requires the 
paternalist to be virtually certain the motor-cyclist will suffer 
injury if he does not wear his helmet, will survive his injuries and 
will become a different character as a result. This scenario hardly 
justifies general paternalist intervention because it may be that 
the majority may well wear their helmets voluntarily, out of good 
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sense, without paternalist coercion being at all necessary. On the 
other hand, Regan's justification of paternalism in obliging motor-
cyclists to wear crash-helmets by coercing those who will not 
voluntarily wear them, involves getting those persons to change their 
views and accept the need for personal safety before they suffer 
injury. Only a hypothetical person's future self is at risk - one 
created by the non-wearing of a helmet, a self requiring paternalist 
action. However, the argument becomes self-cancelling 12 because 
without autonomous choice the individual will be prevented from 
sustaining injury and the possible existence of a more prudent future 
self (if he survives), but if he is prevented from injuring himself, 
the more mindful future self will not come into existence, hence 
paternalist intervention on behalf of a future self cannot be 
justified. 
Although this argument on behalf of a future self is intrinsically 
interesting in its attempt to justify paternalism to avoid harm to 
(another) self rather than to the present self, to use it in respect 
of the compulsory education of children may lack credibility. Regan's 
case in an example as specific as physical harm resulting from the 
omission of craSh-helmet legislation is attended with difficulty, as 
described above. And although children and adolescents do change 
rapidly over the time they may be required to attend school. for 
example, and may be considered to become future selves, the complexity 
of social interaction involved in schooling and the multitude of 
influences affecting learning hardly yield a sufficiently controllable 
situation for one to be able to claim that paternalist compulsion will 
produce particular future selves. Attitudes and dispositions may be 
shaped, understanding may be achieved by children to the ends set by 
their teachers and schools. However, there can be no certainty that 
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teachers will achieve the understanding in their pupils that they 
aim for (a point which is explored below in connection with teaching); 
therefore paternalist compulsion to avoid possible harm to a child's 
hypothetical future self is an uncertain justification for compulsory 
education (in or out of compulsory school). Furthermore, if the 
future self to be aimed for is an autonomous one yet the educational 
means to achieve that self are most uncertain, paternalist compuls1on 
of a present self is unlikely to find justification in pursuing no 
more than possible means to realise autonomy. 
Nevertheless there may be a distinction in treatment of adults 
and children with respect to future selves. Feinberg argaes that: 
"When a mature adult has a conflict between getting what he 
wants and having his options left open in the future, we 
are bound by our respect for his autonomy not to force 
his present choice in order to protect his future 'liberty'. 
His present autonomy takes precedence even over his 
probable future good, and he may use it as he will, even 
at the expense of the future self he will one day become. 
Children are different. Respect for the child's future 
autonomy, as an adult, often requires preventing his free 
choice now. Thus the future self does not have as much 
moral weight in our treatment of adults as it does with 
chi ldren." 13 
Feinberg considers that the adult's own concern for his future self 
is likely to be revealed by his prudence but that it would not be 
right to impose prudence, "from the outside on an autonomous adult". 
However, what is not clear from the above extract is what normative 
definitions Feinberg has in mind in describing "adult" and "child" -
an issue raised in the previous chapter. Further, the denial of 
the chi ld' s, "free choice now", has to be shown to be contributi ve 
to the attainment of autonomy given that it is to be held as a, or 
even the, major aim of education. 
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The differences between the situations of children (or young 
persons) and those of adults may not be as clear cut as Feinberg 
suggests with respect to autonomy. Mill views with concern the 
danger to the individual who may voluntarily contract into slavery; 
such a person may deny his future self the opportunity to exercise 
autonomy in a situation of negative freedom. Paternalist 
intervention on behalf of a future self could prevent the fulfilling 
of the contract of slavery, hence 'strong' paternalism would safe-
guard the f u t u r ~ ~ autonomy of the individual. The person1s immediate 
choice to become a slave would, presumably, be respected by Feinberg 
as long as the person was adult. It could be that the individual 
had very good reasons to adopt slavery - to 'buy' the releas,e of 
his family from persecution or to obtain money to purchase life-
saving drugs for an only child etc.,etc. Much would rest upon the 
reasons or motives for the decision to become a slave. 
Young describes autonomy in two forms to help meet this problem. 
He describes one form as occurrent autonomy in which a person may be 
said to act autonomously in a particular situation; this he contrasts 
with general or global autonomy: 
. 
II ••• in the global sense of autonomy a person's career, 
life-style, dominant concerns and the like will be central 
to his (other) conception of his life. Autonomy as regards 
the important interests in a person's life must be of the 
global kind rather than the occurrent, because only in 
the former sense does the course of an individual's life 
enjoy a unified order and avoid self-defeating conflict In 
fundamentals." 14 
Therefore, Young can argue that to overturn a particular choice or 
course of action by an adult on the basis of occurrent autonomy Is 
right if that choice is contrary to the person's global autonomy. 
Thus strong paternalism is justified in the interest of preserving 
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an individual's global autonomy in overriding his stated wishes and 
occurrent autonomy. Thus a person's occurrent autonomy in choosing 
to enter into a contract of slavery should be prevented by strong 
paternalism so that his future negative freedom and global autonomy 
will be kept intact. However. if the person wishing to enter into· 
slavery has. in his view. strong and compelling reasons associated 
with his own good or that of others in a way which make his decision 
critically important to his life-plan and thus link it to global 
autonomy. then the strong paternalist must demonstrate that this 
is not the case and that global autonomy is at risk ~ n n order to 
justify intervention. Therefore. when the Jehovah's Witness refuses 
the blood transfusion. the strong paternalist may force him to have 
it on the grounds that the person involved may 'well surrender his 
current religious convictions at some later stage in his life - which 
he may well lose without the transfusion. But the mature individual 
may argue that his religious convictions are central to his life-
plan and his occurrent and global autonomies are at one in his 
decision to reject the offensive treatment. 
A strong paternalist could make out a case to set aside occurrent 
autonomy in any instance of a person taking a risk by which harm 
likely to restrict global autonomy might befall him. The person who 
wishes to row the Atlantic. climb a dangerous rock-face. playa 
game of rugby football. cross the road - could all be said" to be 
exercising occurrent autonomy which strong paternalism might claim 
justification for setting aside in the interest of the global autonomy 
of the individual. Feinberg would presumably. allow the informed 
adult to take the risk and would allow him full autonomy. but he 
would deny the child a free choice because his future global autonomy 
might well be at risk since his' very life could be in danger. The 
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level of risk would be assessed dependent upon the age-status of the 
person involved. Therefore, for most children and young persons 
engaged in compulsory schooling, crossing the road may become an 
acceptable risk even though it remains a highly dangerous activity 
which can result in serious injury to future self and global autonomy. 
However, the extent to which the occurrent autonomy of a person in 
middle or later teenage who wants to make particular choices within 
education or who opts for a vocational training should be set aside 
(even though he might vehemently claim that his choice was a 
significant part of his life plan and an expression of his global 
autonomy) seems open to question. This question I shall address below. 
(2) Children and paternalism 
Mill, the champion of personal liberty, has no reservation 
in excluding children, barbarians and those in their nonage from 
the right to freedom. However, as argued in the previous chapter, 
the definition of 'child' has much significance with respect to 
personal autonomy. In this section I shall conSider the relationship 
between children and adults in order to determine the extent to which 
paternalism may be justified in ensuring the development of autonomy 
in the young in order that they may exercise it later as adults •• 
Schrag 15 describes the discovery by the explorer, Garhcs ,of 
Namuh Society which consists of two main classes of persons, the 
Tluda and the Dlihc (T's and D's). The T's are, on average, "strong, 
intelligent, knowledgeable about the world"; the D's are generally, 
"weak, ignorant and dim-witted". The T' s provide care and the 
essentials of life to the D's. The D's do as they are told and adopt 
the T's beliefs; the D's may only pursue their enjoyment within 
arbitrarily determined limits imposed by their protectors and such 
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limits vary from household to household and often "day to day within 
the same household". The Ps have the right to punish the D's for 
breaking the rules and, IIpunishment is often meted out on the basis 
of the flimsiest and most circumstantial evidence ll • The D's may 
be allowed to explain themselves against accusations, but sometimes. 
"there is not even a semblance of due process". The T's handling 
of the D's is apparently barbaric and the whole regime is, "sometimes 
harsh and unpredictable". The reason for these social arrangements 
is explained by the T's because as the D's, " ••• are unable to choose 
what is best for themselves, we make their choices for them. The 
necessity for occasional infliction of patn and deprivation is a 
manifestation of our love and concern for the growth of the soui ll • 
In spite of the harshness which Garhcs observed in the relationships 
in this society, he recorded signs of affection displayed by T's and 
D's towards each other. 
The picture of such a hierarchically ordered society would. 
perhaps, have been recognisable and acceptable to Plato and Aristotle, 
as Schrag paints out, but to the modern philosophic tradition of 
Locke, Kant and Mill, such a society would be an anathema. However. 
when the Tluda turn out to be adult (by reversal of the letters) and 
the Dlihc, child, the Namuh, human, society becomes etched with its 
usual implications. Schrag's concealed expose of human society is, 
however, open to Question in the terms in which he presents it. The 
T's (adults) may be stronger than the D's (children) within certain 
age comparisons but certainly not within all age parameters. Adults, 
similarly. are not more intelligent, in general, than children if 
judged by modern intelligence testing. Perhaps adults are generally 
more knowledgeable about the world than most children. although, no 
doubt, exceptions could well be found. Children could hardly be 
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fairly descibed as, generally, "ignorant and dim-witted". The 
arbitrary treatment of children by adults and the basis upon which 
punishment is meted out on flimsy and circumstantial evidence is 
probably not the case in many, or even most, adult-child relationships. 
If such relationships were based on "harsh and unpredictable" actions, 
adults could hardly view Schrag's description of Namuh society with 
equanimity although some signs of affection are acknowledged between 
Tis and D's. However, the inability of children to choose what is 
best for them requires that paternalism which usually attends adult-
child relationships. 
Schrag's description emphasises the worst features of a SOCiety 
of adults and children; little genuine love or concern seem likely 
to characterise the relationships which Schrag's description affords, 
as Scarre16 indicates. The lack of consistency in adult treatment 
of children is significantly oppressive and the justification of caring 
seems out of place in such a situation. However, the criteria which 
Schrag uses for comparison between adults and children offers little 
justification for paternalism: locomotion and linguistic competence 
are achieved by most children by the age of six years; puberty and 
the growth of physical strength in adolescence are hardly justifications 
for continued paternalism and as girls and young women could be, 
relatively, weaker than men, invidious comparison to the detriment 
of the position of women might result. Further, the ability to 
be rational is a gradual development and many children may well be 
more rational than many adults whose fading powers in increasing 
age may make them increasingly less rational. Some adults may never 
reach Piaget's stage of formal operations in their thinking processes 
and as a result their lack of rationality could, by this criterion, 
never make them free from paternalism. A "capacity for self-
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maintenance" Schrag attributes to Kant in distinguishing chi ldren 
from adults, but if this refers to maturity the concept remains 
vague, culture-conscious and virtually impossible to define in terms 
of minimum capacities expected of a full member of a society17; if 
such "capaci ty II is taken, Ii terally, to mean a chi ld 's abi 11 ty to pay 
his way, some, through stage careers, advertising, musical abilities, 
etc., would be able to do so more effectively than many adults. The 
task of specifying minimal qualifications for occupying various 
social roles such as husband, parent, voter is, in Schrag's analysis, 
essentially value-laden, hence the age criterion is resorted to so 
that subjective judgements of individuals or groups on what constitutes 
maturity can be avoided. 
Indeed, Schrag favours maintenance of what Plato described as 
a "noble I ie", expressing a distinction, based on age, between chi Id 
and adult, although the distinction cannot be based upon defensible 
criteria of difference. He would not want children to have to 
compete with adults in general because children would be the losers, 
in his view, and if different criteria were used to mark the adult-
child boundary, some adults would be subject to much more paternal 
. 
interference than occurs at present. And Schrag cannot conceive 
that adults are not, in general, the best assessors of their own 
interests and, therefore, have the right to exercise personal 
autonomy. 
However, while Schrag's motive of wishing to ensure paternalist 
protection of young children is laudable, the basis upon which it rests 
is admitted by him to be a "lie" - a Ibei t a "noble I ie ": 
"All I am arguing for here is maintaining the idea of 
a firm boundary between the two stages. Perhaps some 
will consider this a decision to support a kind of 
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'noble lie ' , but if so it is not one in which a few deceive the masses for their own good, but rather one 
in which we all believe for our own good. II 18 
The IIgood" of adult society, in Schrag IS view, requires paternalism 
to be kept at bay; he sees inroads on adult liberty already at work: 
"For example. no adult is permitted to purchase powerful drugs without 
a physician's authorization." 19 But this example is hardly a good one 
of that "crack in the door" which threatens a flood of paternalist 
legislation which would probably be strongly resented by the community 
as a major infringement of liberty. Indeed, Schrag's threat of the 
shadow of some kind of paternalistic totalitarianism waiting in the 
wings hardly justifies the weight he places on it. And he is quite 
willing to adjust the, 
" ..• particular age of majority recognised in our own 
society. A good case could be made for lowering the age 
to fourteen or fi fteen." 20 
Yet he considers that a fixed age, an imaginary horizontal line 
drawn across life, is an imperative, an arbitrary but necessary 
safeguard to avoid undermining adult autonomy. J. Fitzjames Stephen, 
a critic of Mill, agrees that the age line is arbitrary. 
" •.. the power of society over poeple in their minority 
is and ought to be absolute. and minority and majority 
are matters of degree. and the line which separates 
them is arbitrary. II 21 
However, Stephen's priority was protection of children from harm 
rather than protection of adults from paternalist inroads on their 
freedom and autonomy: 
"If children were regarded by law as the equal of adults. 
the result would be something infinitely worse than 
barbarism. It would involve a degree of cruelty to the 
young which can hardly be realized even in imagination. II 22 
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Even so, Stephen does regard the minority - majority age line as 
lIarbitrary". Below the line, character had to be moulded appropriately, 
but not necessarily by education which he regarded with scepticism: 
"Society cannot make silk purses out of sows' ears, and 
there are plenty of ears in the world which no tanning 
can turn even into serviceable pigskin." 23 
However, Schrag's "lie ll puts more at stake than arbitrariness; it 1s 
held to be the basis of the treatment of those persons whom we want 
to be personally autonomous beings throughout their adult lives. 
The treatment of children ought to be based on truth since to learn 
involves seeking for truth and yet compulsion to uphold a "lie" in 
order to enforce the relationship of adults and children would seem 
the antithesis of a concern for truth. The development of a child's 
reasoning capacity may well enable him or her to scrutinize the laws. 
the rules enforcing an unreal difference between child and adult 
status as Schrag acknowledges. In schooling, children in their teens 
may well see through this "lie ll , regard it as far less than "noble" 
and become influenced against the values of the education provided 
for them. Constraint which is based on falsehood and which very 
largely denies a young person the right to decide his own good is 
an unlikely basis for gaining knowledge which would otherwise no 
longer have been sought. Indeed, dispositions successfully developed 
in the young may be put at risk by continuation of a "lie" to uphold 
over young persons a paternalism which they may well choose to set 
aside. 
If the "lie" is adhered to. it may then provide a basis for a 
whole range of treatments of children which would be difficult to 
justi fy wi thout ,the protection of that II lie" , 
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" ... any such move is open to the standard objection that 
attempts to reduce any acceptable rule - utilitarianism 
to act - utilitarianism; which is to say, an objection 
that would at least move us towards more subtly organised 
discriminations." 24 
Dearden considers that compulsion does not necessitate coercion but 
if coercion is required, the "lie" will provide for it and although 
in the case of compulsory schooling the coercion may fall more on 
parent than child, the child's attitude will hardly be uninfluenced 
by the coercion of the parent. 
(3) Reason as justification for paternalism 
However, one major consideration providing possible grounds for 
the exercise of paternalism over children is lack of reason, an issue 
which Schrag rules out as indicated above. Nevertheless it 1s a 
critically important issue for the development and exercise of 
personal autonomy and it undoubtedly has powerful support; 
Locke grants that, with regard to children, 
"Parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them 
when they come into the world, and for some time after, 
but 'tis but a temporary one." Eventually, "Age and reason" 
leave the individual "at his own free disposal". 25 
He is specific in placing the age of major1ty at twenty-one years 
when the young person is free to exercise personal autonomy: 
"The freedom. then. of man. and liberty of acting according 
to his own will, is grounded in his having reason, which 
is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern 
himself by, .•• " 26 
Reason is held to guide the individual. therefore, and picks out 
rational criteria which constitute the nomos of autonomy. so that the 
"rule and jurisdiction" of the parent becomes that of the young 
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adult when he attains rationality. Mill's reference to governance 
of children until they are capable of being improved by free and equal 
discussion suggests he attaches Similar importance to the development 
of rationality in the young. 
Scarre presents an argument supporting paternalism over ch1ldren 
in this tradition. He points out that Schrag dismisses rationality 
as unable to justify different treatment of children and adults, 
because, in Scarre's words: 
" •.. there is no species of rationality which fu I fils his (Schrag's) two conditions of being morally relevant to the 
issue of paternalism and of being something in respect of 
which adults and children differ qualitatively." Scarre 
agrees that adults and children do not "qual1tatively"d1ffer 
in respect of rationa 1 powers, "where rationa I powers are 
conceived of in a broad fashion, and difference 1n respect 
of rationality on some more technical·conception, such as 
that of being able to perform certain types of logical 
operations as described by Piaget, ••• is mostly irrelevant -
but this only shows there is something wrong with his 
conditions." 27 
The ability to reason in certain ways to a particular standard as 
Piaget and Kohlberg outline does have significant implications for 
personal moral judgement as outlined in Chapter 3. At issue 1s not 
simply the ability to be able to "perform certain types of logical 
operations II , but to be able to reason in matters of morals ultimately 
to the stage of autonomy. Scarre should not rule out the significance 
of this major conSideration in the development of children and young 
adults, but what he does is to set aside the evidence and conclude: 
"Abandoning Schrag's problems by abandoning his 
qualitative difference condition, we can develop the 
notion, which has much commonsense backing, that a 
person's rationality or lack of it is a relevant factor 
in determining whether he is a suitable subject for 
paternalist intervention." 28 
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Scarre seems to imply here that adult persons as well as children 
might well be subject to paternalist intervention on the basis of 
their not having what Scarre understands to be rationality. Although 
this would be appropriate in the case of some adults, a significant 
expansion of paternalism would be resisted by many, Schrag among 
them. The view which Scarre offers of rationality has its own 
difficulties attached: 
" ..• rational actions are those which are di rected to 
maximising the expected utility of the agent. In addition, 
actions backed by rational decisions typically manifest 
themselves as elements of a systematic approach adopted 
by an agent for maximising his good." 29 
These guidelines do not convey a great deal to one who wishes to 
ascertain whether a personls actions are rational or not. Scarre 
indicates that a personls actions illustrate his rationality, first 
on the ev i dence of "expected uti! i ty II,. Now uti I i ty covers an 
extremely wide field and to judge an action rational by the amount 
of utility it entails would be difficult; it would involve some 
assessment of what would be most pleasurable to the individual and 
to argue a case for Ihigher l pleasures as better, more valuable, than 
Ilower l pleasures, as one philosopher of utilitarianism points out. 
is not altogether a convincing position: 
III shall therefore be arguing for a Benthamite pOSition 
which involves denying that any pleasure can be judged to 
be in itself more valuable. more worthwhile or qualitatively 
superlor to any other pleasure, assuming that they are Quantitatively equal. II 30 
Scarrels emphasis upon utility may be made with thoughts of deferred 
gratification by children, but on his statement above, any pleasures. 
any extreme hedonistic pleasures. "maximising the expected utility 
of the agent" are directed by II rational actions". This may open up 
sweeping choice to children - another Tyndale, perhaps? 
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The second of Scarre's considerations, rational decisions 
expressed as "a systematic approach" to living, Scarre makes much of 
as the ultimate justification for imposing "a genera I paternalist 
regime on children" because: 
IIfJost adults, because they have lived a long time, have this 
ability, but children. because their mental powers and 
experience are alike inadequate, do not." 31 
This assertion is questionable. It suggests that the ability to plan 
ahead systematically is contingent upon having li ved "a long time", 
but how long it is necessary to have lived is not clear. Scarre 
seems almost to infer that adulthood is a status he would attach to 
individuals well above the minimal ,age of majority. Now it may be 
that experience increases with age but many adults may never 
significantly enlarge the horizons of their experience much beyond 
popular T.V. programmes. the latest technologically obsolescent 
gadget or fish and chips on the Costa Brava. Children, dependent upon 
economic opportunity, may enlarge their experience rapidly through 
knowledge. understanding, travel etc. Scarre's further assertion 
that children's IImental powers" are inadequate to enable them to 
plan systematically seems to be Quite contradictory to his previous 
statement that, " ••• adults and Children do not differ qualitatively 
in respect of their rational powers where rational powers are 
conceived of in a broad fashion ••• ". He concludes his article with 
the self-defeating statement that: 
II ••• the restrictions on paternalist interventions should 
include a prohibition against interfering at all in the 
affairs of people who in general manifest the ability to 
consider their actions rationally." 32 
If adults and children do not "qualitatively" differ in rational 
powers there seems no reason why children and young persons should 
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not IIconsider their action rationallyll along with adults. And 
although it may well be justifiable to intervene when lIirrationality 
threatens their well-beingll, how judgements justifying intervention 
may be made on Scarre's criteria is left unanswered. And Brandon 
makes the point that the threat of irrationality to the well-being 
of the child or young person, 
II •• is crucially ambiguous between the unproblematic cases 
of legitimate interference where ignorance or insouciance 
is going to lead to unforeseen and definitely unwanted 
disaster and cases where the person interfering decides 
for himself what is to count as well-being. 1I 33 
Brandon's criticism of the adult-child distinction maintained 
by Scarre on grounds tnat adults are regarded as 
rational and children as irrational, is that rationality is a device 
merely to justify a preconceived point of view. Brandon agrees with 
Pateman that, liThe answers are known in advance; only the Questions 
and arguments remain to be found. 1134 He suggests that Scarre I s 
argument for rationality is simply a device to insinuate values, 
II ... of A's regarding B as irrational because B fails 
to pursue some end, not because B fails to adopt B's 
maximal means to whatever ends B happens to have. 1I 35 
His charge is that Scarre in his claim that adUlt 
society is rational is adhering not to rationality, but to 
rationalization in Weber's sense. And Brandon then proceeds to criticise a 
view of rationality which, no doubt, Scarre would choose to refute. 
Brandon, himself, not only offers lIanswers ll , he also alters the 
IIQuestions" of rationality to suit his argument and describes his 
concept of rationality, Zweckrationalitat, after Weber. 
Weber's view of society reduced rationality to rationalization 
and, as such. is removed from that concept of rationality which 
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provides substance to the nomos of autonomy as described in Chapter 2 
Section (1). Original genuine rationality, in Weber, became 
expressed in the legal-rational authority of political bureaucracy 
and industrial organisation and in this means-end, economist's 
model, rationalization perverts the original nature of rationality, 
"Rationalization of means results in the unintelligibility 
of ends which are no longer given by revelation or 
prophetic inspiration. II 36 
Rationality, as described in Chapter 2 may be taken to mean that a 
person gains access to some specific area of understanding which 
may then illuminate other areas of his life, but in Weber, rationality 
is a whole, an attitude to life, a mode of life, a norm of bourgeois. 
capitalist society; ultimately a universal rationalization takes 
place. "regimenting" persons and incarcerating them in an "1 ron 
cage" of the prevailing economic and SOCial order. In spite of its 
appearance of rationality, bourgeois SOCiety becomes irrational in 
that the autonomy of man is lost sight of in a perspective disguising 
reali ty: 
liThe predominance and the autonomy of the conditions which 
have grown into an independent fact of life is what it 
is - namely irrational - under the presupposition that 
the 'rational ' represents the independence and the autonomy 
of man - whether one determines his humanity in the 
horizon of his sociality, like Marx, or in the individuality 
of his self-responsibility, like Weber." 37 
The question then arises as to what a person can do, within this 
Weberan concept of bougeois society's rationalization process, to 
maintain personal autonomy - how is the child to become the autonomous 
adult? Weber has little to offer other than an attitude of, 
" .•. presuppositionless determination of the self-
responsible individual through himself. Placed into 
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this world of bondage. the individual as 'man' belongs 
to h imsel f and re lies tota lly upon himself a lone." 38 
The individual's search for autonomy is "presuPPositionless" and. 
thus. is in opposition to the given rationalization of the world. 
To exercise autonomy, it is necessary to be within that world, but 
to find "freedom of movement" by opposition to it. There is no 
fixed escape from the "iron cage", but if he acts with "pass10n", a 
strength of will, the individual may realise himself. However, the 
individual cannot rely upon rational1ty to guide him as his nomos 
because, in Weber's view, r e a s o ~ ~ will present only the false 
irrationality of rationalization. Man is left to make choices 1n 
"passion" but without other criterla to guide his choices. 
Brandon's theme, following Weber, is then sceptical of rat10nal 
decisions and systematic life-plans: 
"Speaking as a would-be Parfit-type person, I can only 
testify to my marked reluctance to adopt any systematic 
approach to the good of my future selves, apart from 
laying down the odd case of wine." 39 
Rationality to Brandon, like Weber, is value-laden and an impOSition 
upon the individual whether child or adult. 
However, this position is open to Question. It is unlikely that 
educating or bringing up children can avoid insinuating values, 
indeed, part of the process is, consciously, to do so. The pOint 
is to establish which values are to be adhered to and developed in 
children. To promote dispositions in children (so that they acquire 
certain values) has been argued (particularly in Chapter 4) to be 
a significant part of educational activity. Personal autonomy in all 
its moral. cognitive and affective dimensions may be a major value 
arising from education, coupled as it is with respect for self and 
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for others. In fact, Brandon's own argument is itself value-
conscious and expressed rationally. He 1s scept1cal of the 
"systematic approach", referred to by Scarre, as a characteristic 
of adu 1 ts but not of ch ildren. Where, he asks, is the "system of 
purpose" in 
" .•. 'carpe diem! " or 'consider the lilies of the field! ' 
or, as some members of my present culture-circle say, 
'Jah Rastafari/the IMF will provide'?" 40 
But the "system of purpose" to which Brandon refers 1s purely 
economic as he stipulates by use of the Weberan perspective which 
he embraces into his Zweckrationalitat model. His examples above 
are, themselves, expressive of values and are not necessarily 
divorced from rational thought. If some members of Brandon's culture 
circle take a view expressing selfish irresponsibility, this may 
suggest weaknesses in the dispositions engendered In their education 
and upbringing; but if their view expresses genuine self-concern that 
the world's goods are unfairly distributed, their position may well 
be highly rational and moral. In fact, apart from his own admittedly 
limited systematic approach of "laying down the odd case of wine" I 
which some of us will doubtless applaud. Brandon does involve 
himself in the intellectual and rational activity of presenting a 
critique of Scarre and Schrag's positions and inferring reasons for 
redrawing some aspects of current economiC and social arrangements. 
Altogether, Brandon expresses an individual and autonomous view which 
seems. oddly. to have escaped the shackles of the lIiron cage". 
Nevertheless, there are limits to cognitive rationality (leaving 
aside a Weberan perspective) which should be acknowledged at this 
pOint, following Chapter 1, Section (3) and Chapter 2, Section (2). 
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Scarre places his major emphasis upon cognitive rationality and he 
seems thus in company with Peters, Dearden and others 1n the 
importance which they attach to the concept. Reason and the rational 
criteria it picks out largely shape the nomos of autonomy in 
Dearden's analysis. Without reason, choice 1s considered to be 
uninformed orcriterionlessand either an intellectual or liberal 
education is considered essential in enabling the learner to become 
initiated into rational processes of thought which the fonms of 
.understanding and the established disciplines may be held to provide. 
I do not wish to suggest that these considerations are unimportant, 
but on the other hand to argue that they are all important overlooks 
significant implications in the development of personal autonomy 1n 
young persons, particularly with respect to authenticity - as argued 
in Chapter 1, Section 3. 
Dearden argues for the pre-eminence of cognit1ve rat10nality 
in the attitudes and activities of mind of the person who 1s 
autonomous or developing in autonomy. But this case may be misleading 
in some situations. The Marxist view of history may be a helpful 
analogy here. Marx (and some modern Marxists) would argue that 
economic considerations offer the primary reason to expla1n historical 
change. Although some weight may be given to non-economic 
considerations, economic ones will always be the prime movers in 
any explanation of past or future events. But this can be no more 
. than an assertion based upon an all-embracing theory. and close 
inspection of actual events by historians may lead to different 
conclusions from those drawn by Marxists. Reason may have a 
significant place in judgement and the pre-eminence given by Dearden 
to reason in the development of autonomy may be valid 1n many or even 
most circumstances, but it can only be assertion, rather than 
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conclusive evidence, which claims reason's pre-eminence in all 
aspects of the developing autonomous judgement of young persons. 
Some aspects of experience do seem to lean heavily upon the 
affective areas of human experience and these may not only be 
accessible by cognitive reason. (Chapter 2 Section (3) considers the 
place of feeling in reason.) Cooper41 argues that an individual's 
personal ambition for honours or position cannot be adequately 
explained by the reasons which he may present; the reasons may only 
mask or rationalize a state of mind arrived at in ways which cannot 
be simply attributed to reason, as such. Aesthetic response, in 
some situations, may not simply be explained by the agency of 
cognitive reason. The enjoyment of music does not necessarily involve 
rational judgement of the particular technical merits of a score 
or the skills of the performers or the blend of various elements in 
an impressive performance; these components may be accessible to 
reason, but omitted from a judgement of what a piece of music means 
to a listener is the simple, genuine response (with affective 
associations perhaps) which is just genuine enjoyment of the 
aesthetic beauty of what is experienced on that particular occasion 
in an individual's life. Many persons may well recall such occasions 
and although reasons for the pleasure experienced can be offered, 
cognitive reason may not adequately express the quality of the 
experience and the amount of response occasioned in the individual. 
These situations are not accessible to the rattonal criteria of 
judgement that many other situations are and it may be that 
psychologists will eventually map out this area with some clarity 
when the contrasts and interactions generated by both hemispheres of 
the brain are more fully understood. At present we may do more 
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murder by attempts at rational dissection of such experiences than. 
we can possibly gain by so doing. 
There are, further. the situations of those who hold beliefs 
which cannot be rationally explained as ones which are surely based 
upon true belief in that convictions may just go against the weight 
of evidence opposed to those convictions: 
itA person wi 11 not always be tempted to surrender a 
religious conviction by his judgement that. of the 
arguments he has encountered, those which militate 
against his belief are the stronger. \I 42 
It may, of course, be argued that Cooper1s example above of religious 
convictions is poorly chosen because it may be as irrational to 
argue a person out of his religious convictions as to argue him 
into them. The evidence would, presumably, not be adequately 
conclusive in any objectively, rational sense. But, the polnt ought 
to be, perhaps, that the weight given to reasons and evidence by 
individuals will differ from person to person. Persons differ from 
each other and communication of rational argument and anticipated 
response in others is an unpredictable s i ~ u a t 1 0 n . . Many effective 
teachers may recall situations in which rational argument, instruction 
or exposition - suitably presented to the age and ability of the 
pupils - proves ineffective not because the pupils are not on the 
inside of some area of knowledge. but because reasons and evidence 
which they cognitively grasp just do not seem to reach them. 
It maya Iso be the case that the holder of the belief can rarely 
be sure that he has attained knowledge (true belief) and 1n schools 
it may be quite inappropriate to argue someone out of a conviction 
concerning. for instance, a particular piece of historical evidence. 
An historian will re-interpret the shifting sands of the few fragments 
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of written evidence surviving on an historical issue by. perhaps. 
viewing it, as far as he can, through the eyes of the original 
writer; he may try to empathise with the thinking of the person of 
the past in the Idealist sense. 43 His account may well place 
different emphasis on evidence, previously considered by others; he 
will offer reasons for his view, but ultimately why he holds 
particular views is simply because, with the greatest honesty and 
sincerity within him, those views of the evidence strike chords within 
him different from the way the music previously sounded to others. 
(I am not suggesting all historians operate in this way.) Clearly 
much evidence of the past is lost and although what remains is 
subject to reason, that a student of history or an historian makes 
out a case on a basis of reason does n o ~ e c e s s a r i l y , , fully explain 
why that particular case is made. Two persons of similar training and 
capacity considering the same evidence may draw different conclUSions. 
In practical day to day life there are significant restrictions 
on the extent to which reason can effectively guide the individual. 
Cooper44 pOints out that the limits of logic, intellectual capacity 
and energy must exist and for the person committed to reason, it is 
only rational to accept the point to which logic may be taken. If the 
same person reaches such limits, he accepts them as the best he can 
do in the circumstances, but: 
"What disturbs many people, surely, is not that justifications, a chain of reasons, must come to an 
end, but that they hardly travel more than a few links 
upon it. Others may have gone further, but the rest 
of us must rely on hearsay and authority, neither of 
which are we able to validate for ourselves. This worry 
is then compounded by fear about the possible 
parochialism of the chains of reasons offered and the 
final stands taken at their ends." 45 
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Furthermore our acceptance of good reasons and the conclusions drawn 
may be, 
II a function of upbringing, fashion, social conditions 
and trends which can and do vary in other times and 
cl imes. II 46 
The point at issue is not that of the sociological perspective of the 
relativist that there are no objective means for resolving the 
validity of beliefs, 
"Rather it is one about the individual's power to 
recognise these if there are any." 47 
The kind of issues COoper has in mind include: 
" •.. discourse about health, intell igence, criminali ty, 
grammaticality, insanity or love. Questions like, 
IHas there been a decline in mental health?' 'Are blacks 
as intelligent as whites?I, 100 Harlem blacks speak 
ungrammatical English?I, ICan there be asexual love?', 
have no true or false answers except relative to 
contested choice of concepts serving contested purposes 
of classification, ordering, treating, controlling, 
appraising. and policy. II 48 
A theory of grammar ought to be able to enable us to determine 
how to speak correctly, but language is a dynamic and its capacity 
to change denies us rational, objective criteria to apply. And of 
all the capacities developed in schools, language is, perhaps, the 
most important: 
IIWe act as if we thought this tool of language were 
perfect, and children had only to learn to use it 
correctly, i.e. as we do. In fact, it is in many ways 
an imperfect tool. If we were more aware of its 
imperfections, of the many ways it does not fit the 
universe it attempts to describe, of the paradoxes and 
contradictions built into it, then we could warn the 
children,help them see where words and experience did 
not fit together, and perhaps show them ways of using 
l a n ~ u a g e e that would to some extent rise above its 
limltations. 1I 49 . 
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language may carry different meanings over time, yet words are 
essentially the atoms of language expressing reason. However, words 
carry implications beyond reason and only in reflection at, perhaps, 
a later time might it become apparent that particular terms and 
forms of expression have, while ostensibly expressing rational 
utterances, actually expressed irrationality and bias. E. H. Dance 
lists tenms drawn from history textbooKs which reveal much more 
than word-meanings, terms such as: tyranny, native. coloured. black, 
democracy, murder, execution. martyrdom, Reformation. anCient/ 
mediaeval/modern ... 50 There seems little reason to suppose that 
rational discourse should be unattended by unintended meanings and 
implications. Philosophical discourse searches for meanIng 1n 
language in rational fashion, but the ultimate rationality may 
involve acknowledgement of the limits of critical reason. Cooper, 
commenting on the Dearden-Peters concept of autonomy sums up the 
situation: 
" ••• the current concept of autonomy leaves out too 
much that men should concern themselves with. When 
yoked to critical rationality. the concept has no place 
for those concerns where the giving and criticising of 
reasons is only modestly engaged. or for the importance, 
in the case of some individual convictions, of not 
being bowled over on the weight of evidence. 1I 51 
The importance of cognitive rationality is of significance, however, 
and I do not wish to devalue its function in helping to inform the 
nomos of personal autonomy. Nevertheless, I do maintain that there 
is an area of experience beyond that of reason as such and this 
issue is addressed in Chapter 1 in which authenticity's place as 
part of autonomy is explored. And as Cooper indicates. if the case 
made out above holds by means of reason and rational argument, this 
does not alter the fact that a case for the limits of reason has been 
made. 
267 
To summarize, then: in the argument concerning the significance 
of reason as justification for paternalism over children, I first 
considered Scarre's case that adults are rational and children 
generally less so, pointing out the limitations of this position. 
Brandon's consideration of rationality and his approach to Scarre's 
case was presented and found to offer an argument against rationality 
on the basis of a different interpretation of the concept from that 
of Scarre. However, Brandon's theme of the inadequacy of reason in 
explaining or justifying the adult-child dichotomy was pursued but 
within the parameters of the meaning of rationality apparently used 
by Peters and Dearden and a tentative case was presented to reveal 
possible limits to that concept of reason, taking further the argument 
of Chapter 1, Section (3). It may be that further scientific 
research into the respective influences of the left and right 
hemispheres of the brain may lead to more certainty in revealing 
the limits of cognitive reason as the pineal gland's influence upon 
mapping out a relationship of adults and children through physical 
growth may be shown to do. 52 And it must be questioned whether the 
development of reason, even if it may be brought about 1n children. 
1s sufficient justification for paternalist intervention over those 
who are statutorily defined as 'children' particularly when those 
who are thus defined may prove more 'rational' than many adults. 
However, given these reservations, a lack of rationality is still 
acknowledged as grounds for some paternalist interventions. 
(4) Paternalism and consent 
Consent theory seems to have considerable affinity to autonomy 
since it gives the individual the opportunity to assent to 
paternalist interventions arranged in his interest. The greater the 
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age of the child or young person who is subject to paternalism makes 
the need for consent the greater, given that the individual in 
question is not mentally handicapped to the extent that harm could 
well befall him without some interventions. Tacit or assumed 
consent of children and young persons to compulsory schooling is 
taken for granted, but the incidence of truancy, disruptive 
behaviour in schools and in classrooms created by older pupils in 
their later compulsory school days, implies a lack of consent. (Tacit 
or assumed consent may be thought of as that expressed by one who 
orders a meal in a restaurant with the implication that he will pay 
for it - but only when he has consumed it.) If pupils withdraw 
their actual consent to co-operate in a learning enterprise, neither 
learning nor understanding will be achieved. Greater independence 
will be sought with advancing age; after all, adult rights to 
consent in a democratic society should be considerable and the actual 
right to vote and choose a government is to express some consent to 
its enactments. Nevertheless, in Britain's democratically ordered 
society, voting is an all or nothing affair, a mandate for all a 
prospective government's policies; educational issues do not receive 
explicit consent from the electorate as education will be only one 
part of a party's prospective mandate. (Other democratic societies, 
the U.S.A. for example, have different arrangements by which consent 
to aspects of educational policy are handled separately from other 
governmental considerations.) In Britain, a situation is Possible 
in which a parent (on behalf of a teenager) wishing to withdraw 
consent to compulsory schooling is not allowed to do so by government 
legislation unless the parent can prove that he or she is able to 
provide an adequate alternative education to that of compulsory 
schooling. And, in the case of some fifteen or sixteen year oIds, 
269 
schools may, themselves, withdraw their consent to provide education 
for these individuals with the result that if other schools also 
refuse them, the local authority may have to resort to other means 
to provide some education as no legal opportunity to seek employment 
is open to persons under the age of Sixteen years by current law. 
Autonomy is closely related to consent because consent which 
is not constrained implies that a person may choose to consent to 
act in a certain way. Autonomy·s relationship to consent is. then: 
" .•• central to respect for persons, since it represents 
the level of personal development in which moral agency 
is fully exemplified. It is as the subject and object 
of morally significant determinations that the idea 
of a person, as someone to whom respect is due. gets its 
grip. The reQuirement that personal interactions be 
based on the consent of those involved, acknowledges and 
safeguards autonomy." 53 
In order to clarify the relationship of autonomy and consent, I shall 
discuss below some main types of consent and endeavour to apply them 
to education; first. I shall consider SUbsequent consent and argue 
that it has little significance with respect to personal autonomy; 
second. I shall discuss the implications of prior consent. and 
although it is not usually regarded as of particular significance 
to education. I shall try to show that it does have importance for 
autonomy and education; finally. hypothetical-rational consent will 
be considered and related to prior consent and to choice. 
(a) Subsequent consent and autonomy 
It is sometimes argued that paternalist interventions are 
justifiable if the individual over whom the intervention is made 
comes to consent. subSeQuently. to the action. In the case of children. 
the exercise of paternalism by parents may be justified by the Child. 
270 
1/ eventually coming to see the correctness of hi s 
parentis interventions. Parental paternalism may be 
thought of as a wager by the parent on the child's 
subsequent recognition of the wisdom of the restrictions. 1I 54 
Similarly, compulsory school ing may be seen as a "wager II , a gamble 
that the individual required to attend comes to approve of the original 
compulsion. However. there may well be circumstances which 
intervene to eliminate subsequent approval and, therefore. the 
autonomy of the child. preserved in theory by an assumption of 
future consent. is set aside. The child may die before he Is free from 
paternalist interventions; a young adult. leaving school on the 
final day of compulsory attendance, who becomes a road accident 
victim as he leaves the school premises for the last time, hardly 
has opportunity, leaving aside inclination. to consent to having 
received a schooling. The question therefore arises as to whether 
parents or teachers would have acted differently towards that person 
had they known beforehand that he would die when he did. Children 
suffering from incurable diseases and whose lives it is known will 
be ~ o r e s h o r t e n e d . . are likely to be treated differently from thei r 
healthier peers who, with luck, will reach adulthood and a presumed 
exercise of autonomy. However, without certain knowledge of future 
events and in expectation of a normal life-span, Dworkin's Iwagerl 
centres on whether the paternalism is reasonable in the Situation when 
it is applied. Subsequent consent can, at best. be a technical 
justification and probably largely irrelevant to the subject of it 
once he has escaped from it. 
liThe justification depends upon the assessment of whether. 
at the time the act is performed, it is reasonable to 
believe the child wi 11 corne to consent. II 55 
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The consent in this case may be thought of as hypothetical. 
Carter describes the conditions for subsequent consent as: 
"Subsequent to the interference the subject (i) explicitly consents to the action; or (ii) is disposed to consent either upon request, or upon 
receipt of a relevant piece of information. II 56 
She also adds further qualifications, summarised by Van DeVeer, thus: 
"None of the following are true 
(a) the act requiring justification by consent is causally 
sufficient for that consent; 
(b) the consent would have been withdrawn if the subject's 
desires, preferences or beliefs had not been distorted; (c) the consent would have been withheld or would be 
withdrawn upon the receipt of relevant information." 57 
Carter regards the above issues as exceptions to her support for 
subsequent consent. (a) refers to direct interference with the 
individual such as conditioning or brainwashing and this may, perhaps. 
conceivably apply only to a limited number of cases, but (b) opens 
the door to a very wide field of exceptions. No adequate description 
of "distorted" preferences or beliefs is evident. Subsequent consent 
could be manipulated, however, to ensure that it was eventually 
forthcoming especially, perhaps, from children. Hence there 1s 
abiding interest in any charges of indoctrination of children. 
Adults may define what they view as the good for children and young 
persons and impose this model upon all. The good may not be their 
good in their own estimation and their good may not be his or n!r or 
mine in some respects at least. Berlin's fears that the 'real will' 
of the individual may, by external influence. be made into a 
distortion of the individual'S personal autonomy to ensure he follows 
some creed or political belief is, perhaps, a Similar situation to 
that referred to by Carter as "distortion". 
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The range of guidelines offered by Carter to ensure subsequent 
consent to paternal ist action iswide ranging. It 1s advocated: that 
intervention should have the long-term aims and preferences of the 
person in mind; that he will be supplied with necessary information; 
that some assessment of the pros and cons of the intervention are 
weighed; that there are no irreversible consequences of the 
intervention; that the person's competence 1s assessed etc. But 
few of these can be controlled with certainty, even if an early 
death is eliminated from the argument. A person. for example. may 
not necessarily obtain and digest particular knowledge and reach 
understanding however vigorous the approach of his teachers; the 
consequences of the paternalism may not be adequately assessable 
etc. Essentially it is probably not feasible to ascertain how a 
person wi 11 react to paternalist action,in the long term. And whatever 
precautions are taken of the kind Carter advocates, no certainty of 
subsequent consent can be brought about, without overt distortion 
of the individual's thought and feelings which Carter, fonnally. 
rules out.{A suitable example of a distortion effect upon children 
may be that of the old Amish of Wisconsin who successfully resisted 
compulsory education in the courts for children of 14 or 15 years of 
age. The court would probably have ruled against the sect had the 
children been younger.) 
Without such means of controlling for the effects of distortion, 
subsequent consent can only be guessed at; it would become a complete 
gamble. Gardner58 outlines the kind of distortions and the controls 
necessary to ensure that subsequent consent would be meaningful arising 
from education. He distinguishes "approval" from "thankful" consent 
and points out the problems of ensuring that the assessment of the 
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experience brought about under paternalism is competent and fair. 
Pupils may be unable to judge the experience adequately at the time 
it occurred: 
"Take the case of a teacher who, due to laziness or 
general lack of interest, failed to keep up with the 
latest teaching aids and methods ••• If those taught are 
ignorant about these matters, they may, as mature, sane 
and sensible adults, subsequently approve of what their 
teacher did, but we, knowing what we do. may have 
reservations about their appraisal." 59 
Assuming "the latest teaching aids and methods" would have markedly 
improved the teacher's performance - and there may well be some 
reservation on this point - Carter's withholding of consent on lack 
of relevant information, (c) above. will be no safeguard since the 
pupil, as an adult later, will still remain In ignorance of how to 
make a fair assessment of the teacher. Many parents may assess 
teacher performance and worth in the light of their own ever-dimming 
schoolday recollections since they have very limited access to the 
expertise to make a more accurate assessment and, indeed, teacher-
parents holding some measure of professional expertise may still fonm 
judgements of their children's teachers on inadequate or miSinformation 
resulting in their exaggerated critiCism of their own children's 
teachers. 
Gardner regards subsequent, thankful consent from the person 
who has experienced paternalism as unreliable as justification 
because many other factors would have to be weighed alongside the 
thanks, such as: the quality of any educational gain, the extent of 
compulsion used and justification for particular courses of action. 
He further warns of the "nostalgia effect" - that individuals may 
tend to forget the worst and recall only the best parts of their 
experiences and the "dismissive effect" by which people dismiss the 
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difficulties of particular occasions in the past as tranSient 
however important they seemed to be at the time. The "moral 
sens i ti v i ty /I of the assessor, he a I so rega rds as cruc i a 1. He 
concludes: 
/I ••• consent can justify a paternalistic interference 
providing it comes from someone who is sincere, 
unencumbered, informed about the relevant information, 
able to and does evaluate this information, is not 
suffering from the nostalgia effect or the dismissive 
effect, but who is morally sensitive, has not been 
indoctrinated or brainwashed into approving and who 
does not have distorted moral beliefs and preferences. II 60 
Such an ideal observer will have attained autonomy, but as subsequent 
observers who are to judge their own educational experiences were 
deemed in need of those experiences at that earlier time In their 
lives, they are unlikely to be able to meet Gardner's criteria. Her 
Majesty's Inspectorate, practising teachers and others might prove 
adequate to the onerous task of ideal observers but their 
observations would be paternalistic; only the individual himself 
(affected at the time by paternalist intervention) can give subsequent 
consent. 
However, subsequent consent cannot be justified by a subsequently 
autonomous person because it is, at root, illogical. Subsequent 
consent is thought to be consent which, by stretch of the imagination, 
is given at an earlier point in time from when it Is actually given. 
If an individual has the essential right to be free from paternalist 
interference, to be independent and even autonomous, that right 
cannot be removed without violation of it. No subsequent consent to 
that violation can change the fact that paternalism did Violate that 
right at that earlier point in time. Carter would argue that 
subsequent consent waives the right to avoid paternalistic 
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interference, but an actual right to freedom from interference 
cannot be eliminated. It may be violated; it may be ignored; the 
person i nvo 1 ved may say IIthanks II afterwards - for what it is worth _ 
but no subsequent consent can change the fact that the right existed 
and still exists, whether, in practice, it is recognised all the time, 
some of the time or never. Therefore, if paternalist interference 
occurred at time, T1, and subsequent consent occurred at T2, the time 
lapse from T1 to T2 would be a phase of violation of freedom, 
independence and the right to exercise autonomy; the person involved 
cannot, at T2, logically consent to what has already happened. If a 
woman was raped at T1 but subsequently at 12, in court. say. stated 
that she now had no objection to what had occurred. her later consent 
would not justify the rape; however, the court would have the difficult 
task of ascertaining when the woman's feelings leading to subsequent 
consent occurred since this would determine whether she had suffered 
rape or something else and investigation of why she made a consent 
statement subsequently would be critically important to the courts in 
ruling on the offence. Only if a person were to be in some way a 
different self at T2 from what she was at T1 might subsequent consent 
hold. but even then, the 12 (consenting) self could hardly speak for 
the T1 (interfered with) self if they were then d1fferent selves. 
If paternalistic interference was, certa1nly. for the individual's 
good arid met Gardner's criteria stated above, there would be 
justification for paternalism perhaps, but the just1f1cat1on could 
still not arise from the SUbsequent consent. And to find that a 
person at T2 did not consent to interference at T1 might De used to 
justify even more paternalistic interference extending to times T3. 
T4, TS etc. Further, those who favour a compulsory, centrally 
imposed curriculum on schools61 could argue. indefinitely. for 
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unlimited paternalist interference to ensure understanding was attained 
and consent gained. 
Subsequent consent. therefore, does not justify the loss to the 
individual of the right to exercise autonomy. Prior consent will now 
be explored in connection with autonomy. 
(b) Prior consent and autonomy 
Prior consent is distinct from subsequent consent partly because 
of the time at which the consent is given; for prior Consent to 
operate, the consent must be given before any paternalist intervention 
is undertaken. It involves an individual putting himself willingly 
into others' hands, accepting their direction and guidance so that 
other choices and distractions are ruled out while the consent 
holds. Prior consent to paternalist intervention on behalf of an 
individual seems inappropriate for some persons; the very young, the 
mentally disabled and the senile would all seem to lack the capacity 
to give prior consent to paternalist action other than a consent 
which would be no more than a meaningless form of words to the 
consentee. Some criteria would be appropriate to establish an 
individual's 'right' to give informed prior consent: ability to 
reason. not to be suffering apparent distortion of beliefs (as was 
considered in subsequent consent), to be of an adequate age, to have 
some degree of experience by way of education and life etc. The person 
involved would need to be able to judge the methods and routes 
adopted to achieve some end by the aid of paternalistiC interventions 
which he would endeavour to assess. in advance, as the least 
restrictive to his freedom and autonomy. Dworkin refers to, 
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II ••• a principle of the least restrictive alternative. 
If there is an alternative way of accomplishing the 
desired end without restricting liberty then although 
it may involve great expense, inconvenience, etc. the 
society must adopt it.1I 62 
This principle applied to prior consent, would necessitate some 
judgement considered to be not only within the competence of the 
individual, therefore, but judged also to be the "least restrictive 
alternative" method of achieving the end. Nevertheless, if an 
individual of adequate age and likely competence is involved, it 
would be undermining to that person's individuality and autonomy 
to deny him the right to give prior consent to an intervention which 
should be in his interest, which is, after all, the intention of the 
paternalist because paternalism involves interference with, 
II ••• a person I s liberty of action justi fted by reasons 
referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness 
needs, interests or values of the person being coerced. 1I 63 
Although the consentee ought to make assessment of the alternatives 
to seek out the least restrictive, the good of the consentee should also be 
that of the individual exercising the paternalism. (The issue of 
coercion, stated in Dworkin's definition, will be explored below.) 
In what follows I shall examine the place of pr'ior consent 1n 
connection with persons in their middle teens and above, whose 
education and experience have reached a stage of autarchy 1 f not 
of full personal autonomy. 
Carter considers prior consent a relatively straight-forward 
matter and rules out any difficulties attaching to it by asserting 
justification for intervention is, 
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"Prior to the interferenc.e the subject expl1ci tly 
consents to t h e p ~ e r n a l i s t i c c intervention ••• " 64 
The prior consent envisaged needs to be "explicit", from Carter's 
definition; word or gesture would presumably suffice. However. (as 
suggested above) some standard ought to be expected of the consentee 
or anyone, however ill-fitted to be able to choose to consent In 
advance. might do so. Such a situation could lead to the exploitation 
of adults who, for example, lack even the most limited rationality 
with which to give informed consent. But even with this reservation 
for some minimal Qualification to be required of the consentee, 
prior consent still may not solve the problem of justifying 
intervention, perhaps,as Carter would have it. 
Some have argued that prior consent to paternalism is not consent 
at all. Dworkin's example of prior consent Is that of Odysseus and 
the Sirens. In this classical tale. Odysseus Is informed by Circe 
of the means by which he and his ship's crew can escape the beguiling 
song of the Sirens which will lead to their destruction 1f they allow 
themselves to be lured off course by the entrancing sounds they will 
hear when passing the Sirens' isle. Circe directs that Odysseus 
orders his men to bind him to the mast and not to release him, even 
when he calls for them to do so should he hear the Sirens' song. The 
crew are to stop their ears with wax so that they will not be 
distracted. The crew act in a strongly paternalistic way towards 
Odysseus by coercing him; Odysseus is presumably indulged by Circe's 
plan so that he gains the pleasure of the singing without the hann 
of shipwreck and death. Likewise those who smoke low tar Cigarettes 
(with filters attached) also seek pleasure whilst hoping to minimise 
the risk to their health, setting aside the weak paternalist 
interference of the government health warning on the packet in order 
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to take the risk; Odysseus consents· to strong, coercive paternalism 
in advance to avoid the risk. Kleinig gives the example of smoker 
Neville who recognises his own weakness of will to ensure that he 
will successfully stop smoking and so asks others to prevent him from 
buying Cigarettes so that he will be obliged not to smoke since he 
will have no temptatiOn. 65 
However, it is not clear that the examples given above are 
actual instances of prior consent: 
"What is not clear is that these are Instances of 
paternalist intervention, rather than self-limitation 
of choices to prevent self-harm or to further one's 
interests. 1I 66 
Lively suggests that Odysseus simply directs his men to disobey his 
subsequent demands to be untied so that he will be prevented from 
harming himself. therefore, 
IIPaterna li st intervention seems no more invo I ved here 
than if I bought a house far distant from a pub 
because I feared becoming an alcoholic." 67 
Gardner agrees with Lively's perspective on prior consent 1n urging 
that. 
"Where we have paternalism, the initiative and 
responsibility rest with those who encroach ••• if the 
consent of the agent could be appealed to as justification, then we are not dealing with a case of 
paternalist intervention." 68 
The Lively-Gardner stance on prior consent is not altogether 
satisfactory. partly because it describes situations and events as 
ones which may be explained as wholly paternalist or wholly self-
directing. And, in fact, I would venture to argue that very few 
'. situations exist which should be described in such black and white 
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terms; most situations may be best depicted in shades of grey. 
Undoubtedly Odysseus plays a major part in organising events to 
avoid the danger of the Sirens and in this sense he is acting in 
a self-determining, autonomous way. But, even though he is the 
leader of a classical, hierarchically ordered society of a ship's 
company, his subordinates have a major responsibility to ensure that 
the event passes off successfully; they stick to Odysseus's rules 
(endorsed by the magical authority of Circe) and their part in 
coercing Odysseus is critically important. The actual sequence of 
events from the time Odysseus gave the plan to the successful 
outcome would reveal occasions when Odysseus's autonomy was dominant 
and others when the crew's paternalism was dominant. It may only be 
argued convincingly that autonomous self direction 1s the only 
consideration in a situation were t h ~ ~ individual to be Quite 
isolated from all others. If Lively buys a house distant from a pub 
because he fears becoming an alcoholic he cannot have, for example, 
a family's wishes to take account of. A wife and children may 
strongly endorse his reason for keeping clear of pubs. not only for 
their own prudential reasons, like p"reventing him from wasting the 
family income on drink or having to carry him upstairs each evening. 
but also because they love him and urge the purchase of the house 
distant from the pub out of paternalism (looking after pater) realising 
as they do his addiction to the bottle. Gardner conSiders·, "the 
initiative and responsibility rest with those who encroach ••• " but 
in the case of weak paternalism the encroachment may be put by way 
of guidance or information rather than in stronger form; Lively's 
family may, at least, advise vigorously. If a wife controls half 
the finance needed to purchase a house, her husband may be coerced 
into a 'choice' of location and thus be subject to a stronger paternalism. 
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Most situations may be best viewed from this more refined 
perspective - some way between total self-direction and strong 
paternalism on a kind of scale of escalating paternalism out of 
consent. The Odysseus example is, certainly, nearer to self direction 
than strong paternalism on the grounds that Odysseus, acting on 
advice, prescribes the nature and extent of the paternalism his 
crew should provide. Nevertheless they must still be relied upon to 
choose to obey orders to disobey orders and to impose a coercive 
paternalism over Odysseus. 
However, although it may not be necessary for strong 
paternalism to follow from prior consent, some define paternalism 
as entailing coercion. Carter states that: 
"A paternalistic act is one in which the protection 
or promotion of a subject's welfare is the primary 
reason for attempted or successful coercive inter-
ference with an acti on or state of that person. II 69 
Dworkin's definition given earlier also refers to the issue of 
coercion. But weak paternalism which Dworkin seems to argue for 
elsewhere in his article need not involve coercion. Van DeVeer goes 
so far as to deny that prior consent can justify interference at 
all because of the issue of coercion since Carter includes coercion 
within her definition of paternalism (as stated above): 
" ••• prior consent may not justify eaternal1stic 
interference because actions restraining B in cases 
where B previously consents may not be cases of 
coercive interference and, hence, not paternalistiC 
Interference." 70 
But coercion involves a specific kind of compulsion: 
"What is important is that something is elicited that 
would not have been given in the absence of threat." 71 
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But there are many instances of paternalism which do not involve 
a threat of interference or a withholding of something one has 
reason to expect. Some of Kleinig's examples include: a town council 
sealing off a dangerous track used by motorists as a short cut 
(there is no coercion involved here but the motorists' liberty of 
action is limited); a court rules that a person must convince a 
judge that his compensation for injuries at work will be spent in 
his long-term interest not in short-term advantage; finance 
agreements in which the interest may not exceeed an amount fixed by 
law. Indeed, it is possible to take the argument further into yet 
weaker paternalism by putting the case that paternalism need not. 
necessarily, restrict liberty of action: the cliff top sign that 
warns of danger but no land is even fenced off; the dying woman whose 
son's horrific misdemeanours are kept from her etc. There is 
paternalist intervention in all these instances, but coerCion is 
absent although it may be the case that, 
liThe paternalist exercises some measure of control over 
some aspect of the life of another - be it a thwarting 
of the other's desires, a manipulation of the other's 
beliefs, or a channeling of the other's behaviour. II 72 
Although there must be some degree of independent guidance or 
activity to channel another's behaviour on the part of the paternalist, 
coercion in ensuring that the intervention has some ultimate effect 
on another person is not a necessary element in all situations of 
paternalistic action. In cases of prior consent, the scope and 
scale of the exercise of paternalist intervention should be clearly 
circumscribed and understood before the intervention is consented 
to and effected. 
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Since paternalism is directed at enlarging another's opportunities, 
it should be used most appropriately, perhaps, when the subject of 
the proposed intervention has had the opportunity to give prior 
consent to the action. The stronger the intervention, the greater 
the obligation upon the paternalist to be able to justify his actions. 
But very few situations of prior consent express choices which are 
completely voluntary. The voluntary assumption of risk by an 
individual is described by Feinberg as: 
". •. wh i Ie fu 11y i nfonned of a 11 re levant facts and 
contingencies, with one's eyes wide open, so to speak, 
and in the absence of all coercive pressure or 
compulsion ••• To whatever extent there is compulsion, 
misinformation, excitement or impetuousness, clouded judgement (as e.g. from alcohol) or immature or defective 
faculties of reasoning, to that extent the choice falls 
short of voluntariness. 1I 73 
Such a situation expresses an ideal. one for which to aim, perhaps, 
though it may be unlikely ever to be fully realised. Most persons 
consent and make choices from a less than 'voluntary' basis. The 
person consenting in advance to some degree of paternalism, even 
though non-coercive in nature. must. to some extent, wager that 
the exercise of paternalism will be as intended - for his benefit. 
A situation in which an individual gives prior consent to intervention 
recognises that individual's right to personal autonomy but, in 
consenting the individual accepts, at least some measure of weak 
paternalism restricting his autonomy. This is not. necessarily, a 
contradictory situation because, 
" ••• paternalism can be recognised as one means among 
many by which agents may. indicate. serious concern 
for their future well-belng. An lndication of such 
concern may not represent a denial of one's autonomy 
so much as an expression of it." 74 
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Paternalism, particularly in situations of prior, voluntary consent 
approximating to Feinberg's ideal stated above, may well enable the 
individual to express his personal autonomy particularly in situations 
when he must anticipate, think ahead and make choices which are 
contingent upon his judgement of his long-term good. Therefore, a 
measure of paternalism may prove complementary to the individual's 
long term purposes: 
"Recognition of the individuality of others, then, is not 
some respect for bare voluntary choices or rational 
choosers in an abstract sense, but for continuants whose 
capacities have formal concrete expression in ongoing 
projects, life-plans, etc. and who 1n day-to-day decision-
making can be expected to work within the framework they 
provide. But as we know we are often disposed to act in ways 
that are perilous to our projects and plans that are 
partially constitutive of our identity. Where this 1s so, 
paternalism may not be violative of integrity." 75 
The acceptance of the right of the autonomous person to give prior 
consent to paternalistic intervention on his behalf provides him. 
in recognition of his individuality and self-determination, with as 
much control as he chooses to exercise over 1nterventionson his 
behalf. A situation of checks and balances 1s created for. and by, 
the individual so that on a scale of complete voluntarlness to strong 
paternalism. the individual may consent to pass through a "threshold" 
accepting paternalist intervention even at the expense of his 
freedom because such intervention on his behalf is recognised by 
him as contributing to his long-term good and his acceptance of it 
is an expression of his autonomy. 
In education and in schooling. an aspect of the exercise of 
paternalism Is the nature of the relationships between teachers 
and students. These relationships should express mutual trust. 
respect and care. Excessive paternalism would lack respect for 
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individual autonomy and might destroy the proper relationship of 
student and teacher. The adoption of a careless voluntariness by 
the student calls for paternalistic guidance to ensure the student 
keeps sight of his long-term good. The prior consent of a student 
(in voluntarily choosing to follow a course of study at 16+. for 
example) to some degree of paternalist intervention on his behalf 
if deemed appropriate by his teachers. is essentially an unwritten 
contract between student and teacher based. fundamentally. upon the 
quality of the relationship which exists between them. 
To summarise, then, I have argued that prior consent to 
paternalist interventions does exist since persons do not live as 
isolated entities (as Lively depicts) removed from actual personal 
relationships and committed to total self-direction or strong 
paternalism. Reality has more to do with a scale of complete 
voluntariness to full paternalism which the individual may enter at 
. 
different points. Prior consent gives the individual consentee 
determination of the nature of the intervention he judges it prudent 
to subject himself to and, therefore. recognIses the individual's 
right to personal autonomy. Prior consent. therefore. may be most 
appropriate when given by those who are not the very young nor those 
who suffer from mental infirmities. 
(c) Hypothetical-rational consent 
A further type of consent may be described as hypothetical-
rational in that it is what a "fully rational" person would be 
expected to accept as a form of protection. The appeal to the 
consent of the individual subject to intervention is largely 
irrelevant in this instance since it is that aspect of consent theory 
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which provides justification for paternalism exercised over young 
children. Rationality Is the key consideration: 
"What is it that justifies us in interfering with children? 
The fact that they lack some of the emotional and 
cognitive capacities required in order to make fully 
rational decisions." 76 
In the case of children, Mill's argument that it is wrong that an 
individual should be free to contract not to be free holds because 
it cannot be freedom, permanently to lose freedom. 
Dworkin further considers that: 
" ••• the main consideration for not allowing the contract 
is the need to preserve the liberty of the person to 
make future choices. This gives us a principle - a 
very narrow one - by which to Justify paternalist 
interferences. II 77 
It was argued earlier in this chapter that individuals are not governed 
only by reason. Reason has its limits; thus the assessment of what 
is rational behaviour is likely to present considerable difficulty 
when persons. wittingly, take sIgnificant risks with their lives 
and health. However, this is not at issue 1n the case of young 
children for whom it 1s hypothesized that the opportunity to make 
future choices of their own concerning their own life-plans, as 
they attain the power of personal autonomy, is essential to preserve 
on their behalf. 
A persuasive argument expressing the rational interests of 
children is that of Rawls's account of primary goods. The argument, 
very briefly, is that the less that is known about a person's 
rational preferences, the more the need to act on his behalf with 
respect to his primary goods. Interference is justifIed by what a 
group of rational, generally well informed individuals would adopt 
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as the good of another within the bounds of social order although 
judging from behind a "veil of ignorance" with regard to the 
characteristics of that other individual. 78 The case 1s that whatever 
the culture in which the individual is to be found, as long as he 
is rational and assumed able, eventually, to be able to develop to 
a stage of personal autonomy, he will have need to develop his 
primary goods: health, 1ntellect, imagination, self-respect. rights. 
liberties. opportunities. etc. Rawls articulates two key principles 
upholding this case: (a) that each person should have the right to 
basic, personal liberty conSistent with the same right for all. and, 
(b) social and economic inequalities should be so arranged that. 
(i) the least advantaged will benefit more from the system adopted 
than they would otherwise have done under any previous arrangement; 
(ii) positions and offices should be open to all on a basis of 
equal opportunity.79 For children, then. it is right that they should 
be protected against their irrational impulses so that they can 
develop their rationality 1n order to advance their own good in due 
course. Education is to be regarded as a primary good. 
II ••• an education adequate to choosing among available 
economic and social opportunities and to becoming 
informed, democratiC citizens.1I 80 
Education will convey values from person to person but it is. 
II .•. not whose values but what values ought to be 
imposed upon children. II 81-
Gutman contends further that, 
IIWe rank children's right to education above their 
rights to religious freedom because we believe that 
this restriction of their present liberty is necessary 
to create the conditions for future enjoyment of religious 
and other freedoms.1I 82 
2M 
When a person approaches autonomy and adult status and is able to 
make rational choices, he should be allowed to replace the objective 
criteria of primary goods wlthhis own criteria which, if 
authentiC, rational and moral,(as described in Part 1) will be his 
own and representative of his life-plan. When the individual's 
choices are authentiC, rational and moral his autonomy or at least 
a preliminary stage of autarchy should be recognised and paternalist 
interventions reduced in line with that scale of voluntariness to 
strong paternalism outlined 1n the previous section on prior consent. 
The judge's ruling in the case of the Amish of Wisconsin is 
instructive; the judgement concerning the non-attendance at school of 
Amish adolescents recognised their right to choose what they should 
do: 
"1. that adolescents ought to be granted the full free 
exercise rights of adults 1n certain areas because 
they have the rational capacities of adults, or 
2. that adolescents must be granted some freedoms 
in order to help develop their capacities to exercise 
their freedoms as adults (or at least in order not to 
diminish those capacities)." 83 
The Amish Yoder family won the case, although it seems from other 
aspects of the ruling that they may not have done so had the 
children involved been younger. 
In conclusion, then, hypothetical-rational consent may be used 
to justify interventions on behalf of the young before they can 
effectively exercise their reason adequately. However, no actual 
appeal to consent is relevant in the case of hypothetical-rational 
interventions on behalf of children; the need to preserve primary 
goods on their behalf 1n order to keep open later choices and 
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opportunities when they do attain autonomy or autarchy justifies 
interventions. A status of autarchy recognises that the individual 
can make rational choices and from this stage the appeal to prior 
consent has some standing. as argued earlier. since prior consent to 
continued paternalist interventions does assume recognition of the 
individual's autonomy. 
The point at which hypothetical consent gives way to autarchy 
may not be clearly definitive but an attempt to clarify this point 
will be made in Sectlon (5) below. 
(5) A status of autarchy 
Kleinig likens autonomy to a piece of land which may either be 
permanently enclosed for others' purposes or secured by others under 
"temporary trespass" without permanent alienation by them. 84 When 
an individual reaches a stage of autarchy at which he can make 
rational chOices for himself. he is in a position to claim the right 
that his growing personal autonomy should be afforded some measure 
of recognition and the paternallsm exercised on his behalf when he 
was a young child should be limited. His prior consent should be 
sought to further paternal 1st intervent10n on his behalf and his 
consent given some degree of recognition once he attains a state of 
autarchy, therefore. 
The present sltuation in Brltain(and elsewhere) presents a 
person with the status of adulthood and an accompanying presumption 
of attainment of personal autonomy. somewhat abruptly. at the age of 
eighteen years. As indicated in Chapter 5, Sectlon (3). some 
acknowledgement is legally accorded to young persons prior to the 
age of eighteen such as the right to marry at age Sixteen. with 
parents' approval. or the right to ride a motor cycle (with its 
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accompanying dangers) at age sixteen or the right to drive a 
somewhat safer conveyance, a motor car, at age seventeen; limited 
hours of employment are permitted below the age of sixteen etc. In 
Britain, compulsory attendance at school is currently required until 
the last Friday in May in the year the person involved reaches 
sixteen, thus some may leave school, legally, at age sixteen years 
nine months and others aged fifteen years n1ne months, an anomaly 
created by the arbitrar1ness of age and the "school year". However, 
age is taken to be the general criterion applied in issues of majority 
rights and, therefore, it would lack credibility to advocate any 
change without reference to age. Nevertheless, the present situation 
with regard to legal recognition of persons below the age of eighteen 
seems to leave them more akin to infants in their legal status than 
to that of adults, the status to which they. as reasoning persons, 
naturally aspire since adulthood is to be seen as an essential part 
of their future. 
In order to afford some recognition to the intermediate stage 
of rational autarchy in young persons in their middle teens, it seems 
necessary to provide institutions with the legal flexibility to 
respond to autarchy and, eventually, personal autonomy so as to 
be able, in Goodman's phrase, to multiply the paths of growing up. 
Opportunity for the exercise of rational choice by the young adult 
over his or her life with a corresponding limit on paternalist 
interventions which are made more subject to the prior consent of 
the young adult seem deSirable developments. 
It may be that a new status for those in middle teenage would 
recognise autarchy and enable young adults, below what is now 
compulsory school age, to become more related to the adult community 
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through activities in production or public or community services. 
SChrag85 advocates a newly defined legal status for young adults 
and draws attention to the President's Science Advisory Committee. 
headed by J. S. Coleman, which reported the desirability of a 
separate minimum wage and revised labour standards in, 
" .•. the interest of flexibility, individualization, 
and the opening of wider opportunities for work 
experience and employment." 86 
Schrag's view of this report is that, 
" ••• the authors of the report are conscious of the 
deleterious constraints which minority status places 
upon youth though they are justifiably unwilling to 
accord adolescents full adult status." 87 
Such enlarged status might well be expressed 1n economics, family 
life and political participation and Schrag outlines how these 
categories might respond to the autarchy of young adults. Parental 
concern at such a change of status may be unfounded: 
"First, the period in which the parents exert the greatest 
influence over their children, shaping their basic 
values and attitudes, is probably long over by the time 
they turn sixteen. Second, it 1s doubtful that 
parental coercion and blackmail are ever very successful 
where more benign forms of persuasion have fat led ..• 
Third, parents would retain considerable leverage over 
their adolescent children inasmuch as the latter. though 
not barred from employment, would not usually be 
economica 11y self-sufficient." 88 
The personal relationships between parents and their children would 
largely determine the influence to be wielded. However. Schrag's 
thIrd point above, of eccnomic dependence. would be a considerable 
sanction. And h ~ ~ is probably correct to describe the situation cf 
young adults.thus: 
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liOn the one hand they are exhorted to 'grow up' and to 
act as 'mature and responsible people l • On the other 
hand, they are denied any real i n d e p e n d e ~ e e or 
responsibility. Informally they are urged to act as 
adults while their legal status reflects the fact that 
society does not distinguish them from infants. II 89 
However, an educational input could still be required during autarchy 
yet a route to adulthood effected which both recognised the 
individual IS right to exercise personal autarchy as a preliminary 
stage to autonomy (in that education and/or training could be shaped 
more by the individual's own choice) and at the same t1me a discreet 
paternalism could be maintained over his development. 
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Introduction to Part 3 
The purpose of the final part of this thesis is to show how 
personal autonomy can be exercised and. thereby developed. within 
the practice of education. In the analysis of personal autonomy in 
Part I. the autos, the authentic self, was held to be able to 
empower the individual to deep, reflective evaluation of his motives 
with which the nomoi of the criteria picked out by reason coupled 
with the moral and social implications of personhood interact and 
from which the virtues are fostered. If the account of personal 
autonomy so far given holds. educational activities should aim to 
give opportunity for the exercise and development of personal 
autonomy in the learning process so that by exercising autonomy in 
learning. the person involved may be more likely to practise his 
autonomy after formal education ends. Education is. itself, a 
practical activity and if personal autonomy is to be successfully 
developed. it should also be exercised in educational practices giving 
opportunity for practical realisation of authenticity and practical 
reason. And it may only be by active engagement in educational 
practices that personal autonomy may be developed. The measure of an 
, 
individuals gain in personal autonomy will then be his capacity for 
personal exercise of skills coupled with a complementary acquisition 
of relevant knowledge and understanding as he engages actively and 
directly in educational practices. 
An appropriate definition of a practice appOSite to personal 
autonomy and to educational practices could be the one below: 
"By a 'practice I I am going to mean any coherent and 
complex form of soci ally establ1 shed co-operati ve human 
activity through which goods tnternal to that form of 
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activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve 
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to. 
and partly definitive of. that form of activity. with 
the result that human powers to achieve excellence. and 
human conceptions of the ends and goods involved. are 
systematical ~ y y extended. tI 1 
Applied to practices which comprise education. the tllnternal goods" 
partly comprise the knowledge and understanding which personal 
engagement in the practices only can yield. These tlinternal goods" 
can only be fully realised when the person's autonomy is exercised 
so that the virtues are called into play when that individual strives 
for excellence in the practice. 
Personal autonomy is argued to be a power. in Chapter 5. and 
the "human powers tl to which MacIntyre refers enabling a person to 
"achieve excellence" within his capacit1es in the practice must 
embrace autonomy for how otherwise can personal excellence be 
achieved in any practice? Individual participation in the practice 
1s essential to enable individual achievement to occur; it is 
insufficient to claim understanding of a practice without personal 
engagement In it (as. for example. White2 claims in respect of those 
activities he deSignates as Category II. in. Towards a Compulsory 
Cyrriculym) because only by engaging in a practice will a person be 
able to realise the power of his personal autonomy and possess the 
personal virtues which direct involvement can yield. Active 
personal engagement and commitment to a practice. as White has more 
recently indicated. is crucial: 
tilt is not enough to 'know about'. say, playing football 
in an external way if one is to acquire the courage. 
cooperativeness. etc. which playing this game promotes. 
One has to play it - and not just once or twice or for 
a few weeks. but for as long as it takes for one to 
build up something of the relevant virtues. II 3 
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Engagement in educational practices on this view enables moral 
and intellectual virtues to flower as part of the individual's 
personal autonomy in a socially established, co-operative set of 
human activities within a sense of community described in Chapter 3, 
Section (4) above. 
The three chapters of this final part of the thesis each explore 
aspects of educational practices which hold significance for 
autonomy and for education considered as a set of worthwhile 
practices. Chapter 7 considers knowledge and educational practices. 
Chapter 8 deals with learning how to learn, as a kind of second 
order learning particularly relevant to autonomy and it also considers 
some implications for teaching and student autonomy. The final 
chapter explores some of the ideas and methods of Dewey with regard 
to practices and personal autonomy through education. 
CHAPTER 7 
Section (1) 
Section (2) 
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PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE 
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(1) Procedural knowledge 
An influential exponent of a liberal education based on an 
analysis of forms (and fields) of knowledge, Professor P. H. Hirst, 
describes three kinds of knowledge: (a) knowledge with the direct 
object (of persons, places, things) he subsumes under, (b) knowledge 
I that I or propositional knowledge of true statements or propositions 
upon which the forms which he claims to be epistemologically basic 
rest. However, he describes, (c) knowledge 'how' or procedural 
knowledge as follows: lilt may in fact always invol ve knowledge of 
the first two kinds, but it clearly picks out certain capacities 
over and above the cognitive understanding and mastery of which a 
person is capable.'.4 Pring considers that the balance of what 
happens in school based education has to do with propositional 
knowledge, partly because this can be more easily examined than 
procedural knowledge and the emphasis he considers placed upon 
propositional knowledge ensures that, " ••. so much knowledge is 
taught in total disconnection from the practical world which gives it 
pOint. IIS And if the learner is not actively engaged in practising 
the educational practice in Question the opportunity for the exercise 
of autonomy and for the development of the virtues implicit in that 
practice cannot flower. 
Ryle's analysis of reason into the theoretical and the practical 
distinguishes the latter as that which enables the individual to 
engage in intell igent practices: "What distinguishes sensible from 
silly operations is not their parentage but their procedure, and this 
holds no less for inte llectual than the practical performances. 116 
Performances, procedures and practices illustrating knowing how as 
opposed to knowing that are used by Ryle to, " ••• rescue practice 
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from the intellectualist grip." However, Ryle then goes further 
and endeavours to show that practice is logically prior to and, 
therefore, superior to theory since; lilt is therefore possible for 
people intelligently to perform some sorts of operations when they 
are not yet able to consider any propositions enjoining how they 
should be performed. 117 Indeed. Hartland-Swann has gone so far as 
to contend that if 'know
' 
is to be adjudged a capacity verb and, 
therefore, dispositional in character. all instances of knowing that 
may be reduced to knowing how.8 Thus to ask someone what propositions 
he knows about x is to ask the person the extent to which he knows 
how to state correctly those propositions. However, Roland-Marting 
points out that 'know' must be made stipulatively dispositional in 
order to reduce knowing that to knowing how and pOints out that to 
know how x murdered y by witnessing the events is not the same as 
to know how to swim, tell jokes, speak foreign languages, show 
aesthetic taste. reveal tactful manners etc. - to borrow some of 
Ryle's examples. All the latter examples require practice and are 
practices (although not all may meet the definition of a worthwhile 
practice) yet the witness to the murder had to be aware of what 
occurred prior to knowing how to give an account of it. Nevertheless 
when practice and action are required. knowing how becomes imperative 
and knowing that acquires meaning only in that it may be embraced 
into practice. 
Propositional knowledge is by no means discarded by Ryle who 
does not seek to deny the value of intellectual operations. Ryle's 
surgeon's skill is to be observed in the movements of his hands not 
in the stating of medical truths. Although the surgeon may well have 
learned by instruction, he will also have learned aptitudes and 
skills by practice and such practice requires a different intelligence 
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from that of propositional knowledge. Understanding must be part 
of knowing how and, liThe knowledge that is required for understanding 
intelligent performances of a specific kind is some degree of 
competence in performances of that kind. 1I1O Indeed, Ryle argues 
that if all knowing how required prior theoretical knowledge an 
infinite regress would be entailed since all theoretical knowledge 
requires application and practice and this is knowing how. 
The final step in Ryle's case for the importance of procedural 
knowledge is Chapter IX of The Concept of Mind where having a theory 
is considered to involve, " ••• being able to deliver lessons or 
refresher lessons in it." 11 But "building ll a theory is not the same 
as having a theory and Kepler's and Galileo's efforts to arrive at 
a theory are practices and the use of knowing how. The theory once 
arrived at and formulated becomes separated from the efforts, 
frustrations, successes, failures and the whole emotional involvement 
which intellectual practices require. The justification for theory 
is stated thus: liThe chief point of giving didactic exercises to 
oneself, and to other pupils. is to prepare them to use these lessons 
for other than further didactic ends. Columbus did not explore only 
to add to what was recited in geography lessons.1I In the same way, 
liTo be a Newtonian was not just to say what Newton had said, but 
also to say and do what Newton would have said and done." 12 Ryle's 
view holds for school practice since it is by engagement in practices 
and the accompanying knowledge how by which the learner is directly 
involved in the exercise of autonomy and the virtues implicit in 
that involvement may be realised. 
If, then. the propositional knowledge of a liberal education 
associated with theoretical reason dominates school learning, the 
opportunity for practice is 
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" the epistemology of ratiocination and of intellectual 
work in general ccntinues to be told chiefly in the 
contemplative idiom, this is, in terms appropriate to 
classrooms furnished with blackboard, but no pens or 
paper, instead of in terms appropriate to classroom 
furnished with pens and paper, but not blackboard. 
We are given to understand that to 'cognise' is not 
to work something out, but to be shown something." 13 
However, to rest the exercise of autonomy and the practice of 
the virtues upon the knowing how and knowing that distinction alone 
may be an inadequate foundation. Knowing how to do x is not necessarily 
the same as being able to do x. This distinction has been applied, 
perhaps mis'guidedly, to the nature of ski lIs: "A ski 11 is more than 
knowing, and more than knowing how. It is action too.,,14 But the 
distinction between actually doing x and knowing how to do x is 
emphasised here. Animals do things by instinct and to effect, but 
it seems inappropriate to describe them as knowing how to do things 
since some knowledge of the principles involved in an activity seems 
to be implied by knowing how to do it. This may well apply to the 
person who cannot explain (say how) he does something, but, even 
so, he must have some grasp of the principles if he can actually do 
it. In this sense, knowing how is the knowledge of, perhaps, a 
technique which, in practice, can,be demonstrated in a variety of 
ways. However: "It remains true that a man cannot be said to know 
how to do something unless he can do it, except in the sense that 
he knows in theory how to do it although he cannot do it in practice; 
he knows the principles but cannot apply them.,,15 And it is crucial 
to the development of autonomy that practical engagement in 
activities enables the individual to share in the nature of the practice 
by having an understanding of the principles involved and being able 
to act in accord with the nature of the practice aiming for the highest 
standards possible. 
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An alternative perspective upon knowledge to that of Ryle but 
apparently holding significance for the direct engagement of the 
individual is Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance 
and knowledge by descriPtion. 16 Russell distinguishes two sorts of 
knowledge: knowledge of truths (knowledge that) and knowledge of 
things of two kinds, knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by 
description. Knowledge by acquaintance is direct awareness, in 
Russell's analysis; "We have acquaintance in sensation with the data 
of the outer senses, and in introspection of what may be called the 
inner sense - thoughts, feelings, desires, etc., we have acquaintance 
in memory with things which have been data either of the outer 
sense or the inner sense. Further, it is probable, though not certain, 
that we have acquaintance with Self, as that which is aware of things 
or has desires towards things.,,17 Such direct awareness through 
the elements of sense data, memory, introspection and universals 
inform knowledge by description which is, then, propositional. But 
it is a "knowledge by acquaintance" which is an authentiC awareness 
making directly present to the individual of what it is that he is 
aware. All knowledge is essentially this basic awareness in Russell's 
view. Thus, in his example, a hierarchy of removal from 
acquaintance to description might be: 
i. Bismarck to those who knew him = an acquaintance as near as 
is possible to know another person; 
ii. Bismarck to those who knew him through history = knowledge 
still of who Bismarck was; 
iii. The man in the iron mask = an unknown, but with propositions 
known about him; 
iv. The longest-lived of men = nothing known apart from what 
may be logically deduced from the definition of the man. 
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However, knowledge by acquaintance remains fundamentally private 
to the knower and communicable knowledge must be descriptive, 
II ..• since what one knows must always be identifiable under a 
description and this implies knowledge by description. 1118 Nevertheless. 
even though the very statement of Russell's knowledge by acquaintance 
is itself descriptive, it does describe the orientation of the self, 
authentically, towards acquiring knowledge and also the ordinary 
usage of knowledge by acquaintance (in the sense of lived, direct 
experience of engaging in practices) is made no less coherent. 
However, the priority Ryle gives to procedural knowledge may 
be refined in some respects, perhaps. Scheffler19 pOints to the 
fact that knowing how implies at least a minimal training since 
practice is relevant to performance and some measure of understanding 
is entailed. Ryle identifies knowing how with intelligent 
performance, but mere know-how seems to infer skills of a lower level 
than those intelligent activities required for such Knowledge. Thus 
reading with understanding goes well beyond that mere decoding of 
symbols which may equate to know-how in this respect. IIRoutinizable 
competences II, such as typing or computation Scheffler calls 
IIfaculties II and although an aspect of knowledge how requi ring 
training and skill, they are not "intelligent" in Ryle's sense. 
"Propens i ties II are also excluded from knowing how since these 
comprise a range, chiefly of habits - such as smoking - although 
clearly a person could be said to know how to smoke. Scheffler 
therefore tightens Ryle's concept of knowing how by delineating 
critical skills as its essence and this element of procedural 
knowledge is of major importance in the exercise of autonomy in 
practice since these skills enable the learner to act with regard to 
the wider context of the practice in general. He is not confined only 
to the exercise of a specific skill. 
• 
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Is theory then, banished from the intelligent practices of 
knowing how and the exercise of critical skills? Or, perhaps, is 
theory cast into a minor supporting role leaving autonomy to be 
exercised only in the practice of such skills (within those practices 
deemed to be worthwh i Ie)? Is it that, II ••• we shou Id substi tute the 
• I do' for the • I think' as our starting point and ce·ntre of 
reference"?20 However, to do something without thinking is not 
coherent and is not argued by Ryle. A spontaneous response to feeling 
is not the point, and it should be noted that, " ••• many activities 
are a complex in which theorizing, planning, reference to information 
and reflection upon the results of actions, all playa part along 
with overt physical performance itself."21 Now this is certainly 
not to suggest that practice can be dispensed with but that there 
are theoretical aspects attaching particularly to situations or 
contexts for the exercise of intelligent practice. Thus the surgeon's 
skill in knowing how to perform the operation is exercised in a 
situation in which the actual decision to operate has been taken, 
knowledge of anatomy and physiology is implicit and examination and 
diagnosis have all contributed to that deciSion. The games player 
who has outstanding skills does best when he is aware of game tactics 
or strategy. And, as Entwistle pOints out, some theory in advance 
of practice may also be appropriate in situations such as safety 
procedures in laboratories, learning how to drive a car etc. It may 
be that, " .•• theorizing is most helpful to practice when it is an 
ad hoc kind of acti vi ty carried on in close association with practice. 1122 
It may be, then, that the relationship of theory to practice is 
contextual and an interaction of knowing how and knowing that occurs 
in learning which is complex and different dependent upon the 
educational practice involved. Nevertheless, unless the learner 
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personally engages in the procedures and processes of the practice 
in question and does not settle for knowing only that or about some-
thing in a largely theoretical sense, he is unlikely to have scope 
for the exercise of autonomy and an engagement of the virtues. 
(2) Practi ce 
The connection between knowing that and knowing how is an 
intimate one but the significance of the latter in relation to 
practice and the individual's personal engagement in practices should 
be held central to the exercise and development of autonomy. 
Latterly, Hirst has observed the significance of practice but, as 
yet, is uncertain about its basis: "I must accept too that at present 
the logic of practical reasoning is unclear and that the structure 
of educational theory is therefore uncertain. 1123 However Hi rst 
is prepared to acknowledge the significance of the practical in 
spite of his uncertainties regarding practical reason and looks to 
action for an analysis: " ••• our understanding of action is in 
large measure necessarily derived from an analysiS of what is judged 
to be successful action before we understand, let alone formulate 
. 
explicitly, the rules of principles that it embodies. 1124 Nevertheless 
the starting point must be the practice itself. 
The adjective, 'practical
'
, is somewhat misleading in its 
modern connotation with what may be considered to be anti-intellectual, 
'down-to-earth', a collection of priorities for education determined 
by d Department of Employment Ito serve the needs of industrial 
production'perhaps? However, Aristotle distinguishes this aspect 
of activity as poiesis, concern with making or constructing things. 
The implications of the practical within practical reason, however, 
are more appropriate drawn to the concept of praxis which has to do 
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with doing particular activities as well as one can - eupraxia. 
Praxis (as practice) describes the disciplines. the virtues and the 
activities required within an individual's life; reason and knowledge 
merge in praxis. Aristotle distinguishes reason into both the 
theoretical. theoria. the modern associations of which may. perhaps. 
be in a liberal education of propositional knowledge that, or know-
ledge pursued 'for its own sake' and the practical and instrumental. 
If personal autonomy is to be fostered within education it is 
the aspect of practice which requires dominance in educational 
activities. Bernstein recognises the need to reinstate practice in 
life and learning: 
" ••• the conception of man which we have inherited is a 
distorted one. It has been distorted not only by the 
preoccupation of man as knower. but by a certain view of 
what knowledge is or ought to be - one that is 'incorrigibly 
contemplative'. To correct this distortion, to achieve a 
better understanding of just what sort of creature man 
is and can be. we need to understand him as an agent. 
as an active being engaged in various forms of practice." 25 
The phrase. 'incorrigibly contemplati ve'. which Bernstein borrows 
from G. E. M. Anscombe. refers chiefly to theoretical reason and 
propositional knowledge. But MacIntyre. whose definition of a 
practice is given above. includes among his examples, " ••. the 
enquiries of physics, chemistry and biology. and so is the work 
of the historian, and so are painting and music 1126 as practices. 
emphasising, "enquiries". lithe work of ••• " and the activities of 
participation in painting and music. The practices of doctors and 
teachers involve education and training which are far removed from 
the 'contemplative'. 
The apparent purity of motives of those urging engagement in 
a liberal education of knowledge 'for its own sake' is referred to 
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by Peters and Dearden who give the examples of Matthew Arnold and 
Cardinal Newman both of whom wanted to hold fast to a standard 
expressed by a liberal education at a time of rapid industrial and 
technological change.27 However, Dearden's example of Newman as 
an advocate of liberal education, shows that Newman's own motives 
for promoting this kind of education were related to ensuring that 
Catholic gentlemen retained their faith. Newman believed that a 
liberal education would provide knowledge to combat new ideas 
connected with the development of science and technology; Newman's 
reasons for promoting a liberal education were, then, intimately 
associated with the society he knew and the changes of which he 
disapproved. For him a liberal education was a means of retaining 
a status quo in the values he rated so highly and which he could 
defend with an education which would stand as a bastion to change 
and act as a conservative force in learning. Newman's advocacy 
of a liberal education was, therefore, highly instrumental to specific 
social and moral ends; such an education was to be a motivator to 
these ends. 
Knowledge 'for its own sake', as theoria to the Greeks, may be 
considered intrinsically valuable to the learner who intends his 
knowledge to have no purpose in terms of instrumental consequences. 
His intention resides in the intrinsic value of the knowledge alone. 
Practical or instrumental purposes are considered to be restrictive 
upon the creative thought processes of the learner; the clutter of 
practical ends has no place in knowledge 'for its own sake'. However, 
even though a learner may, by his intention, regard the knowledge 
within a liberal education as intrinsically motivating and 
distinguish it from any purpose outside the personal acquisition 
of that knowledge, some components of a liberal education have, 
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despite their intrinsic nature, relationship to c o n t e x ~ ~ beyond 
themselves. Applied mathematics and applied physics relate to the 
natural world and the circumstance of its physical existence; history 
and the humanities in general relate to man's social existence. The 
enquiries of science, the work of the historian, referred to above 
as practices, develop practical ends and, indeed, generate problems 
as a focus of practical enquiry. 
Practices may well be intrinsically motivating; a person engaged 
in making something in wood, metal, plastiC, etc. may well feel a 
strong sense of satisfaction simply from the process and product 
irrespective of any instrumental purpose attaching to the construction. 
Indeed, it may be that " •.• the motivation to learn is not so 
dependent on external and variable interpersonal and institutional 
factors .. 28 as in a liberal education. Peters pOints out that in 
schools praise, rewards, approval, competition, avoiding punishment, 
passing examinations, etc. are so linked to learning that such 
extrinsic motivation may well divert the learner from pursuit of 
knowledge 'for its own sake' as a pupil can gain praise, for example, 
from a teacher for a variety of reasons and certainly not all have 
connection with knowledge. The intrinSic motives of the learner 
are submerged in extrinsic motives which may well be ambition, greed 
and envy! 
In practical activities the knowledge and skills required are 
evidently relevant to the end of the practice itself and, therefore, 
there may be less chance of the learner's being subverted from that 
end than in a school-based formal education following the maxim 
of knowledge 'for its own sake'. In some circumstances knowledge 
is gained in relation to situational considerations and Peters's 
example of the Schools Council Humanities Curriculum Project is 
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particularly apt. In such learning activities centering on issues 
of a,to some extent, controversial kind and ones of direct concern 
to the lives of young adults such as education, war and SOCiety, 
relations between the sexes, an expansion of knowledge and under-
standing from thought and discussion of situational Circumstances 
outwards from those si tuations may be effected. Such knowledge has 
direct application to the lives of the learners enabling them, 
authentically, to orient themselves by practical reasoning to 
situations in the world affecting themselves. The Humanities 
Curriculum Project has been, " ••• one of the few attempts to connect 
the development of understanding in crUCial areas such as those of 
violence, law and order, sex and personal relationships, with the 
development of autonomy."29 Indeed, the Project1s discussion methods 
must engage the learner in the practice of learning itself and in 
a similar way to the professional practitioners, the doctor, the 
lawyer, the teacher, they build: " ••• competences which require 
the continual exercise of strategiC judgement concerning individual 
cases which they have never confronted before and for which there 
are no exhaustive rules dictating deciSions to be made. 1I30 
As shown in the discussion of reason in Chapter 2, Section (3), 
emotion is an integral part of engaging in practices. MacMurray 
emphasises the operation of feeling in reasoning: 
lilt is not that our feelings have a secondary and 
subordinate capacity for being rational or irrational. 
It is that reason is primarily an affair of emotion, and 
that the rationality of thought is the derivative and 
secondary one. For if reason is the capacity to act in 
terms of the nature of the object, it is emotion wnlch 
stands directly behind activity determining its substance 
and direction, while thought is related to action indirectly 
and through emotion, determining only its form, and that 
on 1 y pa rt i ally. II 31 
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In order to make sense of situations in education and the world in 
general, it seems necessary to acknowledge the significance of 
emotion in the act of engaging oneself in practices and the only 
understanding possible is by rational feeling, according to MacMurray. 
Even in the simple syllogism (as distinct from the practical 
syllogism) the conclusion is drawn from the premises; the thinker 
must feel that the conclusion is right: "That is, one does something. 
It is ultimately feeling that licenses the inference, in the sense 
that only if one feels the- step to be right does one allow oneself 
to make the ultimate mental move, and only if this feeling is a 
rational feeling is one rationally motivated to make it."32 Emotions 
can be motivating (as argued in Chapter 2) and White may be correct 
to distinguish emotion from motive by the strength of feeling 
involved. If, then, MacttJrray is correct in claiming that, " ••• it 
is emotion which stands di rectly beh ind acti vi ty, II engagement in 
practices should involve those emotions as motives and thereby 
involve the individual·s reasons and emotions in commitment to the 
practice. Further, engagement in practices may well involve social 
or communal acti vi ties because; "We are soci al beings and although 
our personal life is in the end higher and deeper than our social 
life, we need to base it on communal life."33 However, each individual 
who fully lends himself to a practice also finds himself, authentically, 
engaged in an " ••. empathetiC challenging" ••• lito overcome timidi ty 
and take up the risk of his own life."34 His care and concern in 
an orientation of himself towards priorities within the practice 
enable him to meet the standards implicit in the practice, standards 
of process more than product, and to experience enlightenment that 
knowledge of those standards brings. He also has the opportunity 
of authentically shaping those standards once he has got, " .•• the 
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granunar of the activity into his guts," not. "so that he can 
eventually (my emphasis) win through to the stage of autonomy .. 35 
but by exercising personal autonomy in his thought and action by 
direct engagement in a practice. Autonomy is to be gained by 
practice and in practice; it is to be exercised within the means of 
achieving ends; it is not only a facet of an end product. (Discussion 
of reason and standards is presented in Chapter 2, Section (2).) 
Hirst36 considers that Peters IS more recent support for 
practical activities in education still requires justification since 
the transcendental justification of a curriculum of knowledge 'for 
its own sake I (leaving aside its validity) is inappropriate for 
a practical curriculum. However, practice is justifiable on the 
grounds that autonomy could not be exercised in education which was 
not practical. Only by a direct personal involvement in practices 
and a teaching method giving scope to the exercise of personal 
autonomy is autonomy likely to be developed. (Illustration of a 
suitable approach to the exercise of autonomy by pupils in classrooms 
is included in Chapter 9 on aspects of Deweyls perspectives on 
educational practice.) 
White. in Towards a Compulsory Curriculum, argues for putting 
a person in an ideal situation as a result of his education, so that 
knowing what is for his good, he can exercise informed choice 
between alternatives in his life as a whole; the individual, therefore, 
comes to exercise autonomy when hi s education has taken him at 
least, one presumes, beyond his compulsory school years.. Latterly 
Whi te has become di ssati sfied with. " .•• the post-reflecti ve-des i re-
sati sfaction theory of the good 1/ because, " ••• it is hard to see how 
the mature, autonomous chooser ever came to be what he is. If 
affective dispositions .•. have been built into him from his early 
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years, he has been shaped by his educators and is not properly 
autonomous. But an education lacking the acquisition of such 
dispositions is, I now believe, inconceivable. 1I37 Now personal 
autonomy is a disposition (as argued particularly in Chapter 4) and 
only by encouraging its exercise in education is the individual 
likely to be able to exercise this disposition when formal education 
is ended. As a disposition autonomy is not only dependent upon 
breadth or volume of accumulated information; it requires a cast 
of mind developed in an education giving scope to the individual's 
autonomous development by centering education upon his direct 
engagement in worthwhile practices so that in the process of learning 
he comes, increaSingly. to exercise judgement and critical skills 
as key parts of his exercise of personal autonomy. 
One final issue remains; by engaging in practices, the individual 
is able to exercise autonomy, and, further, his personal engagement 
calls for the exercise of the virtues, both intellectual and moral. 
His authentic evaluation of himself within and towards the standards 
that the processes of a practice entail gives him opportunity for 
the exercise of the virtues. And, indeed, engagement in worthwhile 
practices towards the development and exercise of personal autonomy 
reqUires the exercise of the virtues. A person who lends himself, 
authentically, to a practice, and remains faithful to the nature of 
the standards he derives in that practice will evaluate himself in 
relation to the values of that practice. Therefore. a doctor will 
show care and concern in engaging in his practice of curing the 
sick. Although, prior to his training, the future doctor may 
have strong feelings to cure people. his virtues will not actually 
be engaged until he personally embarks on his practice. 
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In schools, educational practices should engage the learners 
who will be enabled to develop the virtues within those practices. 
An intellectual education will put considerable emphasis upon the 
intellectual virtues as Dearden demonstrates38 but all educational 
practices will hold implicit moral virtues too because persons 
are involved in practices and justice and respect for others will 
be implicit. Much educational activity is communal; a school is 
a community and co-operation and sharing in social and intellectual 
ways give scope for the development and exercise of the virtues. 
The virtues thus become a part of the development of the disposition 
of autonomy through the medium of an active engagement by the 
individual in worthwhile practices. 
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(1) Learning how and learning how to learn distinguished 
One implication of the phrase, learning how to learn x, is that 
what a person learns in this respect is less direct or immediate 
than simply learning x when x is the particular knowledge involved. 
To learn how (procedural knowledge) is to learn some means, methods, 
procedures or processes to achieve an end which is to learn x. So, 
in order to learn how to learn x involves an order of learning 
twice removed from x. Thus, in a learning situation: 
0) x = propositional knowledge ("content"); 
(ii) first order learning = how to learn x (procedural knowledge or 
the processes of learning how to do x); 
(iii) second order learning = to learn how to learn x (methods, means 
or procedures required in order to utilise first order procedural 
knowledge or the processes of learning x). 
Second order learning must hold a high degree of transferability or 
generalizability since the implication of learning how to learn may 
be applied to learning how to learn not only x but also y or z etc. 
Psychological research has explored transfer in learning and 
there is evidence showing some transfer is possible. In an article 
first published in 1949 and of seminal importance in this connection, 
H. F. Harlow describes a learning set, the acquisition of which is 
learning to learn or learning to think. 1 From experiments with 
higher primates, Harlow distinguished, " ••• learning how to learn a 
kind of problem 112 as a learning set. Situations of a similar kind, 
frequently encountered enable the transfer of learning within the 
learning set to occur; hence, the acquisition of the learning set 
has the effect of, " ••. converting a problem which is initially 
difficult for a subject into a problem which is so simple as to be 
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immediately solvable. ,,3 -Transfer could occur when controls over 
the experience and difficulty of problems were maintained. G a g n ~ 4 4
has also demonstrated that learning involves the transfer of 
training from component learning sets to a new activity requiring 
the exercise of those capacities which the individual has previously 
acquired. Latterly, Pask5, in experiments involving sixth form 
students, has identified different student learning styles: 
'serialist' or sequential, small-step acquisition of information 
and, 'holist', the acquisition of a global view of an area of 
information. Pask considers that differences in learning style may 
well have major implications for teaching methods and he has further 
tried to show that training in general learning habits enables 
students to learn more effectively. 
The student who is able to exercise some measure of autonomy in 
his learning may well be most likely to enhance this developing 
autonomy if what he learns is judged high in transferability or 
generalizability. And a distinction may be made in this connection 
between learning how to practise as, for example, historian or 
. mathematician and learning how to learn to practise as historian or 
mathematician, since the nature of learning how to do x (first 
order learning) is distinguishable from learning how to learn to do 
x (second order learning). The latter may be more transferable to 
different, but not necessarily all, disciplines of first order, 
procedural learning. However, both first and second order learning 
require practice on the learner's part; he, formally, cannot be a 
passive recipient of procedures and processes of first and second 
order kinds. To be said to have learned requires action on the 
learner's part; he may only reveal that he has learned by doing 
because his learning has been of a procedural nature. 
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The acquisition of the procedures and processes of first order 
learning how calls for the application of second order dispositions 
and skills of learning how to learn making the learner the key, 
active agent in his pursuit of knowledge within the practice in which 
he is engaged. Thus in arguing for the importance of knowledge and 
understanding, Bailey makes the point that neither may be gained 
without the exercise of the skills they entail: 
"Not only can you not have skills, properly speaking, 
without knowledge and understanding ••• but it is also 
nonsense to suppose there to be ~ ~ knowledge and 
understanding that does not invoTVE! t ~ e e appropriate 
exercise of skills ••• To know and to understand ••• 
is to be able to follow and to practise particular 
kinds of investigative procedures, weigh evidence, make judgements and decide what to believe and what not to 
bel ieve. II 6 
Leaving aside here consideration of skills (to be explored in the 
next section) it is the engagement of the learner in the processes 
and procedures of learning how to do x (first order learning) to 
which Bailey refers above. And some have argued, further, that 
the process of learning may, itself, be considered, " ••• the highest 
form of content."7 Knowledge and understanding remain crucial, but 
only first order, procedural knowledge how enables the learner, 
personally, to gain access to that knowledge; "knowledge becomes the 
veh i c Ie rather than the desti nation. 118 
Choice of content for a curriculum and a concern for the relative 
importance of information within information is significant because 
appropriate selection might assist transferability or general1zability 
and Scheffler's view is pertinent here on the economy of subject-
matter: 
II content should have maximum generalizabi Ii ty or transfer 
value. The notion of generalizability is, however, 
ambiguous. Accordingly, two types of subject-matter 
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economy need to be distinguished. First, is there an 
empirically ascertainable tendency for the learning of 
some content to facilitate other learning? Presumably, 
this sort of question was at issue in the controversy 
over classics, and it was discussed in terms of empirical 
studies. Second, is the content sufficiently central 
logically to apply to a wide range of problems? This is 
not a psychological question but one that concerns the 
structure of available knowledge. Nevertheless, it is 
through some such principle of economy, in the logical 
sense, that we decide to teach physics rather than 
meteorology,for instance, where other considerations are 
balanced. 1I 9 
It is not my intention to deny the significance of chOice of content 
for a particular curriculum but this consideration is less central 
to the exercise of personal autonomy in learning than it is, for 
example, to the concept of autonomy which White in Towards a 
Compulsory Curriculum regards as dependent upon particular content 
giving a person breadth of knowledge from which to make autonomous 
choices later as an adult. However for the exercise of autonomy 
within the learning process, any worthwhile practice which admits 
of that exercise and its engagement of the virtues is to be 
considered appropriate. The essential is that learning how to do x 
involves the student in a process of learning enabling him to attain 
expertise in that practice; 
liThe predominant value of a subject lies not so much in 
its accumulated information or in its intellectual 
artifacts, but in its special way of looking at phenomena, 
in its methods of inquiry, its procedures for utilizing 
research, and its models for systematiC thought. II 10 
The exercise of autonomy in the activity of learning is, perhaps, 
similar whatever the level of intellectual attainment of the learner: 
"Intellectual activity anywhere is the same, whether at 
the frontier of knowledge or in the third-grade classroom. 
What a scientist does at his desk, or in the laboratory, 
what a literary critic does in reading a poem are of the 
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same order as what anybody else does when he is engaged in 
like activities - if he is to achieve understanding. The 
difference is in degree not in kind. The schoolboy 
learning physics is a physicist, and it is easier for 
him to learn physiCs behaving like a physicist than 
doing something else. II 11 
Therefore the exercise of autonomy in a school student's learning 
how to act as an historian might require an approach to history 
similar to the questions around which Parker and Rubin suggest a 
curriculum could be constructed -
- What is the discipline of history? 
- What kinds of subject matter (or content) are found in history? 
- What questions does history ask? 
- What is the IIstructure II of history? 
- How does the historian function? 
Within such a framework, students should be actively engaged in 
assessing the reliability of evidence of various kinds for themselves; 
they must seek the truth, detect bias, sift evidence, ask questions, 
draw conclusions on the evidence - as an historian should. The student 
who may learn about the past largely from an account of conclusions 
determined and presented to him by his teacher, Is removed from the 
potential development of judgement and criticism which are part of 
the exercise of autonomy in the practice of history. 
An example of a classroom situation in which the exercise of 
autonomy in students is frustrated is that of Warnock who describes 
how, in her view, a teacher should teach his students the topic of 
the guilt or innocence of Mary Stuart concerning the death of her 
husband, Lord Carnley: 
"Now one thing is certain. Pupils In an ordinary school 
class cannot examine any fresh evidence on this point. 
They cannot even read the secondary sources in detail, 
327 
still less can they go back to contemporary sources. They 
must use evidence which is merely described to them, 
rather than presented in detai 1. II 12 
Now leaving aside whatever is meant by an "ordinary school class", 
any evidence they consider will be "fresh" to them, at any rate. 
However, contrary to Warnock's assertion, there seems no reason why 
the individuals who comprise the class should not, themselves, 
consider primary and secondary sources of evidence, given that 
translation or transcription has made the language accessible. In 
Warnock's outline, the pupils eventually receive from their teacher 
a description of, " ••. what ~ ~ thinks is the most likely account." 
Later, but when they are still in school, Warnock considers, liThe 
more adult they become, and the better their earlier experience of 
arguments, the more capable they will be of weighing the probabilities 
differently. II However, such a maturing of historical scholarship 
seems a doubtful prospect since these pupils are denied the opportunity 
to involve themselves in the processes of learning the practice of 
history and, therefore, of exercising autonomy; they are, by Warnock IS 
account, only to be allowed to sit and listen to their teacher's 
conclusions. He denies his pupils the opportunity for exercising 
intellectual autonomy made possible by their own practice of this 
subject. Attentive listening to the end of absorbing their teacher's 
conclUSions, perhaps fulfilling his expectations (or not) in 
repeating those conclusions in examinations are activities but they 
do not release autonomy within an intellectual practice of history 
since the lesson is merely about past events; the lesson does not 
engage the pupils in the practices of the historian. Unless the 
activity in which pupils are engaged can be shown to be a worthwhile 
practice (in the sense discussed in the previous 
328 
Chapter) and since the example above pertains to be the practice 
of what it is not, this seems doubtful, such activity would fail 
to instantiate autonomy in the pupils. 
If autonomy is to be exercised in learning, a student should 
be involved in learning how to practise x; he should be less involved 
in learning about x. Bruner considers the process involved to be, 
essentially, a constant exercise in problem solving leading to learner 
competence: " •.. what seems to be at work in a good problem-sol ving 
I performance , is some underlying competence in using the operations 
of physics or whatever, and the performance that emerges from this 
competence may never be the same on any two occasions. What is 
learned is competence, not particular performances. II 13 And Bruner 
, 
considers that what has distorted educational practice into little 
more than the passing of conclusions from teacher to student are, 
" •.• wrongly focused theories of learning that lost sight of the 
forest of skilled competence for the trees of perfected performances."14 
Oakeshott's analogy of the 'literature' and 'language' of a 
subject,15 referred to in Chapter 4, is a pertinent illustration in 
connection with learning how in that the 'language I of a practice 
may be considered to be that process of thought which a learner 
generates in his activity of learning the practice's 'literature' 
which are those propositions generally held to be true, constituting 
a body of knowledge. Procedural knowledge how embraces an understanding 
of propositional knowledge that within its procedures for without an 
active engagement of the learner in those processes and procedures 
of first order learning, the individual's opportunity to learn x, 
formally cannot occur, since to learn x is to learn how to do x. 
And I have, further, contended that engagement in the mastery of the 
I language I or procedures of a practice is to enable the learner, in 
some measure, the exercise of personal autonomy in his learning. 
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(2) Learning how to learn 
Learning how to learn x is that second order of learning which 
enables the student to access procedural learning how. Both first 
and second orders of learning enable the learner to practise those 
worthwhile practices which call for the exercise of autonomy and 
the engagement of the virtues. 
Dearden pOints out that, in some sense, students have always had 
to learn how to learn. The traditional classroom in which the 
teacher instructs the pupils requires of them that they listen with 
attention to the teacher's accounts and put aside distractions; 
chastisement inflicted by cane or tawse reinforced pupils in 
learning how to learn. However, Dearden identifies four types of 
learning how to learn in a more current sense. First are information 
skills: use of libraries, classification, content lists, indexes, 
reference texts etc.; second he describes as the acquisition of 
general rules and principles; third is the "logic" of different forms 
of enqui ry-method rather than "mass of facts"; fourth is se If-
management and personal organisation of time for learning. 16 
The third of Dearden's categories has been examined above and 
a distinction drawn between learning how and learning how to learn. 
Dearden's third category does not make this distinction. but I 
would agree that learning how to learn does have a close aSSOCiation 
with learning how. Learning how is the practice which the learner 
must actively engage in to gain understanding of what that practice 
is; learning how to learn to practise the procedures of different 
forms of enquiry is to be achieved by methods complementary to. but 
still distinguishable from learning how itself. Learning how to 
learn may, perhaps, then be restated as, (a) a group of particular 
skills and specific learning abilities, and, (b) appropriate dispositions. 
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(a), Skills and particular learning abilities would embrace 
Dearden's first category of information gathering skills and also 
some of his second category which applies to the use of the 
information gathered; thus the acquisition and practice of reading 
abilities (in Dearden's view) would be involved, for example. This 
element of learning how to learn I shall term, study skills, which 
is intended to mean a range of skills and abilities which may have 
limited transferability between practices (an issue explored below) 
but without which learning how in any particular practice just cannot 
occur. Therefore, in the context of classroom learning, the following 
would be examples of suCh study skills: 
reading for comprehension, 
notemaking from reading, 
notemaking from speech, 
writing essays, 
assessing the usefulness of texts, 
using reference texts, 
locating information, 
tackling assignments, 
using graphs and diagrams, 
revising and retaining information. 
(b), Appropriate dispositions would include much of the 
implication of Dearden's fourth category with which some skills may 
be associated but which perhaps reflects the dispositions of the 
potential learner towards his learning. By his engagement, directly 
and actively, in the process of learning so that the practice is 
meaningful to him. dispositions appropriate in a successful learner 
should be developed. In Dearden's second category of learning how 
to learn he includes the example of moral principles and these would 
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apply to dispositions in the learner in which the virtues engage. 
Learning how to learn, then -
" •.• serves to reflect two di fferent sets of conceptions: 
on the one hand, as studying as the exercise of a 
collection of identifiable skills; on the other, of 
learning as an intensely personal activity characterised 
by a search for meaning and understanding. One conception 
tends to emphasise the acquisition of skills and is concerned 
with means, or techniques; the other tends to emphasise an 
awareness of purpose, and is concerned with ends, and the 
individual's relationship to those ends." 17 
(a) Study skills 
Skills in general are currently in vogue in education,perhaps 
partly, because they seem to express an activity or p\oductive 
capacity of a type which some may see as analogous to that of 
industry and which is increasingly rated by some as important in 
schools in the state maintained sector. Skills may well be significant 
in all learning but they are inseparable from the knowledge and 
understanding of those practices of which first order procedural 
knowledge how and second order learning how to learn are a part. 
State education may, to some extent, have been born out of a 
nineteenth century utilitarianism which put emphasis upon the "three 
R' s" as essential ski lIs, the mastery of which by future employers of 
England's dark SataniC mills was regarded as vital to Britain's 
economiC success, prosperity and expanding democracy. There may be 
fruitful parallels to be drawn by historians and sociologists 
between the nineteenth and latter twentieth centuries here. More 
recently, Bloom has restated the significance of psycho-motor skills 
in his taxonomy. And, currently, educational projects offer "social" 
skills and "life" skills which when explored may only approximate 
to their titles in a very limited way! The Hirstian "forms" of 
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knowledge and understanding (if Hirst's thesis that these are 
epistemologically basic is correct) embrace skills distinct to the 
form; Dearden's reference above to the "logic II of di fferent forms 
of enQuiry as a part of learning how to learn is reflective of skills 
attaching to Hirstian forms. 
However, study (and information) skills are that part of second 
order learning how to learn which enable the learner to achieve 
competence in first order learning how in order to master a practice, 
the result of which is enhancement of understanding. And if study 
skills are divorced from first order learning how, they are divorced 
from the purposes of the learner. A skill may be considered to bring 
mastery, but some procedure must be the object of that mastery. 
Irving lists numerous study skills and seems to refer to these as 
separable from the "content" of knowledge: 
"Of course, balancing subject content and study skills is 
difficult at first because it seems that one or other 
is unfairly dominant ••• Classroom time devoted to the 
aCQuisition of study skills will appear to reduce the 
amount of subject coverage ••• " 18 
Although she regards study skills as means of learning how to learn 
"subject content ", she appears to view means and ends of learning 
as separable. In her analysiS study skills enable the individual to, 
" ••• aCQuire and process subject knowledge more efficiently and 
Quickly than before. 1119 But if study skills are taught, perhaps by 
direct instruction, to students as a separate entity in a curriculum, 
transfer into "subject II work may well be severely limited because 
students may simply fail to recognise their application in different 
contexts. 
Transferability, referred to above in connection with the 
research of Harlow and others, is circumscribed by many factors. 
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Situations of a similar kind are required in which common factors 
operate ... 
transfer 
when the learner is made aware of the possibility of 
The more thoroughly the first task is learned ••• 
Intelligence .•• because more intelligent children and adults are 
more likely to spot the relationship between tasks ... 20 Foss I ike 
Scheffler (above) questions the transferability of some central 
concepts such as might be claimed for classics. 21 It does seem that, 
II •• it looks as if normally, at any rate, it is only when there is 
a marked logical similarity between different contexts that transfer 
will take place. 1I22 Therefore, if study skills are taught separate 
from learning how and the context of the practice involved, the 
student is faced with an excessive p r o ~ l e m m of transfer in order to 
apply the skills in different contexts. And if Hirst Is correct in 
identifying formally distinct areas of knowledge requiring different 
skills, transfer of skills between those areas is impossible. 
Further, if a skill is isolated from those contexts and 
procedures for which it is developed, students may be left with the 
impression that their school curriculum is mainly concerned with 
particular isolated skills; therefore if memory skills are taught 
out of learning contexts, students may be led to regard learning 
to be chiefly concerned with remembering rather than concerned 
with active procedures for seeking understanding. Regular practice 
of study skills in context should make them effective instruments 
of learning how to learn; 8iggs23 found that students in faculties 
of arts and sciences in higher education when offered common study 
skills advice had very different perceptions of that advice and 
considerable difficulty in extracting relevance to themselves because 
they operated in different faculty contexts for learning. 
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In order, therefore, to avoid the difficulty of transfer of a 
study skill into a particular educational practice in the secondary 
school, it may require each teacher to teach for the link of skills 
to the educational practice he pursues with his students. Thus, it 
is for, II ••• teachers in indi vidual subjects to orient part of thei r 
teaching towards the development of the study ski 11s reQui red by 
particular courses. 1I24 Reading may, then, be enhanced by activities 
attaching to the context of the reading and this skill attaches to 
a very wide range of procedural knowledge and "content". And much 
of such "content" is not easily acquired other than through this 
skill!25 However, access, through read.ing, to a range of "cognitive 
content" should not be regarded as a means of learning simply by 
easy application of a universal study skill. Reading should be 
appropriate to the context in which it is used. Therefore, as 
Dearden indicates,26(accepting Hirst's distinctions in knowledge) 
effective reading implies different things in different modes of 
thought and cannot simply be expressed as a mastery of a technique 
such as SQ3R. (It should, however, be acknowledged that SQ3R may 
be an appropriate technique in a variety of situations.) 
(b) Dispositions 
Peters's view on the Schools Council Humanities Curriculum 
Project as one of the few attempts to devise a coherent curricular 
approach to linking understanding in crucial areas with autonomy 
was stated in Chapter 7. In this learning context, the student is 
enabled to make judgements and authentically evaluate and develop 
his perspectives on controverSial issues. He may come to care about 
his activity of learning; it may be illuminated with meaning for 
him by his consciousness of himself as a being in a relationship to 
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the world. Peters, himself, is deeply concerned about the values 
within education in a way which distinguishes the essence of that 
care and concern from any analysis of knowing how or knowing that: 
"It is, as Socrates and Plato argued, intimately connected 
with caring about something and does not seem to be a 
case either of 'knowing how' or 'knowing that' which 
are the usual al ternati ves offered." 27 
Learning how to learn may well be meaningless if considered to be 
only a set of skills. It may well only be when the individual 
reaches a depth of understanding and a care to achieve such depths in 
sharpening his awareness of his relationship to learning that 
learning how to learn may be fully realised; only then will his 
disposition be influenced to ensure that he uses the skills to 
pursue the educational practice with which he is engaged. 
Empirical research in Higher Education has identified students 
having "deep" or "surface" approaches to learning. 28 The former 
searches for meaning in learning, using study skills intelligently 
in the procedures of the practice with which he is engaged. The 
student having a "surface" approach operates more by rote-learning; 
memory has a high priority in a generally rigid and mechanical 
style. The student with a "deep" approach to learning may well 
question what he encounters and consider evidence in an open-minded 
way before drawing his own conclusions. The "surface" approach may 
be unduly examination conscious in its concentration on rote-learning 
and recall, without, perhaps,ever reaching full understanding. 
The development of a "deep" approach to learning reflects the 
learner's disposition to his learning and the person who fully learns 
how to learn finds purpose and meaning in his learning as he controls 
the process. A learner's disposition to his learning and his 
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orientation of himself in finding a depth of meaning for him as 
distinct from meaning for any other individual has a likely bearing 
upon schools as well as in Higher Education. Schools give scope for 
feedback between teachers and particularly older students in a very 
direct and confined environment and it should be the purpose of all 
teachers to enable their students to develop the most suitable 
dispositions to learning and this may well require effort to inculcate 
that depth of awareness towards learning which enables the learner 
to come to care for his learning and learn, fully, how to learn. 
(3) Autonomy and learning how to learn 
Within curriculum activities, learning how to learn may seem 
to have a particularly close connection with autonomy. The application 
of learning how to learn in schools recognises individudl and 
social changes which spur the development of the individual Child. 
Reference was made in Chapter 5 to the evidence of the Crowther 
Report concerning the acceleration of biological development of the 
young, attributed, increaSingly, to dietary changes - sometimes 
expressed in the blunt economic determinist terms of Feuerbach as: 
man is what he eats. The young are described as more influenced by 
and responsive to immediate and often controversial issues such as 
sexual relationships and politics in a society of rapid change 
littered with uncertainties concerning employment and the future in 
general. In contrast to the 1930 ls and 140lS, the 180 ls may be seen 
as a state of social and technological flux. And the implications 
of individual physiological changes and rapid technological change 
generate repercussions in society and in education where, " .•• the 
mobile and fluctuating nature of new knowledge and occupations has 
led to the idea that the methods of learning are more useful than 
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the content of knowledge (although of course there can be no methods 
without a minimum of content) ••• 1129 
A student who learns how to learn may also be engaged (within 
the same process) in the exercise of autonomy, albeit within the 
framework of a compulsory education. Indeed, if a student does not 
enjoy that scope in learning activities which learning how to learn 
affords so that the educational practice is closed to his exercise 
of autonomy, the result may be that, II ••• the pupil's intellectual 
and moral activity remains heteronomous because bound to 
uninterrupted s t i m u l a ~ i o n n by the teacher, which can itself become 
unconscious or, on the other hand, freely accepted. 1I30 
Autonomy's links with learning how to learn have been 
characterised as reflecting a relationship of means to ends. In 
an analysis of curriculum aims and objectives, Sockett describes 
different types of relationships of means to ends, two of which he 
describes as: 
Illogically consti tuti ve where the means are a part of 
the end, logically constitutive where the means are an 
instantiation of the end." 31 
The former statement Sockett illustrates by the affirmative, II will I, 
in the marriage service. This is not merely a statement of 
intention to marry but, also, and more significantly, a logically 
necessary statement which is, as a statement in context, actually 
to marry someone; it is a "logical constituent ll of marrying. The 
latter statement is illustrated by Sockett in the example of one who 
seeks political power. By becoming a Cabinet Minister he attains 
such power and has it by the nature of that Cabinet post which is, 
in itself, an instantiation of power. Dearden32 amalgamates Sackettls 
two statements, above, in indicating that learning how to learn is 
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a "partial instantiation" of autonomy. Autonomy may, then, be 
both exercised and developed by the activity of learning how to 
learn in educational practices involving the individual in 
acquisition of procedural knowledge and understanding of the 
propositions he integrates into his own learning. 
Learning how to learn as an instantiation of autonomy in 
educational practices is unlikely to be easily achieved given the 
nature of it as a particular disposition towards learning underlying 
the range of skills entailed. Indeed, presenting learners with a 
model of the student who has, fully, learned how to learn may even 
deter actual students since they may feel inadequate in comparison 
with such a model. Gibbs33 considers that students can only be 
brought to change their perspectives of learning activities slowly 
because fundamental purposes are at stake in learning. Therefore, 
he maintains that the individual student should be helped to 
re-appraise his own processes of learning so as to attain a clearer 
realisation of purpose and practice for only when he achieves such 
a perspective will he be able to reconstruct for himself his approach 
to learning. Gibbs draws upon Kelly34 and ROgers35 for his 
rrethodology: 
Without labouring the pOint, I believe people construct 
their own worlds. New constructions, new understandings 
and ways of seeing things, are based on existing 
constructions and ways of seeing things. I do not see how 
a person's understanding can significantly develop without 
involving their existing conceptions ••• 11 36 
The learner's autonomy is recognised by this approach involving a 
student-centred reappraisal of self in connection with purpose and 
practices of learning. In learning how he can learn, the student 
also learns, " ••• how to cope with change that requires new rreanings 
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to be made. 1I37 Therefore, for the adolescent undergoing physiological 
change in a rapidly changing society, learning how to learn provides 
a flexible means of learning and also an instantiation of his 
autonomy. 
(4) Learning how, learning how to learn and teaching 
Learning how and learning how to learn have implications for 
teaching in, apparently, requiring a different function from a 
teacher than may other kinds of learning. One perspective on 
teaching in connection with learning how to learn is that of 
c. R. Rogers to whom Gibbs partly attributes the approach to learn1ng 
which he has developed. Rogers's approach is discussed in (a) 
below. Section (b) describes other aspects of teaching and learning 
how to learn. 
(a) C. R. Rogers's Freedom to Learn 
C. R. Rogers's in Freedom to Learn 38 and more recently in 
Freedom to Learn for the '80's39 expresses a major concern for what 
he describes as learning how to learn in a rapidly changing society 
in which knowledge is also changing: 
liThe one thing I can be sure of is that the physics 
which I taught to the present day student will be 
outdated in a decade •.• The so-called 'facts of history' 
depend very largely upon the current mood and temper 
of the culture. II 40 
Sociology, chemistry, biology, genetics will, "almost certainly be 
modified by the time the student gets around to using the knowledge. II 
As a result, "teaching and the imparting of knowledge" are pOintless 
because of such rapid change. Rogers's solution to this "state of 
flux" is to enable the individual to note the changes, thus: 
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liThe only man who is educated is the man who has 
learned how to learn; the man who has learned how to 
adapt to change; the man who has realised that no 
knowledge is secure, that only the process of seeking 
knowledge gives a basis for security. II 41 
It is, then, crucial to rely on, "process rather than upon static 
knowledge II . 
Although Rogers does not altogether clarify what he understands 
by "process" and "learning how to learn", it is clear that he 
envisages a mode of active and, in some respects, self-directed 
learning, in which personal relationships between the learners and 
those who enable that learning to occur are considered fundamentally 
important. Rogers considers that "teacher" is a term synonymous 
with "instructor ll or, "imparter of knowledge and skill II and this 
role is inadequate for the function of teaching which Rogers Is 
seeking; therefore he scraps his definition of teacher as instructor 
and adopts instead IIfaci Ii tator of learning ". The personal qual i ties 
of the facilitator are immeasurably important in learning how to 
learn. These qual i ties comprise: "realness II when the facil i tator 
comes, II ••. into a direct personal encounter with the learner, meeting 
him on a person-to-person basis. It means that he is being himself, 
not denying himself. 1I42 The facilitator also "prizes ll the learner -
" .•• his feelings, his opinions, his person. It is a caring for 
the learner ..• ,,43 There must al so be IItrust II and "empathic 
understanding II between teacher-faci li tator and learner-
"When the teacher has the abi li ty to understand the 
student's reactions from the inside, has a sensitive 
awareness of the way the process of education and learning 
seems to the student, then again the likelihood of 
signi flcant learmng is increased. II 44 
In order to achieve successful relationships with students, Rogers 
considers it necessary for the teacher to be llgenuine ll , "honest" and 
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"real" about himself. He must expose and express his real feel ings 
to his students in a natural, open and genuine manner. 
Conrnent 
Rogers wants to bring about learning - by learning how to learn. 
His intention in this respect is, therefore, the same as that of any 
teacher who might be undertaking direct, formal instruction of a 
class. However if Rogers regards knowledge as so subject to change 
as he appears to do, there would seem little incentive to learn x 
when x may have become y or z when the learner gets round to using 
it. As R. S. Peters pOints out, " ••• what is the point ••• of 
equipping people to seek knowledge, if no value is to be accorded to 
its aCQuisi tion?"45 Rogers indicates that given the rapid changes 
in knowledge (and his examples above include social sciences and 
sciences, if not the arts) instruction into knowledge is almost sure 
to be redundant within a short space of time. However, if the 
acquisition of knowledge involves seeking to distinguish propositions 
which are held to be true at some point In time, such propositions 
must be distinguishable from t ~ o s e e which may be shown to be false. 
There would be no point in seeking knowledge at all if the difference 
between propositions remained completely relative; students, teachers, 
facilitators of learning, schools, colleges, universities would 
lose all relevance. 46 
However, Rogers does intend learning to occur, but this is only 
possible, he infers, by the active engagement of freeing the student 
by learning how to learn. But learning how to learn does entail 
learning how to learn x and both first and second order learning is 
intended to facilitate learning x (as discussed above). Therefore, 
at the point in time at which it is learned, knowledge and under-
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standing, which are a part of the process of learning as well as 
the product of that learning, must be held to be true or no 
propositions could be held to be true and no process of learning, 
entailing and representing the acquisition of knowledge and under-
standing, would be worthwhile. (There is no attempt to analyse 
knowledge by Rogers, who is obviously concerned principally with 
methods but his examples describe school or higher education 
situations of learning in subjects forming part of a, not unusual, 
curriculum. )47 
I believe Rogers is correct to stress the importance of first 
order process of learning and second order learning how to learn 
and he is correct also to emphasise a link with student autonomy 
in relation to such learning. However, it may well not be certain 
that all knowledge can be acquired by the methods he advocates since 
this is an empirical matter and Rogers attempts no systematic 
analysis of differences in types of knowledge. It also remains 
uncertain as to the extent to which learning how and learning how 
to learn change over time in differing Circumstances of social, 
intellectual or technological kinds. Nevertheless, Rogers, I believe, 
is correct in emphasising the importance of learning how to learn, 
but his method of achieving this in students requires further 
consideration. 
"Teaching", in Rogers's account is regarded by him as "instruction" 
which, in turn, he considers synonymous with lito impart knowledge 
and skill"; he considers, "Teaching is, for me, a relatively 
unimportant and vastly overvalued activity.1I48 R. S. Peters is 
sceptical of these unexplored dictionary terms as meaningful with 
regard to the nature of teaching and pOints out that Rogers's books 
are themselves instructing. Furthermore, if students are actively 
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and self-directedly engaged in the process of learning, they may be 
placing themselves under instruction by watching video film or 
following computer programmed learning and these activities are 
applauded by Rogers: 
IIWhen learning is being faci Ii tated, the student wi 11 
frequently come across gaps in his knowledge, tools 
which he lacks, information which he needs to meet the 
problem he is confronting. Here the flexibility of 
programmed instruction is invaluable. A pupil who needs 
to know how to use a microscope can find a programme 
covering this knowledge. II 49 
The French student can, similarly, have IIprogrammed instruction in 
conversational French II ; algebra can be learned along the same lines. 
What is not clear is why instruction by an expert in a branch of 
knowledge to induct individuals or groups into these activities is 
taboo when programmed, machine-learning is sound because although 
Rogers's examples are of self-administered instruction, they are 
still instructional and someone has had to write these programmes. 
And although some learning may well be facilitated by the availability 
of programmed learning, to deny the usefulness of a living expert 
in what might be a o n e - t o - o ~ ~ situation of instruction seems 
inconsistent. 
Peters makes the point that instructing and imparting are 
regarded as in contrast to each other as Oakeshott maintains. SO The 
information component of knowledge, in Oakeshott's analysis, requires 
instruction because facts are, IIspeci fic, impersonal and mostly to 
be taken on trust. 1151 However, in order to be able to use 
information, judgement is required to apply the rule-like c h ~ r a c t e r r
of facts. This developing judgement in the learner is what can 
only be imparted by teacher to student. The imparting of judgement 
in the use of information is a subtle thing and Oakeshott writes 
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persuasively about the differences in the "style" of the imparter. 
" ••• not to detect a man's style ••• is to have shut oneself off from 
the ability to convey any but the crudest meanings. IIS2 Imparting 
judgement may. indeed. be more important than the application of the 
rules of factual information because. as Oakeshott indicates, 
information may be applied without the implicit rules being known 
in some cases, so that in language or art the rules exist but they 
may not tell us how to do these things. Therefore, some aspects and 
areas of knowledge may not be accessible solely by student directed 
learning of first order, learning how or second order, learning how 
to learn kinds. Only the imparting of judgement in use of 
information may ultimately lead to knowledge and understanding in 
some areas of learning. 
This imparting of judgement in the use of information can only 
be accomplished "obliquely", in Oakeshott's description. The style 
of the imparter and the. virtually, empathiC awareness between 
learner and imparter is crucial in conveying judgement. The learner 
will only learn how to develop the skills and capacity for judgement 
when he has learned, "... to listen for them and to recogn 1 se them 
in the conduct and utterances of others."S3 The example of the 
thought, word and deed of the teacher as imparter of judgement is 
an intrinSiC part of the relationship between teacher and student. 
It is an empirical matter to determine whether the imparter 
function of Oakeshott's teacher could operate without many of the 
personal qualities of the facilitator of learning in evidence. 
Those personal qualities referred to above - realness. being himself 
with his students, prizing, trusting, having empathic understanding 
with them should be part of a facilitator-learner relationship and 
without these qualities, it may be impossible for that imparting of 
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judgement of which Oakeshott writes. to occur. It is true that 
Rogers has introduced a new name, facilitator of learning, but the 
complementary features of Oakeshott's awareness of the human 
Qualities flowing when judgement in using knowledge is imparted 
by example are also apparent in the facilitator-learner relationship. 
Although Rogers may see the faCilitator in a less active role in 
the learning relationship to that of Oakeshott's teacher-imparter 
(and this is by no means certain as the Barkham example below suggests) 
both give a human context for learning in which care, warmth and 
genuine respect flow. 
Peters is critical of Rogers's view that the relationship 
between facilitator and learner should be a personal one because if 
the facilitator views the relationship as one which will faCilitate 
learning, it ceases to be a personal relationship and becomes a 
role relationship as any teacher-student relationship would. in 
some measure. be. Rogers fails to grasp that: 
" •.• being a facilitator of learning is just as much 
a role relationship as instructing and that what makes 
an action a performance of a role is the aspect under 
which it is v i e ~ d d by the agent.1/ 54 
Undoubtedly the facilitator occupies a very positive role in the 
learning situation in Rogers's view. He certainly should not 
abandon his students to get on with their learning without him. 
Rogers describes Barkham's attempt at facilitating learning how to 
learn in a university SCience course. 55 This facilitator allowed 
a group of students a high degree of self-directed learning and left 
the group to make decisions without his leadership. One student 
duly took over the leader's role. Rogers criticises Barkham because 
he did not regard the course as his own as well as his students' 
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course. And Rogers recollects standing. metaphorically. aside in 
planning a course himself - with disappointing results; " ••• the 
error was made out of an excess of zeal in trusting others. What 
I failed to do was to trust myself to be a useful member of the group. 
Thus I cheated them of what I might have contributed. ,,56 EVidently 
a facilitator can have too much trust in his students' powers of. 
self-directedly, learning how to learn and Rogers sees the need 
for group leadership skills in the facilitator. Perhaps had a 
teacher taught (by the most appropriate methods) the curriculum 
processes of first order learning how. coupled with second order 
learning how to learn. the students might have fared much better. 
In Rogers's example. although he maintains that role relationships 
-are misguided and personal relationships must exist between 
facilitator and learners, it does appear from the above example that 
the teacher involved did notexercise his ~ ~ of facilitator - as 
group leader, effectively enough. 
However, roles may only be of significance when the powers, 
duties and responsibilities of the role are exercised; these can 
only be exerci sed by a person and the manner and "style II in wh ich 
they are exercised are measures of that person. Those who seek 
teaching posts in schools are interviewed by men and women who 
attempt to select the best fit of person to role - an immensely 
difficult task given the nature of the work involved. However, if 
the person and the role do not complement each other making the fit 
of person to role incompatible, the job is unlikely to be done well. 
Rogers stresses the vital importance of the personal qualities 
of the facilitator of learning. He must have genuine concern and 
regard for the learner and 'he must express care. trust and esteem 
in word and deed. No person is likely to be able to act out a role 
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expressing such care indefinitely; person and role must be as 
compatible as nature allows. And Peters agrees that the teacher-
facilitator should, " ••. from time to time, just respond to his 
pupils as fellow human beings. This response is something that is 
valuable in its own right. IIS7 
Rogers describes the methods of enabling students to learn how 
to learn out of the facilitator-student relationship. These methods 
involve: organisation of resources for student use, student contracts, 
small group work, simulation, self-assessment and evaluation by 
students. And I would agree that much of this has a place in 
learning how to learn. However, a great deal of empirical evidence 
would be required to show that this approach might serve all 
requirements of learning given the great breadth of what could, and 
should be learned - which encompasses moral values as well as 
knowledge and understanding in general. 
Essentially, it requi res the judgement of the teacher to 
determine the most suitable approach to fit the circumstances of 
particular learning in particular intellectual and social contexts. 
Learning how to learn has a significant place, but it may well not 
be a cure-all! And as argued in Chapters 4 and 6 on authority and 
paternalism, the development of personal autonomy need not be 
considered incompatible with either of the concepts. However, 
throughout this thesis it has been maintained that the exercise and 
development of the right dispositions in the young are crucial to 
autonomy and Rogers's methods may, in some Circumstances, prove 
effective in the development of these dispositions. 
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(b) Other considerations concerning learning how to learn and teach ing 
Chapter 9, following, illustrates the opportunity for the 
exercise of autonomy in classrooms. But external 
contraints in learning situations were outlined in Chapter 5 and 
only very limited possibilities for negative freedom in classrooms 
seem possible. However. learning how to learn should result in a 
greater competence in the learner to control his learning and 
although it is not my intention to undertake an excursus into 
teaching in general. some implications and Qualif1cat10ns for teaching 
in connection with learning how to learn, aside from the views of 
C. R. Rogers. are considered below. 
Teaching may be described as task or achievement. following 
Rylels distinction between task and achievement verbs. 58 In the 
task sense, teaching may be considered to have occurred when an 
activity is engaged in and an effort will be made to get A to learn 
x, but this task may fail for reasons, perhaps. beyond the control 
of the one attempting the teaching. Furthermore, A may learn y in 
spite of someone IS efforts to teach him x. Thus reading what an 
author has written may teach x to A. although the efforts and 
ingenuity of Ais class teacher may fail. 
In the achievement sense. teaching requires that the teacher 
has an outcome of his teaching in mind before he undertakes the 
task: "A task is only understood by an agent in tenns of what could 
count as a successful upshot for him. ,,59 Therefore, trying to 
teach x to A is not necessarily the same as to teach x to A in that 
an attempt to teach may fail in outcome. Similarly. by saying that. 
"I was selling cars all day but no one was buying them", I really 
mean, "I was tryi ng to se 11 cars ••• etc. u60 
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Freeman argues for teaching to be regarded as a 'perficiency' 
(after J. L. Austin) since perficiency verbs may be used indicating 
intention or non-intention in the sense that: 
U'By doing P, A was x-ing 8' where 8 is a person, x is 
the perficient verb (as distinguished from an activity 
verb) and some condition in 8 1s the perficient outcome. 
The criterion for judging the truth or falsity of a 
perficience claim is whether or not the outcome implied in 
8 has been brought about through A's action. Thus unlike 
actions, activities and performances, perflciences may 
be intentional or unintentional." 61 
It may be in this perficiency sense that teaching's relationship 
to learning how to learn must be regarded since the teacher will, 
apparently, have less control of student learning outcomes than he 
might have in other kinds of teaching. Nevertheless, I would agree 
that there should be the strongest. intentions concerning learning 
outcomes on the teacher's part because they will involve first 
order learning how, second order learning how to learn and the 
knowledge and understanding entailed. The learning situation will 
invol ve much more than one of di rect instruction alone. Rogers, 
himself, points out the danger of the teacher withdrawing from the 
learning situation (in the example of 8arkham's science group). 
However, some Qualifications on Rogers's enthusiasm are required. 
In learning how to learn x, the student will be actively 
engaged in learning processes and be, himself, a practitioner of 
those processes; he may well, then, be interested and motivated 
to learn because he is actively committed. However, it may also 
be unlikely that any curriculum framework of knowledge in the 
secondary school will provide, in all circumstances, matter of 
intrinsic or instrumental interest to all. And it may be considered 
essential during at least some of the earlier years of secondary 
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education for a student's experience to be expanded by breadth of 
knowledge; a teacher's authority, control and direction are likely 
to be required to ensure this breadth of experience is able to 
help inform the student's later personal autonomy as an adult. 
Furthermore, although students should learn more about using 
sources of information and also develop a wide range of transferable 
skills, understanding is the ultimate intention arising from the 
knowledge considered. Understanding required abilities of a 
subtle kind such as good judgement (referred to in Oakeshott's 
.views above), criticism in handling information and awareness of the 
limits and implications of the medium employed. In order to 
facilitate understanding, the teacher may well need to reserve 
judgement and seek for an impartial style in his approach to Questions 
of value in order that his students develop confidence to draw their 
own conclusions from the evidence and develop their critical 
faculties. He should then be an expert in a body of knowledge and 
be up-dated in his own research ensuring that students are aware 
that learning has its own disciplines of mind and that the acquisition 
of knowledge and understanding requires a mastery of these. 
Learning with peers in small groups may be more apparent in 
learning how to learn Situations. but it is also virtually certain 
that direct instruction and explanation will retain a function in 
the t e ~ c h e r ' s s repertoire - dependent upon a topic's requirements. 
Essentially. the teacher committed to learning how to learn 
wants students to develop a "deep" approach and a keen sense of 
purpose in their learning. Growing maturity of judgement and powers 
of criticism should arise and should be nurtured by him as his 
students involve themselves in processes of learning. Empirical 
investigation might find that left too much to themselves in learning 
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how to learn, the process may become monotonous for them In a 
never ending information search without the achievement of that 
depth of understanding which comprises the point of learning how to 
learn. The teacher, then, must give his students scope to learn 
and encourage them to draw conclusions with good judgement so that 
they become less dependent in learni ng upon the "author! tati ve 
utterance", and develop a "realisation that there is appropriate 
evidence and argument independent of the erstwhile authority, and 
which, indeed, can be turned against that author1ty.1I62 
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Introduction 
In the preceding two chapters it is argued that to engage in 
the kinds of practice there described involves the individual 
learner in a kind of practical education. One end of such direct 
individual engagement in these practices is the exercise of personal 
autonomy and development of that autonomy towards 1ts greater 
expression in adulthood and practical life in general. In order 
for autonomy to be exercised in the learning process. an active. 
personal engagement in the practices descr1bed was argued to be 
an imperative, thereby according the learner a significant and even 
directing influence upon the learning which occurs. It may then seem 
that the exercise of autonomy by the individual learner leads to a 
IIprogressive ll or child-centred perspective in education. 
However, engagement in practices in which learner autonomy Is 
exercised can be very different from the emphasis sometimes given 
to a learner's negative freedom in the classroom attributed to a 
child-centred perspective and criticised in Chapter 5. Of child-
centred theorists. Dewey presents a perspective upon child-centredness 
only with considerable reservations concerning both knowledge. what 
is to be learned and the nature of the teaching to be employed. 
Dewey's emphasis upon the practical in education also. at least 
partly, accords with the emphasis upon the practices of education 
outlined in the previous two chapters. However, the nature of practice 
described there as practices embracing the exercise of autonomy in 
learning is broader than the emphasis upon the practical in Dewey 
where problem-solving on a scientific model predominates and other 
practices seem to be largely omitted such as literature and those 
practices which generally involve aesthetic considerations.' 
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This concluding chapter recognises the importance of knowledge 
but also aims to illustrate a via media of educational practice 
between a child-centredness in which the child figures as the agent 
of his own learning and a largely directed activity of education or 
training in which the individual is denied the exercise of autonomy 
and receives information from teacher or instructor leaving the 
learner a non-participant in those practices which comprise that 
education. Dewey presents some insights into a via media in which 
learner autonomy is exercised within educational practices but 
only within particular limits; Dewey resisted, " ••• external direction 
and imposition, but insisted on the importance of external approval 
and encouragement. He thus achieved some kind of reconciliation 
between the progressi ve and traditional views of teaching • .,2 
Dearden's views on child-centred aims are shown largely in 
contrast to Dewey's in what follows. 
The sections of this chapter comprise: 
(1) Dewey, Dearden and aims; 
(2) Process and content in learning practices; 
(3) Autonomy in the classroom. 
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(1) Dewey, Dearden and aims 
To aim at a target literally involves a marksman sighting 
his weapon at a target, preparing that weapon to discharge in 
order to hit the target when the bullet is fired. The 
careful aim of the marksman should enable the process of firing to 
ensure the bullet hits the target accurately. But hitting the target 
is only likely if the process of firing is smoothly and expertly 
accomplished and a true aim established. And circumstances may well 
influence the end result: the marksman may be myopic; his hands 
may tremble at the prospect of splitting the apple; wind direction 
may affect the flight etc. with the result that however well sighted 
the original aim, the target is missed. Aim, process and end result 
require the closest continuity if the aim is to be accomplished. 
In Dewey's view, aims in education may be meaningless b e ~ a u s e e
of the time lapse between establishing an aim and achieving the end. 
Means to the end and the end itself must be complementary and closely 
aligned if the aim is to be true: 
"Given an activity having a time span and cumulative 
growth within the time succession, an aim means foresight 
in advance of the end or possible termination ••• it is 
nonsense to talk about the aim of education - or any other 
undertaking where conditions do not permit of foresight 
of results, and do not stimulate a person to look ahead 
to see what the outcome of a gi ven acti vi ty is to be." 3 
Dewey's reference to foresight includes, " ••• careful observation 
of the given conditions to see what are the means available for 
reaching the end ••• ", a proper order 1n the application of means and 
a choice of alternatives. 4 This emphasis upon a limited time span 
from aim to end with a proper sequence determining the means 1n the 
closest association with aims and ends is of educational significance. 
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Dewey disparages a distancing of means and ends so that, in his 
view, an aim is no more than a " ••• mere tentative sketch "; it 
cannot be externally applied and must grow out of actual, lived 
situations. The external imposition of an aim leaves it "fixed" 
with the means for its accomplishment regarded as no better than 
"unaVOidable", a "necessary evil". 
To hold personal autonomy (about which Dewey says virtually 
nothing directly) as an end of the educational process when learner 
autonomy is removed from the learning situation may be an aim 
unrealistic in practice. Only exercise of autonomy as part of the 
means of that situation by individual engagement in the practices 
involved may achieve the aim of developing autonomy in the learner. 
If autonomy is distanced from its exercise altogether there seems 
little likelihood of it ever gaining psychological reality in the 
individual. 
However, aims·in child-centred education are usually discussed 
in relation to young children ( Dewey's chief. but not exclusive 
focus of interest) although Dearden and Wilson, from different view-
points, have considered the extension of Child-centred curricular 
practice into the secondary school age range.5 Young children are 
a considerable distance in time from adulthood and. therefore, Dewey's 
reservations about the external imposition of aims by adults who 
express a model of adult life to which children should be made 
to conform, seem more justifiable. And his reservations about the 
feasibility of having foresight necessary to realise long-term aims 
distanced from means and ends may carry greater conviction when young 
persons a ~ ~ involved. 
Nevertheless, Dewey, at least implicitly, does seem to have 1n 
mind some kind of long-term aim within the educational process. He 
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is directly concerned to avoid teaching which handles information 
in a way remote from the experience of the child but he is equally 
certain that a framework of "subject matter" should be constructed 
by the adult teacher for. " ••• The problem of teaching is to keep 
the experience of the student moving in the direction of what the 
expert al ready knows ... 6 The perspecti ve of the infonned and broadly 
educated adult is what Dewey wants the child to acquire and the. 
" ••. larger range of perception of the adult is of great value 1n 
observing the abi Ii ties and weaknesses of the young. ,,7 A concept of 
a particular kind of adulthood appears to be held by Dewey. Stnce 
he is concerned for the child to expand his experience from the 
pOint he has reached by, to some extent, allowing him chOice in his 
own learning. the result of enlarging his experience will culminate 
in adulthood where breadth of knowledge from his education should 
enable him to make choices of major significance to his life as a 
whole. Dewey seems. implicitly, to anticipate personal autonomy 
in the adult resulting from the educational process wh1ch he advocates. 
therefore. 
However, he has considerable reservations about too rapid 
progress to force adult thinking and concepts in children before 
their experience enables them to understand these because: 
" ••• it is one thing to use adult accomplishments as a 
context in which to place and survey the doings of 
childhood and youth; it is quite another to set them 
up as a fixed aim without regard to the concrete activities 
of those educated." 8 
But the activities of children within educat·ion must be directed by 
aims and purposes and Dewey is concerned to avoid unthinking. aimless 
activity because humans lack instinct for their activities unlike 
other creatures: "It is equally fatal to an aim to permit capricious 
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or discontinuous action in the name of spontaneous self-expression.,,9 
Foresight of the end. of hitting the target. in short-term aims 
is crucial to intelligent activity in the education of children. 
therefore. And Dewey writes disapprovingly of. " ••• cases in which 
children are surrounded with objects and materials and then left 
entirely to themselves." 10 He regards this as simply stupid. 
Dewey. then. disapproves as strongly as Dearden of such practices 
described by the latter as an abstractionist model of discovery 
learning where children are left to explore materials which the 
teacher leaves available. such as Cuisenaire rods or Dienes blocks, 
on the assumption that the child will, somehow. abstract the concepts 
without further help using only the apparatus, rndeed. particularly in a 
later work, Experience and Education, Dewey roundly condemns teachers 
and schools which do not give purpose to the process of learning and 
which :. 
II tend to make little or nothing 6f organised subject 
matter of study; to proceed as if any form of direction 
or guidance by adults were an invasion of individual 
freedom, and as if the idea that education should be 
concerned with the present and future meant that 
acquaintance with the past has little or no role to 
play in education." 11 
A breadth of awareness of the past cultural achievements of 
society is an important part of the purposes of ~ d u c a t 1 0 n n 1n the 
development of children who are future adults. although. as Dewey 
stipulates, they should not be treated as adults when they are st111 
children. The selection of what experiences are deSirable for the 
child is made by the adult on the child's behalf, in Dewey's view, 
because, II ••• The be lief that all genuine education comes about 
through experience does not mean that all exper1ences are genuinely 
or equally educative ..• For some experiences are mis-educative. "12 
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Concern for the long-term future of the child is paramount here. 
Any experience which arrests or distorts future experience making 
for IIcallousness II, lack of sensiti vi ty, automatic unthinking responses 
tending to reduce the individual's control over his own life and 
future choices, is to be avoided. And, as argued in Chapter 6, 
experience which may reduce future capacity for the exercise of 
personal autonomy by the adult should be proscribed by strong 
paternalist intervention in the interest of preserving the individual's 
future autonomy. Wilson also echoes the concern for assessing the 
meri ts of various kinds of experience for the child: " ••• a teacher 
who stands back and just allows children to pursue whatever interests 
come into thei r heads is practi sing ••• a travesty of child-
centrednes s. " 13 
Dewey holds fast to aims and purposes - "an end view" of the 
process of learning - and he regards the child's wants. "impulse" 
and "desire" as matters to be held In check by adult foresight 
because if desire in the child is very strong it will remove the 
perspective of what consequences may follow: liThe crucial educational 
problem is that of procuring the postponement of immediate action 
upon desire until observation and judgement have lntervened."14 
Dewey places great importance upon the function of the teacher to 
determine that the purpose of the activity is suitable to the 
experience of his pupils; the teacher initiates purpose and activity 
because, II ••• the suggestion upon which pupils act must in any case 
come from somewhere. It is impossible to understand why a suggestion 
from one who has a larger experience and a wider horizon should not 
be at least as valid as a suggestion coming from some more or less 
accidental source. 1I15 The teacher must use the child's experience 
and develop from it more organised and enlarged perspectives because, 
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in Dewey1s account, the teacher is the significant determiner of 
the direction of the child's learning activity and the teacher's 
adult perspective and breadth of knowledge enable him to form the 
concept of what the child should become. This concept must be that 
of the future adult chooser, the status which Dewey. implicitly. 
attributes to the teacher who acts on the child's behalf. It Is the 
teacher who is, II ••• concerned to have a long look ahead ••• obliged 
to see his present work in terms of what it accomplishes. or fails 
to accompl ish, for a future whose objects are linked wi th those of 
the present. 1116 
Given. then. Dewey's misgivings about disorganised, unintelligent 
activity and his emphasis upon the importance of using the teacher's 
longer-term perspective. authority and experience in ensuring both 
purpose in classroom learning and that the child's learning moves 
in the direction of what the expert knows, personal autonomy should 
be both a short-term and long-term aim of education and central to 
the teacher's perspective. In Dewey's account, the teacher is not 
only the stage-manager of his pupils' learning; he Is more a 
producer, or. on occasions, a director of learning. A measure of 
autonomy is allowed the pupil in pursuit of learning and even, In 
some measure. in the choice of activity dependent upon the age of 
the child or young person. But the teacher's wider perspective and 
breadth of knowledge of the practices in which both he and the 
learner are invol ved are part of what the teacher represents to the 
learner and the teacher's task is to involve the learner in sharing 
his wider perspective. The nearer to adulthood the young person 
moves. the closer he ought to be to sharing the teacher's perspective 
in the practices in which both engage. 
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The methods of learning which Dewey advocates centre on a 
process model of scientific inquiry rooted in problem solving leading 
to research, hypothesis formation, testing the hypothesis and so on. 
The chi Id is seen as the centre of the process of learning, as an 
active participant rather than as a passive recipient of a teacher's 
restatement of other conclusions or results. Dewey does not adhere 
solely to this scientific model (as indicated below) but he does 
seek to change the emphasis from the use of rote learning and drill 
in early twentieth century American schools to more Intelligent, 
thinking and active participation in class practices. He wants to 
break from sole dependence upon, " ••• intellectual models and ideals 
that arose centuries before scientific method was developed. 1I17 No 
problem-solver can be intellectually passive! 
Critics of Child-centred education may agree with Dewey in 
his condemnation of a too rigid reliance upon an instructional model 
of teaching children. Such a model is inflexible and inappropriate 
if it is the sole method of teaching employed. And, as indicated 
above, Dewey also condemns lack of teacher direction in c l a s s ~ ~
practices and he regards this as an abuse of child-centred education. 
Dearden expresses scepticism about aims of child-centredness 
aside from its methods which are so closely related to those aims 
which he terms, " ••• relational rather than prescripti ve of content 
to be learned."18 He groups relational alms under: (i) intrinsic 
interest, (i1) self-expression, and, (Hi) autonomy and considers 
t/l!se aims to be livery important II. However, he has reservations 
because, " ••• such relational, or attitudinal, alms leave undeclared 
the di rections in which they will be pursued. 1119 
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A significant consideration In the development and exerc1se of 
personal autonomy (argued in Chapters 3 and 4) is that of the development 
of appropriate dispositions in the young informing the nature of 
personhood within the concept of personal autonomy; these d1spos1tlons 
sit well with the relational, or attitudinal aims of child-centredness 
referred to by Dearden. But Dearden is also concerned about a lack 
of direction within relational aims for he cons1ders essential a 
curricular framework through which, for example. an intellectual 
education (revealing the forms of understanding described by Hirst) 
may be realised by pupil l e a r n e r ~ . . Therefore, although a child-
centred process of learning expressing relational aims is suitable, 
in Dearden' s view, for the lIyoungest children ll , for older primary 
school pupils and secondary school pupils it is less suitable. 
Breadth and balance of knowledge through the medium of forms of 
understanding is considered increasingly necessary to ach1eve the 
long-term aim of enabling the individual as he attains adulthood to 
be able to exercise rational autonomy which D e ~ r d e n n assumes has, 
somehow. developed through the individual's growing experience across 
the forms of understanding. 
However. Dearden's concern that child-centredness has aims which 
leave lIundeclared the directions ll of breadth in knowledge lead1ng 
to adult exercise of autonomy is partly met by Dewey's urgency to 
move the student's experience lIin the di rect10n of what the expert 
already knowsll. There is direction in chlld-centredness. 1n Dewey's 
account, apart from any reference to relat10nal aims. The teacher'S 
directing influence does not leave the child's learning as a random 
enterprise. Dewey (and, latterly, also the Plowden Report) refer to 
the school curriculum in terms of conyentional subject titles. And 
although Dewey is not prescriptiv! of curricular breadth, he has 
,tf"" 
367 
direction in view. A more prescriptive statement of what knowledge 
a curriculum should cover may be inappropriate because children differ 
markedly in their capacity to learn. Although teachers should want 
children to go as far as they can in learning within a curri.culum. 
children's intellectual development will vary and initiation into. 
for example, the forms of understanding described by Hirst, may 
provide little more guidance than to avoid undue specialisation 
in the curriculum. The minimum levels of thought and attainment 
may not be explicitly stated for all because whatever the stated 
minimum. some are most unlikely to attain it and some will far 
exceed it. 
Dearden's view that in child-centred education aims are 
relational and inadequate reference is made to the knowledge content 
of a suitable curriculum leads him to conclude that the Hirstian 
forms of understanding should be that content compri sing: II ••• an 
initiation, to whatever degree time and individual ability allow, 
into a selection of the main forms of knowledge or understanding 
which have historically developed. 1I20 But the content of the forms 
is, in Dearden's view, a means to the achievement of, at least, 
one of the relational aims which he regards as livery important" -
that of autonomy. However, this autonomy is the end of the process 
of initiation into the forms; Dearden holds that the forms are most 
significant in serving this long term aim which is the individual's 
ability to exercise autonomy as an adult when his formal education 
is completed. The development of autonomy is to be distinguished 
from its exercise, in his opinion, when it is held as an educational 
aim. Autonomy is distanced from day to day educational practice, 
therefore, and becomes a very slippery, dimly discernable long term 
aim with the result that Dewey's reservations about long term aims 
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in education seem borne out by Dearden's difficulty in relating 
the means (forms of understanding) to the end (autonomy) in the 
educational process. Dearden accepts the difficulty of pinning down 
autonomy's development and pOints out that it is like happiness: 
" ••• that you do not achieve it by making it your primary objective. 
A decentred concern for appropriate standards would be the primary 
pOint. But the collateral effect on the person himself would be 
no less important for being indirect ... 21 Even if this assertion 
of Dearden's is correct, the development of autonomy by the means 
Dearden advocates(and the maintenance of it as a meaningful 
educational aim)seems to raise a major difficulty because it evidently, 
on this account, cannot influence educational practice to the direct 
end of achieving it. Is it certain, or even likely, that one who 
successfully acquires knowledge and understanding within the forms 
will be autonomous at some, much later point in time? Limits of 
time, individual abilities and aptitudes are sure to influence 
initiation into learning within the forms and although proceeding 
some considerable way into the forms and fields of knowledge may 
increase the likelihood of an individual's potential for autonomy 
since he should be more informed in the choices he makes, there can 
be no surety. Knowledge and autonomy's development may be related, 
but Dearden cannot say just how. 
. 
In order to develop autonomy directly it seems more likely that 
it should be a short term aim infusing and influencing pract1ce 
in day to day activities in classrooms. To accept the distancing 
of autonomy from its means of development (suggested by Dearden to 
be learning within the forms of understanding) seems a very 
doubtful procedure. The exercise (within limits) of some measure of 
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autonomy by pupils in schools seems the only sure way to both its 
development and its exercise in a fuller form later by the adult. 
Both Dewey and Dearden would agree that knowledge is of major 
importance to the individual as its acquisition is an initiation 
into the culture of the individual's SOCiety, " ••• a selection from 
that culture made according to the best judgments available ought 
surely to complement child-centred 'relational' aims. We might even 
say that the latter can be realized only through the former. 1I22 
Dewey, while agreeing on the need to initiate the child into his 
society's culture, might, I venture to suggest, hold that the 
connection between knowledge and the relational aim of autonomy 
should be closer than Dearden advocates because if autonomy 1s an 
aim distanced from its means of achievement (which Dearden takes 
to be an intellectual education involving forms of understanding) 
it may not develop at all. Autonomy requires expression within the 
educational means if it is to be made a real aim of education. The 
learner's direct engagement in practices within education, as 
described in the previous two chapters, may be one way to realise 
autonomy both as a short and long term aim in education. 
(2) Process and content in learning practices 
Dearden takes from Plowden the key axiom of a Child-centred view 
of education to be, "start from the child": 
"Rather than starting from the convenience of the adult 
world, or from logically ordered subject reQuirements,or 
from the future needs of society (or indeed of the child), 
we should 'start from the child'." 23 
The alternatives to starting from the child offered here seem 
inappropriate whatever process of learning is envisaged. The 
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"convenience of the adult world" is likely only to have meaning for 
a child whose understanding of the adult world is sufficient for 
the acquisition of such meaning and, therefore, the age of the child 
or young person is critically important in ensuring his experience 
approximates to that of adults. "Logically ordered subject 
requirements" may also prove an inappropriate starting point if 
adopted without respect to a child's abilities or aptitudes. "The 
future needs of society" or of the indi vidual are also likely to be 
very difficult or impossible to define in a world of rapid change. 
However, to start form recognition of the child as an individual 
person, although young, immature, uninformed, lacking critical 
capacities, downright naughty at times - yet Quite individual and 
different from all other individuals - has perhaps to be the key 
claim in a democratic society prizing the individual. But it is 
only the starting point; the journey which follows is long and may 
be hazardous. Much knowledge, understanding and skills will be 
required if the journey is to be a rewarding experience resu 1 ting 
in adult autonomy. To "start from the child" as a maxim does not 
supply the route to be followed because one of the few certainties 
in the Situation is that childhood is transient and the starting 
point rapidly vanishes from view as parents and teachers are doubtless 
well aware. And to embark upon a long journey across unfamiliar 
" terrain without guide, knowledge or skills 1s less than prudent! 
After the "start", Plowden considers that. " ••• the child is 
the agent of his own learning ... 24 Unless a chUd act1 vely lends his 
mind to the acquisition of knowledge to reach understanding he is 
unlikely to learn since teaching may be undertaken but a pupil may 
not learn what the teacher intends. 25 The child will, thus. remain 
the agent of his own learning whatever methods of teaching are 
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operative. Plowden considers that the child ought not to be 
regarded as a means to some external end. but as an agent he should 
control his learning and exercise some measure of personal autonomy. 
The Plowden Report provides a very different perspective of the 
process of learning in a child-centred tradition from that of Dewey 
who. as indicated above. has little regard for a progressivism 
which left the child to learn with little or no adult guldance.Froebel 
is more the inspiration for Plowden's much used phrases which 
circumscribe the teacher's role. IlSet lessons" are, generally, to 
be aVOided. the IIright environment" is to be selected, enquiry should 
lead to "useful discovery". the teacher should "lead from behind" 
and "collaborate with children". The teacher is to teach by example 
and. II ••• support apathetic children until they gain a momentum of 
their own. They must challenge and inspire children who are too 
readily satisfied. 1I26 He is. further. expected to be. " ••• a good 
man and to influence chi ldren more by what he is than by what he 
knows or by his methods.,,27 
The Froebel ideal is al i ve in the Plowden Report and the ch1ld 
is expected to grow in harmony with coherent, natural laws so like 
the seed corn. a kernal. his life will unfold spontaneously according 
to natural growth for wi thin the child Is. II ••• the whole man and the 
whole life of humanlty.1I28 Froebel is concerned to release the 
individual child to natural growth and deprecates adult interventions: 
"We gi ve room and time to young plants and animals, well 
knowing that then they will develop and grow according 
to the laws inherent in them. We do not interfere 
because we know that this would disturb their healthy 
development. But the young child Is treated as wax or 
clay which can be moulded into any form." 29 
The child should guide the educator who must start from him alone 
because. liThe chi Id sees very clearly whether the biddings of teacher 
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or parent are personal and arbitrary, or are the expressions of 
necessary and universal law. In this neither child, boy, nor youth 
easily errs. ,,30 
It may be that young children are perceptive, particularly with 
respect to adults they know well and they may have a well attuned 
moral sense of fairness from an early age. for example. But the 
natural sense which Froebel attributes to children, their natural 
growth, their essential goodness must be. empirically, doubtful 
as a universal claim for children. Children live in a social world 
(as Dewey is well aware) and Froebe I' s natural imagery of trees 
and plants is an uneasy parallel to situations of human interaction 
for even in the kindergarten, where Froebel's picture of the child 
may have greatest clarity, an adult referee may need to rule on 
children's selfish impulses. The law of nature for man and animals 
can be llred in tooth and claw" showing a very di fferent face from 
the tradition of romanticism out of which Froebel's view of the 
child seems to be drawn. 
The child, in Froebel's view. is virtually infallible, and he 
should determine the nature of school act.tvi ties because, " ••• a clear 
realization of the true nature of the school makes it evident that 
the subject in which a boy needs instruction is also that about 
which he should receive instruction. Otherwise, instruction and 
learning is an idle game incapable of entering into the spiritual 
life. ,,31 The child's felt needs seem to determine school activities, 
therefore. 
However, even Froebel assigns a role to parents and teachers 
as initiators of learning which appears to limit the determining 
force of the child's felt needs for: liThe first and most important 
point in the education of chi Idren is to lead them early to think. 1132 
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The adult should encourage the child to be active In his learning. 
to think for himself and not to be only an accepter of adult 
conclusions. Froebel describes the learning situation thus: 
"A child finds a piece of chalk or rubble. He tries its 
nature by rubbing it on a board. and finds that it makes 
coloured marks. Delighted with this new discovery. he 
soon covers the whole surface of the board. Soon his 
delight extends from the colour to the shapes of the 
lines he has made - straight. winding and curved. Attention 
to these leads him to notice the outlines of surrounding 
objects. The head is seen as a circle; then a Circular 
line is drawn to represent the head. and a lengthened 
circle joined on to it to represent the body; anns and 
legs are seen as lines. straight or broken. and by 
such lines are represented ••• "33 
In this example. the child's interest is taken up by the teacher 
who leads the child on towards new perspectives. It is the teacher 
(although unnamed) who draws the ch1ld's "attention" to the nature 
of lines and enables the child to perceive the meaningful Shapes 
from these lines. This activity may. presumably. extend as long 
as the child's interest lasts and may, then, be contrasted with 
enforced instruction to the child by the adult. 
However. even with very young ch1ldren to whom Froebel 
refers in the above quotation. it may well be necessary for the 
teacher to intervene actively in the operation of a child's personal 
interests to ensure that he or she becomes habituated into the 
appropriate dispositions to act in moral and socially acceptable 
ways. The child will need to acquire such dispositions before his 
reasoning powers have greatly matured; teacher and parent must. 
therefore. habituate the child into cultivation of these diSPOSitions. 
(The supporting argument for the inculcation of good habits and 
appropriate dispositions is put. chiefly, in chapters 3 and 4.) 
Furthermore. the limits upon the ch1ld' s exerc i se of hi s 
felt needs and interests are very considerable 1n the process of 
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learning; regulatory, custodial and disciplinary constraints in 
learning are considered in Chapter 5. Within formal learning 
situations, particularly, authority must limit the personal interests 
of the child because what he learns will largely be rule-governed: 
" .•• to participate in rule-governed activities is, in 
a certain way, to accept authority. For to partiCipate 
in such an activity is to accept that there is a r i ~ h t t
and wrong war of doing things, and the decision as 0 
what IS rlgh and wrong In a gIven case can never 
depend completely on one's own caprice. II 34 
language, for example, is a rule-governed activity and unilateral 
change in the rules is likely to lead only to chaos. Therefore, 
" ••• A relation of authority ••. is an indirect relation between x 
and y involving as an intermediary the established way of performing 
the activity on which x and y are engaged. 1135 Thus, to some extent, 
the relationship of teacher to pupil ts mediated by the authority 
of the rules inherent in the activity; this situation also enables 
the teacher to learn within the activity as well as the pupil if the 
acti vi ty of learning develops sufficient intellectual scope. The 
child cannot exercise control, or even a measure of limited autonomy, 
in the learning activity without the acquisition of some awareness 
of the rules implicit in the activity. And to accept the authority 
of the rules in rule-governed activities is a prerequisite In 
enabling the person to exercise choice; he must enter, in some measure. 
into that knowledge and understanding and into those "roodes of social 
Ii fe" (as Winch describes them) so that he achieves a posi tion to 
exercise choice because, "A child is obviously not In a position 
to choose to do this or that until he has learned ~ t o o do this or 
that. ,,36 
A great deal of the knowledge acquired by children is likely to be 
acquired on the basis of testimony. Such knowledge is acquired from 
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other persons. particularly teachers and parents, as beliefs and 
as a child learns a language he identifies thesounds emitted by 
others as meaningful and accepts them as true. Later, as the child 
develops and gains a greater awareness of the rules of evidence, 
one is. II ••• in a position to achieve a measure of cognitive autonomy 
by using these acquisitions to criticise the authorities who present 
me with beliefs for acceptance.,,37 However, this skill of criticism 
is a sophisticated one and a great deal of knowledge must, for the 
young, be accepted on trust or it is just not accessible at all and 
by teacher guidance, a child may expand his learning horizons and 
gain greater opportunity to exercise autonomy himself. When an 
individual's critical powers develop as he gains experience, autonomy 
becomes possible: 
IICognitive autonomy is achieved when the capacity for 
the criticism of authorities and of personally-formed 
beliefs ••• has become an operative skill. Although 
the basic instruments of criticism are in fact causally 
dependent upon authority, since we do not invent our 
observation - language and logic for ourselves, they 
are not dependent for their acceptability on the 
particular credentials of the source from which they are 
acquired. Thus cognitive autonomy is genuine, despite 
an appearance of circularity." 38 
Within a system of communication, in Quinton's view above, the 
individual can still attain cognitive autonomy. And for the child 
or young person, growing critical powers enable him to test and 
assess those authorities to which he turns for knowledge. 
Nevertheless, at first, the young person is highly dependent 
upon the adults about him and must simply accept their authority 
and guidance because he lacks any alternative. As he develops 
in experience he may come to perceive the source of his beliefs in 
others and develop a critical faculty with which to judge those whom 
he has accepted hitherto as authorities. 
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The teacher's function in the development of the individual's 
critical powers with which to aSSeSs authorities 1s of particular 
importance as Dewey is well aware. As the person in day to day 
communication with the child or young person and having authority 
as described in Chapter 4. the teacher. in particular, can enhance 
the individual's potential for autonomy by encouraging a considered 
criticism towards the content of learning. Dewey's concern to base 
education upon personal experience does not remove the influence 
of the teacher and. indeed. increases the effect. because, " ••• basing 
education upon personal experience may mean more multiplied and more 
intimate contacts between the mature and immature ••• and consequently 
more rather than less guidance ••• "39 But within this sphere of 
teacher guidance. the teacher should regard the child's development 
as a critical, autonomous thinker as of great importance to his 
intellectual progress because without active encouragement from 
the one in authori ty there seems Ii ttle reason why cri ti ca I thought 
should develop. Recent concern is expressed by H.M. Inspectorate 
that in primary schools children were not. " ••• learning to follow 
a sustained discussion and contribute appropriately and in fewer 
still were the children taught to follow the line of an argument. 1140 
the relative absence of such situations reduces the opportunities 
for critical thinking in chIldren. Favourable pupil-teacher ratios 
may be considered essential for such activities and a teacher may 
choose to avoid situations in which pupils are encouraged to think 
critically. " ••• out of his fear. for example, that he may be unable 
to cope with a class in which the critical spirit has been aroused."41 
A disposition embracing a critical frame of mind. is essential 
if authority is to be regarded as rational. The give and take 
of critical discussion is a significant aid to the development of 
critical faculties in the young: 
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liThe educator's problem is to break down the tendency 
to suppose that what is established by authority 
must be either accepted in toto or else merely 
evaded - a tendency to whlch, very probably, the 
child's early training will have inclined him. Once 
the teacher has done that, once he has aroused 
a critical attitude to ~ ~ authority, he has made 
a major step forward. II ~ ~
The capacity to consider authority and its accompanying rules, 
critically, reflectively and independently is to be achieved, In 
Passmore's view, by Dewey's approach to classroom activities which 
involve the substitution of problems and problem-solving for other 
activities. If problem situations are presented to pupils for 
resolution and it is unclear which rule to apply, more is required 
of the pupil learner than if he is only required to practise the 
application of a particular rule known in advance. Problems may 
be either those to which the teacher knows the answer but the pupil 
does not and those to which neither pupil nor teacher know the 
answer: "But the teacher should certainly place emphasis, as far 
as he can, on problems to which the answer is not known, or is a 
matter of controversy - only in that way can he prepare his pupils 
for the future. 1143 
The ability to think critically has close affinity to the use 
of imagination. But imagination should not be mere fantasy; it 
requires care, precision and judgement. However, a disciplined use 
of the imagination is argued by Passmore to be complementary to 
critical thought in problem solving and he condemns those who, 
" ... have condemned application, conscientiousness, carefulness, 
as obstacles to imaginativeness whereas in fact they are 
characteristics of which the imaginative person has particular need 
if he is not to collapse into fantasy."44 
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Critical imaginativeness should characterise the learner's 
activity but such a process can only operate upon problems 
confronting the learner. Critical thinking cannot operate in an 
intellectual vacuum but could be applied to those worthwhile 
practices in education considered in Chapters 7 and 8. The learner must 
actively engage in those practices using his critical imagination 
in searching for solutions or partial solutions to the issues 
confronting him. Knowledge and understanding result from that 
critical engagement in practices. 
Dearden presents a classic literary example of the elimination 
of critical imagination from learning in a quotation from 
Charles Dickens's, Hard Times, in'which Thomas Gradgrind takes 
great care that the 'education' provided in his school meets his 
demand for knowledge of "fact". A government off1cer (Dearden says 
Gradgrind) delivers the following statement: 
'" You are to be in all things regulated and governed', 
said the gentleman, 'by fact. We hope to have. 
before long, a board of fact, composed of 
commissioners of fact, who will force the people 
to be a people of fact, and of nothing but fact. 
You must discard the word Fancy altogether." 45 
But without critical imagination to play upon the "facts" and. 
therefore. without direct personal engagement in a practice 
encompassing particular factual knowledge, the "facts" in question 
would lack coherence and meaning. 46 Factual knowledge has little 
value in isolation from its practical use by the learner actively 
engaged in educational practices. 
However. Bantock seems to echo the DickenSian preoccupation 
with factual knowledge for its own sake: 
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II I fail to see how anyone could appreciate the 
idea that the 'facts of history' are only a selection 
made and interpreted etc. - in so far as they are - who 
has not already acquired a considerable number of such 
facts.1I 47 
But to engage in the practice of history, although it clearly 
requires selection, organisation and understanding of factual 
evidence, does not necessarily require an amassing of facts in 
general. It is just such an approach to curriculum in schools 
which has led to 'clutter' in syllabuses - those facts which are 
not imperative to an understanding of the practice in question. 
In Dilemmas of the Curriculum, Bantock condemns child-centredness 
for its approach to curriculum content which he describes as 
incoherent, a "magpie" collection of "bits and pieces" since it 
lacks the coherence which only the discip1i.nes can supply. But hi s 
advocacy of the acquisition of masses of historical facts seems 
equally haphazard and likely to be meaningless to the learner. He 
writes, further, of learning between the ages of five and ten. 
" ••• chunks of the Bible, gobbets of Shakespeare. fifty spelling 
words a week, the names of the kings and queens of England and 
the chief battles, the names of country towns. chief manufactures, 
capes, bays, isthmuses. rivers - sometimes in blank incomprehension."48 
Although Bantock accepts the unreality and m e a n i n g l e s ~ s s s of this 
rote learning removed as it is from understanding of the educational 
practice involved, he still maintains that this experience made him 
aware that the world in its many physical and cultural dimensions 
was an entity apart from himself. But. if such awareness should 
be acquired, the process of Bantock's learning seems singularly 
discouraging and ineffective in conveying such a message. Had the 
facts been acquired from the engagement of the individual In 
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actually practising the modes of those practices in question, 
meaning, coherence and inter-relatedness may be the more likely 
outcomes. 
Dewey offers a more appropriate perspective on factual 
knowledge within a curriculum in relation to the individual 
learner who remains central to the practices of the educational 
process. His experience is enlarged by his direct involvement 
in practices which the teacher establishes around the learner in 
an intellectual environment. The teacher understands that there 1s. 
" ••. a culture to be perpetuated ••• " and, as a teacher, he is 
able to, " ••• perceive the meaning of the seeming impulsive and 
aimless reactions of the young, and to provide the stimuli needed 
to di rect them so that they will amount to something ••• "49 However, 
it is essential for the teacher to realise that the student is 
unfamiliar with the practice in question; meaningless rote learning 
of capes and bays removed from the context of the practice is 
pointless. Knowledge, subject-matter, is necessary, but, "Failure 
to bear in mind the different subject matter from the respective 
standpOints of teacher and student is responsible for most of 
the mistakes made in the use of texts and other expressions of 
pre-existent knowledge".50 Dewey wants to spare young learners 
from a "gradgrind preoccupation with 'facts''', from, "wire-drawn 
distinctions and ill-understood rules and principles ", from knowledge 
which is no more than, "mere words" divorced from practice and 
experience. The teacher's attention should focus upon. " ••• the 
attitude and response of the pupil. To understand the latter 1n 
its interplay with subject-matter is his taSK. while the pupil's 
mind, naturally, should be not on itself but on the topic in hand."S1 
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The nature of learning is not then left to a "magpie" 
curriculum; its content is those valuable practices linked, at 
least in part, to the cultural inheritance of society and Dewey 
strongly endorses organised curricula: 
"Organised subject-matter represents the ripe fruitage 
of experiences like theirs (children'S). experiences 
involving the same world, and powers and needs similar 
to theirs. It does not represent perfection or 
infallible wisdom; but it is the best at command to 
further new experiences which may ••• surpass the 
achievements embodied in existing knowledge ~ n d d
works of art. II 52 
And those Who follow in the Dewey tradition of child-centredness 
echo his concern for meaningful, prescribed content in a curriculum: 
"Adults and chi ldren ••• can associate well only in 
worthy interests and pursuits,and through a community 
of subject-matter and engagement which extends beyond 
the circle of their intimacy. 
The attitude of deprecating subject-matter, and of 
deprecating curriculum as a guide to the providing 
of worthy subject-matter, reflects therefore the 
half-truth badly used." 53 
(3) Autonomy in the classroom 
Peters doubts that Dewey's 'model' of technological problem. 
solving man is adequate as an educational ideal. 54 And Peters points 
out, among other reservations, that Dewey nowhere emphasises the 
ideals of authenticity and autonomy which are ideals associated with 
the individual rather than the culture of a whole society which is 
more Dewey's priority. Peters may well be correct in this 
judgement of Dewey's emphasiS in his literary work in general. 
But the process of learning which Dewey advocates (and which 
continues in the examples presented below) is, itself, an 
instantiation of autonomy in learning within the school classroom. 
/ 
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It is applied to the subject-matter of curriculum knowledge, as 
indicated above, but the process of learning requires an exercise 
of autonomous thought engaging the practices of education. 
Essentially, use of methods of teaching and learning in practices 
within education not only convey a cultural heritage to the young 
but provide for the instantiation of autonomy by its exercise by 
learners in those practices. 
The practices and perspectives which are considened below are 
a realisation of autonomy and have their philosophical origins 
in Dewey and, latterly, Hawkins who emphasises the importance of 
curriculum content alongside that of autonomy, referring to: 
" .•• the necessary transmission of cuI ture from one generation to 
the next; the other is the human causality of self-direction and 
of choice ."55 Methods of teaching and learning are crucial in 
problem solving by providing opportunity for self-directed learning 
which ought to be afforded the learner and Hawkins argues that 
it is indefensible that. 
" ••• self-directed inquiry can be suspended for n 
years until a child has been 'properlyequipped'1ror 
it by other-directed routines of 'teaching' and then, 
somehow, switched on." 56 
This is not to say that all learning should be problem-oriented, 
but that which is should stimulate autonomy in the learner. 
Comparatively little is known from empirical research how 
autonomy can be actively. fostered in children because a strict 
or authoritarian regime rather than a 1 iberal one may foster 
an autonomous disposition. However, lack of evidence 1s no 
argument in favour of adopting an authoritarian style in class 
activities. It may be that models of teaching which are offered 
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in official publications unwittingly mislead more than Infonm; 
for example, the significance H.M.I. attach to their description 
of primary school teachers (in the 1978 Primary Survey) describing 
a continuum 'didactic' to 'exploratory' in style is questionable 
and it may be that, 
"A more fundamental dimension to this relationship 
is not so much the degree to which the students 
are left to find their own solutions, but the extent 
to which they exert a control over their work, the 
nature of the teacher's collaboration in this, and 
the ways in which the student influences this 
collaboration." 57 
The control which the student e ~ e r t s s over hi s work enables him to 
realise autonomy in his learning. Autonomy Is thus instantiated 
in the student's practice. But not all learning activities will 
give a high level of control to the student; formal instruction 
will be required in some measure; different activities will call 
for different responses and opportunity for control of the learning 
and the learning outcome from the student. The teacher's authority· 
as expert is more than ever necessary when the student proceeds 
some way with a learning activity under his own control and there 
should remain the, " ••• adult feed-back loop ..• the authority of 
the teacher who can meet an individual child on his own ground and 
invest it for him with the promise of growth. IIS8 
The teacher, in order to enhance an autonomous disposition 
in his students, must not stand between the student and the 
educational practice involved. He must help the learner to engage 
in the practice at whatever level is appropriate so that the 
learner gains experience of the rules implicit in educational 
practices. The teacher ,should not superimpose his adult perspective 
upon the child without the child's engaging in that particular 
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practice because the opportunity for autonomy would then be lost. 
The learner must exercise his critical and imaginative powers 1n 
the practice itself so that he gains at first hand an organisation 
of his experience and its extension from within the particular 
practice with which he is engaged. And a major aim of educational 
activity is, II ••• to lay such groundwork as will offer. through 
planning of environment and the strategy of teaching, the maximum 
informational match with evolved conceptual structures in the 
sciences, with the ways of the arts. with the logical schemata of 
historians and mathematicians ••• 1159 The danger of the adul t who 
externally superimposes his perspectives upon the child is that the 
real nature of the practice in question 1s obscured: 
liThe elementary abstractions - of discreteness and form 
in mathematics, of time and relation in history, 
of organisation in the arts - are taken for granted 1n 
those traditions by adults who have lost the pathways 
of their own leaming ••• 11 60 
That children do learn from a wide breadth of knowledge and 
attain understanding enables them to exercise chOice and make 
decisions which are increasingly informed, in learning practices. 
As choice becomes informed, the child develops, in Hawkins's phrase, 
an lIinformed vision ll and a growing potential to exerci se autonomy. 
And if the means of developing autonomy in the young are connected 
with an expansion of the individual's knowledge and understanding, 
it seems indefensible not to ensure increasing exercise of autonomy 
as the individual develops both intellectually and in other ways. 
To assume that personal autonomy will follow in the subsequent adult 
life of the child and young person who may always have been denied 
exercise of autonomy in learning practices during his years of formal 
education seems to lack credibility: 
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lilt is supposed, rather, that self-organisation will 
appear magically after years of schooling subordinated 
to a quite different principle, according to which 
children are deprived of autonomy. They are deprived 
in the interest of what is conceived to be an 
efficient imparting of infonnation and guidance, 
During all this time, and in the interest of such 
efficiency, children are essentially deprived of 
any signiificant exercise of autonomy in choice, 
discrimination, and judgment ," 61 
The limits to the exercise of personal autonomy by children and 
young persons are conSiderable, as indicated in many places in 
this thesis. A child's knowledge. understanding and experience 
expand gradually; his dispositions are not formed overnight. but 
if little recognition is taken of his centrality in learning 
practices. it may be that the opportunity to enhance his learning 
and experience is impeded and his development in personal autonomy 
unnecessarily delayed by lack of opportunity to exercise that a u t o ~ o m y . .
The methods adopted for children's learning ought. then. to include 
problem-solving activities as part of educational practices which 
require critical, imaginative thought from the learner when engaged 
in the practice itself. 
Rowland's description of a research approach in the classroom 
, 
gives some idea of the possibility of engaging children in the 
exercise of an intellectual measure of autonomy in a learning 
practice. 62 One example outlines the activity of a teacher and two 
boys of about twelve years of age who are introduced by the teacher 
to the rule for the Fibonacci series (Note 63). This example of 
pupils engaged in this learning practice (given by Rowland) inVOlves 
a close interaction of a teacher exploring a problem in learning 
with two pupils. The teacher becomes a "collaborator" in the learning 
process in which the pupils require carefully judged teacher 
interventions and initiatives. However. as the pupils become 
386 
increasingly involved in the educational practice, they exercise 
increasing control in the activity and demonstrate initiative, 
independence and a measure of intellectual autonomy. 
Many circumstances limit the autonomy of the pupils in this 
example. The teacher chooses a subject with mathematical content 
appropriate to the pupils; he suggests all initial phases and 
directions in the work undertaken; he intervenes and helps as the 
work evolves. Both pupils already have a good measure of 
mathematical skill and the considerable advantage of one-to-one 
interaction with the teacher when required. The assessment of ~ h e i r r
work will probably present difficulties eventually. 
Nevertheless, this example 1s of an educational practice (1n 
a form of understanding) and the pupils, with teacher aSSistance, 
do achieve understanding and gain a measure of autonomy in their 
engagement in this educational practice. They approach the open-
ended problem imaginatively and thoughtfully and, on Rowland's 
account, do seem to gain. at least intellectually, from the experience. 
The wide-spread application of such methods would probably require 
resourcing beyond what is the current norm in maintained schools 
by way of teacher training for the development of suitable teacher 
skills and attitudes, pupil-teacher ratios and material support 1n 
general. However, if autonomy is held to be a major aim of educational 
activities. it should be worth the price. 
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